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Abstract 
 
The purpose of this thesis is to extend existing knowledge in interfirm knowledge transfer 
research and provide a rich description of the dynamic knowledge transfer process in 
alliance arrangements. An exploratory case study methodology is employed, and one 
international joint venture (IJV) project is investigated. The empirical evidence was 
derived from the researcher‟s involvement with one auto IJV – Shanghai GM, an IJV 
formed between Shanghai Automotive Industry Corporation (SAIC) from P.R. China and 
General Motors (GM) from the United States. Data collection was conducted through 
primary and secondary sources including fieldwork interviews with Chinese and 
American executives respectively in the IJV, selected published sources as well as 
government officials, and consultants who were directly or indirectly involved with the 
case companies.  
Using CATPAC software as an analytical tool for textual analysis of the collected 
data, the following findings emerged. First, partner firms in Shanghai-GM reinforce the 
development of international cooperation as a means of increasing knowledge exchange 
and adaptation, such as enlarging the product ranges, and developing new car models. 
Second, partner firms are motivated to increase their knowledge transfer activities to 
increase competitive advantage levels to match or exceed those of other competitors. 
Both partner companies initially contributed differentiated sets of idiosyncratic and 
nonsubstitutable resources that are distinctively under the control of each partner. The 
Chinese side brings in locally embedded resources and country-specific knowledge. The 
foreign side contributes technology, managerial abilities, brand image, and financial 
resources. There is thus an asymmetrical relationship between the objectives of partners 
and the resources brought into the alliance: each partner firm tries to gain access to what 
the other puts into the joint venture. Third, relevant important preconditions and 
situational factors regarding knowledge transfer effectiveness in alliance context are also 
mentioned. Certain elements are identified as a critical barrier during the process. Fourth, 
IJV knowledge transfer actually occurred over a longitudinal period involving intensive 
interactions between the partners. Different types of knowledge were transferred over 
time starting with key technologies, management skills, followed by the tacit social and 
cultural knowledge. As time passed, both partner firms demonstrated effort and 
commitment in facilitating interfirm knowledge transfer practices. The IJV knowledge 
transfer performance finally influenced the nature of the interfirm partnership.  
This thesis provides a unique example which looks at the two-way learning 
processes for true knowledge creation and sharing in a cross-border collaborative 
organisation, demonstrating the performance of partner organisations in the process of 
IJV knowledge transfer. Based on literature reflections, tangible facts and interpretations, 
this thesis provides a deeper understanding of the organisational activities involving 
cooperation and the dynamic knowledge transfer routines, which is a significant 
extension of past static cross-sectional conceptualisations. This thesis also proposes an 
interfirm knowledge transfer and cooperative learning framework, which is emphasised 
that the issue of sharing knowledge in IJVs and bringing IJVs into profitability requires 
partner companies to engage in interpartner learning and to be able to benefit from the 
transfer of knowledge. A key implication for the firm, therefore, is the critical ability to 
deal effectively and efficiently with the transfer of knowledge resources and in so doing 
to gain a competitive advantage. 
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Chapter 1   Introduction and Overview 
 
1.1 Introduction 
With the emergence of the knowledge economy, knowledge is rapidly being 
recognised as a critical resource. In many firms, knowledge is now considered to 
be as important as strategic capital and critical assets (Nonaka, 1994). Such assets 
can ever become useful in accordance with an organisation‟s strategic goals 
(Davidson & Voss, 2002). It should be clear that organisations will increasingly 
rely on knowledge for survival and competitive advantage, and that knowledge 
development provides the key tool for achieving this end. In this regard, initiating 
a knowledge transfer strategy is all about achieving competitive advantage, and 
knowledge transfer is very much about organisational performance (Boisot, 1995; 
Ding, Akoorie, & Pavlovich, 2009a, 2009b).  
Under the pressures and stimulus of seeking new knowledge resources, 
including technology and managerial techniques, business firms are likely to be 
working together to jointly accumulate complementary knowledge resources 
(Hyder & Abraha, 2003). Various researchers such as Bradley (1999) and Kotler 
(1997) also support the notion that competition is becoming fierce and complex 
both in the domestic and international markets which makes firms‟ operations 
more uncertain and risky; thus it could be impossible for a single firm to hold all 
of the required capabilities and knowledge to successfully pursue the targets of 
business. In addition, firms are also seeking to jointly develop new knowledge and 
find other new technological and managerial techniques to reduce the 
uncertainties and risks related to products or technological development. 
This chapter aims to present an overview in terms of interpartner knowledge 
transfer research. It begins by describing the origins of interorganisational 
knowledge transfer in alliances (in section 1.2). This description is followed by 
section 1.3 which outlines the research objectives and questions. The 
2 
  
methodology and specific research techniques are summarised in section 1.4. 
Research contributions of the study are mentioned in section 1.5. Section 1.6 
discusses research limitations. The structure of the thesis is explained in section 
1.7. 
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1.2 Rationale and Background of the Study 
Global competitiveness of a firm is largely a function of the pace, efficiency and 
extent of its knowledge accumulation (Easterby-Smith, Lyles, & Tsang, 2008; 
Yan & Luo, 2001). According to the resource/knowledge-based theory of the firm 
(RBT/KBT), knowledge has the greatest potential for providing sustainable 
competitive advantage (SCA) for the firm (Barney & Clark, 2007; Davenport & 
Prusak, 1998; Doz, Santos, & Williamson, 2001; Grant, 1996; Inkpen & 
Ramaswamy, 2006; Kogut & Zander, 1992; Kumar, Cyert, & Williams, 1993; 
Schulz, 2001). At the core of the theoretical argument is the idea that valuable, 
rare, and imperfectly imitable resources are the key to maintain SCA which brings 
about positive abnormal returns (Barney & Clark, 2007).  
However, few companies hold all of the necessary resources for obtaining 
positive abnormal returns in the current uncertain and complex markets (Schulz, 
2001), firms thus increasingly specialise in and co-ordinate their external 
knowledge resources (e.g., Ding et al., 2009a, 2009b; Easterby-Smith et al., 2008; 
Inkpen, 1998; Milgrom & Roberts, 1992; Spender & Grant, 1996; Teece, 1998; 
Yan & Luo, 2001). They also need to give more thought to various ways of 
accessing the necessary resources in order to survive – a trend that has become 
particularly strong as a result of globalisation over the past decade (Iles & Yolles, 
2002).  
Firms can gain access to knowledge resources by entering into 
interorganisational cooperative arrangements (Drucker, 1995; Hamel, Doz, & 
Prahalad, 1989; Milgrom & Roberts, 1992). The most well-known cooperative 
arrangements are strategic alliances and joint ventures. Akoorie and Scott-Kennel 
(2005) define a strategic alliance as “a cooperative contractual agreement between 
firms, which does not usually involve equity participation or ownership” (p. 245). 
In contrast, “a joint venture usually involves equity contributions by participants” 
(Akoorie & Scott-Kennel, 2005, p. 245-246).  In other words, a new company is 
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formed using resource contributions from both cooperating firms. While many 
authors do not classify these separately, the key point of differentiation is whether 
or not an equity (investment capital giving ownership rights) investment occurs, 
and whether or not a separate legal entity is formed
1
.  
Knowledge transfer and organisational learning are one of the important 
motives in interfirm cooperative arrangements, and the term “learning alliances” 
has been coined to designate associations in which the primary objective of the 
partner firm is to learn knowledge (Khanna, Gulati, & Nohria, 1998). In a learning 
alliance, the transfer and creation of new knowledge should be seen as central to 
the work of all parts of the business, not the exclusive province of a research and 
development department (Denton, 1998). The ability to take knowledge from 
other organisations or other parts of the organisation and learn from what they are 
doing is an important task.  
Yoshino and Rangan (1995) go so far as to argue that the implicit strategic 
objective for every firm that becomes involved in an alliance is “learning”. In 
other words, cooperative partners can become sources of knowledge with 
potential for utilisation elsewhere in the alliance; partner firms are dependent on 
the alliance for knowledge and other types of resources (Ding et al., 2009a, 
2009b). By collaborating with partners, the firm (either knowledge contributor or 
recipient firm) can build a spearhead at lower set-up cost and can reduce operating 
difficulties and costs, thereby increasing the chances of success. In addition, firms 
can realise synergies through resources combination, risk-spreading, and 
increased market power while adopting joint venturing (Harrigan, 1984).  
In particular, alliances established in transitional economies provide local 
partners with capital and critical know-how about manufacturing, technological 
expertise, marketing, and managing in a competitive marketplace (Griffith, 
                                               
1 Some scholars, for example Yan and Luo (2001), even argue a joint venture is often regarded as a specific 
form of strategic alliances. In order to avoid confusion in this thesis, therefore, the researcher has adopted the 
term „interfirm cooperative arrangements‟ to encompass the wide variety of alliance/JV phenomena. 
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Zeybek, & O‟Brien, 2001). Foreign partners can also access to new markets by 
leveraging their local partner‟s knowledge (Ding et al., 2009a, 2009b; Sharp & 
Barz, 1997), which may help reduce the risks. This situation is a shift from a 
single company‟s perspective to one where two or more companies share costs, 
risks and benefits, and access to new resources (Child & Faulkner, 1998).  
The possibility of using interorganisational cooperative arrangements for 
accessing knowledge has been frequently discussed in the business press and in 
the academic literature over the last three decades (Ding et al., 2009a, 2009b; 
Inkpen, 1995; Lyles, 1987; Lyles & Gudergan, 2006). While there is a 
considerable amount of research on the overall interorganisational cooperation 
and knowledge transfer phenomenon, our understanding regarding the knowledge 
transfer process through cooperative arrangements is still far from complete (Ding 
et al., 2009b; Easterby-Smith et al., 2008; Eunni, Kasuganti, & Kos, 2006; 
Steensma & Lyles, 2000). Inkpen and Pien (2006) acknowledge that “although 
alliances learning has been the subject of much theorising, it remains empirically 
under-researched, and there have been few attempts to examine the actual process 
of transferring knowledge resources via alliances” (p. 779). Faems, Janssens and 
Looy (2007) also state “previous studies provide limited insights into the 
dynamics of interfirm knowledge transfer” (p. 1702).  
Meanwhile, from the perspective of practical implications, although the 
benefits and importance of knowledge transfer in the alliances have long been 
realised, actions of knowledge transfer vary significantly in different alliances 
(Gupta & Govindarajan, 2000; Szulanski, 1996). Thus although there is nothing 
new about knowledge transfer per se, recognising it as a source of corporate 
success continues to challenge many organisations, and few companies realise the 
potential rewards of knowledge because they misunderstand what it is and what 
they need to learn from it (Buchel, Prange, Probst & Ruling, 1998).  
6 
  
The current research was initially inspired by the increased use of 
knowledge-driven cooperative strategies and their significance in the knowledge 
transfer process. The main purpose is to extend existing knowledge in the alliance 
learning area with respect to a particular industry setting – the Chinese automotive 
industry. The research seeks to describe, explain and illustrate a more detailed 
understanding of what, why and how learning takes place and knowledge is 
transferred.  
The thesis is conducted in the following way. First, it encompasses a broad 
literature review, which provides a theoretical basis and then assesses what is 
already known about knowledge-driven cooperative arrangements. It addresses 
the central question regarding the modes of knowledge transfer activities and key 
factors influencing knowledge transfer in alliances.  
Second, it presents methodological issues and research methods. The primary 
data collection procedures are carried out through a series of in-depth interviews 
in order to identify a variety of experiences and perspectives relevant to 
knowledge transfer issues and surrounding management decisions in the 
automotive industry in China.  
Third, this thesis describes the evolution and ongoing process of the case 
companies, and demonstrates how the two companies can make judicious use of 
the cooperative IJV form. The thesis seeks to identify sources of change-driven 
IJV reconfigurations and the prompted shifts in interpartner knowledge transfer 
practices. The background for this case is the consolidation of the automobile 
industry in China, and the need for complementary knowledge (resources) 
integration for new product development, managerial understanding and 
interorganisational competitive advantage.  
Fourth, in the pursuit of an understanding of common features and emerging 
themes, a process of textual analysis was then undertaken. This thesis presents the 
statistical results of the interview transcripts conducted for the study following the 
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CATPAC programme procedures, and thus explores many of the facets that create 
knowledge transfer tensions based on cooperative implementation. 
This thesis also analyses the implications of knowledge transfer and learning 
practices in the case of IJVs, in compliance with the relevant theoretical 
framework and research model. The refined model presented in this thesis 
incorporates context issues and relevant mechanisms of the knowledge transfer 
process as an expression of learning which may be useful for organisations and 
managers that want to engage in knowledge transfer.  
Based on current theoretical reflections, tangible facts, interpretations and 
experiences, this thesis concludes with the main findings of the study, its 
theoretical contributions, managerial implications, research limitations and areas 
for future research. The thesis regards alliances/IJVs as a category of 
organisations that provides a strong source for the construction of a model 
addressing the creation, sharing, and transferring of knowledge overall. This 
viewpoint sees the collaboration as a clear step to reduce risks of knowledge 
transfer by partner firms. This thesis typically suggests alliance partners need to 
improve their abilities and understanding to overcome partnership barriers which 
will have an impact on knowledge transfer outcomes.  
1.3 Research Objectives and Questions 
To address the research issues discussed above, drawing upon the insights 
provided by previous relevant studies and using IJVs as the research context, the 
research objectives are as follows: 
 To review the literature on strategic alliances/IJVs, interfirm knowledge 
transfer and organisational learning;  
 To provide in-depth case analysis regarding the process of knowledge 
transfer and learning; 
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 To examine possible influencing mechanisms on knowledge transfer in IJVs 
among partner firms and the IJV itself in order to improve future knowledge 
transfer strategies; 
 To assist in the building of a theoretical model to integrate some core 
concepts relevant to interpartner knowledge transfer and learning evolution. 
 
In light of the profile of research objectives, the research question of interest 
in this thesis is:  
How does an IJV (the Shanghai-GM) conduct knowledge transfer and 
cooperative learning in the Chinese automobile industry? 
 
Specifically, the researcher tries to explore the following research questions:  
RQ1: What are the main motives in forming IJVs in China for partnering firms?  
1a: Do the motives relate to knowledge transfer consideration and if so, how? 
RQ2: How does knowledge transfer take place in IJVs on the part of partnering 
firms in connection with expectations and contributions of knowledge resources? 
2a: How do the partnering firms cope with knowledge transfer opportunities 
and constraints?  
RQ3: What are the relevant factors contributing to the overall knowledge transfer 
outcomes in IJVs?  
3a: What and how do partners learn the knowledge from their cooperative 
experiences and business operations in the Chinese automotive industrial 
market? Here identification, explanation and thorough description of the 
events critical to the alliance development are specifically focused upon. 
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1.4 Research Methodology 
Using empirical material gathered from the primary and secondary data collection, 
this thesis‟s research objectives required a research approach that would address 
the knowledge transfer issues in alliances/IJVs, and a qualitative-oriented 
approach and case study method were considered to be suitable and appropriate 
(Parkhe, 1993a; Yin, 1994).  
In this qualitative-oriented research, the in-depth case study method was 
employed to permit deep understanding of the key conceptual framework in 
knowledge transfer research. One of the methodological strengths of the case 
study method is that it accelerates rigorous theory development through the 
tracing of changes, which is evolutionary-stage appropriate, and is not limited to 
static assessments. This research followed the organisational learning research 
model as a research framework and also adopted semistructured interviewing 
procedures with executives in case companies for collecting empirical primary 
data. This method was complemented by archival secondary data to ensure the 
validity of the research. 
The IJVs in the Chinese automotive industry provided the context for pursuit 
of the research objectives. The case evidence drew on the researcher‟s 
involvement and research participation with, and selected published sources on an 
auto IJV in China between Shanghai Automotive Industry Corp. (SAIC) and 
General Motors (GM). Although the parent company of the IJV – GM – 
eventually went through bankruptcy protection on Monday June 1st, 2009, the 
PhD thesis preparation during the past 5 years still demonstrated that this interfirm 
knowledge transfer in IJV cases is still valid. The case study covers a range of 
country and operating conditions, and brings important practical elements into the 
discussion of interfirm cooperation, knowledge transfer, and learning issues for 
improving firm competitiveness.  
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1.5 Research Contributions 
This current research on the interorganisational knowledge transfer process is 
important in international business strategy research. This research seeks to make 
the following contributions to the existing literature. 
First, it adds a resource-based view to examine the interorganisational 
knowledge transfer and learning process in joint ventures in a number of ways. 
The knowledge transfer in an IJV is a step-by-step process; and several key 
factors play an important role in the knowledge transfer process. 
Second, the research suggests knowledge transfer and learning add value to 
the alliance activities, such as enhances responsiveness and/or problem-solving 
skills. Although not all business cooperations definitely provide same knowledge 
accessing opportunities, ineffective knowledge transfer will hinder the actual 
alliance performance.  
Third, since most previous studies on the transfer of knowledge in IJVs in 
China have revolved around factors influencing the transferability and 
applicability of Western practices in the Chinese context, the thesis contributes to 
the literature by shedding some light on an important, yet less often addressed, 
issue – the knowledge transfer process itself. 
1.6 Research Scope and Limitations 
Because of the research‟s purpose and its nature, the present study is an 
interpretative, qualitative case study. The present need is for an in-depth 
understanding of knowledge transfer in IJVs. One case sample was studied in 
depth in order to conduct intensive research, and an engagement with a specific 
IJV offers an important opportunity in this respect. The research findings are 
preliminary, and the research seeks to provide insights into, rather than general 
understanding of, the interorganisational knowledge transfer and learning issues. 
By taking a multidimensional perspective, this research on knowledge transfer is 
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still at the exploratory phase; however, the research framework is derived from a 
diligent and detailed literature review and relevant emerging themes. This 
research thus brings us one step further toward filling the empirical gaps in our 
knowledge about “IJV learning” in an emerging economy, and highlights the 
necessities of acquiring knowledge resources for companies involved in 
international business expansion. 
1.7 Structure of the Thesis 
The thesis contains nine chapters outlined as follows: 
Chapter 1 discusses the research background, and relevant research areas. 
This chapter thus provides a guideline for the whole study. The theoretical 
approach, adopted methodology and research contribution and scope are also 
mentioned in this chapter. 
Chapter 2 draws upon available literature to consider knowledge transfer 
and learning which are applied to the specific context of alliances/IJVs. This 
chapter considers the research progress on certain international business theories 
upon which this thesis has been based. Relevant influencing factors and phases 
are also discussed. This chapter finally identifies the research gaps existing in the 
literature.  
Chapter 3 presents a research model. The implications of this model are 
used to identify the categories and relationships regarding IJV knowledge transfer 
and learning issues. 
Chapter 4 presents the research design for the thesis including the arguments 
about methodological and research method issues. It emphasises that the research 
is primarily qualitative in nature and examines data collection procedures and data 
analytical techniques. 
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Chapter 5 traces the features and transformation stages of global automobile 
industry. Certain historical backgrounds and industrial situations in different 
countries regions are described in details. 
Chapter 6 evaluates the historical development path and the main contextual 
situations of the Chinese automotive industry, and here the general characteristics 
of Sino-foreign auto joint ventures are also reviewed. 
 Chapter 7 describes the backgrounds and motivations of the case 
companies, with relevant alliance development outlines and business operational 
situations. 
Chapter 8 presents the research results using CATPAC software analysis. 
This chapter also discusses the research findings and draws together the research 
model that has been derived from applying the research framework.  
Chapter 9 concludes the thesis by presenting the summaries of the findings, 
theoretical contributions, management implications, research limitations and 
future research directions.  
 
Chapter 2: Literature Review 
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Chapter 2   Literature Review  
 
2.1 Introduction 
As the thesis aims to examine interorganisational knowledge transfer in 
cooperative alliances, several major literature streams are reviewed in this 
chapter. The aim is not to give an exhaustive overview, but rather to highlight the 
theoretical foundation of this thesis. The main purpose is to extract suggestions 
and constructs from different perspectives in the literature that can be helpful in 
answering the research questions in the thesis. These literature reflections provide 
an overview on the growth of interorganisational knowledge transfer, by relying 
on alliances in the competitive and changing environment, to describe the 
research setting in which this thesis is positioned. This chapter also identifies the 
gaps in the existing literature when it comes to understanding the knowledge 
transfer phenomena in alliances. 
This chapter begins by clarifiying the concept of knowledge (in section 2.2) 
and knowledge transfer (in section 2.3) respectively; section 2.3.1 also 
demonstrates a simple form of knowledge transfer activities. Section 2.4 considers 
the conceptualisation of organisational learning (in section 2.4.1) and learning 
organisation (in section 2.4.2), and linkages between knowledge transfer and 
learning (in section 2.4.3). Section 2.5 emphasises the alliance context which is of 
the institutionalised knowledge-driven interorganisational cooperation form. 
Section 2.6 discusses the relevant theoretical explanations relating to alliance 
knowledge transfer. The stages of alliance knowledge transfer are shown in 
section 2.7. Relevant antecedent elements influencing knowledge transfer 
performance are then presented in section 2.8. The cross cultural consideration 
and the nature of equity-based alliance/IJVs are mentioned in section 2.9 and 2.10 
respectively. These considerations lead to knowledge transfer strategy recognition 
and facilitation in section 2.11. A metaanalytic review and summary of 
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knowledge transfer studies, including methods and results, are identified in 
section 2.12, leading to research gaps identification in section 2.12.1 and specific 
research questions (RQs) in section 2.12.2. Chapter conclusions are offered in 
section 2.13. 
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2.2 Knowledge: Types and Characteristics  
Knowledge has become a strategic asset, or, as Drucker (1993) puts it: 
“Knowledge is the only meaningful resource today” (p. 42). In most business 
situations, different areas of knowledge resources can be categorised into two 
types – explicit or implicit (Polanyi, 1958, 1966). Explicit knowledge (such as 
manuals and documents) is a part of human capital and can be acquired on the 
open market and bought according to need (Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995; Polanyi, 
1966). Explicit knowledge is often embedded in standardised procedures (Martin 
& Salomon, 2003) and, hence, can easily be written down and shared with others 
(Davidson & Voss, 2002; Nelson & Winter, 1982; Polanyi, 1966).  
The second type of knowledge – implicit or tacit knowledge (such as values 
and procedures) – is a different matter as it cannot necessarily be clearly 
articulated in words or symbols (Lyles & Gudergan, 2006). Tacit knowledge 
typically originates from the nonstandardised and context-specific processes. 
Knowledge supporting an organisational or operational process is normally tacit 
and is arguably more valuable (Yan & Luo, 2001). It can be passed on only by the 
active involvement of each player (Buchel et al., 1998). Jonscher (2000) talks 
about how much tacit knowledge is required simply to communicate with another 
person, “you can believe that a conversation between two people is an 
extraordinary phenomenon that has so far defied all attempts to capture it” (p. 
251). 
Companies normally possess knowledge in both explicit and tacit form 
(Nelson & Winter, 1982). Generally speaking, quantifiable technological 
knowledge and related standardised procedures are more explicit and more easily 
understood (Martin & Salomon, 2003). By comparison, nonstandardised 
managerial expertise, marketing skills and organisational processes are more tacit 
than technological engineering and product development, and cannot be reverse-
engineered easily (Salk & Simonin, 2003; Tsang, 2007; Zander & Kogut, 1995).  
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2.3 Knowledge Transfer 
Knowledge transfer (KT) refers to “a process of exchanging knowledge resources, 
including information and skills, between two different but relevant actors (at the 
individual, group or organisation level) in a systematically organised way, so that 
competitive advantage can be improved” (Tsang, 2007; as cited in Ding et al., 
2009b, p. 10).  
2.3.1 A Typology of KT Communication Model 
Figure 2.1 demonstrates a simplified typology of transmitting knowledge from 
Actor A to Actor B through facilitating channels. 
Figure 2. 1 A Typology of Knowledge Transfer 
Actor A                                                                                                Actor B 
                                               Knowledge Channels (Facilitating) 
 
Knowledge Contributor                   Knowledge Contents                 Knowledge Receiver 
(Existing knowledge base will remain)                       (Knowledge base will be increasing) 
Source: Ding et al., 2009b, p. 11 
 
In this figure, knowledge actors (including knowledge contributor and 
knowledge receiver) refer to different institutions, groups or units, which have 
autonomy and freedom to choose whether or not to transfer knowledge (Albers, 
2005; Ding et al., 2009b).  
Knowledge contents include (1) know-what or information, which represents 
the more articulated knowledge resources, such as technical and functional 
knowledge; and (2) know-how, which is the practical skills or expertise 
accumulation (Ding et al., 2009b; Kogut & Zander, 1992). Although knowledge 
can be classified along different dimensions using various terms (such as the 
tacit/explicit as mentioned in the above section 2.2), researchers generally agree 
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that knowledge contents can be the integration of ideas, experience, intuition, 
skills, capabilities and lessons learned which may allow actors to complete tasks 
(e.g., Foss & Mahnke, 2003; Nonaka, 1994; Simonin, 1999a; Spender, 1996).  
Knowledge transfer is linked with the coordination issues between the actors 
(Tsang, 2007). Figure 2.1 thus also underlines “Knowledge Channels”, which 
refer to interactive and communicative activities conducted between actors as a 
component of the knowledge transfer facilitating system (Ding et al., 2009b; 
Szulanski, 1999). On the one hand, knowledge transfer will be affected by the 
extent of coordination between the involved actors; on the other hand, actors can 
decide which KT activities are to be performed in which way (Ding et al., 2009b; 
Van Wijk, Jansen, & Lyles, 2008).  
Ding et al. (2009b) conclude that “both actors can play a critical role in 
exchanging the knowledge, and the scope and results of KT could then be of 
benefit to both parties” (p. 12). From this figure, a knowledge receiver will 
experience an increase of its existing knowledge base, as the recipient did not 
possess this particular kind of knowledge before the transfer occurred; while a 
knowledge contributor will not be affected by the knowledge sharing actions and 
can continue to hold the knowledge resources after transferring the knowledge to 
the recipient (Ding et al., 2009b). Even if knowledge transfer failed, the level of 
the knowledge receiver‟s knowledge base will remain unchanged. 
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 2.3.2 Nonaka and Takeuchi’s Model: The Spiral of Knowledge 
Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995) provide the following model which shows different 
ways in which individual knowledge can be transferred and become collective 
knowledge; it embraces both implicit and explicit knowledge.   
Figure 2. 2 The Knowledge Spiral Model 
                                                        Implicit          to        Explicit 
 
Implicit 
 
Socialisation 
 
Articulation 
From  
Internalisation 
 
Combination 
Explicit 
Source: Nonaka & Takeuchi (1995, p. 62). 
 
The first stage occurs most readily through the process of socialisation. In 
the course of socialisation, knowledge possessed by individuals must be made 
accessible to others. Knowledge that is subjective or difficult to articulate can be 
transferred without being made explicit, that is through “learning-by-doing”. In 
this first phase, individual learning has not yet been transferred to a large group or 
generally communicated within the company. 
The second phase in the transfer process is to communicate the experiences 
of the individual to a larger circle of people. Nonaka (1991) calls this articulation. 
It constitutes a quantum leap; knowledge is no longer traceable to particular 
individuals, but has gained an independent quality through the process of 
articulation and collective discussion. This process also makes the knowledge 
easier to store and transfer. 
In the third phase, previously articulated knowledge is standardised and 
combined with other knowledge to produce new solutions – combination. This 
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transfer happens, for instance, if routines are developed, and perhaps partly 
formulated in writing. The knowledge then becomes available to many people.  
If in the course of further development new strategies are formed, the 
knowledge can be used as a basis for planning – internalisation. It thus represents 
a potential that can be used in strategy formulation and implementation. The 
internalisation phase completes the cycle of knowledge transfer.  
In the optimal case, these four phases (socialisation, articulation, 
combination and internalisation) form a circular knowledge process in which 
implicit knowledge is communicated to a wider group and externalised, thus 
making it possible for individual knowledge to become organisational knowledge 
(Nonaka, 1991). 
By combining these two models – the simplified KT communication model 
(as shown in Figure 2.1) and the knowledge spiral model (as shown in Figure 2.2) 
– the knowledge transfer can only be seen as a one-way transfer between a sender 
and a recipient, which leads to the conclusion that every knowledge sender and 
every knowledge receiver has to engage in some interactions in order to process 
the inflow or outflow of knowledge (Chini, 2005). Meanwhile, as made clear in 
the communication model, it has to be remembered that no knowledge transfer is 
context-free (see “knowledge channel” discussion). At a later stage, this argument 
will be revisited to explain knowledge transfers in alliances/IJVs context. 
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2.4 Knowledge Transfer and Organisational Learning 
During the last decade, the issues of how organisations learn and how that 
learning can be maximised have taken on such significance that a subfield of 
management devoted entirely to learning has developed (e.g., Argote, Beckman, 
& Epple, 1990; Lyles & Gudergan, 2006; Seibert & Daudelin, 1999; Szulanski, 
1996; Zander & Kogut, 1995). Debate has centred on whether organisational 
learning should be looked at in terms of changes in knowledge (Duncan & Weiss, 
1979; Fiol & Lyles, 1985), changes in behaviour (e.g., Hilgard & Bower, 1975; 
Wingfield, 1979), or changes in “potential behavior” (Huber, 1991, p. 89). 
Acknowledging these debates, Argote (1999) argues, “what is critical for 
advancing our understanding of knowledge transfer and organisational learning 
issue is for researchers and practitioners to be precise about the approaches they 
take and to develop the theoretical and practical implications that can be derived 
from those approaches” (p. 13).  
2.4.1 Organisational Learning  
In simple terms, organisational learning means “the process of knowledge 
development and formation” (Shrivastava, 1981, p. 15), and organisational 
learning assists an organisation to utilise knowledge to make continuous progress 
and improvement in its organisational development. Through the organisational 
learning process, firms seek to increase their capabilities in dealing with constant 
changes from diverging and unpredictable forces (Lyles & Gudergan, 2006). 
Organisational learning, therefore, is a technique to increase organisational 
performance.  
Generally, organisational learning leads to positive performance yet the 
causality is complex. As Dodgson (1993b) suggests, organisational learning is a 
structured and systematic method adopted by an organisation to motivate 
employees to learn. The objectives of organisational learning are to increase an 
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organisation‟s competitive advantage and to reach goals through innovation in 
product and production methods (Zander & Kogut, 1995). 
Marquardt and Reynolds (1994) believe that four cultural aspects can 
enhance an organisation‟s ability to learn: incentives for innovation, learning from 
experience, the learning habit, and corporate support. “Incentives for innovation” 
means rewarding employees‟ ideas and initiatives, leading to more ideas and a 
higher level of initiative. “Learning from experience” means taking advantage of 
past mistakes and encouraging feedback to aid learning. The “learning habit” 
refers to a culture of continuous learning in every part of the business, while 
“corporate support” means a strong top-level commitment to learning. This 
comment often manifests itself as a high percentage of total revenue devoted to 
training and development.  
Denton (1998) argues that the deliberate and conscious possession of a 
learning strategy (embracing both learning and innovation as specific goals) is the 
first primary characteristic of organisational learning. The abilities to learn faster 
than competing organisations can manintain sustainable competitive advantage 
(SCA). Organisations need to make an explicit decision to place learning at the 
top of their list of priorities and to put in place the necessary conditions for 
learning to occur (Denton, 1998). This comment means firms should be 
deliberately geared towards learning. A strategy must be endorsed by top 
management. Thus an inherent feature of a successful learning strategy is high-
level commitment to learning. 
2.4.2 Learning Organisation 
Another similar concept which needs to be clarified is the “learning organisation”. 
Garvin (1998) highlights the fact that, organisations need to act on knowledge. In 
a learning organisation “corporate values and principles are formally articulated 
and are a source of inspiration and unity … they provide a framework for 
behaviour and performance” (Graham, 1996, p. 17). She goes on to list the values 
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commonly expressed in a learning organisation: learning from mistakes and 
appreciation of the personal and business significance of continuous learning. 
These characteristics which are most closely related to culture, lead to a 
supportive atmosphere.  
Garvin (1998) argues a learning organisation can be approximated to the 
creation of structures conducive to learning; one that gives employees the time 
and space to reflect and analyse; one that trains managers/employees in common 
methods of problem-solving; one that opens up boundaries within the organisation 
and encourages the exchange of ideas (cross-functional meetings, presentations, 
seminars); and one that creates learning environment.  
A successful learning organisation could provide a learning opportunity and 
make persistent economic growth possible (Garvin, 1998). According to this 
view, increasing the company‟s ability to solve problems and to take actions are 
as important as acquiring explicit or codified knowledge. An increase in these 
abilities may be termed “tacit” knowledge and it is distinguished from “explicit” 
knowledge (Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995). 
2.4.3 Linking Knowledge Transfer and Organisational Learning 
The connections between organisational learning (OL) and knowledge transfer 
(KT) should be readily apparent. Denton (1998) comments if organisational 
learning means anything it must mean improving the abilities to transfer 
knowledge, and to use knowledge in an organisation. If knowledge is truly 
becoming more important, then so is organisational learning. Thus the increasing 
importance of KT is a key antecedent of organisational learning. This idea is 
supported by Shoshana Zuboff (1988) who notes that an organisation may need to 
expand its knowledge resources i.e., to acquire or transfer knowledge.  
Buchel et al. (1998) emphasise that organisational learning can be viewed as 
dynamic aspects of acquiring knowledge rather than as a traditional, static view of 
knowledge transfer. The important thing is to access relevant knowledge 
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resources and then to create new knowledge – put another way, to learn. As a 
result, more and more organisations are paying increased attention to leveraging 
knowledge for value creation. Since it is difficult to draw a distinct line between 
organisational learning and knowledge transfer (Buchel et al., 1998), the two 
concepts themselves are thus treated and discussed interchangeably in this thesis. 
2.5 Institutionalised Knowledge-driven Interfirm Alliances 
2.5.1 Interfirm Cooperative Alliances as a Corporate Strategy  
The past two decades have seen a large number of interorganisational alliances 
established, despite the fact that alliances are inherently fragile and unstable in 
nature (Albers, 2005; Ding et al., 2009a). According to Ding et al. (2009a, 2009b), 
interorganisational alliances can be viewed as “an important component of 
corporate strategy undertaken by firms” (p. 47), involving two or more parties 
engaging in the operation of a new business entity in both domestic and 
international markets (Ariño & Reuer, 2004; Ding et al., 2009a, 2009b). 
2.5.2 Various Forms and Benefits of Interfirm Alliances 
Interfirm alliances include a spectrum of institutionalised forms (as shown in 
Figure 2.3), ranging from just short-term contracts to complete mergers and 
acquisitions (when one firm absorbs most of the stock of another) (Albers, 2005; 
Ding et al., 2009a, 2009b; Hyder & Abraha, 2003). These different cooperative 
forms illustrate an important phenomenon in organisational management practices 
– companies become gradually interdependent (Child & Faulkner, 1998; Ding et 
al., 2009a, 2009b; Pavlovich & Akoorie, 2003).  
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Figure 2. 3 A Spectrum of Interorganisational Cooperative Arrangements 
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Source: Adapted from Contractor & Lorange (2002) (Cited in Ding et al., 2009a, p. 54) 
The benefits derived from interorganisational alliances have been noticed in 
the height of the globalisation of markets (Ding et al., 2009a, 2009b). Researchers 
point out that interorganisational alliances are ideal for maximising economies of 
scale, capturing long-term profitability (e.g., Inkpen, 1996; Lyles & Gudergan, 
2006), being cost-effective and efficient(Barney, 1996; Ding et al., 2009a, 2009b); 
and gaining local market networks (Albers, 2005).  
Albers (2005, as cited in Ding et al., 2009a) explains the resource access as 
the benefits for organisations where they enter into alliance arrangements to 
integrate their complementary resources. Cooperative arrangements could also 
have chance to bring about the innovativeness and competitiveness of the 
members involved because of the dispersion of capabilities across firms (Hamel, 
1991).  
Smaller/Shorter        Expected Longevity                         Higher 
Mutual Commitment 
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2.5.3 Interfirm Alliances as a Form of Transferring Knowledge  
Scholars particularly view alliances as important platform for knowledge transfer 
and skills learning (Ding et al., 2009a; Parkhe, 1991; Tallman, 2005). Table 2.1 
provides three different ways of accessing knowledge resources, which are either 
through the market, through internal development, or through alliance formation. 
Table 2. 1 Ways of Transferring Knowledge: Advantages and Disadvantages 
Knowledge Development 
Within Company 
Alliances as Learning 
Instrument 
Purchase of Relevant 
Knowledge in the Market 
Advantages   
Control over knowledge Emergence of new 
knowledge 
Purchase based on goods 
Lead over competitors Implicit knowledge transfer No dependence on 
facilities 
 
 
Building up problem-
solving potential 
 
   
Disadvantages 
Cost-intensive 
 
Danger of knowledge 
leakage 
 
Cost-intensive 
Time-consuming Knowledge transfer  
barriers must be deleted 
Limited availability of 
relevant knowledge 
Few incentives  Implicit knowledge 
Transfer is difficult 
Source: Adapted from Buchel et al. (1998) (Cited in Ding et al., 2009a, p. 54) 
 
Generally speaking, collaboration is attractive when it provides desirable 
resources that a firm cannot develop within an acceptable time frame and cost 
structure (Tallman, 2005). When a firm is bereft of resources, it will seek alliances 
with other firms possessing these attributes instead of purchasing the resources 
from the market (Hyder & Abraha, 2003). Researchers also note that companies 
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can seek the mechanism of cooperation as a means to access resources, core 
competencies, innovative skills, and country-specific knowledge from each other 
that they cannot develop by their own efforts (Ding et al., 2009a; Eunni, 
Kasuganti, & Kos, 2006), 
According to Child (2001), even though alliances are set up for other 
considerations, knowledge resources acquisition is regarded a well-accepted 
cooperative byproduct. Ding et al. (2009a) and Pavlovich and Akoorie (2003) 
emphasise that partnering firms from various industries could be involved in rich 
and fine-grained knowledge exchanges. According to Ding et al. (2009a), Inkpen 
(2002) and Schuler and Tarique (2006), companies that are capital-rich but 
knowledge resource-poor are attracted to collaborative alliance ventures. In doing 
so, they can achieve time advantages in comparison to the alternative of 
developing or acquiring the needed resources alone. 
Albers (2005) and Ding et al., 2009a) explains the resource access as the 
benefits for organisations where they enter into alliance arrangements to integrate 
their complementary resources. Cooperative arrangements could also have chance 
to bring about the innovativeness and competitiveness of the members involved 
because of the dispersion of capabilities across firms (Hamel, 1991).  
With these arguments in mind, it is thus important for companies to consider 
the potential opportunities of forming inter-firm alliance linkages, as it seems not 
only benefit companies‟ growth (Hill, 2005) but also will be “essential to gain an 
advantage and stay a step ahead of the opposition – a key strategy for modern 
corporations” (Ding et al., 2009a, p. 48). 
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2.6 Three Schools of Theoretical Explanations 
The literature reviewed above provides relevant perspectives on knowledge 
transfer, alliance networks, and the benefits for firms entering into alliance 
arrangements. With regard to the phenomena of interfirm knowledge flows based 
on alliances, researchers (i.e., Ding et al., 2009a) have argued that it is necessary 
to consider multiple disciplines and theoretical thoughts (such as economics, 
sociology and psychology), before going further into the detailed clarifications 
about the research topic. The next sections thus classify three different but related 
schools of thoughts (i.e., Transaction Cost Economics, Resource-based Theory 
and Knowledge-based Theory).  
2.6.1 Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) 
Transaction cost economics theory (TCE) is thought to be most useful for 
examining different governance mechanisms from the economics perspective 
(Alter & Hage, 1992; Johanson & Mattsson, 1987; Kogut, 1988b; Pearce, 1997). 
The assumptions underlying transaction cost theory are that any governance 
mechanism formed (such as business exchanges, boundary activities and 
organisational structures) is because this mechanism is considered efficient and 
not-expensive (Ding et al., 2009a). The TCE perspective is oriented specifically 
towards the minimisation of the transaction costs when dealing with various 
business activities (Ding et al., 2009a; Tallman, 2005; Williamson, 1975, 1985; 
Zajac & Olsen, 1993). Transaction costs include: time spent for investigating 
marketing channels and conducting negotiations; expenses consumed when 
preparing terms and conditions of contracts; fees occurred when implementing 
legal claims and agreements; efforts occurred for maintaining working 
relationships (Kogut, 1988a, Ding et al., 2009a).  
TCE identifies the conceptual significance of knowledge transfer in alliances. 
TCE suggests that in order to avoid environmental uncertainties, firms are willing 
to engage in alliance governance, as the costs incurred are perceived to be lower 
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than “market means” and “full integration of the given activity within the existing 
corporate hierarchy” (Ding et al., 2009a, p. 48). As this “mutual hostage position” 
functions, it could be possible to result in the “sharing of technologies, and then 
guaranteeing performance through agreement on the division of profits or costs” 
(Ding et al., 2009a, p. 48). Some researchers (e.g., Ding et al., 2009a; Hennart, 
1988, 1989; Kogut & Zander, 1992, 1993) conclude it is rational to regard an 
alliance arrangement as an alternative means of extending the current hierarchical 
structures, to minimise coordination expenses, and to improve the scale and scope 
of knowledge exchange and communication frequencies. TCE thus provides a 
greater understanding of cost-benefit comparisons under the alliance form of 
cooperation (Yan, 2000). 
However, researchers also state there exist certain limitations in the TCE 
approach when explaining alliance learning behaviour (Alter & Hage, 1992; Ding 
et al., 2009a; Doz & Prahalad, 1991; Johanson & Mattsson, 1987). Kogut (1988a) 
argues TCE mainly considers alliance learning based on cost-minimisation 
perspective, ignoring the fact that in some circumstances, alliance knowledge 
transfer may represent “a more costly” situation (Ding et al., 2009a, p. 49). A 
more fundamental limitation of the TCE approach is that it has “an antitrust 
tendency” when assuming the nature of human beings and organisations.  TCE 
believes “people always want to maximise profits in all business activities”, thus 
“opportunism” will be unavoidable (Ding et al., 2009a, p. 49).   
According to Boisot and Child (1988) and Ding et al. (2009a), while this 
assumption could be valid when analysing some organisational behaviour under 
the influence of Western culture (taking the United States context as an example), 
this may be not true in the East Asian context. Evidence reveals that there is a 
tendency in organisational behaviour toward greater trust and interdependency, 
including all types of interorganisational collaboration, and away from only 
pursuing profit maximisation, even if small numbers are involved (Alter & Hage, 
1992; Ding et al., 2009a; Doz & Prahalad, 1991). 
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2.6.2 Resource-based Theory (RBT) 
First introduced by Penrose in 1959, RBT is an alternative theory to TCE for 
explaining firm exchanges and integration (Ding et al., 2009a; McGunagle, 2007). 
The primary concern of RBT is to identify why firms exhibit varying 
performance, and which characteristics could generate the growth of the firm 
(Barney & Clark, 2007; Ding et al., 2009a; McGunagle, 2007). Penrose (1959) 
argues firms can be seen as “a set of productive resources and administrative 
organizations” (cited in Ding et al., 2009a, p. 49). It is argued that a firm may 
compete against other firms when successfully possessing and exploiting unique 
resources (Albers, 2005; Ding et al., 2009a).  
The essential notion of the RBT is that a firm needs to own “more or less 
strategic relevant resources” with “four attributes” (i.e., valuable; rare; 
substitutable; and imperfectly imitable) (Barney, 1996, p. 105), in order to 
achieve a higher level performance, or a so-called sustainable competitive 
advantage (SCA) than the average (Barney, 1991; Barney & Clark, 2007; Gulati, 
Nohria, & Zaheer, 2000; Penrose, 1956, 1959; Tallman, 2005). The first identified 
attribute is that firms‟ resources need to be valuable, i.e. resources that can 
contribute to “the firm‟s effectiveness and efficiency” will be considered valuable 
(Barney, 1991, p. 106). Second, resources need to be rare, which means “no or 
only a small number of competitors possess these same resources” (Ding et al., 
2009a, p. 50). If every firm can obtain this same resource, even this resource is 
valuable; it still can not be considered as rare, as “no single firm has an advantage 
over the others” (Ding et al., 2009a, p. 50). The third attribute is resources should 
be imperfectly imitable, which means it will be costly for other competitors to 
imitate the firm‟s unique resources. The last attribute is called substitutable, 
which is “closely linked to the imperfectly imitable attribute” (Ding et al., 2009a, 
p. 50). A firm‟s resources that “do not have strategically equivalent resources” 
will be refered to “nonsubstitutable resources” (Ding et al., 2009a, p. 50). The 
model of RBT is illustrated in Figure 2.4 below:  
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Figure 2. 4 A Resource-based Theory (RBT) Model of SCA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Barney & Clark (2007, p. 69) (as cited in Ding et al., 2009a, p. 55) 
 
Regarding the interfirm alliance knowledge transfer phenomena, RBT 
provides certain convincing arguments although it is viewed “still in its infancy” 
(Ding et al., 2009a, p. 50). The RBT sees alliances as a unique system for 
deploying resources (including explicit and tacit knowledge, skills, competences, 
and capabilities) (Barney & Clark, 2007; Ding et al., 2009a). From a RBT 
perspective, firms will be willing to conduct alliance knowledge transfer activities 
if cooperative arrangements can provide “resource access opportunities in a 
shorter time and/or at lower costs compared to developing the resources on its 
own” (Ding et al., 2009a, p. 50). Meanwhile, firms providing required resources 
to the alliances can still retain its own unique or heterogeneous resources without 
any loss (Das & Teng, 2000; Grant, 1991; Gulati et al., 2000; Hyder & Abraha, 
2003). Hence, it seems that the RBT “clearly helps explain all the components of 
the resource access motive and economies of scale” (Ding et al., 2009a, p. 50). 
Peng (2001) also argues given that the RBT is ultimately a theory about how to 
extract rent from knowledge resources, in an emerging market environment those 
alliances who can acquire a favourable initial knowledge resource position should 
be able to earn an early success. In the strategic management field, some 
researchers further extend the RBT and develop a so-called knowledge-based 
theory (KBT) as discussed below. 
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2.6.3 Knowledge-based Theory (KBT) 
The KBT argues that knowledge is a firm‟s most important and primary resource 
(Grant, 1996, 2002). Researchers adopting the KBT perspective emphasise that “a 
firm‟s future growth comes from the coordination and combination of different 
knowledge resources through business activities at the firm level” (Ding et al., 
2009a, p. 50). Quinn (1992) and Spender (1996) comment that a firm is a 
repository with distinctive production technology and organisational knowledge, 
which cultivates organisational learning and growth. As a firm‟s competitive 
advantages are related to knowledge stock accumulated through path-dependency, 
it should own specific competencies in creating and protecting distinctive assets 
so as not to be imitated and/or exploited by competitors (Grant, 1996).  
With regard to the emergence of knowledge transfer in alliances, the 
knowledge-based theory (KBT) also provides certain convincing arguments (Ding 
et al., 2009a). According to the KBT, strategic alliances are used to access other 
firms‟ resources and for knowledge enhancement in certain critical functional 
areas, as the required knowledge cannot be developed independently (Ding et al., 
2009a, 2009b; Madhok, 1996). Building on the knowledge-based approach, while 
alliances sometimes bring together partners making similar contributions, e.g., 
sharing the risks of assets‟ investment, it seems that they more frequently 
contribute to the integration of strategic and complementary inputs and knowledge 
resources (Ding et al., 2009a, 2009b; Mowery, Oxley, & Silverman, 1996). 
Therefore, alliances can be seen as systems of knowledge inputs, which is 
similar to RBT‟s arguments. Alliances are “required to integrate the specialised 
and idiosyncratic knowledge, thus to constitute the coordination for generating 
advantage, creating returns” (Demsetz, 1991, p. 172), and developing relevant 
organisational abilities (Knight & Cavusgil, 2004). In most situations, “there 
exists a mutual reinforcing relationship between knowledge and capabilities”, 
which “can enable companies to create new knowledge” (Ding et al., 2009a, p. 
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50). Ding et al. (2009a), Tallman and Fladmoe-Linquist (2002) point out, these 
knowledge movements will result in a virtuous cycle of capability and 
technological enhancement  
2.6.4 Theoretical Critique 
There exist certain different theoretical perspectives with regard to the various 
aspects of interfirm knowledge transfer phenomena. Specific contributions of 
these above-mentioned approaches include the identification of antecedent 
conditions that provide a strategic rationale for entering alliances, the anticipation 
of specific returns, and the selection of a governance structure (Gulati, 1998).  
Transaction cost theory is traditionally viewed as the mainstream theory 
when examining alliance knowledge transfer research (Das & Teng, 2000), which 
provides some different explanations comparing with that of the RBT (Albers, 
2005). While the RBT focuses on the firm as a predefined whole organization by 
examining the resource integration implications for its strategy formulation (Ding 
et al., 2009a), TCE basically focuses on the transaction exchanges based on 
contract conditions (Williamson, 1975, 1985, 1996). TCE particularly emphasizes 
the importance of cost reduction for each business dealing rather than value 
creation when firms seek competitive advantages vis-à-vis its competitors 
(Albers, 2005; Ding et al., 2009a; Faulkner & De Rond, 2000). 
According to Ding et al. (2009a), there exist certain common issues for RBT 
and KBT. First, both approaches emphasise the unique characteristics and 
significance of knowledge, competence and capabilities, such as patents, 
processes and brands, when explaining why firms are different in growth 
(Faulkner & De Rond, 2000; Gomes-Casseres, 1996; Li & Shenkar, 1996). 
Second, they provide persuasive arguments when explaining how to develop 
competitive advantage and maximise long-run profits through using firm 
resources, including knowledge (Tsang, 1998). Third, both approaches suggest as 
few organisations are self-sufficient in critical resources/knowledge, the lack of 
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self-sufficiency in the firm introduces both uncertainty into the decision-making 
process (Barney & Clark, 2007; Koza & Lewin, 1998; March, 1991), and 
knowledge learning opportunities (Hyder & Abraha, 2003). By exchanging 
compelementary resources and sharing knowledge “that otherwise are not 
available to each individual partner”, two or more firms “can form an alliance to 
achieve a symbiotic cooperative advantage and economies of scale” (Ding et al., 
2009a, p. 51). 
In sum, given particular affinities with either economics or organisation 
theory, these three schools of thought exhibit distinct chatracteristics. However, 
“none of these explanations should be seen as being superior to any other, and it 
cannot be assumed that interorganisational cooperation is always prompted by a 
single aim” (Ding et al., 2009a, p. 52).  
Drawing the above three theoretical explanations, Ding et al. (2009a) also 
comment that “although a unified theory is not yet available, it is helpful if we 
view these explanations as being complementary rather than contradictory” (p. 
52). Each explanation “makes a singular contribution to our understanding, and it 
is possible to offer a systematic overview of the main perspectives which 
contribute to our understanding of the research topic and to draw some 
comparisons between them” (Child & Faulkner, 1998, p. 17). Indeed, a review 
and comparison of the most common theoretical frameworks may illustrate this 
point.  
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2.7 Alliance Knowledge Transfer Stages 
Knowledge transfer in alliances is often viewed as an unfolding process consisting 
of stages in which characteristics not only appear to a greater or lesser extent, but 
also in certain order of occurrence (Berdrow & Lane, 2003). Researchers (i.e., 
Buchel et al., 1998; Harryson, Dudkowski, & Stern, 2008; Inkpen & Pien, 2006; 
Sammarra & Biggiero, 2008) are generally agreed that a series of relevant and 
interconnected stages including knowledge identification, contribution, 
acquisition, application, development, and knowledge harvesting, can be 
identified. This section offers an overview of these stages in the alliance 
knowledge transfer process with the individual elements and concepts being 
mentioned in relevant academic writings. 
2.7.1 Knowledge Identification 
Knowledge identification refers to the conscious development of goal categories 
that emphasise the acquisition of specific knowledge in alliances (Inkpen & Pien, 
2006). The deliberate formulation of knowledge identification is a way of 
influencing the knowledge objectives and the knowledge base of the organisation. 
A description of the knowledge identification answers the question, “What 
knowledge transfer objectives are being pursued with regard to the existing 
knowledge base?” Hence, the important task confronting any partnering 
organisation wishing to create a knowledge transfer strategy is to classify whether 
or not knowledge exists and where it is (Beamish & Berdrow, 2003). As 
knowledge normally resides in (1) the minds of the staff, (2) office reports, (3) 
corporate data sets, and (4) the suppliers‟ documents (Davidson & Voss, 2002), at 
this point, seeking the common sources of knowledge to any organisation is a 
must. 
Identification of knowledge is also the process of creating connection with 
alliance partners in terms of knowledge complementarities in the internal and 
external environment (Inkpen & Pien, 2006). Knowledge connection provides the 
Chapter 2: Literature Review 
35 
  
answer to the question, “What kinds of knowledge exist in the organisation?” In 
order to identify knowledge connections, knowledge needs are a given. 
Knowledge identification thus may be based on identifying the current state of 
knowledge bases, connection and complementarities according to their strategic 
importance, and immediate or future knowledge needs. 
2.7.2 Knowledge Contribution  
Knowledge contribution means the starting process by which knowledge is 
transferred between partnering organisations. In order to make knowledge useful, 
it is important to ascertain whatever knowledge exists in the alliances (Davidson 
& Voss, 2002). The question is, “How is knowledge shared?” When an 
alliance/joint venture is formed, the partners must allocate responsibility for 
various decision areas (Geringer & Hebert, 1989; Killing, 1983). This allocation 
of responsibility is the basis for determining the resources committed by the 
partner firms.  
This knowledge contribution phase explicitly shows that partner firms are 
willing to integrate their knowledge which is already known (Yan, 2005), which 
has received attention in the research (e.g., Berdrow & Lane, 2003; Kedia & 
Bhagat, 1988; Tung, 1994). Researchers (e.g., Ariño & de la Torre, 1998; Doz, 
1996) argue that knowledge contribution is where partners bring size of 
knowledge resources (initial investment) into the alliance/joint venture, which can 
create its initial resource profile to start an operation. At the alliance formation 
stage, firms contribute various types of knowledge and skills to their alliances. 
Initial investment in an alliance includes capital, technology, management know-
how and marketing network (Hitt, Levitas, Arregle, & Borza, 2000). For local 
partners, the critical knowledge contribution revolves around an understanding of 
the local institutional environmental conditions and production facility (Inkpen & 
Beamish, 1997), while foreign partners generally contribute advanced technology, 
product know-how and global strategic support (Yan & Gray, 1994). Generally, 
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partners bring to the alliance their stock of firm-specific knowledge or other 
business activities (such as technology R&D, marketing, production, etc.). 
In sum, subsequent knowledge contribution from both partners after the joint 
venture formation stage is critical not only in terms of better use of the existing 
knowledge resources/capabilities of the joint venture, but also in building new 
knowledge resources and capabilities to deal with a changing market environment 
(Buchel et al., 1998). Those who fail to reinvest appropriately in developing 
capabilities of the joint venture will likely see their initial advantage gradually 
disappear. On the other hand, those who invest appropriately beyond the 
formation stage of the joint venture will be able to gain a stronger position 
(resource profile) over time (Buchel et al., 1998).  
2.7.3 Knowledge Acquisition 
The phase of knowledge acquisition is that of gathering information from 
different sources, mainly external. The question is, “Where does knowledge come 
from?” Examples of knowledge acquisition activities include sharing of 
manufacturing know-how, exchange of design technology, tacit knowledge, and 
market and customer information (Lei & Slocum, 1992). Knowledge acquisition 
normally happens when the firm enlarges or changes its knowledge base (Fiol & 
Lyles, 1985; Lyles, 1988, 1994). The knowledge acquisition phase may be useful 
for acquiring more explicit and codified knowledge. This process, however, may 
not be effective when the knowledge is complex and thus it is hard for alliance 
partner firms to acquire knowledge and integrate it into its own knowledge base. 
Also, alliances often may not know what kind of knowledge will be useful in the 
future when alliances engage in experimentation and trial and error processes. 
Therefore, while knowledge acquisition is important, equally important is a 
process where alliance partners engage in joint experiments, trials, and related 
activities to develop new knowledge. Related to the acquisition process is the 
learning that occurs when firms benchmark and imitate best practices.  
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2.7.4 Knowledge Application  
Knowledge needs not only to be acquired, but also applied (Davidson & Voss, 
2002). Acquiring knowledge does not guarantee that good use will be made of it. 
The procedures for making use of knowledge should, therefore, be examined. The 
question is, “How can knowledge be applied internally and marketed externally, 
for example in the form of new product?”  
One underlying motivational factor for the establishment of alliances is to 
achieve synergies and establish a competitive position through the integration of 
complementary resources/ knowledge (Inkpen & Beamish, 1997; Kogut, 1988a; 
Lane & Beamish, 1990). Application is thus the relevant process that decides on 
the success of integrating given knowledge. When knowledge application is 
considered from a long-term perspective, it is the market value or knowledge that 
will finally determine the firms‟ success (Buchel et al., 1998). For example, 
researchers respectively point out that firms capable of integrating knowledge, 
when pursuing international strategies, will demonstrate competitiveness (Quinn, 
1992), superior performance (Eppel, Argote, & Devadas, 1991), and enhanced 
adaptability (Doz, 1996).  
2.7.5 Knowledge Development  
Talking about knowledge development in companies usually refers to the 
development of new knowledge. But even though this is the major focus, the 
development of new knowledge needs to be based on knowledge that is already 
held (Buchel et al., 1998). Certain structures, processes and tools need to be 
shared in order to build on them as a joint basis for further development. 
Companies also need to consider the time necessary to build up this joint basis 
and whether this time is compatible with the knowledge objectives it has 
formulated. The management of knowledge development is related to duration 
management of firms (Buchel et al., 1998). Knowledge development thus 
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sometimes focuses on the emergence of new knowledge in organisations. The 
question is: “How is new knowledge generated?” 
Knowledge development requires contribution from all areas of the 
knowledge resource profile of a firm, as well as building new knowledge 
resources (Das & Teng, 2000). In the knowledge development stage, alliance 
partners agree to jointly engage in the tasks of integrating contributed resources, 
to adapt them and finally to create new cognitive understanding, new technology, 
or new sets of routines that neither party currently has (Harryson, Dudkowski, & 
Stern, 2008). Thus a series of joint experiments, trial-and-error activities, and 
adaptations often occurs as organisations engage in the knowledge development 
process. 
This knowledge development pattern is actually concerned with learning 
through the transformation or synergy of transferred practices as a result of the 
joint activities and the creation of new practices within the alliance (Harryson et 
al., 2008). Interaction occurs in teams consisting of key members from all 
partnering organisations. The teams discuss and share their own perspectives on 
the issues at hand, air their own assumptions, and engage in joint discovery and 
reflection then they can develop a fresh understanding of the issues. Casson 
(1993) has noted that this process may require an adaptation of technology and 
managerial practices to the local environment, especially in line with cultural and 
institutional differences.  
In sum, although the initial knowledge resources/capabilities brought by all 
the partners are critical for early success in the market, it is difficult for them to 
guarantee sustainable competitive advantage without further development of the 
resources consistent with the evolution of the industry. 
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2.7.6 Knowledge Harvesting 
Beamish and Berdrow (2003) refer to this stage as learning through the harvesting 
of new knowledge practices that have been created in alliances, i.e., the 
transferring of newly developed knowledge from the alliance to the parent firms. 
It is argued that while the initial knowledge resource contribution can be seen as 
the initial asset stock a joint venture obtained from the strategic factor market, the 
knowledge harvesting stage (asset accumulation) can be considered as the 
building of strategic asset stock (Dierickx & Cool, 1989). This stage is thus a 
distinct part of the knowledge transfer process which may allow the parent firms 
to gain benefits from the higher value of developed knowledge resources and 
from implementing the new knowledge to enhance existing internal or new 
operations in alliances that the firms engage in (Tiemessen, Lane, Crosson, & 
Inkpen, 1997). 
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2.8 Alliance Knowledge Transfer Challenges  
There has been a growing amount of research on the challenges of transferring 
knowledge in alliances fuelled by the recognition that acquiring, absorbing, 
amplifying and developing knowledge cannot essentially be separated from an 
organisation‟s context, as knowledge is also relevant to human activities (Nonaka 
& Takeuchi, 1995; Roos, Roos, Dragonetti, & Edvinsson, 1997). Researchers 
agree that KT is not an idealistic and simplistic process in the context of alliance 
settings (Ding et al., 2009b; Gupta & Govindarajan, 2000; Nonaka & Takeuchi, 
1995). Understandably, questions arise about how alliance companies acquire 
knowledge, and what management practices they employ to exploit and transfer 
knowledge resources. The following sections identify certain KT challenges thus 
to bring an important issue to the forefront, which is why organizations differ in 
promoting or hampering KT process in alliances.  
2.8.1 Knowledge Characteristics and Nature 
The first challenge originates in the socially embedded nature of knowledge (Ding 
et al., 2009b). It is recognised that the transfer of hardware such as blueprints, 
products and specification samples is easy enough (as mentioned in Section 2.2). 
Some scholars argue that in contrast to exchange codified and explicit knowledge, 
which is generally transparent, readily accessible, and thus inherently diffusible, 
most knowledge transferred between alliance partners is tacit, context-specific, 
and socially or organisationally embedded (Ding et al., 2009b; Yan & Luo, 2001). 
Studies on organisational learning also recognise that “embedded knowledge” 
may result in “asymmetry” (Killing, 1983). Such asymmetry is likely to obstruct 
interpartner learning and knowledge exchange. The concepts of “complexity” and 
“ambiguity” are also widely recognised barriers to knowledge transfer (Ding et 
al., 2009b; Simonin, 2004).  
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2.8.2 Knowledge Base and Ability to Transfer 
Dierickx and Cool (1989) and Ding et al. (2009b) and Simonin (2004) make the 
point that the KT is mainly affected by (1) the extent and scope of the existing 
knowledge base, and (2) the capabilities of transmitting knowledge to the 
recipient. The existing knowledge base is conceptualised as a stock of knowledge 
which is accumulated through prior independent learning activities. Other new 
knowledge inflows may occur through pursuing cooperative tasks (Cohen & 
Levinthal, 1990; 1994). The significance is that the KT action tends to be more 
effective and efficient “if the contributor unit has a sufficient prior knowledge 
base” (Ding et al., 2009b, p. 15). It is also true that a recipient unit with a rich 
knowledge base will easily absorb and process more intangible knowledge 
resources than a firm with a poor knowledge base (Ding et al., 2009b). Several 
empirical studies (e.g., Bucic & Gudergan, 2004; Inkpen, 2000; Lane, Lyles, & 
Salk, 2001) have been conducted in support of this finding. 
2.8.3 Contributor’s Willingness to Transfer  
One problem with knowledge transfer concerns firm‟s incentives for knowledge 
sharing and its protection against knowledge leakage (Ding et al., 2009b; Yan & 
Luo, 2001). It is natural that “firms may be reluctant to share knowledge 
irrespective of its rich resource base and each party wants to protect its knowledge 
from uncompensated leakage to the other or any third party” (Ding et al., 2009b, 
p. 16). Unwillingness to transfer knowledge thus refers to a concern of controlling 
knowledge flows, which is likely to adversely affect the level of knowledge 
transfer (Becerra, Lunnan, & Huemer, 2008; Faems et al., 2007; Simonin, 2004). 
Ding et al. (2009b) emphasise that the risks-benefits consideration will affect 
contributor‟s willingness to transfer knowledge. The more the potential benefits 
derive, the greater it is willing to transfer the knowledge. If alliance partners are 
rivals or potential rivals, it is reasonable to predict that they will strive to prevent 
knowledge leakage to partners due to the risks of knowledge spillover (Hamel, 
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1991; Inkpen, 1998). Ideally, “partner protectiveness will be minimal when an 
alliance is designed by both parties to facilitate knowledge transfer” (Ding et al., 
2009b, p. 17). 
2.8.4 Recipient’s Learning Intent 
For organisational learning to take place, a clear intent, instead of mere 
willingness, needs to be present (Ding et al., 2009b; Simonin, 2004; Szulanski, 
1999, 2000). Researchers point out that a clear intent of acquiring knowledge is 
an important determinant for facilitating learning from its allies (e.g., Beamish, 
1988; Hamel, 1991; Inkpen, 2002; Killing, 1983), while the reluctance to learn 
will hinder the dissemination of skills and knowledge (Ding et al., 2009b; Zander, 
1998). Dong and Glaister (2006) and Si and Bruton (1999) look at similar 
motivation issues and found that knowledge acquisition intent is explicit for 
Chinese firms in alliances/IJVs in China. Ding et al. (2009b) conclude that a 
recipient with conscious intent will seek knowledge more actively from its partner 
(knowledge contributor) via the alliances than those who do not. 
2.8.5 Recipient’s Absorptive Capacity  
Absorptive capacity (AC) refers to certain abilities to recognise the importance of 
new knowledge which is developed externally, assimilate and apply it for 
commercial purposes (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990, 1994). Ding et al. (2009b) and 
Lyles and Salk (1996) identify that the collectively constructed ability to absorb 
knowledge plays a critical role in transferring knowledge. Lane et al. (2001a)  
demonstrate the cognitive similarities between firms and clarifying the value of 
relative AC in knowledge transfer enhancement. The “dynamic capabilities” 
perspective has also been introduced which distinguishes between potential and 
realised AC (Bucic & Gudergan, 2004; Ding et al., 2009b). This ability is largely 
dependent on a firm‟s prior related knowledge base (such as existing managerial 
expertise and experience) and organisational factors, such as communication and 
knowledge distribution (Lau, Lu, Makino, Chen, & Yeh, 2002). In this vein, a 
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prior knowledge base and relative absorptive capacity may explain the issues of 
innovation, business performance and interorganisational learning (Ding et al., 
2009b). 
2.9 Knowledge Transfer in Cross-cultural Alliances  
By their very nature, cross-cultural issues are inherent in alliances (Ding et al., 
2009b). Culture distance can be distinguished as “subjective” cultural distance, 
which is “a way of perceiving the environment”; and “objective” cultural 
distance, which can be expressed in a meaningful way (Triandis, 1972, p. 4).  
International alliances are normally formed by partners coming from 
different countries and ethnicities, and with different historical traditions, political 
bases and cultural backgrounds (Albers, 2005; Ding et al., 2009b). These 
differences may be responsible for considerable diversity in firm-specific 
characteristics that might be linked to each firm‟s national heritage and cultural 
misunderstandings. These differences appear to be particularly susceptible to 
failure on management and other behaviours (Datta & Rasheed, 1993; Ding et al., 
2009b). It is natural that cultural differences (in the areas of national culture and 
organisational culture) will impact on a series of issues for an alliance, from 
negotiation of setting, to performance and survival (Ding et al., 2009b; Meschi, 
1997).  
Researchers argue that alliance knowledge transfer is subject to cultural 
influences (Ding et al., 2009b; Ford & Chan, 2003; Simonin, 1999a, 1999b). 
Inkpen and Dinur‟s (1998) study identified the knowledge management processes 
in IJVs: technology sharing; organisational interaction; personnel transfer process; 
the way knowledge is gained, and the questions asked that could be affected by 
national cultural differences. In IJVs, interpartner cultural diversity might inhibit 
the ability for partners to work jointly and effectively unless the firms can 
overcome their differences, cross-cultural differences included (Ding et al., 
2009b). It may also mean that, although companies from culturally dissimilar 
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countries have a higher potential for knowledge transfer, such knowledge transfer 
will require more effort and commitment from management (Pollard, 2001). Ding 
et al. (2009b) and Killing (1982) further found that cross-border collaborations 
between partners from developed and developing countries are particularly 
troublesome. As Killing (1983) points out, such cultural differences can delay the 
creation of an effective, cohesive management group. The ability of managers to 
interpret one another‟s estimates correctly – the forecasts of a sales manager, the 
delivery promises of a production manager, or the cost estimates of a financial 
controller – means the group can develop more rapidly into a cohesive unit that 
shares many basic assumptions, in which everyone is seen as working towards the 
same objective (Ding et al., 2009b).  
Organisational culture, a company‟s ways of doing things, can also cause 
problems where companies with distinctive cultures merge or jointly form a third 
venture (Ding et al., 2009b; Lyles & Salk, 1996). The managers or employees 
from the parent firms tend to carry with them a home-company cultural burden 
which may not be easy to shake off. This baggage, if not directly responsible for 
poor performance, can have implications for the daily business operations in the 
form of tension and frustration, for example (Datta & Rasheed, 1993; Ding et al., 
2009b).  
Child (1994) classifies knowledge transfer in alliances into three different 
levels (i.e., technical, systemic and strategic level). Child‟s (1994) study found 
that knowledge transfer at the strategic level, which is a major challenge, is 
greatly influenced by cultural elements. For example, in the previous centrally 
controlled economy, Chinese managers from state-owned enterprises (SOEs) were 
often under the government direction and supervision. They normally have no 
opportunity to make strategic decisions by themselves. After implementing 
economic reforms (since 1978), Chinese manangers gradually changed their 
traditional way of thinking and understood the competitive nature when doing 
business with foreign companies. Child (1994) emphasises that it is necessary to 
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be aware of this background, to understand how local Chinese managers think, so 
that the foreign partner‟s senior managers can interact accordingly and cooperate 
with their Chinese counterparts. The reasons behind this need are quite simple. 
The evolution and transformation of national and organisational culture is a slow 
process (Ding et al., 2009b; Meschi, 1997). Although the forces of 
homogenisation and westernisation can no doubt change some dimensions of 
national and organisational culture, they cannot eliminate the differences between 
them. Researchers thus agree that cultural distance between firms has implications 
for their ability to transfer knowledge (Ding et al., 2009b; Simonin, 1999a). 
In sum, cross-cultural distance is related to knowledge transfer, and aspects 
of cultural similarity, collective or individualistic approaches and the relative 
positions of people in the collaborative venture might be relevant. Both 
knowledge acquisition and knowledge development would be affected by cultural 
differences. However, there still remains a diversity of attention when considering 
cross-cultural knowledge transfer as a source of competitive advantage in 
collaborative working and learning. The main point is that cultural differences 
should be appreciated, so knowledge transfer processes can be designed 
accordingly (Ding et al., 2009b). 
2.10 The Impact of Ownership Structure Characteristics 
The preceding sections explained the emergence of interfirm collaboration, why 
organisations acede to cooperative arrangements and highlighted the various 
considerations relating to the conceptual background of knowledge and 
knowledge transfer. This section next focuses on knowledge transfer in one of the 
specific forms of alliances – international joint ventures (IJVs). As a specific form 
of strategic alliance, international joint ventures (IJVs) are a cooperative 
arrangement with two or more separate sponsoring organisations collectively 
dealing with the managerial decision-making activities needed to fulfil their 
strategic objectives based on a specific contract or agreement (Benvignati, 1983). 
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There are, therefore, multiple benefits. First, resources/knowledge for 
international business expansion can be acquired through the cooperation process; 
and second, joint use of complementary resources, competencies, and skills 
possessed by partnering organisations can create synergistic effects, which none 
of the companies is able to achieve if acting alone (Yan & Luo, 2001).  
IJVs are often regarded as the organisational channel by which 
interorganisational knowledge transfer most often occurs. IJVs are also relatively 
efficient at transferring tacit knowledge between partners, as long as restrictions 
are not placed on the release of such knowledge (Child, 2001). IJVs bring 
cooperative partners into a close working relationship, fostering learning both by 
facilitating knowledge transfer and by promoting knowledge creation (innovation) 
on the basis of complementary competencies (Child, 2001; Inkpen & Pien, 2006). 
Equity-based IJVs are a type of ownership structure that is shared amongst 
two or three companies that join together to establish a new business abroad. A 
common arrangement is a 50/50 share arrangement where both parties contribute 
equal management and operational control (Hill, 2005). There are a number of 
advantages of being joint ventures (Hill, 2005): first, one partner firm will benefit 
from the other partner‟s knowledge and past experience that include culture, 
market conditions, and political, legal and business systems of the host country; 
second, in opening and expanding a foreign market, development costs and/or 
risks can be very high, but these costs and/or risks are shared by the firm with the 
partners in terms of joint ventures; third, due to political considerations, the joint 
venture may be the only feasible entry mode in many countries.  
Researchers note (e.g., Buchel et al., 1998; Contractor & Lorange, 1988; Das 
& Teng, 2000; Yan & Luo, 2001) that in addition to cost considerations, joint 
venturing is an effective, if not the most effective, avenue for companies in 
developing countries to learn about new business processes and to catch up with 
the substantial technological advantages possessed by their counterparts from 
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developed economies. Lyles and Salk (1996) examined KT in IJVs and found 
explicit business goals help facilitate the process of knowledge transfer and IJV 
managers could have a windown to learn what have already been useful in the 
parent companies.  
Meanwhile, each IJV is unique, and many of the knowledge resources in 
IJVs are tacit; therefore, knowledge access in an alliance is often difficult to copy 
and assimilate (Szulanski, 1996). Equity-based international joint ventures (IJVs) 
are viewed as the most effective way to transfer tacit and embedded knowledge, 
through interacting and frequent communicating and direct observation among the 
technical and managerial staff members (Schuler & Tarique, 2006; Shenkar & Li, 
1999; Todeva & Knoke, 2005). Similarly, Millington and Bayliss (1995) identify 
that IJVs enable a firm, with the assistance of a local partner‟s knowledge and 
resources, to swiftly enter local markets through product and technology transfer 
abroad; alliances can consume excess capacity, increase efficiency, and lead to 
economies in research and development, production and promotion. In a 
technology-complementary joint venture, partners can share technology, patents, 
new products and technology development with each other to realise economies 
of scale that enable the gradual process of experiential learning and successful 
tacit knowledge transfer (Tsang, 1999). 
It is the distinctiveness of many joint venture experiences that requires 
organisations constantly to adapt their alliance knowledge transfer process to new 
circumstances. Consequently, the routines built to support alliance management 
and acquire knowledge from partners have always been subject to questions of 
adaptation, reevaluation, improvisation, and mutation (Lyles, 1988; Miner et al., 
2001). Thus, equity-based IJVs have some important economic and managerial 
advantages over both simple contractual agreements and direct capital investment. 
However, it is also observed that the unstable nature of IJVs, such as the 
escalation of partner political behaviour or mistrust between the cooperative 
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partners, may result in the failure of collaborative ventures, affecting knowledge 
access (Duysters, de Man, & Wilderman, 1999; Shenkar & Yan, 2002).  
2.11 Facilitating Interfirm Knowledge Transfer in Alliances 
While KT is a prerequisite for obtaining competitive advantage, effective KT 
mechanisms are still required even if these preexisting conditions are not present 
(Perez-Nordtvedt, Kedia, Datta, & Rasheed, 2008; as cited in Ding et al., 2009b). 
One important consideration is that knowledge transfer is unique and complex, 
requiring management to recognise that access to a partner‟s knowledge base 
needs serious consideration, especially when  much of the knowledge is 
often organisationally embedded and tacit in nature (Ding et al., 2009b; Szulanski, 
1996). As knowledge transfer does not necessarily take place efficiently or 
effectively, Gupta and Govindarajan (1991) state, “the realisation of resources 
(knowledge) sharing and the accompanied benefits depends on how linkages 
among organisations are actually managed” (p. 696). 
2.11.1 Frequent Interaction 
Bucic and Gudergan (2004) and Kogut and Zander (1996) suggest that firm 
boundaries provide the context for knowledge to be developed and exploited; they 
emphasise the role of social interaction and coordination as key activities of the 
firm interactions enhance learning capability, which may mitigate the 
transactional concerns. In a similar vein, Nonaka (1994) emphasises the role of 
“socialization” within organizations (as mentioned in Section 2.3.2). His 
perspective suggests that “social connections enhance the emergence of new 
knowledge and the transformation between tacit and explicit knowledge” (as cited 
in Ding et al., 2009b, p. 19).  
Social interaction necessitates knowledge exchange among partner firms and 
this exchange process promotes extensive interorganisational coordination and 
integration. Existing interorganisational connections provide channels for flows of 
resources. Such interaction between firms provides avenues to ensure that their 
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cooperation follows the broader mission (Dhanaraj, Lyles, Steensma, & Tihanyi, 
2004). Empirically, Tsai‟s (2000, 2001) study demonstrate there is a positive 
relationship between organizational socialisation and resource exchange. Thus, 
previous research has concluded that social interaction and communication 
promote interorganisational learning and knowledge acquisition, and social 
networking facilitates the sharing of tacit knowledge (Ding et al., 2009b). 
Teece (1998) argues there is a necessity for frequent interaction if companies 
are culturally distant from each other. Interaction between individuals and the 
transfer of knowledge are necessarily carried out in an environment of cultural 
differences, whether they are in face-to-face contact or not. Pollard and Tayeb 
(1997) discuss the idea that “the provision of knowledge, the expectations of its 
recipients and the implementation of new techniques all have significant cultural 
dimensions” (p. 68). Hence, transferring knowledge involves crossing national 
boundaries in such a way that it has implications for collaborating partners.  
2.11.2 Interpartner Trust Relationship 
Trust has been viewed as an aspect of the organisational context and as an 
antecedent of cooperation (Ding et al., 2009b). Uzzi (1997) has noted in his study, 
trust “facilitated the exchange of resources and information that are crucial for 
high performance but are difficult to value and transfer via market ties” (p. 678). 
A reputation for trustworthiness is an important factor that will influence both the 
way in which a firm will manage its relations with other exchange partners and 
also the content of the relations, i.e., the type of knowledge transferred and the 
mechanisms used. Knowledge transfer is fundamentally dynamic and is thus 
organised and created by social interactions among individuals and organisations 
(Ding et al., 2009b; Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995; Nonaka et al., 2000).  
Such trustworthy behaviours increase the scope of the relationship, and 
enhance an enriched, meaningful mutual knowledge transfer between firms in the 
alliance (Ding et al., 2009b). As there are no specific contractual agreements that 
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could cover all of the changing variations and conditions, trust, which is “the 
belief that one partner would not behave in fulfilling its self-interests” (p. 43) is 
seen as being essential in alliances (Uzzi, 1997), and the extent to which one 
partner‟s knowledge is accessible to the other also depends on interpartner trust 
(Ding et al., 2009b). Researchers (e.g., Lane, Salk & Lyles, 2001b; Van Wijk et 
al., 2008) specifically examine the relationship between trust and knowledge 
sharing. They confirm trust influences the knowledged exchanged at both extent 
and efficiency level, which lead to further increase in investments, risk sharing, 
and knowledge exchange (Muthusamy & White, 2005; Van Wijk et al., 2008). As 
Pollard (2001) notes, the link between learning and trust was alluded to earlier in 
the context of sharing information in groups; trust helps the transfer of knowledge 
and information over company boundaries. 
2.11.3 Shared Vision and Understanding 
In the social capital literature, a shared vision is often used to refer to the common 
goals of the member organisations (Dyer & Singh, 1998; Inkpen & Tsang, 2005). 
Ouchi (1980) notes, “common values and beliefs provide the harmony of interests 
that erase the possibility of opportunistic behavior” (p. 138). Knowledge and 
learning could be built on shared vision and understanding (Ding et al., 2009b; 
Pavlovich & Corner, 2006; Pollard, 2001). Denton (1998) argues that shared 
vision is the important characteristic which is most closely relevant to the idea of 
a learning strategy. Without a shared vision and a striving for the desired future, a 
company will not be moving forward (Hamel & Prahalad, 1994). The same line of 
reasoning applies in the cross-cultural alliances context (Dyer & Singh, 1998). As 
the cross-cultural alliance matures and both partners build trust and learn more 
about each other, they are likely to have developed a basic understanding about 
each other‟s skills (Ding et al., 2009b). 
One difficulty facing researchers and arguably practitioners in any cross-
cultural alliance situation is the problem of identity (Tsang, 1998). People 
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interpret situations and actions in a cultural framework and it is all too easy to add 
one‟s own cultural perspectives to an international setting (Ding et al., 2009b). 
This limitation can manifest itself in culturally-bound interpretations of 
management issues, and errors in understanding or action might not be realised 
until a problem occurs. An example might be failure to properly regard the 
seniority of a partner firm‟s senior manager, leading a loss of status or face (Ding 
et al., 2009b). Thus a shared vision and understanding are necessary conditions 
for an exchange to take place (e.g., Lane et al., 2001a, 2001b). The existence of 
shared goals and values can enhance culturally different partners‟ responsiveness 
to each other‟s needs, and an appreciation of the other‟s initiatives helps to create 
a conducive environment for knowledge sharing (Ding et al., 2009b). 
2.11.4 Summary 
Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995) empasise that knowledge transfer is fundamentally 
dynamic. Additional competence, abilities, and trust-based cooperative 
relationships (Ding et al., 2009b; Inkpen & Dinur, 1998) are, therefore, required 
to overcome the challenges (Lyles, 1988; Miner, Bassoff, & Moorman, 2001).  
In business alliances, the most significant knowledge processes aim to 
facilitate knowledge flows between partners from different background and to 
control unwanted knowledge leakage (Buchel et al., 1998; Ding et al., 2009a, 
2009b). To ensure this knowledge exchange process occurs, partners must work 
closely together and learn through watching, or through acquiring new skills 
under specific guidance where people can allow others to gain insight into their 
own capabilities. The ability to absorb new knowledge may be reduced in 
business alliances due to the differing cultural background or differences in 
viewpoints on the alliance‟s cooperation objectives. It is only when previously 
accepted values are reconsidered that there will be a space for creating something 
unique (Nonaka, Toyama, & Konno, 2000). The readiness to pass on knowledge 
which was previously present in implicit form, and to organise and create new 
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knowledge through creative cooperation within business alliances, can thus be 
encouraged by careful moulding of tools, such as social interactions, and versatile 
communication systems between individuals and organisations (Ding et al., 
2009b).  
2.12 Identifying Research Gaps and Proposing Questions 
Knowledge transfer (KT) research has attracted many organisational management 
scholars dating back to the early 1990s (e.g., Bou-Liusar & Segarra-Cipres, 2006; 
Buckley, Clegg, & Tan, 2003; Crossan & Inkpen, 1995; Ding et al., 2009b; Eunni 
et al., 2006; Tsang, 2001, 2007). Looking at the literature on knowledge transfer, 
the development of the research trends has contributed to our understanding from 
diverse perspectives linked to the knowledge transfer (Ding et al., 2009b). In the 
international business context, several streams of literature on knowledge transfer 
have revealed a series of research considerations, such as knowledge transfer 
contents, tools, determinants and outcomes, and transfer of technology as well as 
the transfer of managerial know-how (Easterby-Smith & Lyles, 2003; Easterby-
Smith et al., 2008). Some research focuses mainly on intrafirm knowledge 
transfers, and the concept that knowledge may be transferred, integrated, and 
disseminated in an evolutionary way (Schlegelmilch & Chini, 2003). Other 
researchers focus on the extent of the internalised and institutionalised knowledge 
acquired by the recipient (Cummings & Teng, 2003; Kostova, 1999).  
Most often, knowledge transfer research is considered in alliance settings, 
which has actually gained heightened recognition in the literature (i.e., Ding et al., 
2009b; Dong & Glaister, 2006; Inkpen & Tsang, 2005). In the strategic alliance 
literature, knowledge transfer research generally sees a transfer as the movement 
of existing knowledge between relevant collaborative organisations, when one 
partner either imitate or learn from the other organisation in the field of relevant 
business or production behaviours (Ding et al., 2009b; Tsai, 2001). Some 
researchers thus view knowledge transfer as a learning process. They also identify 
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various factors which could impact on the acquisition of knowledge from external 
partners (e.g., Inkpen, 2002; Simonin, 1999a, 1999b, 2004). Table 2.2 below 
presents major studies on knowledge transfer in alliances.  
2.12.1 Identifying Research Gaps 
However, research on interfirm knowledge transfer in alliances is still in its early 
stage of development, which creates a significant gap in the literature of interfirm 
knowledge transfer research (Ding et al., 2009b; Duanmu & Fai, 2007). With 
respect to overall interfirm knowledge transfer based on the alliance phenomenon, 
Duanmu and Fai (2007) and Easterby-Smith et al. (2008) acknowledge that 
although alliances‟ knowledge transfer has been the subject of much “theorising”, 
it still remains relatively underresearched. A key challenge in studying knowledge 
transfer is how to adequately specify the actors involved, the contents to be 
transferred, as well as the channels in “facilitating” the transfer (Ding et al., 
2009b; Van Wijk et al., 2008). Particularly, extant knowledge transfer research 
tends to focus on either the contributor or the receiver instead of on both sides. 
This unidimensional rather than a multidimensional perspective has prevented us 
from reaching a holistic understanding of the KT process, and few studies tend to 
explicitly address the difficulties or challenges experienced between foreign 
MNEs and host nation local partners (Duanmu & Fai, 2007). Finally, most studies 
(except Inkpen & Pien, 2006) mostly employ quantitative methods (such as 
surveys), rather than in-depth case analysis. This confirms that the nature of KT in 
alliances creates fundamental challenges for both practitioners and researchers 
alike (Ding et al., 2009b; Szulanski, 2000). 
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Table 2. 2 Major Studies on Knowledge Transfer and Learning in Alliances 
Author(s) 
Country of 
Investigation 
Research 
Method 
Key Aspects Investigated 
Markoczy, 1993 
Hungary 
 
Case Study 
 
The impact of changes in contingent factors, such as decrease in dependence on authorities and 
the increase in dependence on the foreign partners, on organisational routines and procedures. 
Cyr  
& Schneider, 1996 
Poland, Hungary & 
Czech Republic 
Interview    
Questionnaire 
How human resource management contribute to new values learning for local partners. 
Geppert, 1996 East Germany Case Study How learning/KT in organisations are related to particular external environment elements. 
Lyles  
& Salk, 1996 
Hungary 
Survey    
Questionnaire 
The impact of the organisational feature and institutional factors on knowledge acquisition 
from parents to subsidiary in JVs. 
Nilsson, 1996 
East Germany 
 
Longitudinal  
Case  Study 
How changes held by western firms are related to learning in Eastern Europe. 
Villinger, 1996 
 
Czech Republic,  
Hungary, Poland  
& Slovakia 
Survey Questionnaire 
 
Main skills needed for overcoming the learning barriers. 
Lyles  
& Steensma, 1997 
Hungary 
Longitudinal 
 Questionnaire Survey 
The impact of managerial activities and technological knowledge supported by parents on 
learning, and IJV survival. 
Mowery, Oxley, &  
Silverman, 1996 
USA Meta-Analysis Equity arrangements and absorptive capability promote greater knowledge transfer in alliances. 
Shenkar  
& Li, 1999 
China Questionnaire 
Possession of the complementary knowledge is a prerequisite, and JV is the vehicle for 
transferring the tacit knowledge. 
Si & Bruton, 1999 China Survey Knowledge acquisition ultimately helped increase the IJV satisfaction. 
Simonin, 2004 USA Questionnaire Proposed and tested a basic model of organisational learning in alliances. 
  
Chapter 2: Literature Review 
 
  
5
5
 
Continued 
Dhanaraj, Lyles, 
 Steensma, & 
Tihanyi, 2004 
Hungary Stratified Sampling Examined the role of relational capital and its impact on IJV success. 
Wang  
& Nicholas, 2005 
China Survey Identified the collective learning in contractual JVs. 
Inkpen  
& Pien, 2006 
China Case Study Examined alliance knowledge transfer, found tacit knowledge was difficult to transfer. 
Becerra, Lunnan,  
&  Huemer, 2008 
Norway 
Questionnaire Survey  
& Interview 
Role of trust and tacit & explicit knowledge transfer on the learning alliances. 
Harryson, Dudkowski, 
 & Stern, 2008 
Sweden Case Study Identified transformation network theory and innovation in alliances. 
Mason & Leek, 2008 
Europe 
& India Based 
Case Study Explored the business models as an example of interfirm knowledge transfer. 
Van Wijk, Jansen,  
& Lyles, 2008 
 
Meta-Analytic  
Literature Review 
Examined the antecedents and consequences of inter and intraorganisational knowledge 
transfer. 
Perez-Nordtvedt,  
Kedia, Datta,  
& Rasheed, 2008 
USA Survey 
Examined the relationship between source and recipient, and indicated that recipient learning 
intent and source attractiveness positively impact on KT effectiveness & efficiency.  
Sammarra  
& Biggiero, 2008 
Rome, Italy 
Telephone  
& Face to Face Interview 
Investigated the exchanges of technological, market and managerial knowledge based on social 
network analysis. Revealed the complex process of knowledge-specific exchange. Emphasising 
the nature of innovation in collaborative relationships. 
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2.12.2 Proposing Research Questions (RQs) 
As the current dynamic environment requires firms to concentrate on their core 
activities while forming collaborative relationships with other firms to access and 
build internal resources (knowledge) (Pavlovich & Akoorie, 2003), this 
knowledge transfer process in alliances seems to be of strategic importance 
particularly in the context of international business activities and has long been a 
part of the research agenda (Ding et al., 2009b).  
Given that research on knowledge transfer has received increasing attention, 
we still know relatively little about how to transfer knowledge within and across 
organisational boundaries (Ding et al., 2009b; Inkpen & Ramaswamy, 2006), and 
unlike the profusion of conceptual work, there has been only limited empirical 
work on the knowledge transfer in strategic alliances (Ding et al., 2009b; 
Easterby-Smith et al., 2008). 
This thesis focuses on the interfirm knowledge transfer and learning process 
in IJVs in the Chinese auto industry context. Focusing on the IJVs – a specific 
alliance form – provide good opportunities to examine international partnership 
and interfirm knowledge transfer nature (Ding et al., 2009b; Inkpen & Dinur, 
1998). It sought to examine how companies with different backgrounds working 
together to exploit cooperative opportunities in order to share, integrate and 
develop knowledge for the purpose of acquiring competitive advantages in a 
specific industrial setting.  
Building on the pertinent contemporary theoretical thinking and 
conceptualisation considerations, the thrust of knowledge transfer and learning as 
a dynamic process is the main research focus in the thesis. Possible influential 
factors in knowledge transfer activities, specifically, knowledge characteristics 
and trust dimensions, and alliance management behaviour in the knowledge 
transfer process are also considered. The researcher looks more closely at the 
bases of learning processes in the IJV and tries to answer the question “What does 
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learning in the IJV system mean?”. Particularly, the researcher uses the following 
points as a basis for discussing learning processes in the IJV system: (1) Agents: 
“Who learns in the IJV?”; (2) Content: “What is learned?”; (3) Process: “How is 
it learned?”.  
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2.13 Chapter Conclusion 
Alliance/IJVs are frequently formed with the intent of facilitating organisational 
learning and gaining access to new knowledge from the partner firms (Ding et al., 
2009b; Parkhe, 1993b). Scholars have treated aspects of knowledge transfer and 
interfirm learning in alliances in a diffuse manner, and defined the terms in 
question using a multitude of different theories or drawing on different empirical 
findings. Theoretical explanations go some way towards explaining the increased 
use of the alliance mode, which means that a company can be involved in 
cooperative arrangements in different market areas and with different partners at 
the same time, bringing different strengths to each partnership as they are needed, 
such as knowledge of the market in a particular region, or the capital needed for 
an important investment. In some countries, alliances may be the only acceptable 
and possible form with local partner/s; the firm could reduce liabilities of 
foreignness and have keen insights about local environment, thus increasing the 
likelihood of success (Li & Shenkar, 1996). Pavlovich and Akoorie (2003) point 
out that different knowledge owned by different partners; consequently how the 
knowledge could be used by each other means that the alliance phenomenon is 
not entirely unexpected. Therefore, learning expectations and goals exist in 
alliances which were shaped for strategic, or functional considerations. This 
alliance knowledge transfer phenomenon has occurred particularly in knowledge 
intensive or high-tech industries.  
This chapter presented an overview of the literature and the relevant theories 
concerning the area of study. It critically reviewed theories relevant to the 
research questions. The purpose was to illustrate the importance of interfirm 
knowledge transfer in IJVs and relevant knowledge transfer barriers and 
facilitating mechanisms and knowledge transfer stages for alliance partners faced 
with the new knowledge environments. Based on the review of the literature, this 
chapter identified the research gaps of knowledge transfer in alliances and 
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proposed several research questions when considering the particular 
characteristics of knowledge transfer and learning process as an additional way of 
looking at cooperative relationships. 
After summarising the relevant literature, the next chapter will introduce the 
proposed theoretical framework and a conceptual research model, which will 
define various constructs, conditions and dynamics that favour effective 
knowledge transfer between partners in alliances. 
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Chapter 3   Research Model 
 
3.1 Introduction 
As the literature review chapter suggests, the formation and operation of an IJV 
raises many knowledge transfer and interfirm learning issues that have 
implications for how the IJV partners manage their cooperative learning activities 
in the IJV system. Many of these implications are grounded in the assumption that 
partners in the IJVs have routines for transferring knowledge, learning, gaining 
management efficiencies (Schuler & Tarique, 2006). Thus organisations can 
support knowledge flow, learning, sharing and even developing with technology 
and management practices in IJVs (Jackson & Schuler, 2003; Inkpen & Tsang, 
2005).  
This chapter introduces the conceptual research model of knowledge transfer 
within learning IJVs. It justifies the constructs and identifies the interrelationships 
among these concepts through proposing a framework of interfirm knowledge 
transfer and organisational learning in IJVs. Section 3.2 formulates a theoretical 
framework. The research model is considered in section 3.3. The chapter 
concludes in section 3.4. 
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3.2 Formulating a Theoretical Framework 
An appropriate theoretical framework is needed to guide this research. Chen 
(1995) and Kang (2002) argue that first, a suitable theoretical framework can 
decide the basic units of analysis; second, a suitable theoretical framework is able 
to identify and address some kind of special or nonrandom relationship from the 
basic units of analysis which is a specific institutional relationship; third, a 
suitable theoretical framework is able to observe the repeated process of 
interaction between the basic units of analysis; fourth, a suitable theoretical 
framework can be a guide to delineate the boundaries of the basic units of analysis 
from other units outside them; fifth, a suitable theoretical framework is able to 
identify independent preconditions and their influence on the basic units of 
analysis both inside and outside boundaries; and finally, an appropriate theoretical 
framework has an undeniable function – it is able to distinguish the causal 
linkages between the determinants and outcomes.  
However, a great challenge lies in formulating a suitable theoretical 
framework to guide the whole research process. Interfirm knowledge transfer in 
IJVs essentially presents an institutional arrangement, which is very different 
from both traditional forms of hierarchy and market in its organisational form 
(Powell, 1990). Knowledge transfer in IJVs also involves many issues of 
operational strategies in the field of international business. Further, the decision to 
transfer knowledge and the operational decisions to be made relating to 
knowledge transfer in IJVs are not made in isolation from the two or more 
partners since IJV learning behaviour can be understood only in the social 
context. Thus the formulated theoretical framework must be capable of dealing 
with all three areas: organisational form, business strategy, and social behaviour. 
Considering the research purpose (presented in Chapter 1), this thesis 
addresses interfirm knowledge transfer in a broad historical background and 
social context in which the partners are embedded. It focuses on the dynamic 
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process of knowledge transfer evolution as a result of cooperative arrangements. 
It asks questions which are relevant to the thesis purpose. The questions centre on 
the conditions under which IJV knowledge transfer could be affected by the 
management of the cooperative partners and the knowledge itself. 
Looking at the theoretical explanations, the use of the transaction costs 
approach and other perspectives to study interfirm knowledge transfer has not 
been incorrect, but simply incomplete (Ding et al., 2009a). Recognising 
knowledge resources and learning opportunities as the major reasons for IJV 
formation, firm specific knowledge development is dependent upon partners‟ 
interactions to access, assimilate and accumulate knowledge (Barney & Clark, 
2007).  
The resource-based theory (RBT) defines and shapes the precursors, 
processes and outcomes related to interfirm knowledge transfer in their social 
networks, which is a give-and-take process that includes combining and pooling 
knowledge resources. Learning can take place only in an environment where 
change is encouraged – as the organisational learning school views alliance 
knowledge transfer as collaborative learning processes intended to internalise and 
codify skills needed to improve firm performance (Faulkner & De Rond, 2000).  
The RBT theory tends to ask and answer “how” questions related to interfirm 
knowledge transfer, whereas transaction cost economics fails to capture the 
mechanics and dynamism of interfirm knowledge transfer activities. A 
knowledge-based view (KBV) highlights the idea that the firm‟s future growth is 
dependent on the productive integration of knowledge resources and the 
derivative capabilities (Ding et al., 2009b; Steensma & Lyles, 2000). The KBV is 
thus an alternative to the RBV for explaining firm knowledge resources‟ 
integration. Following Ireland, Hitt, and Vaidyanath‟s (2002) classification, this 
thesis uses the term “knowledge” referring to those skills, capabilities, and 
processes which could be critical to enhancing organisational competitiveness.  
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3.3 Conceptual Research Model 
Drawing on the relevant theoretical ideas about cooperative arrangements and 
knowledge transfer (refer to the literature review chapter), a research model with 
which to frame this study is postulated (see Figure 3.1 below). The 
conceptualisation is shown schematically as a model of the interfirm knowledge 
transfer in IJVs. The proposed theoretical framework of the research includes 
several major groups of elements. The first group involves the partner firms in the 
IJV‟s internal cooperative system. The second group contains knowledge transfer 
stages. The final group constitutes the central part of the model: it includes 
knowledge contributor dimensions, recipient firm dimensions and relevant 
influencing factors (knowledge characteristics and interfirm interactions) related 
to the knowledge transfer process. This conceptualisation of the interpartner 
knowledge transfer model, in common with past conceptualisations, shows a 
holistic view of the IJV system involving the knowledge transfer dynamics. 
3.3.1 Category A: Interfirm Cooperative System 
Strategic alliances including IJVs are most frequently (at least implicitly) founded 
on the resource-based theory (Faulkner, 1995). As the RBT views companies as a 
unique system to collect and deploy resources (such as knowledge, skills, 
competences, and capabilities), these resources determine the effectiveness and 
efficiency of a company‟s activities (Barney & Clark, 2007; Collis & 
Montgomery, 1995; Ding et al., 2009a). A resource-based view of joint ventures 
suggests that all the partners involved in forming the joint venture could bring a 
certain set of knowledge resources to the joint ventures. The formation of a joint 
venture could increasingly create value through combining the knowledge 
resources, thus reaching an optimal return (Das & Teng, 2000; Ding et al., 2009a).  
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In the research model, Category A constitutes a cooperative system 
comprising two partner firms (Firm I and Firm II) from different backgrounds. An 
IJV cooperative system is considered as the firms‟ business relationships with 
other organisations and/or individuals who have an interest or can play some role 
when developing the business and exchanging knowledge resources (Cook & 
Emerson, 1974; Granovetter, 1982; Johanson & Mattsson, 1988). An IJV 
cooperative system is based on three major factors: (1) partner firms who get 
involved in an IJV partnership; (2) interactions and exchanges, and (3) knowledge 
resources (Albers, 2005; Ding et al., 2009b; Johanson & Mattsson, 1988).  
The knowledge exchanges and transactions that take place between partner 
firms refer to the knowledge transfer and learning activities. An interfirm 
cooperative arrangement has been described by Håkansson (1989), Johanson and 
Mattsson (1988) as a useful asset that can be created by the exchange relationship 
between the actors. Due to the establishment of the IJV network, partners will 
encounter and many times gain entrance to each other‟s knowledge resources in 
the system.  
3.3.2 Linking Category A and B: Knowledge Transfer Stages 
How partner firms develop and utilise the knowledge in the network is important 
in the IJV system because IJVs are, to a large extent, expected to dictate the 
capacity of the IJV. Researchers recognise different yet closely interconnected 
knowledge flows in alliances calls for distinctive knowledge management 
procedures (such as knowledge creation, dissemination, and use) (Barney & 
Clark, 2007; Davenport & Prusak, 1998; Ding et al., 2009b).  
Category B involves the interfirm knowledge transfer stages (including 
identification, contribution, acquisition, application, development, and harvesting 
of knowledge) that cooperative partners employ to get to know and to mobilise 
external knowledge and skills as a way of strengthening the alliance‟s competitive 
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advantage. Here, the partners seek to develop the alliance‟s existing knowledge 
by including new knowledge significant for raising the alliance‟s competence.  
These knowledge transfer stages do not always confer direct benefit on the 
IJV but may be helpful in creating reliance and confidence in the partnership 
between the cooperative partners. Before an IJV is formed, partner companies 
may decide how much knowledge (initial resources) is needed by the new joint 
venture. At the initial stage of IJV formation, partner firms contribute both 
tangible and intangible knowledge (such as technical knowledge, managerial 
knowledge, and market knowledge) to the IJV. At the following stage, additional 
knowledge will “flow” into the cumulative knowledge “stock” of the IJV.  
While the initial knowledge resource commitment is an irreversible (fixed) 
decision, once the IJV is formed the ongoing knowledge transfer stages can be 
adjusted according to market requirements and other factors. The sustainability of 
the alliance‟s competitive advantage will depend on both the initial knowledge 
contribution and the cumulative new knowledge developed through learning 
generated beyond the initial operational stage. Thus, the following 
resource/knowledge adaptation and development beyond the formation stage can 
be a topic of concern.  
3.3.3 Linking Category B and Group Category of (C, D, E and F) 
Although the benefits of knowledge transfer as the primary internal function for 
providing a basis of knowledge/competence development have long been realised, 
the activities of interfirm knowledge transfer are a complex process, and vary 
significantly across different alliances (Ding et al., 2009b; Easterby-Smith et al., 
2008; Tsang, 2007). Some scholars (e.g., Gupta & Govindarajan, 2000; Szulanski, 
1996) argue that as there are several fundamental impediments to interpartner 
learning and knowledge transfer, KT does not automatically occur. 
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Category C: Knowledge Contributor Firm – Category C concerns the 
knowledge contributor firm‟s characteristics in terms of its strategic goals. 
Alliance formation is often regarded as one of several means or tools to pursue the 
strategic goals/motives of the business firm. The goals/motives include economic 
and/or strategic considerations. Certain goals and motives must be presented to 
justify creating an alliance/IJV, which suggests firms do not merely cooperate, but 
cooperate for a reason – an appropriate assumption is that organisations decide to 
enter cooperative relations with one another (Hyder & Abraha, 2003). As Albers 
(2005) comments, “Certainly, cooperating firms aim at creating positive 
synergies” (p. 13). Doz and Hamel (1998) also suggest, “Executives do not awake 
one morning with an unexplained urge to collaborate. It is not in their nature.” (p. 
225) 
Naturally, the knowledge contributor firm may be reluctant to share 
knowledge and want to protect its knowledge from uncompensated leakage to the 
recipient. Thus, knowledge transfer willingness is also considered in this category. 
If international joint venture partners are rivals or potential rivals, it is reasonable 
to predict that the contributor will strive to prevent knowledge leakage to the 
recipient because of the risks of knowledge spillover. 
The existing knowledge base and its ability to transfer knowledge are also 
considered in this category. A certain level of knowledge base affects knowledge 
transfer ability which stimulates or impedes interpartner learning, although a 
reciprocal need or willingness to transfer serves as a solid basis for knowledge 
transfer. Meanwhile, high complementarity in the knowledge base increases both 
incentives for knowledge transfer and accessibility to partner‟s knowledge.  
Category D Refers to Knowledge Recipient Firm – Tsang (2007) argues 
the transfer of organisational knowledge could depend not only on the 
contributor‟s dimensions, but also be related to the recipient-related 
characteristics. Ideally, knowledge transfer will be encouraged when the recipient 
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possesses definite strategic goals with a certain level of knowledge base. Those 
parties who have no learning intent will often be hesitant to acquire knowledge. If 
the recipient is not able to absorb the contributor‟s knowledge, interfirm 
knowledge transfer between partners is likely to have problems. Similarly, a 
reciprocal need for each other‟s proprietary knowledge boosts knowledge 
exchange between partners and ensures resource accessibility. Thus, in a two-
partner joint venture, accessibility to other partner‟s knowledge resources also 
depends on recipient‟s strategic goals, the extent of the its knowledge base, 
learning intent and absorptive capacity, as indicated in Category D. 
Category E Identifies “Knowledge Characteristics” Related Elements – 
The first characteristic originates in the socially embedded nature of knowledge 
(tacit or explicit). In contrast to the codified, explicit knowledge, which is 
generally transparent, readily accessible, most knowledge transferred between 
joint venture partners is tacit, context-specific, and socially or organisationally 
embedded (Ding et al., 2009b; Nelson & Winter, 1982; Nonaka, 1994; Yan & 
Luo, 2001). Studies on organisational learning also recognise the embedded 
knowledge may result in “complexity” and “ambiguity” (Kogut & Zander, 1992; 
Simonin, 1999a, 1999b), and such factors are likely to obstruct interpartner 
learning and knowledge exchange (Granovetter, 1985). Thus, these widely 
recognised barriers, including “tacitness”, “complexity” and “ambiguity” are thus 
involved in the Category E of the model.  
Category F Emphasises InterFirm Dynamics – As interfirm knowledge 
transfer includes both the knowledge contributor and the recipient firm, the 
interfirm dynamics between the contributor and recipient constitute the central 
issue in the research model and are also regarded as the focus in this thesis. 
Meanwhile, it is also recognised that while transferring hardware such as 
blueprints, specification sheets is easy enough, real commitment is required to 
make sure the tacit or ambiguous know-how transfer across units of an 
organisation (Killing, 1983). It is thus acknowledged that frequent interaction 
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involved in Category E may enable partners to conform to new procedures and 
processes, and to contribute equally business practices and resources (Miesing & 
Slough, 2003). Another two dimensions are whether there are trusting 
relationships and shared understanding between cooperative partners.  
Related to this stream of logic, active management involvement, 
communication, visits, meetings, training and social interactions appear to 
encourage greater knowledge sharing (Ding et al., 2009b; Inkpen, 1997; Nonaka 
& Takeuchi, 1995). As collaboration matures and the venture organisations build 
trust and learn more about each other, such shared knowledge could also be a 
platform for developing understanding about each other‟s skills, and so on. 
Specifically, as interpartner trust increases and mutual understanding develops, 
access to each other‟s knowledge base will become less problematic (Ding et al., 
2009b; Pavlovich & Corner, 2006). This category thus refers to both partners 
providing more active support and getting involved in the IJV primarily to 
combine their knowledge in the IJV and thus increase their competitive strength.  
3.3.4 Ownership Structure and Cultural Distance Considerations  
In the collaborative IJV system, knowledge management involves the transfer of 
knowledge between the venture partners working together to increase their total 
knowledge (Bresman, Birkinshaw, & Nobel, 1999). If a company relies on a 
partner‟s constant supply of necessary resources and knowledge, it will tend to 
form an equity-based IJV structure, as Huber (1991) argues one of the critical 
issues concerning knowledge transfer cannot be separated from the consideration 
of the type of ownership structure (See literature review in Section 2.8).  
Such knowledge management activities in equity-based ownership structure 
are complex enough within the same national environment but the transfer of 
knowledge management to foreign locations poses further difficulties (Bresman et 
al., 1999), especially when knowledge is acquired and institutionalised in cross-
cultural settings, a difficulty which deserves serious attention from international 
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managers (Huber, 1991; Yan & Luo, 2001). Nevertheless, the cultural 
compatibility of partners determines if they can effectively communicate and 
coordinate. Higher cultural compatibility heightens the odds of knowledge 
transfer across nations (Pollard, 2001) (See literature review in Section 2.9).  
Finally, knowledge transfer in the cross-cultural alliance/IJV setting cannot 
be effectively conducted through market transactions (Ding et al., 2009b; Hamel, 
1991; Mowery et al., 1996). Through interpartner mutual interactions, trust 
relationship and consensus building (i.e., factors identified in Category F), IJV 
can help firms create a unique culture distinctive from that of the partner 
companies in order to promote shared understanding and effective knowledge 
transfer. 
3.3.5 Linking Category of (C, D, E and F) and Category A  
Interfirm knowledge transfer activities in IJVs may play an important role in the 
overall cooperative activities. It is anticipated that knowledge transfer results will 
vary in the IJV depending on the interpartner cooperative management. Beamish 
(1987) pointed out that combined resource strength describes the joint venture‟s 
overall resource endowments and capabilities and it should contribute to better or 
worse joint venture performance. When combined resource strength changes 
during a knowledge management process, the joint venture‟s performance would 
be expected to change accordingly (Eunni et al., 2006). It is the combined 
knowledge resources that give the joint venture a competitive advantage over its 
competitors (Das & Teng, 2000). 
Hence, the model finally suggests that changes in IJV cooperative 
management will lead to changes in the knowledge transfer process and in turn 
change the learning performance in IJVs. As partner firms combine their 
knowledge in the IJV, more learning and adaptation take place, which may also 
have a synergetic effect on the overall IJV development. 
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3.4 Chapter Conclusion 
Knowledge transfer in alliances/IJVs needs to be approached realistically if they 
are to provide companies with a meaningful way of extending their scope for 
action by cooperating with others (Buchel et al., 1998; Ding et al., 2009b). 
Experience has demonstrated that companies are often eager to embark on 
alliances. However, this versatility constitutes both the attraction of alliances and 
one of the main difficulties which they present. This is especially true when 
dealing with knowledge transfer practices, which are another demanding and 
unfamiliar task. There are a rapidly growing number of researchers focusing on 
IJV knowledge transfer issues; however, a unified theoretical framework has not 
emerged yet.  
This chapter articulates and presents a research model (See Figure 3.1) for 
the current research in categories that bring together the major features of IJVs 
and knowledge transfer. In Figure 3.1, alliances/IJVs are regarded as a specific 
kind of interorganisational cooperative system. The partnership of the firms is 
treated as an institutional relationship and also constitutes the core tier of the IJVs. 
This figure indicates the interpartner knowledge transfer based on cooperative 
partnerships between the firms as well as the operations of the key constructs. 
Through the operations of the IJVs, knowledge transfer can be conducted by the 
partners both inside and outside IJVs with their subsequent behaviours, and may 
affect their alliance cooperation performance. This chapter thus presents a 
conceptual framework in which certain key elements influence and are influenced 
by each other, following relevant literature review and theoretical analysis in 
Chapter 2. This conceptual model also provides part of the basis on which the 
research methodology and research design are selected, which will be discussed in 
the following chapter. 
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Chapter 4  Methodological Issues and Method 
 
4.1 Introduction 
The literature brings out certain crucial questions and theoretical improvements 
regarding the studies on interfirm knowledge transfer in IJVs. Parkhe (2006) 
critiques the fact that some research projects have not followed a “collectively 
coherent” theoretical logic, and thus progress in the study of alliance knowledge 
transfer has been hindered. These mixed results, Parkhe (2006) claims, come from 
the methodological inconsistencies to a certain degree. While specific 
methodologies have been used in past interfirm knowledge transfer research, this 
thesis addresses a number of fundamental philosophical and research method 
considerations in relation to the proposed research question in Chapter 1.  
This chapter firstly provides clarification in terms of philosophical inquiries 
and paradigms in section 4.2, including a presentation of the dominant 
philosophical foundations and a qualitative interpretive inquiry in sections 4.2.2 
and 4.2.3; a suitable theoretical paradigm consideration regarding this thesis is 
then discussed in section 4.2.4; the process of research method selection is 
explained in section 4.3, including the details of the specific in-depth case study 
design for fieldwork and contextual analysis; data collection procedures and 
principles are considered in section 4.4; fieldwork access and procedures‟ 
execution, and ethical considerations applied in conducting the research are 
described in section 4.5; and the details of interpreting data and software analysis 
techniques are presented in section 4.6. This chapter concludes in section 4.7. 
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4.2 Philosophical Inquiries and Paradigms 
“Most quantitative techniques are data condensers. They condense data in 
order to see the big picture. Qualitative methods are best understood as data 
enhancers … It is (thus) possible to see key aspects of cases more clearly.”  
– Ragin, 1994, p. 92. 
 
4.2.1 What is a World View or Paradigm? 
Discussion of the philosophical basis, which draws on a variety of specific world 
view or paradigm and why it is meaningful to a research topic, has been central to 
the debate about different research methodologies. International business 
management research is no exception to this. Willis (2007) states that a world 
view or paradigm is “a foundational system of assumptions about the world nature 
that guides research and practice” (p. 8), which has five components as outlined 
by Chalmers (1982, p. 91): 
1. Prescriptions about how to conduct work; 
2. Techniques bringing the laws to a variety of situations; 
3. Standard ways of applying the fundamental laws; 
4. Principles guiding work on the real world; 
5. Explicit theoretical beliefs. 
Then why should we be concerned with understanding the paradigm guiding 
a research study? Burrell and Morgan (1979) state the answer well, “the principal 
concern is to understand the way of how the individual interprets the world” (p. 
3). Jennings (2001) further proposes a paradigm needs to consider the following 
three questions: 
1.What is the nature of “reality”?(Ontological Considerations) 
Ontology is concerned with the nature of reality (Guba, 1990). Burrell and 
Morgan (1979) state that ontology is reflecting different prescriptions of what can 
be real and what can not in the world, “whether the „reality‟ is external to the 
individual consciousness or a product of one‟s mind” (p. 5). There are two 
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competing views of reality: idealist or materialism. Proponents of idealism assert 
that perception or mind creates the reality. While a materialist ontological position 
means all that is real is the physical world which is not the product of one‟s 
consciousness (Crotty, 1998). That is, reality is material rather than mental or 
spiritual.  
2. Relationship between the knower and the known (Epistemological 
Considerations) 
Epistemology refers to what humans know about reality and how to know it 
(Crotty, 1998). Burrell and Morgan (1979) describe an epistemological 
assumption as being how one might begin to understand the reality and how to 
communicate this understanding as knowledge to other people. The 
epistemological assumption is also concerned with whether knowledge is 
something that must be acquired or experienced. It includes identifying how one 
might go about disseminating true and false information (Burrell & Morgan, 
1979). This distinction has a direct influence on the way the researcher might 
attempt, for example, to elicit information from his or her subjects. 
3. How should the knower go to find out knowledge? (Methodological 
Considerations) 
A methodology is a discourse or a theory of inquiry or a system of ontological 
and epistemological assumptions on which research is to be based. It is generally 
referred to certain key aspects and procedures of conducting a research, such as 
the selection of subjects, research design, data collection, and analytical methods 
(Willis, 2007). Different world views, ontologies and epistemologies may 
embrace different methodologies which, therefore, makes their usefulness and 
capacity to create meaningful findings, and reach consensus on methodological 
considerations difficult (Silverman, 2000).  
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4.2.2 The Dominant Paradigm in IJV KT Research 
Willis (2007) comments different scholars may have different world views or 
paradigms. Within knowledge transfer research in IJVs, the predominant 
paradigm appears to be that of positivism, which assumes that there are universal 
laws that govern the operation of the social world – the belief holds that a 
common physical reality exists, and that use of the appropriate methods of 
analysis will uncover these laws (Neuman, 2000). The same argument posits that 
there is a body of knowledge that existed independently of whether people knew 
it or not, and that the task of the researcher is to uncover that knowledge piece by 
piece, building up a comprehensive understanding of the nature of reality 
(McNeill, 1985).  
Positivists see science is waiting “out there” to be revealed, and is free of 
religious values or individual consciousness (Neuman, 2000). This positivist 
worldview is apparent in the methodology and method selections. It perceives 
research in an instrumental way, and the eventual research purpose is based on 
scientific explanations – to find out, explain, and to testify the common laws of 
human social activities. They can then be described in an objective and value-free 
way (a strong version of positivism is objectivism), and the hypothesis-deductive 
method is the best way of following this procedure (Derksen & Gartrell, 1992). It 
prefers to collect accurate quantitative data and uses surveys, experiments, and 
exact statistical tools “searching for rigorous measures, and to test hypotheses by 
cautiously analysing the numbers” (Neuman, 2000, p. 66).  
Traditionally, quantitative research develops strict design and research 
procedures before the research actions begin. In quantitative research, it adheres 
to statistical analysis and measurements (Marschan-Piekkari & Welch, 2004; 
Sarantakos, 1993). A specific, testable hypothesis or hypotheses is/are then 
formulated from this theory (Tashakkori & Teddlie, 1998), as summarised in 
Table 4.1: 
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Table 4. 1 Dominant Positivism Assumptions in Knowledge Transfer Research 
Worldview (Ontology) Universal Laws and Truths (Realism) 
Epistemology Objective and Value Free 
Methodology Nomothetic (Experimental, Quantitative Research) 
Method Questionnaires (Surveys, Measurement Scaling) 
Source: Crotty (1998); Willis (2007). 
The rigorous quantitative approach provides a sense of substance, scale and 
completeness to research results. In quantitative research, the focus is to observe 
and measure. The main concern for the quantitative researcher is the “objectivity” 
of the research, so that care is taken not to influence the research data through 
personal involvement with the data. The purpose of quantitative research is 
usually to certify or falsify an existing theory through empirical testing, or to 
generalise an existing theory in order to expand its application. In practice, 
quantitative inquiry has its prespecified intent (Silverman, 1995). The key 
variables and their general relationships, which are predetermined, can provide a 
clear conceptual framework for empirical testing.  
However, many researchers have expressed openly their dissatisfaction with 
the positivist thinking and quantitative methodology. Critics challenge the 
positivists‟ perception of a single reality, the goals it pursues, the methods it 
employes and its perception that the world was “mathematically drafted” 
(Sarantakos, 1993, p. 5). The overemphasis on quantitative measurement and 
technique standardisation by quantitative research is neither beneficial nor 
justifiable, as the overemphasis on objectivity and standardisation may lead to 
technocratic needs, and may neglect the real meaning of social actions and 
cultural constructions. For instance, Silverman (1993) criticises the way 
positivism leads people to focus on static numbers while ignoring those actually 
dynamic changing lives in the real world, and not all research findings are 
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consistent with the worldview that this nomothetic methodology implies. Cicourel 
(1964) also notes how the choice of a purely mathematical logic can neglect the 
common sense reasoning used by both participants and researchers.  
4.2.3 A Qualitative Interpretive Inquiry 
In contrast, a qualitative interpretive research study allows the researcher and the 
researched to be perceived as two equally important elements of the same 
situation. The qualitative research needs to observe the research subject, ask 
questions, and interact with relevant people, in depth and long term sometimes in 
situations at one or more field sites. The whole process, which is developing and 
changing over time, includes the stages of problem statement, research design, 
interview questions and interpretations. According to Easterby-Smith, Thorpe and 
Lowe (1993), Gummesson (1991), and Veal (2005), qualitative findings can be 
constructed in a narrative way, so readers who are not trained in statistics can still 
understand the whole research report. This kind of research usually examines 
changes over time, and it aims to look at human-interest issues, which have 
significance to operating managers. The underlying indicators provide a basis for 
the interpretivism philosophical and practical framework as illustrated in Table 
4.2. 
Table 4. 2 A Qualitative Interpretivism Framework 
Worldview (Ontology) Multiple Realities (Nominalism) 
Epistemology Antipositivism, Subjective 
Methodology Qualitative 
Method  Case Study (Participant Observation, In-depth 
Interview, Focus Group) 
Source: Adapted from Crotty (1998); Willis (2007). 
The epistemological stance in qualitative research is mainly considering an 
ontological approach that the reality is to be understood from the perspective of 
participants involved in the events that are investigated. It is the perception and 
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interpretation by agents of these facts that provide fundamental data. 
Interpretivism argues that research needs to facilitate an understanding of the 
construction of people‟s social meaning, which arises from their real life 
perspectives. Human values do encroach upon the construction of social life, and 
to exclude them from the process of inquiry presents a singular and atomised 
perspective to understanding the theoretical foundations of reality.  
The essence of the qualitative interpretive framework draws on the richness 
of direct experience to heighten perception and understand actions and meanings 
in their social context (Crotty, 1998), which can be sought through observing the 
events and phenomena in the process in an effort to identify different ways things 
can be viewed (Mercer & Powell, 1972). This experience must be that of those 
who participate in the context of the research as no one can experience things on 
behalf of the participants (Crotty, 1998). Interpretivism criticises positivist 
thinking and especially the underlying assumption that people, through their 
senses, can capture the world around them (Alvesson & Skoldberg, 2000). It 
suggests that people can explain their everyday experiences and knowledge 
(Holstein & Gubrium, 1998). McNeill (1985) also argues “reality is not waiting to 
be experienced by social actors, even though it may often feel as though it is” (p. 
112). Instead, social reality can be actively constructed through social interaction. 
This interpretation perspective has led to the growth of those research 
methods that emphasise the importance of studying social life in its natural 
setting, describing the realities and perceptions as they are seen and experienced 
by those involved as respondents. Van Maanen (1983) also confirms that 
qualitative research comprises “the interpretive techniques that make it easier to 
describe and decode certain naturally occurring phenomena” (p. 9). Qualitative 
interpretive research seeks individuals‟ understanding and translations rather than 
relying on external influences (Sarantakos, 1993). The main characteristics of the 
qualitative inquiry are to be open and evolutionary. This nature of openness, 
evolution and emergence leads to ambiguity, and it means a lack of 
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standardisation (Veal, 2005). That is to say, when conducting a qualitative 
inquiry, the clear criteria, which will be applied to each step of a research, are not 
known and cannot be provided in advance. However, the strength of the 
qualitative method is that it sets a stage for exploration and discovery. Therefore, 
the key elements and/or hypotheses in qualitative research are emerging from the 
data rather than being determined in advance (Bailey, 1988).  
This qualitative interpretive framework is particularly effective in 
investigating dynamic organisational processes in terms of knowledge transfer 
and strategic management research (Marshall & Rossman, 1989). In order to 
understand the knowledge transfer process, some knowledge transfer researchers 
have chosen to use qualitative interpretive methodology which examines 
situations subjectively by gathering and translating qualitative data (Buckley, 
Clegg, & Tan, 2004).  
Several studies, for instance, Hoopes and Postrel (1999) and Pavlovich and 
Corner (2006) have demonstrated that an interpretative perspective is appropriate 
to understand the “intangible” nature of knowledge resources. Indeed the 
qualitative paradigm in the extending of IJV knowledge transfer suggests that it is 
a tool of “scientific discovery” while nomothetic methodology drives “normal 
science” (Kuhn, 1970). Interpretive research utilises qualitative information to 
understand what lies behind poorly understood social phenomena (Strauss & 
Corbin, 1990). It attends to the social construction of meaning and is more 
concerned with subjective experience, observation and description from field 
research (Cicourel, 1964; Neuman, 2000; Silverman, 1995). Understandably, 
most qualitative research has preferred to describe and illuminate the meaningful 
social world as prescribed by the interpretivist paradigm (Silverman, 1995). 
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4.2.4 Adopting a Suitable Theoretical Underpinning 
Various scholars such as Bryman (1988, 1989), Marschan-Piekkari and Welch 
(2004), Podsakoff and Dalton (1987), Tashakkori and Teddlie (1998), Yin (1994) 
distinguish the significant differences between the qualitative and quantitative 
approach in several ways as shown below: 
Table 4. 3 Comparisons between Quantitative and Qualitative Approach 
             Quantitative Approach                             Qualitative Approach 
Objective facts measurement Social reality construction, subjective, 
holistic 
Variables-focus                           Interaction, events process-focus 
Reliability emphasis                       Authenticity emphasis 
Value-free                               Value-explicit inquiry 
Independent of context                    Time-and-context specific 
Statistical analysis                        Thematic analysis, less emphasis on 
statistics 
Research is neutral                       Research is actively involved with 
Participants 
Deductive analysis                        Inductive analysis 
Source: Adapted from Marschan-Piekkari and Welch (2004). 
 
Layder (1988) argues that traditionally there has been a gulf between 
qualitative and quantitative research, with each belonging to distinctively different 
paradigms, and that the distinction relates to the production of knowledge and 
research processes. In considering qualitative and quantitative research 
methodologies, it is evident that there are disagreements regarding the value of 
each, and each academic discipline tends to favour some research approaches over 
others with differing methodologies (Brannen, 1992). The positivist tradition, 
which underpins much social policy research is, not surprisingly, often less than 
sympathetic to qualitative perspectives (Finch, 1986). Qualitative interpretive 
research is usually seen as a comparatively minor and even marginalised pursuit 
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within international business research, a pursuit which is adopted at an early 
exploratory stage to familiarise the researcher with a research setting before a 
large-scale sampling begins (Silverman, 1995), implying that the quantitative 
study is the standard form and the foundation of research. Weaknesses of the 
qualitative research approach in terms of its nature and features are also noted. 
For example, overemphasising the adoption of qualitative research may result in 
extreme subjectivity risks or in collecting meaningless data; it is a time-
consuming research process; and the research findings‟ generalisability and the 
objective research attitude need to be considered (Sarantakos, 1993). Moreover, 
the interpretive social sciences have often been equally dismissive of quantitative 
methods (Brannen, 1992). 
However, Marschan-Piekkari and Welch (2004) argue that “compared to 
quantitative methods, qualitative research takes a more holistic approach to the 
research object and studies a phenomenon in its context” (p. 8). Qualitative 
methods can take advantage of rich data and in this way allow the researcher to 
obtain more meaningful results about “soft” interrelationships between core 
factors (Wright, 1996). Chadwick, Bahr and Albrecht (1984) also emphasise the 
idea that interpretive research could demonstrate a more realistic worldview, 
allowing interpretative meanings; raising a deep understanding of the 
respondents‟ perceptions; and achieving flexibility. This issue means that a 
subjective and interpretive, rather than an objective, framework is required.  
In spite of the above arguments, it is still argued that research approaches 
cannot be inherently good or bad (Veal, 2005). Quantitative or qualitative 
approaches serve different purposes and result in equally valuable but dissimilar 
types of data. Each is more or less appropriate for the task at hand. How the two 
approaches can be integrated depends upon the problems to be addressed and the 
purposes to be achieved (Sarantakos, 1993).  
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For this research, a suitable theoretical paradigm was applied with the data 
collection including both interpretive description and empirical statistical 
methods. The combination of these two paradigms varies with the different stages 
of the research, and the combining of different methods within a single piece of 
research raises the question of movement between paradigms. The part of the in-
depth interviews with IJV executives from both sides was entirely qualitative. The 
use of a qualitative approach gave the participants the ability to express their 
views, and as a result their responses formed a basis for studies such as this one 
which interpret “how the various participants – individuals, groups or 
organisations – socially and subjectively construct rather than objectively 
determine the world round them” (Glesne & Peshkin, 1992, p. 6). The use of a 
qualitative approach also gave the researcher ability to comprehend “the inherent 
complexities of social interaction and to respect this situation in its own right” 
(Glesne & Peshkin, 1992, p. 7). 
Meanwhile, although generally against the notion of an objectively 
experienced reality, interpretivism does not reject its existence outright; rather, it 
argues that there is an objective world, but it is experienced only through 
meaningful understanding and new perception (Crotty, 1998). The most important 
function of interpretivism is to penetrate and look beyond the various layers 
constructed by actors in the real world so that the essential structure of 
understanding becomes clear (Ritzer, 1983). This perspective has led to the 
growth of adopting certain positivism research methods that emphasise the 
importance of studying social life in its natural setting, describing the realities and 
perceptions as they are seen and experienced by these respondents involved. For 
example, a software package statistical analysis – CATPAC – was used to 
enhance the analysis of textual data and their reliability (The nature of CATPAC 
will be described in section 4.6.2.). This computer-based method has advantages 
for handling large volumes of textual data in qualitative research at high speed 
with rigor and consistency (Silverman, 2000).  
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Overall, this research, in its current evolutionary stage, will adopt qualitative 
case descriptions. Meanwhile, this research will also employ statistical 
frequencies in portraying the results/findings of the research. This combination of 
theoretical paradigms gives the research the opportunity to apply various data 
collection and analytical tools and to build the research from one stage to the next, 
which is an efficient way to advance the theory of IJV knowledge transfer. In 
particular, through the application of CATPAC software, it provides a more 
detailed assessment and facilitates statistical comparisons, thus enriching the 
knowledge transfer measurement methodology required by Easterby-Smith et al. 
(2008). This kind of research may permit deeper understanding and sharper 
delineation of concepts, and allow for theory building, by focusing on the 
phenomena that are related to the knowledge transfer in IJVs.  
4.3 Considering the Case Study Method 
Turning from the epistemological lens, a research method describes the process 
within which the data is collected, analysed and presented in the thesis document 
(Noorderhaven, 2004). For qualitative interpretive research, case studies are often 
a preferred approach (Pavlovich, 2000). Yin (1994) argues “the case study is an 
empirical investigation method which could explore a real-world phenomenon in 
a contemporary social context” (p. 13), “consisting of research questions, 
theoretical perspectives, empirical findings, interpretations, and conclusions” 
(Yin, 2004, p. xiv). The process of identifying case study as the vehicle for this 
thesis utilised the framework is illustrated in Table 4.4: 
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Table 4. 4 Identification of Appropriate Research Method 
Yin’s Indicators Relevant Features of the 
Thesis 
Yin’s Suggested 
Strategies 
Research questions form Asks “in which ways”             History, Case study 
Control over behaviour?  No control, impartially 
seeking experiences of 
participants         
Survey, Archival 
analysis, History, Case 
study 
Focuses on temporary 
events?   
Principal focus on 
contemporary perceptions 
and events.            
Experiment, Survey, 
Case study 
Source: Yin (1994). 
However, case study research in reality is not easy, even though it has 
traditionally been viewed as a “soft research” (Yin, 1994, p. 26). Yin‟s statements 
distinguish a case research from some other research methods, such as surveys, 
histories and archival analysis. As each method has its strengths and weaknesses, 
researchers could consider single or multiple methods in any given research study. 
What the researchers need to consider regarding how to select the appropriate 
methods come from factors, such as the research purposes, types of questions 
(open-ended, or structured), the research setting/situation, the degree of control 
over behavioural processes and the extent of looking at historical documents 
versus contemporary events (Yin, 1994). As regards this thesis, the main practical 
considerations are as follows. 
First, the ultimate research approach depends upon the types of proposed 
research questions. When asking a “what” question, (e.g., “What are the most 
effective ways to communicate in alliances?”), then the research objective is 
maninly to develop hypotheses for later testing. If the questions concern “how 
much” or “how many”, (e.g., “How many ways to communicate in alliances?”), 
then the survey method or archival analysis will be recommended. Finally, when 
asking “how” or “why” questions, (e.g., “How to communicate in alliances?”), a 
case study method is appropriate (Ghauri, 2004). Yin (1994) also points out, the 
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case study is often helpful when asking how or why questions which are 
concerning set of contemporary events or a particular phenomenon under 
circumstances that researchers have difficulties in controlling.  
Second, the case study method is well suited when the phenomenon under 
examination is hard to separate from its natural settings (Yin, 1994). This 
situation is particularly useful when collecting data from cross-cultural and/or 
international business context (Ghauri, 2004), as researchers need to consider the 
attached different environmental contexts. It also means when examining the 
effects that the turbulent business environment has on international business 
operations, case studies could be helpful to understand the combined 
macroenvironmental elements, industry-level institutions, and company-level 
strategies. 
Third, Romano (1989) believes that while the business literature base has 
been preoccupied with developing practical results, it has ignored the need for 
profound methodological processes in the development of business theory. As a 
result, existing business studies lack an understanding of the internal mechanisms 
of business. One main characteristic of the case study is that it is “useful to new 
research areas for which existing theory seems inadequate” (Eisenhardt, 1989, pp. 
548-9).  
Fourth, another advantage of the case study approach is that it is flexible and 
holistic, which is very important when describing a process (Hyder & Abraha, 
2003). Case studies are useful for conducting process-oriented inquiries and for 
theory development, as they allow the tracing of significant events and capture the 
richness and subtlety of the phenomena (Ring & Van de Ven, 1994). Unlike those 
who use a survey, the case study researcher not only identifies certain causal links 
in terms of variables, but also is concerned with understanding, describing and 
interpreting the whole situation. Ghauri (2004) similarly points out that case 
studies are mostly conducted through reviewing the existing archival materials, 
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plus direct observations and interviews, providing a holistic account and analysis 
of an event or a series of related phenomenon under investigation which are not 
well documented in order to offer explanations in certain organisational 
functioning areas, such as strategic implementations and accompanied results 
(Bryman, 1989; Chetty, 1997). 
Fifth, Duanmu and Fai (2007) propose that when a complicated research 
subject involves organisational cooperative partnerships and knowledge transfer 
processes, the case analysis approach may be considered appropriate. The fuzzy 
nature of the interorganisational knowledge transfer process recommends the 
appropriateness of the qualitative approach (Easterby-Smith et al., 2008). Nearly 
half of the empirical inquiries and investigations in this area adopt a case study 
method (Inkpen & Dinur, 1998; Leonard-Barton, 1992; Rouse & Daellenbach, 
1999). 
In sum, the case study, as opposed to the logical-empiricist studies, is a 
viable research approach (Denis, 1990). The identification of case study as a 
strategy and framework for this thesis provides a basis for case selections 
processes and revelant analytic tools used in the collection of evidence. There are 
some principles in the selection of cases:  
1. Choosing cases that help extend theory, rather than provide randomly 
selected statistical assessments (Eisenhardt, 1989);  
2. Obtaining differences in research constructs (Yin, 1994); and 
3. Capitalising on individual relationships with respondents to guarantee a 
smooth interviewing process and quality data collection and information 
access (Inkpen, 1997).  
The purpose of case selection such as this is not to ensure representativeness, 
but to ensure that the case selection really does address the research questions and 
the main research purpose. This selection is even more legitimate when the study 
is characterised by theory building (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
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4.3.1 Research Design in a Case Study 
An appropriate research design in a case study is needed for the purpose of 
logically linking the collected data with the proposed initial research questions, 
and ultimately with the conclusions. Figure 4.3 shown below outlines the steps in 
designing the case study strategy. 
Figure 4. 1 Designing the Case Study: Research Strategy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Based on Yin (1994, 2004). 
 
The main purpose for setting up the research strategy is to prevent a situation 
where the collected evidence and data may not properly answer the research 
questions. As mentioned in the above section, case studies most probably answer 
the questions structured in a “how” and “why” format (Ghauri, 2004, p. 11). The 
major study themes refer to the required directions that need to be examined in a 
case study. Research targets are relevant to the research boundaries that define 
what the real case is and what is being talked about in a case study. The research 
targets and boundaries could be guided through the literature review. Research 
design should also be outlined to explain how to analyse the collected evidence, 
what the logic is, and the findings‟ assessment guidelines (Yin, 1994). The last 
essential stage of designing the research strategy is in developing the current 
theory (Yin, 1994). At this stage, the researcher can think about appropriately 
  Define & Design          Prepare & Collect              Analyse & Conclude 
                               Case Selection 
Develop                                                      Conduct       Case Report           Conclusion 
Theory                                                       Case Study 
                                Design Data 
                             Collection Protocol 
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facilitating the generalisability of research findings and defining the application of 
the whole research design process. 
This thesis followed the above framework guidance to design the case study 
research strategy by, first, conducting the literature review and relevant case 
readings to find out the gaps in terms of previous established literature theories; 
second, identifying the research themes and selecting the major unit of analysis; 
third, constantly exchanging the ideas in the research project with the supervisors 
and preparing the research questions; fourth, gaining access to the field sites and 
getting more information from the case company participants; and finally, based 
on the investigative findings followed by the major research outlines or formats, 
finding out the key theoretical and managerial implications. 
The unit of analysis, which is the interfirm knowledge transfer in the IJVs, 
was incorporated in a single case study design
2
. Single case design is suitable, (1) 
when it can be used to explain an established theory; (2) when a focused 
phenomenon can be studied which can provide useful insights; (3) when a case is 
unique (Ghauri, 2004). The selection of a single case design in this thesis was also 
closely linked with the identification of the research questions and context. This 
thesis put strong emphasis on the analysis of the collected information, to deepen, 
broaden and support the understandings of IJV knowledge transfer. Emphasis was 
given to the context within which knowledge transfer occurred. The identified 
context is one where partner firms transfer knowledge based on the established 
cooperative connections in an IJV setting in China‟s automobile industry. Thus, 
their different motivations, and the nature of their partnership demonstrates that 
human actions, perceptions and relationships would be important social realities, 
requiring the researcher to get close to the involved individuals for getting an in-
depth understanding. Several factors in the environment, which had major impacts 
                                               
2 Some scholars argue that the selection of case numbers in a research mostly depends on the research 
objectives and proposed questions. There is nothing wrong with “a sample size of one” (Mintzberg, 1979, 
p.583). In certain circumstances, only one case is enough (Ghauri, 2004; Mintzberg, 1979; Pauwels & 
Matthyssens, 2004). 
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in the functioning and process of knowledge transfer, were incorporated in the 
model. Emphasis has also been put on identifying and describing critical events. 
The single case research design helped the researcher to achieve maximum 
flexibility whenever necessary during the research process, which is a typical 
characteristic of the qualitative research approach (Ghauri, 2004). 
4.3.2 Research Industry Setting 
Although extremes of methodological view are useful in addressing specific 
questions, specific research methods for a research undertaking cannot be 
determined outside the nature and impact of the research context and research 
setting for the research process itself (Morgan & Smircich, 1980). Researchers 
thus need to consider the context of the research process which raises a 
fundamental consideration for both methodological credibility and theory 
development (Cappelli & Sherer, 1991). It is also widely acknowledged that 
qualitative research is well suited to capturing contextual factors. In fact, 
qualitative research is so closely associated with knowledge transfer studies in 
their “natural setting” or “local context” that this is regarded as one of its key 
distinctions (Marschan-Piekkari, Welch, Penttinen, & Tahvanainen, 2004, p. 244).  
This research concentrates on the IJV knowledge transfer in the Chinese 
automotive industry. Theoretically, comparing with other knowledge intensive 
industries such as the telecommunications manufacturing industry, the automotive 
industry occupies an intermediate situation between high and medium 
technological levels, which means it is less technologically intensive than, for 
example, the telecommunications industry (Buckley, Clegg, & Tan, 2004). The 
automobile industry depends mainly on mature technological skills and massive 
production to minimise operational costs and to maintain competitiveness over 
other players, thus the probability of finding cooperative arrangements such as 
alliances/joint ventures is very high (Buckley et al., 2004).  
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This auto industry research setting offers several strengths. First, the 
automotive industry in China is a rapidly changing industry in which the wide 
range of knowledge transfers have been demonstrated as a result of the dominance 
of extensive FDI activities (Buckley et al., 2004), and Chinese authorities have 
already issued some industrial policies around knowledge transfer in joint 
ventures formed between foreign multinational enterprises (MNEs) and local 
Chinese companies. Second, the use of a single auto industry helps control for 
industry-level factors. However, the researcher still expects that the results 
concerning knowledge transfer issues in this setting could have implications for 
other industry settings and business activities. 
4.4 Principles and Sources of Data Collection 
There are six relevant sources of data collection in qualitative research, including 
“historical artifacts, archival documentation, physical records, interviewees‟ 
description, direct observations, and indirect observations” (Yin, 1994, p. 79). 
Each source offers an effective way of accumulating relevant information; and no 
single source can completely replace any other. Following Yin‟s (1989, 1994, 
2004) comments, the data collection process permits the researcher to look 
through a broad range of evidence to make the findings and conclusion more 
convincing and appropriate, which means a good case study needs to use a broad 
range of sources in an appropriate procedure. 
The use of multimethods of collecting data is actually not new, as Campbell 
and Fiske (1959) suggest that researchers should use more than one data 
collection method to ensure validation. Collecting data from various sources of 
information can reduce the likelihood of misinterpretations and 
oversimplifications, and identifies a more complete portrait of the object (Ghauri, 
2004; Pauwels & Matthyssens, 2004).  
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4.4.1 Interviews as Primary Data Sources 
Primary data are a kind of information or evidence directly gathered from either 
internal or external sources for meeting certain purposes. Mostly, the primary data 
come from interviews, and indirect or direct observations within or outside the 
involved company (Yin, 1994, p. 79). An interview is a situation “where the data 
and findings are based on direct researcher-to-respondent conversations (in person 
or by phone)” (Daniels & Cannice, 2004, p. 185). According to Cohen and 
Manion (1989), Page and Meyer (2000), the interview is a very commonly used 
approach in exploratory and descriptive studies. It can obtain past and relevant 
evidence about phenomena or processes and focus on the participants‟ context-
specific and systemic statements, or descriptions, an outcome which can not be 
effectively achieved by other techniques of research.  
There are three situations in which interview techniques may be appropriate 
for international business research (Daniels & Cannice, 2004). First, interviews 
are particularly useful for exploratory studies. In this case, interviews allow the 
researcher to discover new relationships or situations not previously conceived, as 
the comments and opinions of the main respondents constitute a focal part of the 
research. Second, interviews are well suited when there is a small population of 
interviewees. In this sense, researchers must focus on the depth of collected data 
when breadth is simply not attainable
3
. Third, interviews may allow researchers to 
develop a deeper rapport with interviewees than is possible through written 
questionnaires; thus they may create a trusting relationship when needing further 
information or cooperative contribution to the research. Thus, by properly 
managing interview studies, researchers can develop a network of new data, and 
insights which can be used to achieve research efficiency (Lindlof & Taylor, 
2002).  
                                               
3 Of course, a researcher should not seek depth just to overcome the problem of a small population; rather, 
interviews “offer an opportunity to acquire a richness of information from each respondent” (Daniels & 
Cannice, 2004, p. 186).  
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4.4.2 Selecting the Semistructured Interview Method  
Generally speaking, there are three types of interview format (Page & Meyer, 
2000): 
 The first type refers to a structured-interview format, which involves more a 
specific range of questions requiring restricted responses; 
 Regarding the second type of interview, an investigator can ask key 
interviewees about facts and events followed by specific questions derived 
from the case situation in an exploratory nature without any restrictions on 
how the participants would reply; 
 In the third type – semistructured interview – both closed-ended and 
completely open-ended prestructured questions are sent to all respondents. 
Care needs to be taken when using completely open-ended questions as the 
concern will be how to analyse those responses in a meaningful (systematic 
and objective) manner. 
Although interviews can be conducted one-on-one, and may be either in a 
structured or semistructured format, researchers recognise that semistructured 
format would be more flexible than other means (Page & Meyer, 2000). Some 
advantages related to semistructured interviews including the generally higher 
response rate, flexibility, ability to observe nonverbal behaviour, control over the 
investigative environment, and control over question order. In addition, they offer 
the ability to explore through follow-up probing and provide a great opportunity 
to assess the validity of responses (e.g., via observation of nonverbal behaviour). 
Other advantage of the semistructured questions relates to the possibility of 
raising additional questions and discussing essential issues in depth. This type of 
flexibility relates to the possibility of modifying the research design, as it is not 
essential to design formal questions, though some guidelines for conducting the 
interviews are necessary in order to ensure that the study remains focused and 
corresponds to the research questions. These guidelines or questions enable 
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respondents to describe the process, as it really exists, without too much influence 
– so that the process becomes a natural outcome of the prevailing situation. 
Additional questions or thoughts could even be taken up later and not necessarily 
on the same interview occasion. However, regarding the semistructured interview, 
the researcher still needs to be aware of some key issues including travel costs, 
time consumed, potential bias, and interpretation inaccuracy (Hyder & Abraha, 
2003).  
Following Adler, Campbell and Laurent‟s (1989) call, the researcher decided 
to design an semistructured open-ended interview questionnaire to improve the 
validity, since Chinese managers often do not use the same constructs that 
western researchers do (Adler, Campbell & Laurent‟s, 1989), but thereafter leave 
greater freedom to change the ways of asking interviewees; to adjust the 
questioning sequence; to modify the amount of interviewing time, and even to add 
or delete particular questions which then seem to be inappropriate according the 
conversation context (Robson, 1993).  
In preparing the interviewing questions in details, the researcher followed the 
reviewed literature, the conceptual model, the proposed research questions, and 
the preapproved PhD Plan (Refer to Appendix A). Some of the main concepts of 
the model were reflected in the questions, something which made it possible to 
create a strong linkage between the research problems, the conceptual model, and 
the empirical data. The finalised interview questions (See attached Interview 
Questions List in Appendices C and D.) were written in two versions (English and 
Chinese), which were then approved by the Waikato Management School Ethics 
Committee. 
4.4.3 Interview Respondent Selection 
The selection of the relevant and suitable interview respondents is quite important 
for researchers. Well-informed respondents can provide insightful perspectives, 
unique expertise, or areas of knowledge that researchers probably cannot access 
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on their own. These have a decisive and meaningful influence on the research 
findings obtained in answering the research questions in certain ways (Daniels & 
Cannice, 2004). 
This research selected multiple respondents from the case companies and the 
interviews were conducted at Shanghai-GM (The process for selecting interview 
respondents is discussed in section 4.5.). The interviewees are IJV American and 
Chinese top managers including presidents, general managers, representatives of 
partnering firms, and functional department managers (who are in charge of 
business development, marketing planning, technology R&D, and human 
resource training programmes). These respondents had an in-depth insight of the 
interfirm cooperative strategies and knowledge transfer operations in the IJV.  
Previous research conducted by Dhanaraj et al. (2004) and Peng and Luo 
(2000) supports the viewpoints that reliable data provision (from either self-
reported or archival documents) can be expected from the IJV top managers. 
Child, Yan, and Lu (1997) and Geringer and Hebert (1991) also point out that 
there exists a significant and reliable correlation between parent firms and IJV‟s 
top managers‟ attitudes toward IJV operational performance and a parent firm‟s 
influence. On average, the American and Chinese managers had been in their 
current position for about 4 years as at the first contact, and all were involved in 
the knowledge transfer processes.  
With the interviewees coming from both sides of the IJV, there were 
differences in competence, age, rankings, and nationalities. In response to their 
different cultural backgrounds, the researcher carefully designed two versions of 
the interview questionnaire: one in English, and the other in Chinese. As the 
researcher has lived and worked in Nanjing city, Jiangsu Province (close to 
Shanghai) for a long period, this personal background proved convenient in terms 
of understanding the local environment and establishing the necessary personal 
connections. More importantly, his bilingualism (Mandarin and English) was very 
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helpful in conducting the interview data collection procedures. Finally, the 
method of back translation was also adopted to keep the questions‟ content 
consistent, as suggested by other researchers such as Brislin (1970), and Buckley 
et al. (2004). Table 4.5 gives a summary of the interviewees and their 
backgrounds. 
Table 4. 5 Relevant Issues and Topics Covered in the Interviews 
(1) American Interviewees 
Interviewees Date Topics 
A1 November 
2005 
GM‟s business strategy and strengths; background of 
investment in China; reasons to choose the Chinese partner; 
comments on IJV performance and partnership with the 
Chinese; types of technology (knowledge) transferred; 
problems to transfer and background story 
A2 December 
2005 
Background of establishing the partnership with SAIC; 
objectives of GM; reasons to choose the JV form; auto 
industry policies; comments on IJV performance and 
partnership; different behaviours of American and Chinese; 
conflicts and misunderstanding; learning in JV; 
impediments or benefits of knowledge transfer  
A3 December 
2005 
Knowledge transfer to IJV in China; product development; 
auto policies; learning intent of Chinese; product 
development; adaptation; HR issues 
A4 January 
2006 
JV business performance evaluation; localization; partner 
relationships; Conflicts between the partners; managerial 
styles; cross-cultural considerations 
A5 January 
2006 
Strategic objectives; working environment in JV; partners 
conflicts; cross-cultural issues; methods used to solve 
problems encountered; learning issues; knowledge 
adaptation; barriers in knowledge transfer 
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(2) Chinese Interviewees 
B1 November 
2005 
JV set up background; major strategic objectives; adapting GM‟s 
expertise; perceptions of the competencies of GM; impediments to 
maintaining good partner relationships; conflicts; preferential 
treatments of the Shanghai City Government to the Shanghai-GM; 
benefits of sharing know-how 
B2 December 
2005 
JV consideration; background of JV establishment; first batch of 
expatriate managers from both sides; Qualifications of the American 
managers and Chinese executives in Shanghai-GM; implementation 
of knowledge learned and rationales; conflicts in implementing the 
new system; training received; perceived competencies of GM 
managers working in Shanghai; technology transfer and R&D issues 
B3 December 
2005 
Background of JV; HR practices in JV; difficulties encountered and 
factors contributing to success; GM‟s willingness to transfer 
production system 
B4 January 
2006 
Recruitment of Chinese employees; human resource training 
practices; principles of personnel management learned from GM; 
localisation and adaptation practices 
B5 January 
2006 
Objectives of SAIC‟s participation in the Shanghai-GM project; 
contributions of the partners; how the Chinese partner was 
transformed as a result of learning 
B6 December 
2005 
Nature of the knowledge learned from the Shanghai-GM; willingness 
to transfer from GM; impediments to learning, business partnership 
B7 January 
2006 
Significance of learning and knowledge transfer; the relations 
between cooperation and knowledge complementarities 
B8 February 
2008 
Working environment in the JV; cross-cultural conflicts and 
misunderstandings 
B9 February 
2008 
Joint venture daily operations; knowledge acquisition activities 
B10 February 
2008 
China‟s automotive industry background and joint ventures; 
knowledge acquistion 
B11 February 
2008 
China‟s automotive development; knowledge acquisition issues 
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4.4.4 Secondary Data Sources  
It is always helpful when doing case investigation to have a look through some of 
the existing information to get an overview of the research subject first. These 
secondary sources play a critical role when preparing a case study. What appears 
in the files of the companies as texts can be used as sources of knowledge, even 
though these could be regarded merely as remnants of the organisation‟s activities 
in the past (Yin, 1994). In this case research, in addition to carrying out the above- 
mentioned interviews, certain written documents (such as annual reports, interim 
reports, company memos, websites, newspaper articles, booklets, and company 
brochures containing information about the products and services), were used as 
additional and complementary information sources, as suggested by Yin (1994).  
Additionally, the researcher also consulted professional magazines, published 
journals, and online academic databases such as EBSCO and ProQuest. This 
secondary research was possible, as the researcher had access to the Internet 
database of the University of Waikato in Hamilton, and had opportunities to go 
back to Shanghai, China to visit the company (which is described in Section 4.5). 
The study of documents forms part of the case study, which provided the 
opportunity to see developments before and after the IJV formation. Thus the 
researcher was able to identify differences and changes in content.  
However, these secondary sources cannot be used without scrutiny and must 
be treated with a critical eye, as some of them were written for other purposes and 
audiences. As Yin (1994) points out, “the researchers need to bear in mind that, 
reviewing these materials doesn‟t mean to accept all of these opinions; 
confirmation and assessment tasks for verifying the usefulness and effectiveness 
are still fully required” (p. 81). In addition, the researcher needs to add an 
assessment of the relationship between the writer and the focus of the writing 
(Ghauri, 2004). For example, (1) was the writer close enough in time and space to 
Chapter 4: Methodology and Method 
98 
  
witness what he/she is saying? (2) Would the writer have any interest in changing 
the story in his/her own favour, or in order to suit other interests? 
In sum, the thesis tried to employ various procedures to increase 
understanding and explanation of interfirm cooperation and knowledge transfer 
activities over time. The principles of data collection were intended to make the 
research process as feasible as possible, and to set up the links between specific 
evidence and final results. In this way, research findings could become more 
persuasive, comprehensive, and accurate. These principles are of crucial 
importance for understanding the very complex nature of the business alliances 
and knowledge learning issues in this case study. Through these principles of data 
collection, plus with reviewing literature, studying company documents and 
archives, and contacting the case companies, understanding on the research issue 
of knowledge transfer in IJVs in China‟s automotive industry was gradually 
increased. 
4.5 Access and Execution of the Fieldwork  
Fieldwork is part of the PhD research. A number of scholars have reflected upon 
different types of difficulties regarding fieldwork access to the studied 
organisation and to the individual interviewees (Andersen, Borum, Kristensen, & 
Karoe, 1995; Michailova, 2004). The reasons for the difficulties are, however, of 
a different nature in certain organisations in certain research settings. Michailova 
(2004) maintains that fieldwork sometimes is an art, which make the access 
possible. 
4.5.1 Initial Contacts and Gaining Access  
The fieldwork research and interview activities were carried out during the period 
between September 2005 and February 2006 (First Round Data Collection), and 
in February 2008 (Second Round Data Collection) respectively. In order to 
conduct the data and evidence collection procedure properly, and to get firsthand 
materials and information on the situation, following the suggestions of Singleton, 
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Straits, Straits and McAllister (1988), the researcher sent emails several times to 
establish initial contacts before the fieldwork stage. It has to be emphasised here 
that in China, if people do not know any person working inside the company or 
have no personal connections (so-called guanxi networks) outside, the chances to 
get permission in conducting interviews in these big Chinese companies would be 
minor. Sometimes these companies‟ doormen will even not let the interviewer 
enter into the office building without showing appropriate “Letter of Introduction”.  
In order to surely get the interview things done, the researcher then asked his 
father to try to get approval first from the Chinese case company. As the 
researcher‟s father had been working in the vehicle and transportation 
management field for so many years in Jiangsu Province, he had certain important 
guanxi networks, and he initially contacted some of his friends who were in 
charge of the automotive development in the government of Jiangsu Province and 
Shanghai city. Because the researcher was introduced by the relevant government 
departments, after several rounds of emails and telephone calls made to the 
Shanghai case company, the beginning of fieldwork research was verified and the 
case company finally offered to host the field research during certain days. In this 
way, the researcher could increase the reliability of the whole research data 
collection process. These interview arrangements and getting access helped the 
researcher receive more information in an informal manner by secured manner 
without perceived difficulties
4
.  
4.5.2 Meeting with Managers 
One Chinese managing director warmly welcomed me, showing that the offer 
made was not an empty promise (which was also a gesture of “giving face” to the 
researcher and other relevant people involved in these fieldwork arrangements). 
He is an open-minded, friendly man in his late thirties. Professionally and socially 
he is active in Shanghai Automotive Industry Corporation (SAIC). After 
                                               
4 One disadvantage of using personal connections for determining the field is that the researcher may in this 
way be forced to conduct a study in a organisation that may not be the most appropriate one for investigating 
the particular research issues he/she intends to deal with, as commented by Michailova (2004). 
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exchanging business cards, we spent a few minutes talking about things not 
related to the research, for example, the trip to make the visit and the weather in 
both Shanghai and New Zealand, all of which helped establish an easy tone for 
the following conversation. As we had already scheduled this particular day for 
interviewing, the researcher then briefly explained the study again and why 
undertaking this research. Meanwhile, the researcher reassured him that when the 
interview process began, he and other participants could refuse to answer any 
interview question if they feel uncomfortable about it. Finally, the researcher 
emphasised the confidentiality and anonymity issues regarding this research and 
asked him to pass this consideration to other managing directors and his 
colleagues. 
After having lunch which was provided by the company, we decided to meet 
other senior Chinese and American managers who were interested in this topic 
and willing to provide useful information into the study (The choice of a suitable 
respondent – someone able to provide the relevant information – was particularly 
emphasised.). Because of his senior managerial position as one of the managing 
directors, he was able to show me around the company building and access to 
different departments. This entrée turned out be helpful for my data collection and 
interview procedures with the relevant managers, most particularly because 
people could easily see me as his guest. The following step was then to hand in  
the research project information, consent forms, and questionnaire guide to the 
Public Relations Department (in charge of the media interview and news release), 
as a way of formally requesting the joint venture to participate in this study.  
Of the 20 IJV top managers contacted (in the areas of planning, marketing, 
R&D, manufacturing, and HRM), 16 agreed to participate and were interviewed. 
As not all of the senior executives had seen the researcher before, this was a 
perfect occasion to introduce the research in a relatively formal way. The aim was 
to lay open my intentions to the top managers, to appreciate them for participating 
and full support for this study.  
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4.5.3 Conducting Interviews  
The face-to-face dialogues with 11 Chinese executives were conducted in 
Mandarin and the conversations with five American managers were in English. 
Generally speaking, each interview in this research followed a four-part protocol 
to ensure reliability:  
First, the researcher started with general questions in a warm-up phase, 
things for example, the researcher clearly described the project content and 
research purpose to make sure that the respondents had a basic idea about the key 
theoretical concepts. The researcher also generally took 5 minutes to brief 
participants on the research, and gave a two-page, well-written introductory 
statement on the project; together with a one-page covering letter that addressed 
any concerns about anonymity and confidentiality (The ethical issues are 
discussed in the following section 4.5.4). The respondents working in various 
departments of the company were then asked to provide personal information 
(such as the respondent‟s position and background). The researcher again 
especially emphasised the confidentiality issues to the participants involved.  
Second, the researcher switched to let the respondents answer very broad 
questions, talking about the historical development and current status of the IJV 
firms involved, thus stimulating storytelling at this stage.  
Third, the respondents were asked to provide detailed activities they had 
participated in that involved knowledge transfer and learning from the source unit 
to the recipient unit. The researcher paid particular attention to the following 
aspects of the interview process: (1) how respondents described the details of 
knowledge transfer activities they engaged in; (2) what knowledge transfer 
mechanisms they perceived as effective or ineffective; (3) what benefits of 
transfer strategies the respondents deemed effective; (4) how respondents 
compared various knowledge transfer practices; and (5) the knowledge transfer 
activities involved in the chronologies that the respondents described, along with 
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the rationale behind the sequence. In this phase, the researcher also posed precise 
questions about important subjects, such as conflicts, connected to knowledge 
transfer while at the same time, checking answers by asking the same questions 
again in a slightly different way. 
Towards the end of the interview, in the final phase, the researcher asked 
about more general subjects, moving away from sensitive issues to other relevant 
things, such as the developments in the auto industry as a whole, rather than in the 
company itself. Essentially, the interviewer was continually helping the 
participants to clarify their understanding and thinking, accompanied by an 
encouraging nod of the head. The most frequently asked questions took the 
following form: 
 Can you give me some examples? 
 What do you mean by that? 
 Could you please further explain or say a little more about that? 
These dialogues provided the information regarding the firm‟s business 
operations. Each interview normally lasted at least half an hour, and many were 
much longer. The researcher explained to the respondents the issues being 
investigated during conducting all interviews. Although it was not always easy to 
give a complete picture, it was important that the respondents were given 
background knowledge and information about the phenomena being researched. 
Marked differences between American and Chinese managers over the issues of 
IJV learning were expected as these differences are reflected in their perceptions 
of knowledge management in alliances. Such differences between Chinese and 
American managers may impact on the quality of the received information. 
For presenting the overall perspectives of the joint venture knowledge 
transfer operations, the subject matter concerning the relative influence of 
Chinese and American partners was answered separately by American and 
Chinese managers in the joint venture, i.e. the interviews with different managers 
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tended to get both a Chinese and American perspective. The aim was to 
strengthen the validity of the information provided.  
4.5.4 Three Fieldwork Research-related Considerations 
(1) Ethical Considerations  
It is often justified by the researchers on the grounds that research findings might 
contribute more benefits to the public society. However, research practices have 
also shown that this uncontrolled freedom could result in adverse effects on the 
participants, directly and/or indirectly causing serious problems for the subjects in 
the research process (Sarantakos, 1993), and thus violating those participants‟ 
rights. In order to avoid or prevent such malpractices, it is claimed that “ethics” 
should be the controlling factor, i.e., researchers need to be guided by certain 
standards and principles in the area of social investigation to ensure responsible 
research practice.  
These issues mentioned above are particularly sensitive in Sino-foreign joint 
ventures, as senior managers tend to feel that the release of confidential 
information could put them at a competitive disadvantage. A few respondents 
might even feel that the information would be used against them. Thus, in order to 
conduct this research successfully and without any trouble, several important 
considerations regarding ethical issues were kept in mind. First, when conducting 
the interviews, the researcher initially identified himself to the respondents in an 
appropriate way (Sarantakos, 1993). All the participants were then informed about 
the whole procedures involved in this research beforehand either in written or 
verbal form (See Appendices A and B). Second, in accordance with Waikato 
Management School‟s ethical guidelines, all of the interviewees who volunteered 
to participate in this project were required to sign a consent form. The 
interviewees could also withdraw from the research at any time. They also had the 
right to refuse to answer any question under any circumstance. Finally, the 
relationship between the researcher and the interviewees was kept totally 
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independent. It was important that the researcher allowed the managers to express 
their own interests or enthusiasms and to feel that they had the opportunity to talk 
about these within the scope of the interviews.  
(2) Gaining Cooperation with Respondents  
Business and management research is a kind of dynamic interactive process 
involving researcher(s) and respondent(s). Successful research interviews are 
always dependent on trustworthy cooperative relationships, as well as on fulfilling 
promises and well-accepted expectations. 
During the interviewing period, the researcher had endeavoured to create an 
open and trusting relationship with the respondents by communicating in the 
interviewees‟ language, providing assurance of anonymity, and communicating an 
understanding of the interviewees‟ situations in the IJV to obtain reliable and 
valid responses from interviewees. For example, the researcher asked some more 
sensitive questions at the end of the interview after all other questions had been 
answered and rapport had been built up, although the researcher was aware that 
some managers preferred to focus on some particular topics, such as procurement, 
investment decisions, product pricing, branding or marketing instead of topics 
such as conflicts, unhappiness and misunderstandings between each other. The 
researcher also encouraged a positive attitude towards the interview by indicating 
the benefits of previous knowledge transfer research, together with the feedback 
report that the participating companies would receive
5
. 
On this basis, researchers enter the research site(s) with a relatively large 
number of options for action. This freedom of action has always been thought to 
offer the best opportunities for answering the research questions, or solving the 
problems under investigation.  
                                               
5 A specific aspect of conducting fieldwork in the case company was that the Chinese managers were not very 
interested in receiving the researcher‟s findings, which I speculated was that they might perceive providing 
the interview and data collection as merely a personal favour. One Chinese manager excused himself with the 
words: „Don‟t worry about that, if you are not quite sure about the company situation, just let me know‟. But 
for American managers, there were several times they told me that “it would be interesting to see the results 
of your research”. 
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(3) Using a Tape Recorder 
Initially, the researcher did not realize the importance of using tape recording 
techniques when conducting the fieldwork, as this was the researcher‟s first time 
to experience this type of interview-based qualitative research. During the first 
round of interviews in 2005, the researcher only took notes during the 
conversations and then transcribed the notes as soon as possible thereafter. Then 
the transcriptions were submitted to the interviewees for clarification. However, 
the researcher gradually realized it was quite inconvenient without using a tape 
recorder, as the researcher found in certain circumstances, some participants 
spoke really fast, and it was difficult to write every single word down the paper 
while trying to concentrate on the conversations and interviewees‟ answers. 
Therefore, the researcher only wrote down some key words which made certain 
transcripts were not in a complete form. Realising this problem, the researcher 
decided using tape recorder during his second round interviews in 2008. The 
researcher then noticed although it was time-consuming when listening tapes 
again and again sitting in the room, it was quite useful and necessary to get full 
original transcripts afterwards. Tape recording the interviews was thus seen a 
positive light and, therefore, critical as a “serious” research technique (although 
using recorder still needs to obtain permissions from each interviewee first). 
4.6 Data Analysis Strategy and Methods 
4.6.1 Interpretation and Descriptive Analysis 
This process of interpreting and analysing case study evidence and qualitative 
data is difficult. As with so many aspects of qualitative research methodology, 
there is extensive debate about the most appropriate aspects of qualitative data 
analysis. Prasad (2003) observes that qualitative research is in no way a uniform 
set of procedures for data analysis, and can be conducted within a variety of 
intellectual traditions (Hammersley, 1992). Denzin and Lincoln (1994) try to 
move beyond this position by suggesting qualitative research is a multimethod 
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way to “interpret phenomena in terms of the meanings people bring to them” 
(p.2). Bryman (1989) identifies certain characteristics of data analysis. First, much 
emphasis has been given to the research object or the context characteristics. 
Second, the changing process, i.e., to unfold the events in time, is emphasised in 
qualitative research.  
In this research, “authenticity” rather than reliability is the main issue. The 
idea is to present the “authentic” understanding of people‟s experience, which 
means not just understanding the viewpoints of the individuals and organisations 
being studied. Researchers cannot be satisfied merely by “telling stories” (Yin, 
1994). In addition, “data has to be interpreted against the background of the 
context in which they are produced” (Ghauri, 2004, p. 117). Because of this 
difficulty, preplanning the analysis is seen as critical to ensure the quality of this 
case study results. In this research, research evidence is based on the collected 
data combined with the conceptual research model. Data analysis consisted of 
multiple readings of the interview transcripts and related documentation, and 
identifying activities and subjective evaluations pertaining to the success of 
knowledge transfer and learning configurations (Strauss & Corbin, 1990). Table 
4.6 presents the case analysis techniques with relevant explanations: 
Table 4. 6 Case Analysis Techniques 
Case Analysis Techniques  Explanations 
Chronologically ordering Narratively explain the events occurred (arranged by 
year, month, and date) 
Coding Organising data according to the themes and relevant 
concepts 
Clustering Sorting cases according to the common features 
Matrices Explaining the linkages between identified elements 
Decision Tree Modelling Grounding the depictions of decisions and/or events 
in the real world 
Pattern Matching Comparing a predicted pattern with an empirical one 
Source:  Ghauri (2004). 
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In this research the data analysis was not a consecutive activity, but was 
carried out concurrently with the evidence collection process during the life cycle 
of the case study research (Silverman, 2000). Interview data were compared with 
public company reports and press releases, internal company documents, and 
other articles written about the case company‟s operations. Meanwhile, the 
fieldwork impressions were also included. On certain occasions, the researcher 
communicated with the respondents to rectify some situations when encountering 
inconsistencies, a technique suggested by Daniels and Cannice (2004). Then the 
researcher is more confident about the accuracy of the information received. 
Nevertheless this case analysis involved the following several stages. First, was to 
construct the case descriptions (including the “story” of situation and historical 
development path) in a “narrative” way (Ghauri, 2004, p. 118). This procedure 
attempted to explain what happened, then interpret “how” things are developing 
over time and “why” things happened the way they did (Ghauri, 2004, p. 118). 
The next step was to rearrange the collected data, and to try to present the 
data in an understandable manner through classifying the data, and extracting 
common or conflicting themes. This coding and categorisation helped with data 
interpretation and the relationship of the information to the research questions and 
conceptual model. Importantly, the relationships between different themes and 
research questions could be identified predicting how the elements are connected 
and related (These steps can be done with the help of a computer software 
package called CATPAC, which is discussed in the following sections.). In sum, 
the analysis followed a pattern of description, interpretation, evaluation, and 
application – an analytic method proposed by Miles and Huberman (1994). Data 
analysis adopted the tools identified in the case study protocol, with the 
classification and examination of evidence to make linkages between concepts as 
a basis to address the research questions (Dey, 1993).  
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4.6.2 Computer Software Analysis - CATPAC 
Computer software is viewed as one choice in the management of case evidence 
and data (Silverman, 2000). Software programs are particularly useful in 
rendering data analysis more systematic and providing counterarguments to those 
who claim that case study researchers are “just telling stories” (Ghauri, 2004, 
p.119). In this research, a software package (CATPAC – CATegory PACkage) 
was utilised, which was developed by Joseph Woelfel and Terra Research and 
Computing more than a decade ago (Woelfel & Stoyanoff, 1998). CATPAC is a 
nonbiased self-organising computer program, designed to analyse data in a 
consistent and replicable way. It has options which allow the concepts to be 
related to one another. It reads the text and determines what words occur the most 
frequently (Woelfel & Stoyanoff, 1998).  
4.6.3 How to Operate CATPAC 
When running CATPAC, the user is asked to specify the number of unique words 
he/she desires. At this point, the programme functions like a human brain; for 
example, when one reads or receives information, it is virtually impossible to 
retain every single word iterated from the source. Like the brain, CATPAC 
remembers the n-most frequent concepts of the data, with n being an appropriate 
number assigned by the analyst. At this point, while a person might have the 
ability to remember only a limited amount of information given in a text, an 
analyst like CATPAC can opt to remember as many words or concepts as exist in 
the data set. The text is read using a sliding window. The user specifies the 
number of words CATPAC should look at, and moves through the text according 
to the slide size. For example, if the window size is seven, and the slide size is 
one, CATPAC will look at the first seven words
6
, move one word over and then 
look at words two through eight, three through nine, etc. This process is repeated 
                                               
6 When running CATPAC, it asks the user to specify the number of unique desired words. At this point, this 
program functions like a human brain. Like the brain, CATPAC remembers the n-most frequent concepts in 
the data – with n being an appropriate amount assigned by the analyst. Seven words at a glance are 
approximately how many words a “human reader” sees at one time (Woelfel & Stoyanoff, 1998). 
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until the entire text has been read. At this point, CATPAC might have the capacity 
to remember not a limited amount of information given in the data, but as many 
words or concepts as those that existed in the data. 
 Frequency Statistics – The output from a CATPAC run includes the 
following files: .cat, .win, .crd and .lbl, the prefix name of the files is assigned by 
the programmer, and the suffix (i.e., .cat) clarifies the type of file. The .cat file 
shows the parameters that were chosen for executing the run (nodes clamped, 
window size), and basic information about the specific data file (total number of 
words, lines, etc.). The .cat output includes two lists of the same information; one 
in descending frequency and one in alphabetical order of concepts. Each word is 
listed with its frequency and its percentage occurrence. The output table can 
demonstrate which words occurred the most, along with their frequencies of 
occurrence compared to the others. Analysts often use the frequency to see which 
words occur most frequently (Woelfel, 1998). Frequency information thus can be 
used to help identify whether the data need any further cleaning-up procedures or 
not before onducting a second run. 
Cluster Analysis of Dendogram – However, the list of frequency statistics of 
the unique words alone does not lend itself to significant interpretations (Woelfel, 
1998). Therefore, to further explore the underlying concepts of the data collected 
in the interviews, the results are presented in a dendogram to visually illustrate the 
most frequent key words used in the texts. A dendogram graphically provides a 
matrix representing the cognitive clusters of concepts and shows how closely 
associated one word is to another. As a result, the relationships between words 
can be discussed in various ways such as in terms of their clustering, their 
distance matrices, and closest and furthest words (Woelfel, 1998). Similar 
nodes/concepts thus get clustered, and the stronger the linkages between nodes, 
the closer they are located.  
Based on the text entered and analysed in the computer, the dendogram 
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displays an output of words at the top of the page. Dips in the dendogram show 
the divisions between groups of concepts, and the height of the “hills” made by 
the stacked arrow-heads represents the strengths of the relationships between 
nodes. This display generated a visual “city skyline” of “building” across the page 
(Woelfel, 1998). In essence, the building skyline illustrates how the words 
clustered together. Accordingly, each skyline building represents a concept by 
shading the area underneath the set of words that go together. 
4.6.3 Detailed Operating Procedures 
First, for the purpose of achieving satisfactory interpretable results from this text-
mining analysis, the textual interview data were transcribed onto computer disk as 
ASCII text form. Since text files include many words that do not add to the 
content of the text, a laborious “smoothing out” procedure and technical 
operations have to be considered for the textual data prior to analysis (Woelfel, 
1998). Thus CATPAC ignores prepositions, conjunctions and other words, 
including: 1) identifying certain words, such as “the”, “a”, “you”, “are”, “I”, 
“am”, which occur in the text but have no underlying meaning. The researcher 
loads these exclusion words – loading these words means they are not included in 
the CATPAC analysis; 2) using singulars instead of plurals; 3) using present tense 
rather past tense; 4) making the spelling of the companies‟ names consistent, and 
combining some multiple names (with two or three words) into one, for instance, 
“Shanghai-GM” was recorded as “ShanghaiGM”; 5) after the above procedures, 
then have multiple runs of the CATPAC to further exclude some words such as 
“month”, “ten”, since these terms will have no contributions for  interpreting the 
data. These refined data formed the base for the main content analysis and 
synthesis from which the conceptual contribution emerged. Then the researcher 
loads three main starting parameters: (1) unique words 25; (2) window size 7; and 
(3) slide size 1. Thus, CATPAC initially picks up 25 unique words for the 
connections; and the CATPAC scans seven words each time. After several 
experimentations, a setting of relevant unique words was pickeded up as most 
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appropriate. 
Second, for each of the CATPAC runs, Ward‟s Clustering Method was used 
with the words in the co-occurrence matrix. In this instance, CATPAC used this 
clustering method to look for associations among the words to identify the 
interviewees‟ perceptions of specific topics and interview questions. The findings 
are then grouped into a square matrix of summary statistics where the rows and 
columns represent the words, and the cell value represents the associations 
between every pair of words.  
Third, the hierarchical cluster analysis is presented in this chapter by 
computing a visual of a “city skyline”. The dendogram creates a skyline formed 
below the important words (unique words) of the text. The important words are 
vertically positioned across the top of the page. The dendogram identified clusters 
of concepts, by shading the area directly below those words that cluster together. 
More specifically, the dendogram constructs each of the clusters to represent the 
linkages among the textual data. As each of the clusters grows wider from the 
bottom of the dendogram as it includes more words, it peaks at the top as fewer 
words are linked. In this instance, the visual representation of data is used to 
describe or recognise the subclusters by creating the illusion of a building skyline 
in a city. 
4.6.4 Summary and Implications  
CATPAC simply reads the text, identifies the most important words and 
establishes patterns within any kind of written text, such as speeches, focus group 
discussions
7
 (Woelfel, 1993; Woelfel, 1998). The scanning of the text produced a 
matrix with weights that showed associations between words (Woelfel, 1998). 
The output of the analysis could also be displayed as a conceptual map because of 
the strong visualisation abilities of CATPAC (Lockyer, 2005). Distinct from 
traditional textual analysis, CATPAC does not require any precoding of the text, 
                                               
7 Some examples of text files people have studied using CATPAC include: in-depth interview transcripts; 
answers to open-ended survey questions; newspaper reports and magazine articles. 
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nor is it necessary for the analyst to precode or determine what categories of 
information (or even how many categories) might lie in the text in advance 
(Woelfel, 1993, 1998). The procedures outlined above are done by CATPAC in 
an interactive environment to prevent any inappropriate changes of the underlying 
meaning of the text
8
. 
Advantages of looking at individual issues across the interview transcripts 
include (Woelfel & Stoyanoff, 1998): (1) a unique perspective on how consistent 
interviewee participants were from one question to another; (2) the ability to see 
through vague answers, for example, if one manager was asked a question about 
an issue he/she was not comfortable with, he/she might not answer ambiguously, 
but redirect the answer into another concern which he/she is highly confident 
discussing. While he/she might be successful in eluding the interviewer, his/her 
answers, analysed in CATPAC, will reflect the real issue he/she focused on; (3) 
the analysis of individual issues across all the interview questions will also enable 
the analyst to extrapolate from the data to what extent each interviewee knows the 
issue at hand, and his/her self-referent relationship to the issue. In each of the 
interviewee answers, a title was assigned to sections according to the questions 
asked. Thus, the importance of reading interview transcripts‟ texts in the present 
study provided key insights that helped enhance an understanding regarding the 
IJV interfirm knowledge transfer practices. 
                                               
8 Programming CATPAC to ignore words that do not change content but function grammatically to clarify 
interview transcripts etc. further illustrate how the program acts like a human brain – when a person analyses 
the text, they do not focus on how many times the interviewees said “the”. Instead, that person is more likely 
to remember if a particular issue was addressed repeatedly.  
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4.7 Chapter Conclusion 
This chapter identified a qualitative approach as being most appropriate for this 
research. Qualitative approach is appropriate when research is a complex and 
pluralistic process, diverse in purpose and methods, based on a varied theoretical 
and ideological structure which reflects the researcher‟s belief system and 
methodological stance, drawing on the relative philosophical theories about 
methodologies, plus the identification of research context and questions. This 
approach assumes reality is constructed through ongoing processes of 
interactions, communications and negotiations and is based on the definition 
people attach to that reality within the context, suggesting “social reality exists as 
people experience it and give it a subjective meaning” (Hughes, 1990, p. 89). 
Further, as people may experience different social experience; there may exist 
multiple views of interpretations about realities (Neuman, 2000). 
This chapter also describes a case research strategy for conducting the 
empirical work, and the applied method in writing this thesis – from developing 
the research design to conducting the entire investigation of case research. The 
key stages in developing the case research are: choosing the research problems; 
constructing a research model; deciding on fieldwork methods; gathering the data 
– with the researcher not only collecting related secondary information on case 
companies – but also designing interview questions in terms of research 
objectives, and starting to contact interviewees for details about interview times 
and places. Lastly, this chapter specifies a computer-assisted software CATPAC 
package for coding and analysing the data. 
The next chapter moves to present contextual analysis of global automobile 
industry – to obtain a clear understanding of the current situation of the global 
auto industry, its characteristics, historical development and its future trends.  
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Chapter 5   The World Automobile Industry 
 
5.1 Introduction 
Automobiles have revolutionised transportation and been affecting the way 
people live. By various measures of size (e.g., employment, value of output) the 
automotive industry is regarded as one of the world‟s most important 
manufacturing industries. It has been a glamour industry worldwide showing 
massive rates of growth and, with the development of its distinctive production 
methods and consumer products. This chapter looks at the specific characteristics 
of the automotive industry in a global context in order to explore industry-related 
issues, highlighting its importance and significance over 100 years, and why 
human society has so readily embraced a global automobile industry as a 
mechanism for economic and social development.  
This chapter begins by defining the construct of the automobile industry and 
motor vehicle products (section 5.2 and 5.3); it then describes the transformation 
process of the auto industry in the global setting (section 5.4) and in the USA 
context (section 5.5) respectively. Reflecting upon these past events facilitates a 
clearer understanding of the current situation of the global auto industry and its 
future development trends. Section 5.6 then mainly considers the issue of global 
auto industry‟s sustainable development. This chapter finally concludes in section 
5.7. 
 
Chapter 5: World Auto Industry 
115 
  
5.2 The General Category of Motor Vehicles Type 
The automobile has shortened the time and distance for transportation, and 
enabled people to travel farther and faster. However, the concept of the 
automobile has remained much as it was in the mid 1880s since the invention of 
the original practical motor vehicle a hundred years ago – in spite of the fact that 
vehicle manufacturing technology, operating performance and individual personal 
comfort have been advanced, the automobile is basically used as an internally 
powered, four-wheeled road transport tool with a driver and a few pasangers 
(Lundqvist, Button, & Nijkamp, 2003).  
The general category of motor vehicles includes a wide variety of products, 
differentiated by dominant function or size, weight and method of propulsion. 
Variations in engine size and dimensions of vehicles reflect national differences 
in vehicle and fuel taxation, driving conditions and traditions, and income levels. 
For example, there exist major contrasts between American standards and those of 
Western Europe and Japan, where small- and medium-sized engines dominate 
(Lundqvist et al., 2003). To the producers, retailers and consumers worldwide, 
automobiles are normally classified by particular make, model and variant, which 
appeal to distinct market segments and always convey particular implications of 
quality, image and tradition (Lundqvist et al., 2003).  
Passenger cars are considered the dominant vehicle type, which can be 
classified by body type (two-door, three-door, four-door, hatchback, sedan/saloon, 
sports, and station wagon), engine capacity, and price class (Lundqvist et al., 
2003). The second category, commercial-vehicles manufacturing, consist of 
relatively light-weight vans, pick-up trucks, and buses, which are used for 
commercial purposes, recreation, and general passenger carrying (Lundqvist et 
al., 2003). Many of these commercial vehicles are close derivatives of passenger 
cars and have traditionally been made by the large automobile manufacturers. 
Commercial-vehicles manufacturing are governed by varied national regulations 
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on gross vehicle weight, unladen weight, seating capacity, width, and length 
(Lundqvist et al., 2003). Comparing with passenger cars, licensing of vehicles, 
use and driver are more stringent with commercial vehicles. The use of diesel 
engines is more widespread in commercial vehicles but varies internationally 
depending on fuel tax policies (Lundqvist et al., 2003).  
5.3 Subdividing the Automobile Industry 
The automobile industry is generally grouped within the cluster of vehicle 
engineering and the more specific category of transport equipment manufacturing 
industries. The manufacture of motor vehicles can be subdivided into a number of 
distinct but closely related sectors (Lundqvist et al., 2003): 
(1) The first sector, which is also the largest sector of the industry, refers to the 
manufacture and assembly of complete motor vehicles and is normally 
dominated by the well-known motor corporations. Vehicle products include 
passenger cars, vans, trucks, buses and special-purpose vehicles, such as fire 
engines and ambulances. 
(2) The second sector encompasses the making of bodies and trailers mainly for 
trucks and buses, where bodies are fitted closer to the point of sale for the 
special requirements of customers. This sector was much larger in the past 
when custom-made car bodies were common and before the large 
independent mass-produced body makers were acquired by the large vehicle 
producers. 
(3) The third sector covers a wide range of motor vehicle parts and components, 
such as engines, clutches, gears, transmissions, brakes, body frames, and 
wheels. Some of these are now made in the same establishment as motor 
vehicle assembly. Large motor corporations worldwide are interested in 
acquiring firms in this sector and have become increasingly integrated 
within them.  
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These three sectors described above form the core of the automotive industry. 
Car and commercial-vehicle manufacturing are distinct sectors of the automotive 
industry (Lundqvist et al., 2003).  
While differentiation by product type continues, control of the two sectors is 
now largely integrated within the big motor corporations. Small independent 
manufacturers remain only in the specialist sectors of car and commercial-vehicle 
building. Beyond this there is a wide periphery of ancillary industries, often 
strongly integrated with the production of motor vehicles. Many essential 
components used in vehicles are classified in other industrial groups. Examples 
include automobile glass (glass products), tyre making (rubber products), 
electrical equipments (batteries), fabrics and textiles (Lundqvist et al., 2003).   
5.4 Mapping the Development Path of Global Auto Industry 
The global auto industry has experienced various stages of remarkable 
transformations (Lundqvist et al., 2003). These transformations and relevant 
background descriptions are summarised in Table 5.1.  
The first transformation was from horseless carriage to the automobile age 
starting from the 1890s. The second transformation was around 1910, brought by 
the American car producers, moving into a period of mass production. The third 
stage commenced in the 1940s when European manufacturers proposed both the 
concepts of mass-volume production and product differentiation. The fourth stage 
occurred in the late 1960s when Japanese carmakers emphasised both lower-cost 
products and manufacturing technological accuracy. The fifth transformation (the 
late 1980s into the 1990s) was characterised by the emergence of new producers 
from regions such as the Soviet bloc and the newly industrialising countries (e.g., 
Brazil and Korea). The current stage of the global auto industry transformation 
includes developing countries, such as those in Latin America, Eastern European 
countries, China, and India. The following sections examine the nature of how 
these transformations occurred. 
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Table  5. 1 Industrial Transformation in World Automobile History 
Transformation 
phases 
Year Production or 
product 
innovation 
Geographic 
area of rapid 
market 
growth 
National or 
regional 
industry 
seizing the 
initiative in 
shaping the 
world auto 
industry 
 First 1890s into 
1910s 
From horseless 
carriage to 
automobile age 
Europe, US Europe, US  
Second 1910s into 
1930s 
Standardised 
product, mass 
production 
system 
US US 
Third 1940s into 
1960s 
Product 
differentiation, 
emphasis on 
product 
technology 
Europe Europe 
Fourth Late 1960s 
through 
1970s 
Just-in-time, 
total quality and 
corporate 
groups as a new 
system of 
production 
organisation 
Japan Japan 
Fifth Late 1970s 
into 1980s 
Concentrated 
production at 
low-factor-cost 
locations 
Certain regions 
such as the 
Soviet Union, 
Korea, Mexico 
and Brazil 
 
Sixth Late 1980s, 
1990s until 
the present 
day 
Mass 
introduction of 
flexible 
manufacturing 
systems, new 
forms of 
“cooperative” 
competition 
Latin America, 
the ASEAN 
countries, 
Eastern 
Europe, China 
and India 
 
Source: Adapted from Kennedy (1972) and Lundqvist et al. (2003). 
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5.4.1 From Horseless Carriage to Automobile Age (1890s-1910s) 
During the period of 1890s and 1910s, there was a great emphasis on the 
automobiles “as an entirely original transportation tool in the application of 
gasoline power that could move over the public highways without the assistance 
of a horse” (Kennedy, 1972, p. 1). 
The world‟s first automobile was completed by German carmaker – Benz – 
in 1886 (Kennedy, 1972). Interest in motor vehicles then expanded rapidly in the 
1890s in France, and to a lesser extent in the US and Britain. After the automobile 
was initially born in Germany and France in the mid-1880s, the establishment of 
motor vehicle manufacturing as a distinct industry took place in the period 
between 1898 and 1908 (Bloomfield, 1978). By 1906, more than 20 years after 
the appearance of the first practical vehicle, French and German producers 
accounted for 58% of worldwide production and were acknowledged as the 
leaders in high-performance vehicle products. However, the market was still 
generally tiny, fewer than 50,000 vehicles were produced per year in Europe at 
that time (Bloomfield, 1978). Meanwhile, the momentum in the world auto 
industry was also being transferred to the United States.  
Six motor vehicles were displayed at the 1893 Columbian Exposition in 
Chicago. That same year two bicycle mechanics, Charles E. and J. Frank Duryea, 
successfully made the first gasoline automobile in Springfield, Massachusetts 
(Flink, 1975). Experiments in the US also began with Haynes and Apperson in 
Kokomo, Indiana (1894), and Maxim in Lynn, Massachusetts (1895), who also 
produced motor vehicles using some ideas from Europe but often undertaking 
parallel developments (Flink, 1975).  
From these inauspicious beginnings, a new form of mobility was rapidly to 
become a major force in shaping the twentieth-century. Considerable progress had 
been made since the mid-nineteenth century in developing more compact and 
efficient power units. Most significantly, during the 1860-1890 period light-
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weight, high pressure, internal combustion engines with automatic controls were 
developed (Flink, 1975). Flink (1975) points out that the implementation of the 
automotive throughout Western Europe and the United States by the 1890s also 
depended upon a reawakening of interest in the highway transportation, which 
provided a fertile climate for the commercial exploitation of the advances in 
automotive technology made in preceding decades. This new interest in highway 
transportation created requirements that neither the railroad nor the horse could 
meet (Flink, 1975). The automobile, however, began to outgrow its horseless 
carriage era where until 1896 a man carrying a red flag was required to walk in 
front of any motor vehicle, and few motor trucks being produced before 1910 
(Turner, 1963; Kennedy, 1972).  
The last quarter of the nineteenth century was thus a very important period. It 
witnessed both invention and major innovations in transport and in the widening 
use of transportation facilities, such as improved machine tools and petroleum 
refining technology. Flink (1975) argues, “It is probable that no invention of such 
so quickly exerted influences, transforming the national culture, even habits of 
thought” (p. 2). Everyone was now automobile conscious. Although horses 
continued to be hardworking and dependable for pulling wagons and cabs, they 
did come with some drawbacks – even if manure clean-up on the city streets gave 
employment to many men (Anderson & Anderson, 2005). Although most of the 
automobile news during that period centred upon car performance such as cross-
country endurance tests and races, predictions that a cheap, reliable car for the 
masses would soon be built and many people believed that within the foreseeable 
future a utopian automobile age would dawn began to become commonplace 
(Kennedy, 1972). 
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5.4.2 Ford’s Initiation in Volume Production (1910s-1930s) 
In the early 1900s there were several small automakers building cars. Many of the 
early automakers were new business entrepreneurs with no particular commitment 
to this industry (Lundqvist et al., 2003). The days before 1914 were a time of risk. 
The automobile industry lacked appropriate mass-production techniques due to its 
concentration on luxury designs resulting in a very small market. In 1900 world 
vehicle output was only estimated at 9,500 units, mostly produced in France and 
the United States. By 1908, world output had risen to 106,000 vehicles 
(Bloomfield, 1978). As demand rose, a more popular market developed, and 
manufacturers began producing standardised light cars. With the progress of 
vehicle technical improvement, some industrialists began making experimental 
and then practical working models. The early models of these vehicles were 
experimental prototypes designed for pleasure and amusement (Lundqvist et al., 
2003). A large proportion was shortlived and may never have reached full 
commercial production, but the growth illustrates the wide interest in the new 
vehicle. The successful firms were commonly characterised by a skilled labour 
force, accurate and standardised machining of components, strict quality control 
of materials and finished products (Lundqvist et al., 2003).  
It was Henry Ford who helped popularise the ownership of a car (Lundqvist 
et al., 2003). Ford began producing the famous Model T in Britain in 1911 – at an 
assembly plant in Old Trafford, Manchester. By the beginning of the First World 
War Ford improved its operational ease and achieved great success through 
bringing in mass-production. Ford also standardised auto parts and reorganised 
production to maximise efficiency. In 1913, the first moving assembly line was 
laid down at Ford‟s Highland Park, Michigan plant, and by 1914, a chassis was 
being turned out every 40 seconds (Turner, 1963).  
By the time the First World War came, Ford was turning out 6,000 cars a 
year. Although no fewer than 198 makes of car had been put on the market, fewer 
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than half of them were still in production by 1913 (Turner, 1963). Yet the war 
was not a wholly negative influence. It created a public with a much greater 
conception of the potential of the motor vehicle and trained thousands of drivers 
who might otherwise never have sat behind the wheel of a car. The end of the war 
found an industry ill-prepared for bad times. Such plant as had survived was 
unbalanced, and although engine shops had expanded, the coach-building shops, 
which had handled the car bodies, had almost ceased to exist. There were far too 
many uneconomic firms, and during the 1920s the car industry “was forced to 
streamline itself under the twofold impact of the slump and fierce competition” 
(Turner, 1963, p. 21).  
The first million annual output was achieved in 1915, and 2 million vehicles 
were made in 1919 (Bloomfield, 1978). In the second half of 1920s, the American 
auto giants came to the European continent and Britain in full force. When the 
war ended, it was clear that Ford had outgrown its prewar headquarters in 
Manchester, and now sought a new centre which it could use primarily as a great 
exporting base for Europe. In 1925, Ford acquired a 500 acre site at Dagenham. 
Operations began in 1931, and within 4 years the company began to sell its car on 
the market (Turner, 1963). The Ford expansion was then to take a large slice of 
the European continental and British markets.  
Between 1924 and 1929, car prices fell on average by 25% (Turner, 1963). In 
1925, General Motors took over Vauxhall. By 1929, car production output had 
climbed to 6.3 million, which was to remain as a record figure until post Second 
World War expansion. After 1929, the world economic depression had a strong 
influence on total auto production worldwide, seeing it decline to 1.9 million 
vehicles in 1932 (Bloomfield, 1978). 
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5.4.3 Volume Production plus Trade Tariffs Decline (1940s-1960s) 
The Second World War meant major dislocation and shortages within the car 
industry, as the manufacture and repair of arms immediately became a top priority 
(Lundqvist et al., 2003). When the war ended, the European producers had been 
hit hard, and in Germany many motor manufacturing plants lay in ruins. While 
there was an increasing demand for cars in the world, there were few cars to be 
had. In 1943, only 1,649 cars came off the assembly lines (Turner, 1963). In 
America, domestic demand swallowed up total home production.  
This situation had far reaching significance. For 10 years the world market 
had been starved of cars, and at that time quality became secondary (Turner, 
1963). Equally, in the rush to produce cars, labour relations had to take a back 
seat. Management was far too concerned with production figures to spend time on 
unions. Consequently, they tried to ignore the union‟s increasing power. Another 
consequence of postwar disruption was the way in which governments milked the 
car industry (Turner, 1963). The problem, apparently, was no longer how to sell 
the cars, but how to produce them quickly enough. It was a new world in which 
the motor car was not merely (as in prewar days) an instrument of luxury and 
pleasure but also a tool with which to rebuild a broken economy.  
At this stage, a large number of automobile manufacturers began to pursue 
different design and technical solutions in order to meet various national market 
conditions, such as the wide variations in consumer incomes, vehicle taxes, and 
geographic locations
9
. In Europe, some manufacturers experimented with large 
engines; others favoured small cylinder layouts. Some producers concentrated on 
rear-engine/rear-drive arrangements, others used front-mounted engines with rear-
wheel drive, and still others offered front-mounted engines with front-wheel 
                                               
9 For example, in Italy, with its low incomes, high fuel taxes, and the concentration of population in ancient 
cities with narrow streets and limited parking spaces, consumers demanded small cars. In Sweden, lower fuel 
taxes, higher incomes, less dense cities, and harsh winter driving conditions combined to channel consumers‟ 
desires toward larger cars, even at the expense of higher purchase cost and fuel consumption (Lundqvist et 
al., 2003).  
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drive. In North America, carmakers had standardised on a large, 6- or 8-cylinder, 
front-engine/rear-drive, gasoline-fuelled, chassis-on-frame design (Lundqvist et 
al., 2003).  
During the three decades after World War Two, as a consequence of 
increased personal income and redeployment of labour from wartime 
manufacturing to peacetime production designed for consumption, the world 
production of new vehicles and the total number of vehicles in use climbed year 
after year, reaching 10.5 million units in 1950, and 16 million in 1960. 
Manufacturing output almost doubled in the 1960s, reaching 30 million in 1969. 
Among these figures, the European auto industry accounted for only 13.6% of 
world auto production in the early 1950s, compared with North America‟s 85.1% 
(Humphrey & Memedovic, 2003). In 1958, for the first time over one million cars 
were produced in Britain, and the achievement was trumpeted as the beginning of 
a new age. The dream of “a car in every home” seemed about to become reality 
(Turner, 1963, p. 9).  
Trade barriers such as tariffs were also falling dramatically across the world 
in the 1950s and 1960s due to the successive rounds of tariff negotiations under 
the General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade (GATT). The European external 
tariff on automobiles was reduced to 10.9% by 1973 while the American tariff 
was reduced to a nominal 3% (Humphrey & Memedovic, 2003). In a competitive 
world auto industry, this reduction meant that consumers had opportunities to 
access to most of the world‟s automotive products without paying high tariffs. It 
also meant that international auto marketplace competition increased at a rapid 
rate. The European carmakers took advantage of this opportunity, greatly 
promoting the sales of their motor vehicles. In contrast, American auto exports, 
which had fallen during the 1930s, failed to grow significantly in the 1950s and 
1960s, even as tariffs fell and American exports to most world markets were 
rapidly increasing in other sectors. The reason was quite simple: the North 
American automobiles had grown so large that they were not suited to consumer 
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incomes and energy prices in any other world market (Humphrey & Memedovic, 
2003). By the early 1970s, the total European auto market was equal in size to the 
North American market.  
5.4.4 The Emergence of the Japanese Auto Industry (1960s-1970s) 
By 1973, the Japanese auto industry was well on its way to world leadership in 
manufacturing techniques, and it was concentrating on the production of small 
cars because the energy shock had shifted the pattern of demand. The oil price 
crisis of late 1973 had a substantial effect on the world auto industry, and 
production declined to 35 million units in 1974 (Shimokawa, 1994). After the 
1979, when energy-price adjustment pushed demand patterns even further in the 
favour of Japanese manufacturers, western producers began to speak of the 
“Japanese Challenge” (Sobel, 1984). In the United States, the growing Japanese 
market share in the late 1970s was coming mostly at the expense of European 
small-car imports.  
The general characteristic of the Japanese auto industrial structure was the 
fact that it was highly oligopolistic and government-managed from the beginning 
(Conybeare, 2004). The Japanese auto industry‟s first transformation was ushered 
in by the Americans. Ford and General Motors established their Japanese plants in 
1924 and 1927 respectively to assemble CKD (Completely Knockdown Kits) 
produced in Detroit. During the 1930s, however, the Japanese Government‟s 
concern about foreign domination grew, as most of the vehicles in fully finished 
form were either assembled by or imported from the United States. For example, 
in 1931, 30,000 vehicles in Japan were designed and manufactured by Ford and 
GM for the Japanese market, while Japanese auto production was only 437 
vehicles (Shimokawa, 1994).  
The Japanese army was particularly anxious about the full-scale 
manufacturing capability of indigenous Japanese auto industry. The Law 
Regarding Automobile Manufacturing Enterprise of 1936 made this intent clear, 
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as it “excluded all foreign manufacturers, setting the conditions for an oligopoly 
market of domestic producers” (Conybeare, 2004, p. 9-10). By 1939, both Ford 
and General Motors had closed their Japanese operations (Lundqvist et al., 2003). 
However, the focus on war production and then the war itself foreclosed any 
immediate possibility of Japanese-owned producers building up an internationally 
competitive auto industry. 
In the immediate postwar period, the Japanese Government was concerned 
about the desirability and particularly about the feasibility of developing an 
independent auto industry (Shimokawa, 1994). The Japanese Government 
preferred to have a concentrated auto sector and in the early 1950s even 
encouraged consolidation. By the end of the American occupation in 1952, the 
Japanese Government had determined to include the auto sector in the list of 
industries to be favoured with low-cost bank credit, preferential tax treatment, and 
careful protection of the domestic market. In addition, it reaffirmed the prewar 
practice of requiring that Japanese auto plants be Japanese-owned (Shimokawa, 
1994).  
In the 1950s and 1960s the Ministry of International Trade and Industry 
(MITI) stressed the conventional view of the auto industry as a high-volume 
business above all else (Shimokawa, 1994). To foster high volume it continually 
tried to consolidate the industry into two or three firms in the belief that each 
manufacturer should specialise in a certain size segment of the vehicle market 
(Conybeare, 2004). MITI argues that in this way Japanese producers could 
quickly obtain the necessary volume to reduce their costs, expand volume in the 
domestic market, and break into world competition (Sobel, 1984). However, 
progress in building an indigenous domestic industry was still slow at this stage, 
and Japanese auto companies generally resisted government consolidation 
arrangements like this (Conybeare, 2004). 
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In the early 1950s, although the Japanese producers obtained organisational 
techniques, designs and tooling from a number of western producers, progress in 
developing the products toward the minimal standard of quality and comfort for 
consumer acceptance in the United States and Europe was arduous (JAMA, 
2009). Manufacturing volume and output per model in Japan were too low to 
compete against the economies of scale and productivity accruing to the US mass 
production system (Conybeare, 2004). Japanese industrialists realised they could 
not be competitive in world markets simply by following in US footsteps. A new 
production system was then led by Toyota Motor Corporation as Japanese car 
manufacturers responded to US industrial hegemony (Cusumano, 1988).  
Here, William Edwards Deming (October 14, 1900 – December 20, 1993) 
played a critical role in the development history of the Japanese auto industry, 
although he was actually an American statistician, lecturer and business 
consultant (Hill & Lee, 1994). Since 1950, Deming had presented a series of 
speeches to the Japanese top management in the field of management science and 
theory, such as how to improve product quality, testing, design and services when 
competing in the global market. Deming was then famous for his contributions to 
Japanese later renown manufacturing capabilities, innovative products and 
quality-related management system, and is often regarded as one of the “national 
heroes” in Japan (Austenfeld, 2001; Hill & Lee, 1994). 
By around 1960 the Japanese auto industry had begun to export a very basic 
product sold on the basis of very low price. But the initial Japanese efforts, around 
1960, to export were not successful. These cars were not up to a minimum 
international standard and could not be sold merely on the basis of low price 
(Cusumano, 1988). Instead, Japan‟s export success came through fine-tuning 
manufacturing systems to combine high-volume output with high quality and low 
labour content. Together, these developments represented a major breakthrough in 
production organisation that soon made it possible for the Japanese to establish a 
standard for all auto manufacturers. This breakthrough was the key to this third 
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stage of transformation. Japan‟s share of western markets jumped in several years 
(notably 1970, 1975, and 1979), which drew the attention of the automotive world 
to Japan (Cusumano, 1988). Different from American mass-production method 
which was focusing on maximising economies of scale and minimising product 
diversities for the purpose of cost reduction, the Japanese achieved efficiencies 
through flexible specialisation and just-in-time (JIT) manufacturing process 
(Cusumano, 1988).  
Over the following 20 years, as an organisational model had been found in 
industrial and conglomerate groups, a new labour-relations model was developed 
in the form of company-based unions with lifetime employment in Japan (JAMA, 
2009). Finally, a new manufacturing philosophy, based on the concepts of just-in-
time (JIT) and total quality management (TQM), had taken hold, although these 
two concepts were actually brought in by Deming (Hill & Lee, 1994). 
5.4.5 Transformations in New Regions (1970s-1980s)  
The developing world includes a vast array of countries with widely differing 
cultures, political systems, and levels of industrial infrastructure. A number of 
these countries have developed substantial auto industries for recent years, and 
some are even now exporting, mostly to other developing countries, at low 
volumes (Lundqvist et al., 2003). Three examples (the Soviet bloc, Brazil and 
Korea) can be cited to show the problems facing countries with developing 
domestic auto markets and export ambitions during the period of 1970s-1980s. 
(1) In the 1970s, the Soviet bloc and the low-wage developing countries 
emerged as the prime prospects although they offered limited success. In the 
1930s, Ford first provided the necessary technical assistance for mass production 
in the Soviet bloc (Aervitz, 2007). However, the domestic automobile markets of 
the Soviet Union and its Eastern European satellites still remained small after the 
first two decades of the postwar era. In addition, the local production systems and 
product designs were not competitive compared with western offerings. The 
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indigenous producers gave no evidence of innovation that might launch them onto 
the world stage. 
In the late 1960s, the Soviet Union and a number of the Eastern European 
nations embarked on a new course calling for large-scale imports of western 
manufacturing know-how, tooling, and vehicle designs. These imports were to 
pay for themselves by means of automotive exports to the West, often in the form 
of buy-back arrangements wherein tools and designs would be exchanged for 
finished autos and components (Aervitz, 2007). For example, Lada in the Soviet 
Union bought tooling from Fiat to produce under licence the 124 model, and soon 
Lada was exporting to Western Europe. Several other producers in Poland and 
Romania also followed the Russian example, obtaining designs and tooling from 
Fiat, Renault, and Citroen in return for cash or shipments of components and 
finished vehicles back to the western firms for sale in the West (Aervitz, 2007).  
By 1980 the world‟s motor vehicles had grown to 320 million cars. Three 
major auto-producing regions (North America, Western Europe, and Japan) 
accounted for 87% of the world‟s automobile production, yet had only 16% of the 
world‟s population (Lundqvist et al., 2003). This fact demonstrates that these 
three major regions exported most of their products to the rest of the world.  
However, during 1979-1982 a substantial market still existed in the Western 
industrialised economies for extremely low-priced autos even if, these were not 
very stylish or up to the latest Western standards (Aervitz, 2007). Through most 
of the 1970s Eastern-bloc exports to the West grew steadily, although from a tiny 
base (Lundqvist et al., 2003). Eastern-bloc exports to the West stabilised at a 
modest level, accounting for 1-2% of the new-car market in Western Europe 
(Aervitz, 2007).  
In the late 1970s the eastern producers showed little capacity to 
independently design new vehicle models and manufacturing systems, and some 
of the European vehicle products were judged to be of inaduquate quality for sale 
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in the West. Meanwhile, because western producers would not introduce their 
latest designs and tooling system, it was inevitable that the Eastern Europeans and 
the Russians would always lag one product generation behind the western market 
(Lundqvist et al., 2003).  
(2) Since the 1920s, automobiles had been assembled with a low proportion 
of the manufacturing process taking place within Brazil – a totally protected auto 
market. In 1957 the Brazilian Government launched a “Brazilianization” plan for 
the auto industry that required a high level of local content (Ferro, 1995). Those 
multinational auto producers investing in Brazilian auto-manufacturing facilities 
were to be offered favourable tax treatments in return for greatly increasing their 
market share (Ferro, 1995).  
By 1962 the average automobile sold in Brazil reached 93% local content 
requirements (RNCOS, 2008). However, this occurrence came at a high price for 
local consumers. In 1967, Brazilian cars cost 60% more than similar products 
produced in the United States and Europe, despite much lower wages. The 
problem was that the large number of producers was sharing a very small market 
(RNCOS, 2008). The Brazilian Government then fostered a skewed income 
distribution, creating a nationwide financing system with attractive low interest 
for purchasing cars. Finally, the importing of vehicles manufactured elsewhere 
was prohibited. 
By the early 1970s, the Brazilian Government realised that Brazil might be 
able to join the ranks of world auto exports because the cost of Brazilian cars was 
dropping dramatically as auto production volume increased (RNCOS, 2008). The 
1972 Special Fiscal Benefits Programme for Exports took the bold step of 
encouraging exporting from Brazil, involving agreements with multinational 
enterprises (MNEs). The Brazilian Government offered MNEs large tax breaks on 
domestic sales and the right to add new product lines for the Brazilian domestic 
market in return for promises to export given volumes of finished components 
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over the following years. Brazilian auto exports to the world then rapidly 
increased from only 2,000 at the start of the programme in 1972 to 135,000 in 
1981 (RNCOS, 2008).  
Brazil stands alone among the less developed countries in this achievement, 
but its future as a major auto exporter is far from assured for a number of reasons 
(RNCOS, 2008). A fundamental problem is that the Brazilian industry has no 
competitive edge in production systems or finished units beyond low wages, even 
though some products of given specification and quality seem to be higher than 
those in the developed countries. Second, Brazil‟s domestic market demands only 
a considerably simple automobile model which differs from other markets in the 
world, and most of its vehicles have to be exported to other countries. Thus its 
domestic market to digest its production capability seems quite limited. 
(3) Korea is another example of an industrialising nation eager to break into 
the international auto market during this transformation period. Korea‟s auto 
industry began to develop later than Brazil‟s and it followed the alternative path 
of building up domestically-owned producers.  
Initially, as a labour-abundant country lacking comparative advantage in 
producing autos, “Korea used protection from imports to force feed the industry” 
(Conybeare, 2004, p. 11). In 1962, Korea prohibited imports of completely built 
cars. At the same time, the Government decreed that only firms with majority 
domestic ownership would be licensed to produce cars in Korea (Lee, 1997). 
From this point, local content requirements were raised gradually as the domestic 
producers showed the capacity to meet them. In 1974, the Korean Government 
announced an ambitious plan to design and market indigenous products to 
compete against the established multinational producers in world export markets 
(Lee, 1997).  
A modest recovery then followed, South Korea entered the world motor 
vehicle arena in the early 1980s as a low cost production site for American 
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multinational enterprises (MNEs) who had lost the compact car market to more 
productive and higher quality Japanese automakers. At that time, wage costs in 
the South Korean auto industry were only 10% that in the United States, due to 
the Korean Government subsidised the auto industry and repressed workers‟ 
movements to ensure that wages remained low (Amsden, 1989). Meanwhile, 
infrastructure for auto production – particularly steel and machinery industries 
transferred earlier from Japan – was also well established (Amsden, 1989). 
Korean automakers were organised into giant conglomerates (chaebol) capable of 
making massive investments in capital intensive production facilities.  
However, the process of building Korea into an automotive export giant still 
took much longer, and the actual performance of the Korean auto industry was 
less spectacular than planned. Auto production increased slowly to 9,100 units in 
1974, then further sharply dropping to nearly half in 1980 after a short time peak 
at 114,000 in 1979 (Lee, 1997). Scale economies were, therefore, unavailable, and 
production costs were very high despite low labour costs (Hill & Lee, 1994). Part 
of the problem was that the Korean Government‟s policy of supporting domestic 
auto producers (giving them, for example, favourable taxes, and export 
assistance) was not coordinated with its domestic treatment of auto purchases 
(Lundqvist et al., 2003). In fact, purchase taxes were assessed at 45% of the retail 
price ex-tax, annual registration taxes were more than 10% of purchase price, and 
gasoline was taxed at one of the highest rates in the world at that time (218% of 
the price ex-tax in 1977, 168% in 1982) (Lundqvist et al., 2003). Hence, the 
Government‟s consumption/demand policy was essentially anti-auto. Finally, the 
income distribution in Korea was much more egalitarian than that in Brazil, so the 
middle class did not have as much income to purchase new cars (Lundqvist et al., 
2003).  
Therefore, it was not surprised to see when the Korean Government removed 
protection in the 1970s and 1980s, its auto industry became vulnerable and came 
to rely on foreign MNEs. For example, Daewoo Motors, originally established in 
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1970, later set up a 50/50 joint venture with GM, with GM relinquishing its share 
in 1972 for US$ 170 million (Conybeare, 2004). 
The experience with auto manufacture in Eastern-bloc countries and less 
developed countries (such as Brazil and Korea) was mixed at this stage. Their 
domestic markets and production were growing rapidly before the worldwide 
economic slump of the early 1980s. However, they did not make the leap into the 
world arena as major exporters of finished units or components, nor had they 
shown any creative dynamism in their domestic industries that might combine 
with lower wages during this period (Conybeare, 2004). The limits of government 
assistance in seizing the initiative were also apparent from the examples cited 
above.  
5.4.6 Current Major Trends (1990s-Present Day) 
Since the 1990s, the global auto industry has grown larger and the effects of high 
vehicle ownership have become more apparent (Carty, 2008). Until 1997, sales of 
vehicles in the Triad economies (including Western Europe, Japan and North 
America) accounted for over 70% of global vehicle sales. However, of the three 
Triad regions, while the vehicle production increased by 4.2%, vehicle sales 
increased by merely 0.6% and experienced its stagnation in the auto industry 
between 1990 and 1997 (Humphrey & Memedovic, 2003). Both Western Europe 
and Japan suffered losses and their vehicle sales remarkedly lagged behind in 
1997 than they had previously been in 1990. Only North America enjoyed its 
benefits at the end of the 1990s, because of the booming economy in the United 
States, and the significant changes of consumers‟ tastes in the US market – from 
demanding passenger cars towards asking for light trucks (Humphrey & 
Memedovic, 2003). Humphrey and Memedovic (2003) explained the auto 
industry in the Triad regions had actually been plagued by low productivity, 
manufacturing overcapacity and cost pressure during this period, although it is 
mature. 
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In contrast, other emerging economies began to demonstrate their 
fastgrowing business performance which became a remakable feature in this 
period (Lundqvist et al., 2003). Particularly, the rapid growth was concentrated in 
Latin America, Eastern Europe, the ASEAN countries, China and India. Taken 
together, the vehicle sales in these active emerging markets increased about 9% 
each year in the 7 years up to 1997 (Humphrey & Memedovic, 2003). In 2007, 
there were about 72 million vehicles sold worldwide (OICA, 2007): North 
America (19.4 million); Europe (23 million); Asia-Pacific (21.4 million); Latin 
America (4.4 million); the Middle East (2.4 million); and Africa (1.4 million). 
However, the emerging economies took an impressive vehicle market share 
(Global Market Data Book, 2008). From the perspective of global auto industry 
development, it is becoming obvious that the potential of the emerging markets 
are rapidly growing stronger that those of the Triad economies. Of these main 
markets, China, Russia and Brazil are more attractive. 
Recent years have also seen other unique changes in the automotive industry. 
Traditionally, truck and sport utility vehicles (SUVs) are often loaded up with 
expensive options and thus have been the sources of making biggest profits for 
vehicle manufacturers (Carty, 2008). However, due to the fact that there are 
potential crisis worldwide such as rapidly rising fuel prices, drastic CO2 
emissions mandates and increasing raw material costs, consumers are gradually 
changing their purchasing habits and shifted their preferences away from trucks 
and SUVs (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2008). As a result the trend in the global 
automotive market is towards smaller and fuel-efficient vehicles on the road 
(SEMA, 2008). 
It is thus not surprising to imagine that automakers are experiencing 
continuous pressures. For instance, Honda and Chrysler are experiencing troubles 
from the decline in sales of large vehicles (including trucks, pick-ups and 
minivans). Likewise, Toyota saw the sales of its light truck in 2007 went down by 
16%. In contrast, Ford saw its two hybrid versions – Mercury Mariner and Escape 
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SUV– were selling well in the market, while Toyota‟s hybrid version sales were 
up 51% in 2007 (Carty, 2008). Nonetheless, at the current stage of industrial 
transformation, only those automakers who are prepared well for these challenges 
can grasp opportunities to survive. 
5.4.7 Summary 
Unlike many other industries, the global motor vehicle manufacturing has created 
a distinct industrial landscape. From the review of the automotive history in the 
above sections, it appears that transformations are the norm rather than the 
exception in the history of the global automobile industry. Each transformation 
stage has been fuelled by extraordinary dynamisms within the industry, and each 
stage has had creative breakthroughs in some aspects of vehicle production 
systems, resulting in a powerful explosion of demand in either the domestic 
market or the rest of the world‟s market (Lundqvist et al., 2003). That is to say, 
each transformation in different countries/regions has brought in new opportunites 
which shape the development path of the world automobile industry. Next section 
will move to the contextual descriptions in terms of the automobile industry 
transformation in one of the wold‟s most developed auto market – the United 
States. 
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5.5 The Automobile Industry in the United States 
It is generally agreed that the large American motor corporations have played a 
major role in the world automobile industry for more than half a century, although 
the technical evolution was generally slow at the beginning, which required a 
number of years for the public to be familiar with the concept of a “car” (SEMA, 
2008). In 1900, there were 76,000,000 people in the United States. However, 
automobile production had only increased to 5,000 cars, which means fewer than 
4,000 owned automobiles at that time (Kennedy, 1974). Eight years later in 1908, 
the number of car production was reached to 63,000. In terms of families rather 
than of individuals about 1 out of every 5,000 American families owned an 
automobile (Kennedy, 1974). Here was the greatest potential market that any 
manufacturer could desire.  
For the first 10 years of the twentieth century, most of the American 
corporations have passed through a series of fundamental technical progress 
(Kennedy, 1972). The early automobile technicians had contributed tremendous 
efforts in improving the reliability, endurance, power, and new speed of the cars. 
For example, Ransom Olds built his first steam powered car in 1894, and his first 
gasoline car in 1896 respectively (Kennedy, 1972). In 1902, Ransom Olds also 
initiated American series production with his “curved dash” Oldsmobile 
(Lundqvist et al., 2003). This car was tiny in comparison with typical European 
products and was explicitly intended for a mass market.  
By 1906, Henry Leland had designed a Cadillac with competely 
interchangeable parts. This innovation won the Dewar engineering competition in 
England when three Cadillacs were completely taken apart by the judges, 
reassembled into three new vehicles, and driven 500 miles without mechnical 
failure (Rae, 1984). Leland‟s design also established interchangeability as the 
automobiles design philosophy in the future.  
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By 1908, Henry Ford and his associates were combining the design and 
manufacturing ideas of Olds, Leland, and many others into a new car, the Model 
T. The Model T integrated certain advances which were to be backed up by a new 
manufacturing system, such as fabrication techniques and materials (Lundqvist et 
al., 2003). The main purpose was to simplify manufacturing procedures, reduce 
maintenance costs, as well as to adapt cars to primitive countryside driving 
conditions. The excellence of the design was augmented in 1914, by the 
introduction of the continuous production system, that is, the assemby line. New 
production machinery in the assembly process was linked to a “scientific 
management” approach to facilitate the continuous flow of materials which united 
many years of experimentation in two separate aspects of production – the 
division of manufacturing skills and the routinisation of complex work (Lundqvist 
et al., 2003, p. 16).  
The Ford Motor Company used this new system of organisation and 
production machinery to lead the world auto industry into the age of mass 
production (Rae, 1984). Ford achieved an early dominance of the mass production 
and mass marketing sector of the industry. From 1,700 vehicles in the company‟s 
first year (1903), production rose slowly to 10,000 in 1908 (when the Model T 
was introduced), but then exploded to 300,000 in 1914 (when the assembly line 
was fully installed) (Rae, 1984). By 1914, the industry was selling 548,000 cars, 
with the retail price down to about US$ 1,000 per car. In 1916 the retail price had 
fallen again to about US$ 800. However, a car was still considered to be too 
expensive to be afforded by average American families, except for a Ford 
(Kennedy, 1972).  
After World War One broke out in 1914, the output of automobile production 
was almost tripled in 1916 (Kennedy, 1972). At that point, Ford still made 58% of 
the world output of motor vehicles from its American production base after the 
economic devastation brough by the war. In that year other American producers, 
notably the rapidly growing General Motors, accounted for an additional 2.1 
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million units, bringing the American share of world auto production in 1923 to 
91% (Ling, 1990). In the early 1920s, Alfred Sloan at General Motors perfected 
the decentralised organisational techniques needed to manage the enterprise. 
American dominance in the world‟s auto industry was then nearly complete (Rae, 
1984).  
Throughout the 1920s the American share of world auto production remained 
at 84% or higher, and the US automobile industry was dominated by a few very 
large companies (Ling, 1990). In 1929 they exported 10% of their production 
(546,000 units) and captured 35% of the world auto market outside the United 
States. During this period, the auto manufacturers produced roughly 4 million 
passenger cars each year, and 23 million cars were sold by the end of 1929. It was 
then estimated that nearly three out of four American families owned a passenger 
car (Kennedy, 1972). After World War Two, the auto industry was even regarded 
as a pillar industry which would be benefit to the American economic growth 
(Cooney & Yacobucci, 2005).   
Until the late 1960s, the so-called “Big Three”, including General Motors, 
Ford and Chrysler, became emerged as major players in the world automobile 
industry. In 1973, which was considered as a peak year for these three large 
American firms, they made almost half of the world‟s annual production output. 
While the bulk of their output came from factories in the United States, each firm 
had developed assembly and some manufacturing plants in other parts of the 
world. In 1973, 34.4% of Chrysler production was made outside the United States 
and Canada, Ford produced 30.1% of its vehicles outside North America, and the 
proportion for General Motors was 20.5% (Rae, 1984).  
The United States automotive industry has, however, changed significantly 
since the 1980s (SEMA, 2008). The “Big Three” have always been criticised that 
they do not deal with the environment-related and social issues in an appropriate 
way since 1980 (SEMA, 2008). For example, due to the operational losses 
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resulting from fierce business situations and worldwide financial crisis, the “Big 
Three” gradually closed many factories and cut job positions, despite the fact that 
about 600,000 employment opportunities in the US have generally been provided 
by the “Big Three”. Meanwhile, the “Big Three” operations are hindered by their 
relatively expensive labour costs, and their wage levels are much higher than 
those “transplants” in the US (referring to foreign-based vehicle production plants 
in the US). One example was the average annual wages for production workers at 
the “Big Three” were US$ 67,480 in 2007; and US$ 81,940 for skilled workers. 
Meanwhile, health care and pension costs also put extra burden of US$ 1500 to 
the vehicle production costs (SEMA, 2008). These combined factors make it very 
difficult for the “Big Three” to lower vehicle sales prices. One of them, Chrysler 
had no better choice but became part of the German-controlled DaimlerChrysler 
car corporation in 1998. By the close of 2007, most of the passenger cars sold in 
the US were mainly come from the so-called “transplants”. Finally, in the US 
market, once-dominant position for the “Big Three” in the field of sports utility 
vehicles (SUVs) has been gradually replaced by Japanese and German auto 
producers (Lundqvist et al., 2003). 
The “Big Three” used to emphasise the promotion of fuel-guzzling big cars. 
With the alarming of gasoline prices shot past US$ 140 in 2008, the “Big Three” 
realised the potential difficulties in the retail sales when Amercans would stop 
purchasing this type of expensive vehicles. For instance, GM reported sharp 
decreases in the retail sales of its SUVs down by 36.7% from 2007, while the 
sales of Chevrolet Aveo, Chevrolet Malibu and Pontiac Vibe were up in 2008 
(Stockley, 2008). Following these sales trends, GM gradually closed its four truck 
assembly plants in North America (starting on June 3, 2008), while adding extra 
shifts at another two car plants instead. Meanwhile GM also cancelled its US$ 2 
billion strategic investment in a programme called “full-size SUVs updating” in 
2009 and even undertook a general evaluation of its famous Hummer brand 
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(Moore, 2009)
10. GM‟s experiences were not exceptional. Ford also experienced 
the same situations as it saw its SUVs sales went down 44% in 2009, comparing 
with a 20% increase in its car sales in 2008. The Ford‟s Lincoln-Mercury brand 
was the biggest loser as its sales were down 3.5% in 2007 (Espinoza, 2008).  
The financial crisis started in 2008 brought about significant consequences as 
the consumers‟ credit was tighted and it became more difficult for average people 
with poor credit to get the approval from a bank to purchase a car. As a result, the 
“Big Three” lost most of their customers in the US auto market 11  and only 
dominated in the light truck sector. The worse thing was even in this sector, they 
were still being challenged by some foreign automakers with competitive prices 
and reliable quality (Espinoza, 2008).  
These series of damaging blows caused the “Big Three” to the verge of 
bankruptcy, which generally had major effects on the structure of US automobile 
industry in recent years. However, bankruptcy of the “Big Three” would mean 
unbearable to the American economy and social stability. It was estimated that the 
bankruptcy would bring about a total loss of 3 million job opportunities in the US, 
including a loss of 240,000 high-paying jobs at the “Big Three”, and a loss of 
980,000 jobs at a large number of suppliers and network dealers, plus the extra 
loss of 1.7 million jobs throughout the economy (Cole, McAlinden, Dziczek, & 
Menk, 2008). Personal income in total would be dropped to US$ 151 billion in the 
first fiscal year which would definitely cause a huge loss in tax revenue for the 
federal, state and local governments (Cole et al., 2008).  
                                               
10 On June 2, 2009, Sichuan Tengzhong and GM signed a memorandum of understanding in terms of 
Hummer takeover. Tengzhong is a privately-owned industrial machinery group in Sichuan province, China. 
This Chinese company initially aimed to acquire the HUMMER brand valued at about US$ 500m. As part of 
the transaction, Tengzhong pledged to retain Hummer‟s management while enlarging the brand‟s access to 
the Chinese market (Moore, 2009).  
11 The first signs emerged when foreign companies such as Volkswagen and Honda started importing cheap, 
well-made cars in the 1960s. The “Big Three” convinced Congress to impose quotas, while the foreign 
companies responded by opening their own plants in the US (Cooney & Yacobucci, 2005). 
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Intense debate was then underway to get a massive bailout from the Congress 
in order to save the US automobile industry. In late 2008, along with Chrysler, 
GM announced that it had hired some lawyers to make relevant arrangements 
about how to file a bankruptcy. GM stated as it was short of efficient cash for 
normal business operations, it might not survive past 2009 (“In Pieces”, 2009). It 
initially sought support from the Bush administration in 2008 when seeing 
“US$ 30.9 billion in losses and its cash resources shrink by more than US$ 19 
billion” (Strumpf & Johnson, 2009, para. 25). However, with the bad news and 
rumours widespreaded everywhere, consumers gradually lost confidence of GM‟s 
future even after the Obama government “promised to provide billions of dollars 
in financial assistance” to GM (Strumpf & Johnson, 2009, para. 26). Thus filing 
for bankruptcy was considered an unavoidable choice for GM. GM listed several 
options for liquidating or selling all of its undesirable assets and then reorganised 
its contracts with existing car dealers, unions and components suppliers (“In 
Pieces”, 2009).  
 On December 19, 2008, the Bush administration approved a financial 
assistance plan and gave GM and Chrysler US$ 13.4 billion from TRAP 
(Troubled Assets Relief Program) funds. Under the terms of the Treasury 
Department, the two carmakers were required to submit recovery plans 
respectively for passing the emergency aid deal. On February 17, 2009, GM 
stated that it still need extra US$ 16.6 billion, in addition to the US$ 13.4 billion 
that it had originally received, in order to be leaner and more efficient (“In 
Pieces”, 2009). However, despite the support from former President George W. 
Bush, plus some Democratic and Republican party members, the US Senate 
vowed against any bailout plan and government financial assistance. 
On March 5, 2009, Deloitte & Touche LLC, GM‟s public accounting firm, 
issued an auditing report which emphasised its doubt about GM‟s ability of 
continuous business operations. This independent report raised certain concerns 
about the possibilities of filing for bankruptcy protection based on its financial 
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assessment for GM (“Wagoner‟s Fast Exit”, 2009). While seeing GM‟s stumbling 
reaction to its own problems and crisis, the newly-elected Barack Obama 
government lost patience and decided to replace Rick Wagoner (the CEO of GM 
for almost 9 years) with Fritz Henderson as new CEO after “a government-
imposed deadline of March 31” (Strumpf & Johnson, 2009, para. 27). The 
purpose was to let GM restructure and modify itself before a new set deadline – 
June 1, 2009. 
 Wagoner was mainly criticised for his “not confrontational” approach when 
dealing with the Unions (“Wagoner‟s Fast Exit”, 2009). Meanwhile, the car 
industry taskforce pointed out GM‟s progress for restructuring itself in recent 
years has been far too slow. Several areas were identified by the taskforce as it 
found GM either to be over-optimistic or in denial: domestic market share; the 
quality and ranges of GM‟s products; GM‟s business and investment operations in 
Europe; performance of car dealers; health care and pension liabilities plan. As 
GM‟s future was not much clear, certain measures were considered must be done 
to keep GM in business (“Time for a New Driver”, 2009). 
GM announced its restructuring plan on Monday April 27, and presentented 
its final proposal at the end of May to persuade the Obama government to release 
billions more of dollars to save GM (“GM‟s Latest Remodel”, 2009). GM 
suggested it would be appropriate to request another US$ 11.6 billion from the US 
Government in addition to the US$ 15.4 it has already received. Accordingly, the 
US Government would receive a 50% stake in GM
12
, and the United Auto 
Workers (UAW) would also get a 39% stake. GM stated these proposed measures 
would definitely reduce its debt, and each year would save roughly US$ 7 billion 
(“GM‟s Latest Remodel”, 2009). However, putting an end to weeks of 
                                               
12
 In December 2008, when GM secured a large slice of government bail-out funds to keep it alive, this car 
company was jokingly dubbed “Government Motors” (“GM‟s Latest Remodel”, 2009).  
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expectations, GM finally filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection on June 1, 
2009 in order to redeem itself (Please refer to Coda at p. 356 for further details.).  
Along with GM, Chrysler – the smallest of Detroit‟s “Big Three” carmaker – 
also suffered bitterness although it did not just give up and did try its best to look 
around for any survival opportunities existed. Chrysler had certain serious 
problems which had already been pointed out by Obama‟s car-industry taskforce, 
such as insufficient resources and funding, out-of-date vehicle models, poor 
reputation for quality, and over-dependence on the North American market 
(“Time for a New Driver”, 2009). Some car-industry analysts even critised 
Chrysler‟s recovery plan can‟t be simply achieved under the current global 
economic recession (“Time for a New Driver”, 2009).  
Since January 2009, Chrysler had negotiated with Italy‟s Fiat for potential 
tie-up relations (“Wagoner‟s Fast Exit”, 2009). Based on the framework of 
negotiations, Fiat was expected to provide cutting-edge technology in the form of 
fuel-efficient engines, small-car platforms and factory automation. In return, Fiat 
could get a 35% stake in Chrysler as a manufacturing and distribution base to 
expand its business in USA (“Wagoner‟s Fast Exit”, 2009). Meanwhile, Chrysler 
further asked for extra financial support (US$ 5 billion) from the US Government 
besides the US$ 4 billion it had received earlier (“End Game”, 2009). On April 
27th the United Auto Workers (UAW) union agreed to a series of concessions, 
such as the suspension of cost-of-living adjustments, and restrictions on overtime 
pay. Unluckily, despite these efforts, Chrysler still failed to avoid bankruptcy 
protection and had to close its operations at the end of April, 2009 (“End Game”, 
2009).  
In sum, as has been noted in the last several decades, the prospects for the US 
auto industry have been changed. GM, Ford, and Chrysler used to be dominant 
players in the world automobile industry, controlling more than 90% of the 
automobile business (“Time for a New Driver”, 2009). However they have done 
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poorly in recent years (SEMA, 2008). Some reasons could explain why they have 
been challenged by so many uncertainties and difficulties: the endless competition 
at domestic and overseas markets, increasing material prices, restructuring 
internal job arrangements and government regulatory requirements. In addition, 
the reality of escalating fuel prices has also changed consumers‟ demands – 
smaller and economic-type vehicles are becoming more acceptable and popular 
worldwide. These combined factors have resulted in a series of impacts on the US 
automobile industry. It is thus not surprisingly to see the bankruptcy of some 
vehicle companies such as GM and Chrysler. Meanwhile, it was also argued that 
in an industry with just three dominant players, it would be impossible to avoid a 
decline of the so-called “competitive sprit”. As Kennedy (1972) stated, “a 
hundred companies might cut one another‟s throats, but three companies are 
bound to tip their hats politely when they pass each other on the street” (p. 325). 
5.6 Sustainable Development of the Global Auto Industry 
It is now recognised that with the development of transportation technologies, 
millions of people worldwide have now gradually relied upon the mobility, 
convenience and integration provided by trucks, passenger cars and buses. The 
world economy also benefits from the development of automobile industry bring 
about an important source of employment opportunities and business activities. 
However, the automobile has also been accused of related negative effects, such 
as the emission of greenhouse gases on the road casusing certain level of air 
pollution, traffic congestion and highway fatalities (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 
2008). The following sections provide some of the major considerations regarding 
sustainable development issues of the global auto industry. 
5.6.1 Regulatory Restrictions 
More and more industries have now under great pressure to conform to 
environmental protection regulations. The automobile industry is no exception 
and has been increasingly perceived as one of the major sources of damaging the 
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air quality and public health (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2008). Because of the 
growing number of cars on the roads, governments and international institutions 
have been busy with introducing legislation concerning vehicle emissions control.  
It is reported that, since 2003, the European Union has regulated its standards 
of limiting carbon monoxide (CO), hydrocarbon (HC), nitrogen oxide (NOx) and 
particulate emissions. From September 2009, according to the newly issued “Euro 
5 Directive”, most new cars sold in the European Union market are required to 
use particulate filters on diesel engines (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2008, p. 29). 
Similar regulations have also been applied in other developed countries (such as 
the US and Japan) and some developing nations in Africa, South America and 
Asia, working towards reducing fuel emissions by vehicles.  
Current standards do not lay down any restrictions in terms of CO2 emissions 
by vehicles, however, the world‟s major automakers are being forced to be in 
align with government objectives and have to take gradual and integrative 
measures towards zero emissions through various technological improvements 
such as a changeover from petrol to diesel, the use of biofuel, and new air-
conditioning systems (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2008). For instance, in order to 
reduce the CO2 emissions and decrease fuel consumption, the US President 
Barack Obama has mandated to invest and develop cleaner energy technology in 
the automotive industry, beginning in 2011 (Greenfield, 2009). 
Vehicle consumers are also encouraged to buy less gas-guzzling vehicles 
(PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2008). Through these various measures, global 
automakers can thus reduce their burdens of reducing emissions with 
governments, business partners and consumers.   
5.6.2 Technical and Technological Challenges 
Going into the twenty-first century, from a technical point of view, the new 
challenges is likely to be developing new auto technology, notably including “the 
optimisation of engines and transmission systems, new diesel engines, biofuels, 
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hybrid technology and fuel cells” to reduce the amount of potential emission 
(PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2008, p. 31).  
However, some industrial analysts predict that there still exist key strategic 
challenges in terms of gradual technological modifications. First, although 
manufacturers are already developing the potentially disruptive technology of 
hybrid protypes in the automotive industry, which is viewed as one of the 
prevailing trends in the next decade, hybrids are still considered not so fuel 
efficient – given that these require two systems to operate 
(PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2008). The second challenge is how to integrate the 
idea of minimising the manufacturing costs of future models while still in 
compliance with current standards. More concerns are also addressed, such as 
manufacturing capacity and brand concerns (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2008).  
It seems that global automakers will have to seriously think about potential 
strategies to face these above-mentioned challenges. Thses strategies will lead to a 
market restructure, resulting in losses for those that can not deal with difficulties. 
Only those that know how to adapt and seize the new opportunities can survive.  
According to PricewaterhouseCoopers (2008), automakers must undertake 
massive efforts to transform the traditional form of truck-based autos and begin 
favouring more fuel efficient vehicles to gain a sustainable competitive lead. 
Although each new technology has its limits, innovation strategy is surely a 
primary solution to automakers. 
5.6.3 Materials and Safety Practices  
In the future, vehicles will be made of different materials. For example, the 
improved plastics and composite body construction will be widely applied for 
cutting car weight, allowing smoother surfaces and more complex shapes. 
Another material – ceramics – has also been under research which will also 
increase operating efficiency in applications such as pistons and turbocharger 
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rotors (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2008). Innovation in these areas will facilitate 
the whole process of saving production costs and better manage fuel energy.  
The second consideration is related to increasing vehicle safety. Government 
officials, global automakers, industrial experts, and insurance agencies always 
have considerable concerns about safety issues (SEMA, 2008). They have been 
trying to work out practical solutions to prevent vehicle collisions and reduce 
death rates on the road (Stockley, 2008). Generally speaking, vehicles are now 
expected to have certain features in the event of a collision. For instance, it is 
emphasized that vehicles should be equipped with airbags and side-impact 
protection functions to protect the occupants in the vehicles (“Stopping in a 
Hurry”, 2008).  
Meanwhile, vehicles are required to be upgraded for having other 
mechanisms in certain dangerous situations. One case is the automated braking 
systems can help drivers avoid crashes in the first place. Germany‟s Daimler is 
reported that it is doing some experiments on a radar-based monitor – called 
Distronic – in some of its Mercedes-Benz vehicles (“Stopping in a Hurry”, 2008). 
The vehicles with Distronic at high speed can automatically adjust their 
acceleration and braking at the same time to maintain an appropriate distance 
from other cars. If a collision seems likely, Distronic will signal a warning. When 
drivers try to press the brake pedal, the Distronic system will automatically 
applies the optimum pressure required to prevent hitting the car in front. If drivers 
fail to do so, the brakes can function automatically. In 2009, Daimler also 
introduced a device to detect drivers‟ fatigue. It uses multiple sensors to store a 
driver‟s personal physical and/or mental profile initially when he/she drives in a 
normal way. If that driver departs that particular profile, an alarm will be given 
(“Stopping in a Hurry”, 2008). 
These so-called “intelligent” vehicle-safety systems have been conducting 
worldwide in the automotive industry, which can potentially and effectively avoid 
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so many traffic tragedies in the future and probably will save numerous lives 
during collision (“Stopping in a Hurry”, 2008). The VTT Technical Research 
Centre of Finland, a contract-research organisation based in Finland once 
calculated if these systems could be applied to all vehicles in Europe, it would 
reduce the number of people killed on the roads there by almost 17% (“Stopping 
in a Hurry”, 2008).  
Those innovative safety equipments will gradually make their way from 
expensive vehicles to modest models, which can improve cars‟ handling 
performance and make cars much more “aware” of their surroundings (“Stopping 
in a Hurry”, 2008, p. 85). Eventually, through technological improvements and 
progresses, experts generally predict cars will be getting better and safer. 
5.6.4 Global Alliances Trend in the Auto Industry 
The automobile production system across the world has seen major changes in the 
last two decades, which shows new forms of competition and cooperation 
established worldwide. Interfirm alliance developments such as the merger of 
DaimlerChrysler, joint venturing by GM-Toyota, Ford takeover of Mazda, and 
Renault equity stake in Nissan are almost impossible to keep up with (Global 
Market Data Book, 2008).  
Researchers have already explained the major reasons that the international 
alliances form has been widely adopted in the auto industry (Glaister & Buckley, 
1996). First, “scale economies” and “learning by doing” characterise the 
automotive industry for the purpose of reducing costs and achieving maximum 
profits. Alliances effectively allow vehicle production rationalisation while 
reducing the suspicions and risks of a full-scale merger and acquisition mode for 
firms in the same industry (Contractor & Lorange, 1988). Second, alliances can 
be tactically treated as a defensive tool to minimise fierce competition (Harrigan, 
1985). Third, alliance formation could encourage the automobile companies to 
access and develop unfamiliar markets (Gannon, 1993). Fourth, alliances may 
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integrate the necessary know-how, skills and talents that cover different aspects in 
the automobile industry, which are pertinent to the manufacturing, scale and 
distribution outlets.  
The Global Market Data Book (2008) provide several insights in a research 
report about the tremendous growth in the automotive industry in recent years, 
plus some challenges faced by current car manufacturers: 
 First, since passenger car demand has grown quickly, competition has 
become more acute;  
 Second, managerial and technical innovations have led to changes in the 
competitive priorities, increasing the concern for effective management, 
marketing promotion, higher quality products with lower costs and prices; 
Due to that peculiarity, Kobayashi (1988) proposes the positive relationship 
between the need for continual updating of the carmakers‟ capabilities and the 
strategic alliances as facilitators. Glaister and Buckley (1996) state the global auto 
industry will still be characterised by alliance formation to a certain degree, 
although the competitiveness and alliance development may still imply the 
creation of new management challenges for the automakers in today‟s global 
environment.  
Hayes, Pisano, and Upton (1996) also suggest that the alliance trend is 
strongly related to the aim of building skills in new market sectors. For instance, 
there has been the surge of the “lean approaches” to production and operations 
management. As a consequence, it seems the process of transformation and 
alliance adjustment is not at an end when global automakers today find 
themselves having to face various challenges (Anderson & Anderson, 2005).  
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5.7 Chapter Conclusion 
The automotive industry stands for one of the important symbols of modern 
industry all over the globe. The influence of the automobile has been enormous, 
and the motor vehicle has made a very substantial contribution to human society 
in the modern civilised world. By providing more transport, it has affected the 
detailed location of commerce and industry. As a new mode of passenger 
transport, it has modified urban and rural areas, allowing new dimensions of 
personal mobility for commuting and recreation. Although new-vehicle sales and 
production dropped dramatically at times in response to broader economic and 
political conditions, they invariably rebounded and surged upward. Kennedy 
(1972) argued “… from a psychological standpoint, there is a great escape in 
driving a car” (p. 319). In fact, it is difficult to imagine how the current world 
would have developed without this invention in the 1880s. 
This chapter looked at the transformation stages of the auto industry in the 
global and some specific country markets. This chapter initially stated that, from 
1886 to 1898, although there was no real established auto industry in the strict 
sense, it was realised that the overall costs of transportation could be decreased 
through mass production and marketing. The time period since has thus been 
called “the automobile age” (Kennedy, 1972, p. 320). A century later, use and 
ownership climbed ever higher, mass automobility spread to more and more 
nations, and new operating capabilities were continually perfected.  
After reflecting upon previous several transformation stages of the world 
automobile industry, this chapter then emphasised that the future of auto industry 
seemed more critical than its past. This chapter pointed out although the auto 
industry has achieved great achievements during the past decades, and although 
the automaking is considered as the largest manufacturing activity on the globe, 
since 2008, this view has changed – the automotive industry today is now actually 
facing dramatic pressures (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2008). Questions have been 
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raised about the long-term prospects for the automobile and its industry. The day 
of new entrants on the world scene producing and exporting whole vehicles, with 
the transforming consequences of the Americans, the Europeans, and the Japanese, 
may even be past.  
This chapter finally concluded for the auto industry, achieving a balanced 
global footprint and maintaining competitive advantage and sustainable 
development are particularly important (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2008). Global 
automakers need to make pertinent strategies regarding how to keep their 
sustainable competitive position over time. Only those companies which can 
rapidly deal with uncertainties and be adaptable to innovative activities will 
prevail.  
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Chapter 6   The Chinese Automobile Industry 
 
6.1 Introduction 
The global automotive industry is now been experiencing transformations. 
PricewaterhouseCoopers (2008), the independent research organisation, estimates 
that the global car market dropped by 2.8 million vehicles in 2008, and further 
declined by 4.2 million to 66.6 million in 2009. The reasons for this slowdown are 
the weak global economy, the emergence of excess production capacity, and 
saturation in the main global markets (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2008). This 
slowdown is being felt especially by MNE automakers which are experiencing 
declining sales in the three most developed economic areas and also the largest 
automobile sales markets – North America, West Europe, and Japan.  
Facing these problems, MNE automakers are now seeking future 
opportunities in emerging markets, such as the South American, East European 
and Asia-Pacific regions. With their continuous economic development, 
increasing demand and growth potential, these areas are growing into major and 
important economic markets and will offer the next potentially great auto markets 
in the coming years (Carty, 2008). Amongst these emerging markets, global 
automakers are penetrating interactively into China, placing their hopes for 
recovery on a huge surge in demand for their vehicles. In fact, global businesses, 
including major auto companies, have all viewed China as a very attractive 
emerging market (Carty, 2008). 
This chapter seeks to explore the features of and prospects for the evolution 
and restructuring of China‟s automobile industry, in order to contribute to the 
discourse on the influence of institutional factors on the growth of Chinese auto 
firms, which helps us better understand the changing market situations, key policy 
formulations, inward FDI activities as well as the embedded incentives of 
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technology (knowledge) transfer rationale in the auto IJVs in China. Section 6.2 
begins by describing the role of inward FDI in China‟s auto industry. Section 6.3 
focuses on the historical growth stages of the Chinese auto industry and the 
influence of foreign technology transfer from an institutional perspective; it also 
discusses how Chinese Government policies shape the development strategies of 
the Chinese auto firms. Relevant institution-based implications are presented at 
the end of section 6.3. The impact of the current global economic crisis on the 
Chinese auto industry is also described in section 6.4. Section 6.5 offers the 
chapter conclusion. 
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6.2 The Chinese Auto Industry and Economic Development 
China‟s automobile market has now moved to a sustained growth state, and we 
remain confident in the overall prospects of China. 
- Philip Murtaugh, Former Chair and CEO of GM China 
If we stay out [of China‟s growth opportunities], we will miss our competitive 
position. 
- Carlos Ghosn, Renault & Nissan CEO 
 
6.2.1 The Role of the Chinese Auto Industry in Economy 
China represents an important case of economic reforms in an emerging market. 
The annual rate of China‟s economy is growing at around 9%13, and the increase 
in China‟s GDP has been impressive when compared to that of other markets 
(Dow Jones Newswires, 2009). China‟s GDP was an estimated 30 trillion RMB 
Yuan (US$ 4.4 trillion) in 2008, up 9% from a year earlier, and the GDP per 
capita reached 22,640 RMB Yuan (US$ 3,320) (Wang, 2009). One of the 
fundamental causes of this dramatic performance lies in its progress of 
manufacturing sector in China (Zhang & Zhang, 2008). As part of the 
manufacturing sector, the Chinese auto industry represents “6% of the total value 
added of manufacturing in China in 2003, a near doubling of this percentage from 
its level in 1990” (CATARC, 2004, as cited in Gallagher, 2006, p. 22). The 
Chinese auto industry is especially contributing to economic development “with 
respect to employment and output” (Gallagher, 2006, p. 22). 
 
                                               
13 China‟s GDP in the final 3 months of 2008 rose only 6.8% because of the impact of the global economic 
recession, which was a 7-year low and also down sharply when compared with the 10.6% expansion in the 
first quarter of 2007 (Dow Jones Newswires, 2009). 
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6.2.2 The Influence of FDI in the Chinese Auto Industry  
One characteristic related to the progress of the Chinese auto industry is that the 
influence of a rapid expansion of inward FDI and entry of the international 
automakers into China (Wang, 2009). Before 1980, the Chinese auto market was 
entirely closed to the outside world. As the market prospects were not very clear 
and the auto-related FDI regulations were very strict, major MNE automakers 
were reluctant to commit a large amount of investment into this relatively 
uncertain market. Up to the end of 1989, only 20 equity-based Sino-foreign auto 
joint ventures had been set up in China.  
This FDI inflow situation in the Chinese automobile industry began to 
change sharply from 1992 onwards due to the booming auto market
14
 and China‟s 
fast-growing economy. China began to consistently receive more FDI than any 
other developing country after the mid-1990s. In 1993, the accumulated number 
of FDI-involved auto companies was 120 (McGunagle, 2007). After 1994, foreign 
automakers started a new round of investment, and the accumulated number of 
FDI-involved auto companies skyrocketed to 500 in 1997, with the cumulated 
contracted FDI amounting to US$ 7.39 billion. It was reported that over 800 
domestic auto firms had been in receipt of FDI amounting to US$ 12 billion at the 
beginning of 2001 (Zhang, 2002), and billions of dollars worth of FDI are in the 
planning stage in order to increase auto production capacity by 2010 (Wang, 
2009). Hong Kong
15
, the US, Germany, France, Japan, Italy, South Korea, and 
Britain are the major FDI sources. In 2006, China accounted for 30% of the 
                                               
14 Dating back to 1993, China‟s ratio of auto owners per capita was the lowest of any major country in the 
Asia-Pacific region. In 1993, there were only 680 people per car in China, compared to 131 in the Philippines, 
70 in Thailand, 7 in South Korea and 3 in Japan. 
15 Hong Kong has been the major FDI source for mainland China for the last three decades. One interesting 
thing that needs to be noted here is that there actually exists a substantial amount of “round-tripping” capital 
(estimated 15% of total Hong Kong investment in China) (Wei, 2000). This capital arguably originated from 
Chinese domestic capital, but is listed as Hong Kong-based FDI source, then it goes back to mainland China 
through Hong Kong, aiming to take advantage of the tax privileges and other incentives which are only 
available to foreign investment but not available to Chinese domestic investors (Dees, 1998). This may lead 
to overestimation of FDI inflows from Hong Kong into China. 
Chapter 6: Chinese Automobile Industry 
156 
  
growth in the global automobile industry (McGunagle, 2007). This growth has 
been driven by major investments in China by the top eight global auto 
manufacturers
16
which were expecting the emerging markets to create the growth 
opportunities necessary for their firms (McGunagle, 2007).  
Although FDI in the automobile industry seemed to be declining in 2005 and 
2006, due to falling margins and continued restrictions, China is consistently 
attractive as regards absorbing more inward FDI. Even though it too has been 
experiencing the global economic slowdown since 2008, the Chinese auto market 
is still more attractive than the western markets because of its cost advantages and 
massive, potential consumer market (Mallela, 2009).  
6.2.3 Relevant FDI Policies in China  
Child (1994) and Yan (2000) comment that one particular characteristic of the 
inward FDI activities in China is that they are administered by a special set of 
regulations, including “1979 Joint Venture Law”, “1983 Implementing 
Regulations regarding Foreign Investment”, “1985 Foreign Economic Contract 
Law”, “1986 State Council Provisions” (also known as Twenty-Two Articles), 
“1990 Amendments to the Joint Venture Law”, “1993 Company Law”, “1994 
Foreign Trade Law”, and “1996 Taxation Law of the People‟s Republic of 
China”. However, since China joined the WTO, these above-mentioned policies 
have been viewed as “discriminating toward domestic companies, who frequently 
ask for the same treatment as foreign companies” (ChinaStakes, 2008, para. 5). 
For example, the so-called “two-year exemption three-year reduction” actually 
indicates that foreign manufacturing enterprises operating over 10 years in China 
can be granted a “tax exempt for 2 years starting from their first profitable year” 
and are only required to pay “only a half rate” for the following 3 years” 
(ChinaStakes, 2008, para. 3). Starting from January 1 2008, the Chinese 
                                               
16  The largest investments were made by Hyundai and General Motors and followed by Toyota and 
Volkswagen, with the smallest investments being made by Renault-Nissan, Ford, and Honda (McGunagle, 
2007).  
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Government decided to unify the corporate tax rate for both domestic and foreign 
companies, stating that the tax rate will be “reduced to 25%” (dropped from 
current 33%) for domestic companies; while foreign companies will finally “pay 
25%” (increased from current 15%) after “a five-year transitional period” 
(ChinaStakes, 2008, para. 1).  
6.2.4 FDI Approval in the Chinese Auto Industry 
Inward FDI (IFDI) in the auto industry must get relevant government approval 
either at the state or subsidiary level, depending on the investment size or nature 
of the industry (Wang, Richet, & Wang, 2000). The 1997 “Guidance of Foreign 
Direct Investment in Industries” clearly set out the guidelines and categories, 
stating that the Central Planning Commission and the Ministry of Foreign Trade 
and Economic Cooperation (MOFTEC) (later reorganised as the Ministry of 
Commerce) were responsible for monitoring the approval of the investment 
projects, such as complete-built-up (CBU) passenger car projects, and key 
components projects (such as engines, ABS, air bags), or if the investment would 
be more than US$ 30 million in capitalisation. For investment projects which fall 
below the threshold of US$ 30 million, government agencies at the provincial 
level possess the decision-making authority to review and approve all FDI 
projects (Wang et al., 2000). Another feature of this screening process is the 
bigger the investment, the stricter the process, although the screening process at 
provincial level may be relatively simple and efficient (Huang, 1999; Jin, Qian, & 
Weingast, 1999). For example, it took four years to approve the Guangzhou-
Peugeot project, and Shanghai-VW also spent six years completing the review 
procedures before setting up their auto joint ventures.  
One important response to market and institutional changes in the auto 
industry was the restructuring of China‟s central decision-making process and 
control management at the beginning of 1998 (Sit & Liu, 2000). The government 
organisation which used to deal with the auto industry – the Ministry of 
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Machinery Industry – was taken over by the State Administration of Machinery 
Industry in March 1998 as a result of government reform and simplification. The 
relevant staff numbers were reduced to 95 from 400 (China Business Update 
Enews, 2000). This structural adjustment of the central management system 
rearranged the screening procedures, but in a more efficient way. Together with 
the Ministry of Commerce, the State Economic and Trade Commission (under the 
supervision of the State Council) is now controlling the investment decisions and 
becoming the major industrial and trade regulatory body. In addition, several 
measures have been taken to release certain FDI limitations and also to encourage 
the scale of FDI in the Chinese auto industry. 
6.2.5 Positive and Negative Features of FDI in the Auto Industry 
Scholars agree that FDI has played key role in facilitating the growth of Chinese 
national economy and auto industry in a number of aspects (Buckley, Clegg, 
Zheng, Silver, & Giorgioni, 2007; Gallagher, 2006). First, it has provided job 
opportunities for Chinese workers in Sino-foreign joint ventures. Second, it has 
created sources of demands for auto materials and components which further 
benefitted the wider economy. FDI has also made contributions to the industrial 
development by improving local production, management methods and marketing 
systems during the last 30 years (Luo, 2001; Yan, 2000). Multinational enterprises 
(MNEs), with the provision of advanced production techniques, industrial know-
how, and capital could also get permission to explore the market opportunities in 
China. 
On the other hand, some industrial analysts also comment that FDI does not 
always stimulate positive economic development for the recipient developing 
country. Gallagher (2006) explained the reasons behind, this FDI is often attracted 
to the already productive sources of the economy, not the less productive ones. 
Some researchers emphasise that in the Chinese auto industry, while the joint 
venture structure did help the transfer of know-how and expertise to Chinese 
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locals firms and gradually became the driving forces for the initial progress of the 
local state-owned enterprises (SOEs), there still remain problems in this complex 
structure (i.e., 50/50 equity-based joint venture requirements). Holweg, Luo and 
Oliver (2005), and McGunagle (2007) argue that the knowledge transfer 
activities, including vehicle designing capabilities to the Chinese firms, actually 
did not happen in certain Sino-foreign auto joint ventures.  
Furthermore, the nature and complexity of these multiple cross-border 
international partnerships also means considerable difficulties in management 
issues. On the one hand, some domestic Chinese auto companies established 
several joint ventures with different foreign companies; however, in reality these 
foreign companies are actually direct international competitors. On the other 
hand, there are some foreign automakers which have teamed up with different 
local Chinese companies, which are also domestic rivals.  
In one case, Japanese Honda has been connected with two Chinese 
companies, one is the Guangzhou Automobile Industry Group and the other is 
Dongfeng Motor Company in Wuhan (Bursa, 2006). Both Chinese partners are 
competing with each other to acquire Honda‟s new model designs because of the 
limited vehicle product range introduced into the two JVs. It is hard for Honda to 
make a balanced decision as to these two joint venture operations in China, 
resulting in potentially unhealthy competition. This phenomenon could also 
explain BMW‟s case as it did not team up with the SOEs recommended by the 
Government; instead it finally partnered with Brilliance for the simple reason that 
Brilliance has no single partnership with any other foreign automakers, reducing 
BMW‟s worries that its technology might leak to other competitors (Guide to 
China‟s Auto Market, 2005).  
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6.2.6 Current International Partnerships in the Auto Industry 
Not surprisingly, as China has become one of the largest markets globally, the 
world‟s auto giants from Europe, the US, Japan and Korea all flocked to enter the 
market. Nowadays, almost all of the global automaker giants like General Motors, 
Ford, Chrysler, Volkswagen, PSA Peugeot Citroen, BMW, Toyota, Nissan-
Renault and Honda have freely made their decisions to select the appropriate 
cooperative Chinese partners, set up their footholds, and formed auto production 
sites in China. As far as the Chinese companies are concerned, more than 90% of 
Chinese state-owned auto companies have formed cooperative connections with 
foreign players to produce mainstream passenger cars (Alon & McIntyre, 2008). 
The current complex international partnership arrangements in the Chinese auto 
industry are demonstrated in Figure 6.1. 
Figure 6. 1  Complex International Partnerships in the Chinese Auto Industry 
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Early movers, such as Shanghai-VW and Beijing-Cherokee have been 
enjoying significant benefits since the early 1990s. For Volkswagen (VW), with 
five joint ventures to manufacture cars in China, China represents its largest 
market after Germany at the moment (Ho, 2009). VW has been one of the top 50 
foreign-invested companies listed by Chinese authorities for almost 24 years since 
1985 (Ho, 2009).  
6.3 Historical Development Path and Institutional Changes   
Although the phenomenon of Chinese auto industry development has attracted the 
attention of scholars only recently, the roots of its growth and expansion can be 
traced back some five decades. The following sections describe how, from a 
historical perspective, the Chinese auto industry has gone through several major 
transition periods, and particularly, how it has sought to acquire manufacturing 
capabilities and skills from foreign carmakers under the rubric of government 
industrial policies.  
6.3.1 Prewar Static Automotive Production (Before 1949) 
Before 1949, there was actually no automotive production in China. The whole 
country was largely poor and backward in social, economic and industrial aspects, 
with a low technological base (Gallagher, 2003, 2006; Zhang & Taylor, 2001).  
Initially automobiles were mainly imported from abroad and were only used 
by political elites and business tycoons in China.  For instance, it was reported 
that the famous “revolutionaries Sun Yatsen and Zhou Enlai had driven US-made 
Buick cars” during that period (Gallagher, 2003, p. 13). As it was expensive to 
ship completed vehicles to the Chinese market, western carmakers only 
established a few crude assembly plants in Beijing, Tianjin, and Shanghai (these 
three cities later became important vehicle producing centres in China) to put both 
Chinese-made and/or imported vehicle components together for making cars 
(Harwit, 1995). At that time, western auto companies did not invest in China to 
the extent that they did in other developing countries. For example, GM opened 
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an assembly plant in India in 1928 and another one in Brazil in 1929; they only 
set up a company office in Shanghai that same year (Gallagher, 2006).  
As far as the local Chinese manufacturers were concerned, they began to 
acquire vehicle producing expertise, but through other channels. One example 
was Chang‟an Automobile (Group) Corp., originally built as part of the Qing 
Dynasty‟s “westernisation” experiment. It was named the “Shanghai Western-
Style Artillery Bureau” in 1862 (Gallagher, 2006, p. 34). With the process of 
artillery production, Chang‟an gradually accumulated certain experience in 
making other machinery equipments; it later began producing its first automobile 
in 1958 based on the Soviet Union technology.  
During that period, which was full of constant political chaos, economic 
recessions and social struggles, the Chinese Government lacked real initiatives 
and consistent policies to develop its domestic auto industry (Harwit, 1995). The 
later stage of China‟s war of resistance against Japan during the 1930s, and then 
the civil war (1946-1950) further delayed the progress of the auto sector in China 
(Gallagher, 2006).  
6.3.2 The Early Postwar Years (Early 1950s) 
After 1949, the Communist Party won power and officially announced the 
establishment of the People‟s Republic of China. Under the leadership of 
Chairman Mao Zedong, China then began a radical industrial transformation. In 
order to reach the national goal of industrialisation and modernisation, the 
Chinese Government initially approached the Soviet Union, China‟s close 
northern neighbour and ally, for the purpose of introducing the Soviet 
industrialisation experience – the so-called “Stalinist heavy-industry development 
model” which was considered suitable at that time (Zhang & Taylor, 2001). 
Feinstein and Howe (1997) also emphasise, “For China, they had no reason to 
suspect the Soviet technological and industrial systems‟ superiorities” (p. 2). As 
China relied heavily on the Soviet Union during this period, the combination of 
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the internal abundant labour resources and external technical assistance from the 
Soviet Union played a great role in helping China to complete many large projects 
during 1950-1960, and as a result, China realised most of its economic plans 
during its first 5-year period (1953–1957). 
In July 1953, with the objective of developing a Chinese automobile 
industry, the Chinese Government reached an agreement with the Soviet Union 
(Harwit, 1995; Zhang & Taylor, 2001). As a result, First Auto Works (FAW) was 
built and designed in Changchun (a north eastern city in Jilin Province) in 1953. 
The construction of FAW, which was China‟s first auto plant, was an example of 
industrial success, although the auto manufacturing knowledge, assembly lines, 
equipment, vehicle designs and relevant training programmes were transferred 
from the Russians. In 1956, FAW‟s first vehicle product the Jiefang (liberation) 
truck was released, providing 1,600 assembled units. This truck was based on the 
Russians‟ ZIS 150 Model (Gallagher, 2006).  
Two years later in 1958, both FAW and Shanghai Automotive Assembly 
Plant (which has now been renamed the Shanghai Automotive Industry 
Corporation) made the Chinese-brand Hongqi (Red Flag) and the Phoenix sedan 
for the exclusive use of senior government officials. However, the production 
costs required huge central government subsidies; the resource allocation and 
even end-product deliveries were all centrally planned. 
6.3.3 Small-scale Industrialisation (1958-1960) 
Shortly after FAW opened, the Great Leap Forward campaign (1958-1960) 
began which was characterised by rash industrialisation with the encouragement 
of centrally planned decentralisation (Holweg, Luo, & Oliver, 2005). Chinese 
auto firms adopted the path of small-scale industrialisation, which ultimately 
proved untenable since they ignored the advantages of resource consolidation and 
mass production. This approach was in striking contrast to the European and 
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American auto companies and resulted in the establishment of more than a 
hundred small-sized vehicle assembly plants (Holweg et al., 2005).  
The whole Chinese auto industry then suffered several problems: low levels 
of productivity and efficiency, a fragmented production system, diseconomies of 
scale, and absence of competition. Taking FAW as an example, FAW produced 
only 1,542 units in total between 1959 and 1981, i.e. 67 units came off the line on 
average per annum (Zhang & Taylor, 2001). The Chinese automotive industry 
gradually lagged behind other international auto producers and the technological 
gaps widened considerably from the 1960s onwards (Halberstam, 1986). 
Coincidentally, the Japanese and Korean auto firms began to grow rapidly and 
they developed their own indigenous capacities at this time, aiming to catch up 
with the European and American auto firms (Newman, 2004).  
6.3.4 Two Decades of Independent Development (1960s-1970s) 
During the 1960s, the international political circumstances also changed greatly – 
the final deterioration of Sino-Soviet friendship (due to the respective communist 
ideological differences and conflicts of national interest) in 1962 put China in 
opposition to both the two world superpowers – the USA and the Soviet – at that 
same time. A Third Line defense campaign was promulgated in 1964, its main 
purpose being to resist potential military attacks, through the relocation and 
dispersal of heavy industry and military bases to remote mountainous regions. 
Meanwhile, as the Soviet ended its technology and experts‟ assistance after 1960, 
China was consequently forced to pursue two decades of self-reliance and 
independent auto production capability development (Gan, 2003). All newly-built 
auto factories, such as the Second Auto Works (SAW), were then designed and 
constructed with the support of the existing auto plants (Shapiro, 2001).  
During the period of the Cultural Revolution (1966-1971), the production of 
passenger cars was entirely shut down with no further investment – as sedans 
were regarded luxury and against the political ideology (CATARC, 2002). SAW 
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for instance began to construct plant and equipment in 1967, but it only started 
production in 1975 (Gallagher, 2006). According to official statistics, China‟s 
entire annual auto production during that period was less than 700 units 
(CATARC, 2002). The Chinese automobile industry thus had not made any 
progress at all since the 1960s. Not only had it lost or forgotton the manufacturing 
expertise, but there had also been no further acquisition of new technological 
capacities and innovative workers for many years (Gallagher, 2006). 
Conversely, the 1970s represented the “Golden Age” for European, 
American, and Japanese auto manufacturers, as they were massive producers of 
auto units, profiting from increasing sales of vehicles year-by-year with the 
combination of “learning-by-doing” strategy, thus strengthening their innovation 
capabilities and competitiveness in the world auto market. For example, each 
American auto plant was manufacturing 200,000 – 400,000 units a year, and the 
total output of the automobile industry accounted for roughly one quarter of the 
country‟s GNP (gross national product) in the US (Halberstam, 1986). Hence the 
lost opportunity to the Chinese auto industry development was probably 
enormous (Gallagher, 2006). 
6.3.5 Opening-up and Reform Period (Since 1978) 
Since the opening-up and reform from 1978 onwards, the predominant concern of 
the Chinese Government has been to develop a socialist market economy, with an 
emphasis on developing productive power, market-based competition, and a 
gradual decentralisation of economic planning rather than political and 
ideological correctness (Gan, 2003). One can observe without any difficulty that 
this rapid economic reform and business systems development have created 
significant opportunities as well as unprecedented challenges for the Chinese 
automotive industry.  
China‟s automobile industry began to experience its second “infancy” after 
China reopened its door to the outside world in 1978 (Gallagher, 2006, p. 37). 
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However, there were too many difficulties and problems need to be resolved after 
many years‟ political chaos and economic upheaval nationwide. Meanwhile, 
because of the rapid demands, imported cars outnumbered domestic production 
during the 1980s. One negative effect was the impact of the cost of imported cars 
on the country‟s foreign reserves which were about US$ 2.64 billion in 1985 
(Zhang, 2004). The shortage of car supplies in the early 1980s made the Chinese 
Government realise the necessity of modernising the country‟s automobile 
industry and at a minimum, establishing a more flexible programme of vehicle 
import substitution, as they found that most of the automobiles running on the 
roads were unattractive, out-of-date, unreliable and inefficient (Harwit, 1994).  
Initially, China negotiated with the Japanese for help. The Japanese agreed. 
But as the Japanese were unwilling to cultivate a potential competitor in the 
future, the extent and duration of technical assistance to the Chinese auto industry 
were quite limited – they only exported a large amount of trucks during the early 
1970s to the Chinese (Gallagher, 2006). During this period, the Chinese 
government also began to consider the feasibility of encouraging import 
substitution by approving technology licensing with foreign automakers and joint 
venture operations (Zhang & Taylor, 2001).  
The first auto joint venture was Beijing-Cherokee signed in January 1984 
between Beijing Automobile Industry Corporation (BAIC) and the American 
Motors Corporation (AMC). AMC was later taken over by Chrysler in 1987 and 
then Chrysler combined with Daimler Benz in 1998 (renamed DaimlerChrysler). 
As the Chinese Government restricted foreign ownership in automobile joint 
ventures to no more than 50%, AMC duly took a minority stake. In this joint 
venture, AMC provided new technologies in the form of completely knockdown 
(CKD)
17
 kits. Those CKDs were packaged in the US by AMC, and then exported 
                                               
17  CKDs are “sets of automotive parts that are packaged in one country then exported to another for 
assembly” (Gallagher, 2006, p. 37). 
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to China for assembly by the JV Chinese workers. This joint venture was very 
important for the Chinese at that time as it reflected how the country could absorb 
foreign investment and technology while moving towards industrialisation, but 
without compromising key domestic influence (McGunagle, 2007). This 
partnership was also the “first major manufacturing sino-foreign joint venture of 
any kind after the Cultural Revolution” (Gallagher, 2006, p. 37). And it now still 
continues. 
Shortly after Beijing-Cherokee, a second joint venture was also founded in 
October 1984 between Shanghai Automotive Industry Corporation (SAIC) and 
Volkswagen. The total capital was US$ 4,483 million and Volkswagen took a 
50% stake. Production started with the Santana model, then the Passat was added 
in 1999, the Polo in 2001, and the Santana 3000 in 2003 (McGunagle, 2007). This 
joint venture‟s business operations have been more profitable than those of 
Beijing-Cherokee, and Shanghai-VW has proved to be the leading international 
joint venture in China ever since the mid-1980s (Gallagher, 2006). It produces 
450,000 units of passenger cars annually – this production capacity is equal to the 
size of Volkswagen‟s major manufacturing site based in Wolfsburg, Germany. 
Volkswagen gained an early-mover advantage and dominated China‟s auto 
market for quite a long time, although the joint venture still mainly produces the 
old Santana model. This dominant position was only lost in 2005 when Shanghai-
GM overtook other rivals with the highest auto production volumes (Ho, 2009). 
Between 1984 and 1989, five influential joint venture agreements were 
consecutively established, namely Beijing-AMC, Shanghai-VW, Guangzhou-
Peugeot, FAW-VW, and Tianjin-Daihatsu. These joint ventures helped reduce the 
consumption of foreign reserves due to the previous heavy imports of foreign cars 
(Zhang & Taylor, 2001). Meanwhile, because of these joint partnerships, China‟s 
auto industry attracted a large amount of foreign investment – to those foreign 
auto-producing investors, China‟s untapped market potential was irresistible 
(Zhang & Taylor, 2001). These joint projects were relatively successful during the 
Chapter 6: Chinese Automobile Industry 
168 
  
1990s, especially the Shanghai–VW project, which strengthened the confidence 
and interests of both the Chinese Government and foreign auto firms, and there 
was a flood of investment from both foreign and domestic sources into the 
Chinese auto industry. Based on official statistics, total investment from various 
sources was estimated at US$ 60 billion in the passenger car sector in the 1990s 
(CATARC, 2002). With relaxation of central planning, domestic market demand 
for cars increased rapidly (Newman, 2004).  
Most importantly, during this period, Chinese auto companies gradually 
obtained technologies to produce mini sedans through licensing agreements with 
certain foreign carmakers. For instance, Tianjin Automotive Industry Corporation 
produced the Xiali (Charade) mini cars in 1986, which was later widely used as 
taxi in a lot of Chinese cities. This vehicle model was actually based on Japanese 
Daihatsu technology. In another example, Chongqing Chang‟an also introduced 
Japanese Suzuki‟s technology in 1983 to make its own minisedans (Gallagher, 
2006).  
6.3.6 The 1989 Industrial Policy 
The Chinese Government issued the “Outline of National Industrial Policy” in 
1989, and identified five “pillar industries” in its Seventh Five-year Plan (1986-
1990) drafted in 1984 consisting of machinery, electronics, petrochemicals, 
automotive, and construction sectors (Child, 2000; Zhang & Taylor, 2001). Pillar 
industries referred to those industries that were in the highest stage of national 
industrialisation, intending to drive the national economy growth, possessing the 
potential for high productivity, aiming to reach international quality standards, 
increasing market share internationally, and reflecting a certain degree of 
“comparative advantage” (World Bank, 1997, p. 39).  
As far as the automotive sector was concerned, it was the first time for China 
to formulate such relevant industrial policies. Apart from the “pillar industry” 
concern, the automobile industry was actually the first sector to be fully supported 
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by this 1989 industrial policy, which was based on the following major 
considerations (CATARC, 2002, 2003): First, Value-added effect – it was 
calculated that the value contribution of the Chinese automotive industry was 
around US$ 12 billion in the fiscal year of 2001, accounting for 5% of the added 
value brought by China‟s manufacturing sector. Second, Employment-related 
considerations – there were about 1.6 million Chinese working in the auto 
industry in 2002. Third, Related industrial development – “An automobile is 
composed of more than 10,000 various components”, as the automotive industry 
has related connections with certain industries such as “metallurgy, petroleum, 
chemistry, coal, light industry, electronics, and textiles” (Holweg, Luo, & Oliver, 
2005, p. 14). It was thus reasoned that a better-coordinated automotive industry 
would facilitate the growth of many other industrial manufacturing sectors in 
China. 
6.3.7 Rethinking the Auto Development (Early 1990- Mid-1990s) 
In the early 1990s, while the Chinese Government wished to increase the 
production volume, the output of passenger cars still accounted for less than 10% 
of total vehicle output (Gan, 2003). In 1991 and 1992, the production of cars 
reached only 81,055 and 162,725 units respectively (Buckley et al., 2007). 
Although investments from both domestic and foreign sources flooded into 
China‟s automobile industry, the Chinese auto market was at a standstill until the 
mid-1990s, extensive increase in production and sales did not happen after the 
mid-1990s (Gallagher, 2006). From 1995 to 1996, the production of cars reached 
at 325,461 and 391099 units respectively. Since 1995, the average annual growth 
rate in vehicle production in China has been around 15%, compared to the world 
average of 1.5% during the same period. Overall, the early 1990s to mid-1990s 
saw the passenger car production grow at an average growth rate of 27% annually 
(China Automotive Industry Yearbook, 1996), and passenger car production was 
doubling almost every two and half years (Luo, 2005). 
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During this period, there were two new joint ventures established. The first 
one was between First Auto Works (FAW) and German VW in 1990 with a total 
capitalisation of US$ 2,925 million. The FAW-VW project located in both 
Changchun and Chengdu City with a strong industrial base, designed to produce 
the Jetta model followed by the Audi model
18
. The second joint venture was a 
50/50 partnership agreement between Dongfeng Motor and French Citroen in 
Wuhan, Hubei Province. It was designed to produce the Fukang compact with a 
total capitalisation of US$ 1,765 million (McGunagle, 2007). 
During this period, the Chinese Government gradually realised that foreign 
auto companies did not actually teach their Chinese partners anything significant, 
and Chinese side has not acquired much needed up-to-date vehicle technology 
and R&D knowledge (Gallagher, 2006). The Chinese Government thus began to 
reconsider its auto industrial strategies in a specifically regulated way.  
However, there were different views within the Government in terms of how 
to construct its auto industry (Gallagher, 2006). Some officials pointed out that 
the Japanese or Korean path was a viable choice, and China should learn from 
them to develop a world-class independent auto industry. After all, Japanese and 
Koreans auto companies both had developed independently and held their 
challenging or even surpassing positions when competing against their US and 
European counterparts after World War Two.  
On the contrary, some officials believed that it could be late for China to 
possibly catch up with the foreign automakers. They argued that if foreigners 
would like to invest in China to manufacture and sell cars through joint ventures, 
this still be a good choice – at least China could benefit from job creation and 
associated tax revenues. Since the Chinese Government wanted to strengthen the 
                                               
18 Full-scale production started in July 1996, with the Jetta CL and City-Golf. In 1996, Audi production began 
with the Audi A6. Production of the Bora started in 2002. In 2003, the Audi A4 model was added, along with 
the Caddy in 2005. Now besides Volkswagen, FAW also has a licensed technology tie-up with Toyota for 
several models (McGunagle, 2007). 
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SOEs automakers‟ competitiveness in the industry, it began to consider various 
regulations, including foreign equity limits, and local content requirements. 
6.3.8 Formulating the 1994 Auto Policy 
By promoting the indigenous car industry and accelerating its modernisation, the 
legitimacy for transferring foreign technology and management expertise has 
been established since 1978. The demand-led increase of imported cars in the 
mid-1980s, combined with the globalisation trends since the beginning of the 
1990s, further forced the Chinese Government to initiate much more new and 
systematic legislation to deal with the economic relationships with foreign 
companies (Sit & Liu, 2000).  
On February 19, 1994, “more than 10 years after the announcement of the 
first auto joint venture” (Gallagher, 2006, p. 39), the Chinese State Planning 
Commission (SPC) completed the first real and fundamental industry-specific 
document for the automobile industry – the “1994 Automotive Industry Policy”. 
Comparing with the 1989 policy, this 1994 policy took “a radically different 
approach in three significant ways” (Gallagher, 2006, p. 39): 
1. Call for Long Run Consolidation and Integration  
This 1994 policy intended to consolidate the scarce resources and investment to 
set up a few large-scale, internationally competitive national auto groups instead 
of the scattered small producers, by 2010 (Newman, 2004). The Chinese 
authorities sought to form a strategic arrangement of “Big Three, Small Three and 
Mini Two”, which was roughly similar to the American “Big Three Auto Group” 
model (Holweg, Luo & Oliver, 2005, p. 21). The Chinese “Big Three” refers to 
First Automotive Works (FAW), Shanghai Automotive Industrial Corporation 
(SAIC) and Second Automotive Works/Dongfeng Motor Company. The “Small 
Three” includes the Beijing Automotive Industrial Corporation, the Tianjin 
Automotive Industrial Corporation and the Guangzhou Automotive Industrial 
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Corporation. The “Mini Two” comprises Chang‟an and Guizhou Aviation (Xia, 
2002, cited in Holweg, Luo, & Oliver, 2005, p. 22). 
2. Local Content Anticipation and Technology Transfer Requirements 
This policy, for the first time, placed strict and integrated restrictions on auto-
related FDI. It clearly specified localisation and knowledge transfer requirements 
for setting up joint ventures with foreign automakers. Foreign auto firms with 
their own product patents, strong manufacturing capabilities, ample financing 
resources, and independent global marketing channels would be regarded as 
potential cooperative partners. Joint ventures are required to have their own R&D 
centres, and balance their foreign exchange requirements independently. JV 
products must comply with international technical standards. Chinese equity in 
the joint ventures must be at least 50% to be able to exert more control and 
bargaining power. Finally, the parts and components in the joint ventures must be 
localised by at least 40%. More preferential status may be granted according the 
level of local content achieved (Holweg, Luo, & Oliver, 2005).  
3. Market Creation and Encouragement of Consumption 
This 1994 Auto Policy reaffirmed the legitimacy of private car ownership and 
purchasing with the intention of stimulating market consumption further. All of 
the foreign automakers were also required to go through the confirmatory 
procedures to gain government approval.  
Reflecting upon the 1994 automotive policy, some scholars (i.e., Gallagher, 
2006) comment it has not actually brought about the expected outcomes. For 
example, the consolidation of the auto industry for the purpose of market creation 
and consumption encouragement was not achieved (Gallagher, 2006), and it also 
seems that this scrutiny did not discourage foreign investment into China‟s auto 
industry at all. Investment from both the Chinese Government and foreign sources 
flooded into the Chinese motor vehicle and related industries. For instance, in 
1997, General Motors established the joint venture – Shanghai-GM – with 
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Shanghai Auto Industry Corporation (SAIC), which was GM‟s largest single 
foreign investment in China (See Chapter 7.). Also in 1997, Honda replaced 
Peugeot and negotiated with Guangzhou Automotive Company. In 1999, Ford 
cooperated with Chang‟An Manufacturing Group. Based on the Chinese official 
statistical report, investment from all sources amounted to “nearly US$ 60 billion 
during the 1990s” (CATARC, 2002, cited in Gallagher, 2006, p. 40). After the 
1994 policy was implemented, almost all of the giant multinational automakers 
entered China to capture the fast growing market opportunities.  
Furthermore, although China‟s Government had given a high degree of 
protection to the industry, not all Chinese auto producers had confidence to 
compete in the world market. In fact, there were few than expected vehicles were 
exported to other countries and regions during this period. Only one positive 
outcome noted by Gallagher (2006): the 1994 policy made the Chinese domestic 
components manufacturers “effectively created and developed” (p. 42). For 
example, “in 1994 only 24% of the VW Jetta parts were made by Chinese 
companies, but by 2000, 84% of the parts were Chinese-made” (Gallagher, 2006, 
p. 42).  
6.3.9 The Impacts of WTO Entry in 2001 
The impacts of China‟s WTO accession in 2001 in regulating the Chinese 
automobile industry can not be neglected, as Chinese membership of the WTO 
provides a special transition period for the auto industry (Conybeare, 2004). 
Historically, the Chinese Government adopted certain important policy tools 
to regulate internal auto industry development and protect local firms. Now, being 
one of the WTO member countries, China had to conform with certain WTO 
regulations such as “the Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMs)” and “the 
Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs)”. These agreements aim to 
further open the Chinese domestic market to foreign operations, to seriously 
consider internationally standardised and more transparent procedures, and to 
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liberalise many of the past restrictions, such as high tariffs on imported vehicles in 
the early 1980s (Newman, 2004).  
A condition of joining the World Trade Organisation (WTO) for China in 
December 2001 was to ease restrictions on foreign investment and products‟ entry 
into the economy (Richter, 2001). Thus China‟s accession to the WTO actually 
placed significant constraints on state policy towards the auto industry. Some 
major impacts upon the Chinese auto industry after entry into the WTO are 
demonstrated in Table 6.1 below: 
Table 6. 1 Key Issue Comparisons (Pre and PostWTO Membership) 
 PreWTO PostWTO 
Tariff Rates was 200% in 1980s 
Changed to 80-100% in the 
1990s 
10-13% for 
parts/accessories; and 
25% for complete cars 
on July 1, 2006 
Auto Import Limitations 30,000 units per year Eliminated after 2006 
Local Content 
Requirements of Auto 
Products 
40% for the initial year 
60% for second year 
80% in third year operation 
Cancelled 
 
Foreign Financing for 
Chinese Customers 
 
Prohibited Permitted 
 
Technology Transfer 
Imposed on Foreign Firms 
Required Eliminated 
 
Source: McGunagle (2007). 
 
However, some researchers point out that whatever effort foreign producers 
are making to ally with domestic Chinese auto firms, “the Chinese government 
will continue to protect its domestic market despite WTO rules that encourage 
developing countries to open up their markets to competition” (Conybeare, 2004, 
p. 11). 
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6.3.10 Adjustment Period and Tenth Five-year Plan (2001-2005) 
After 2001, the Chinese auto market grew even faster than before. In 2002, the 
total vehicle production reached 3.25 million units, which was a 38.83% growth 
compared with the outputs in 2001. For the passenger car segment, production 
volume was 1.09 million units in 2002, for the first time going over the one 
million units‟ mark – which was a 55% increase over 2001. Also in 2002, China‟s 
vehicle production volume was ranked fourth in the world (after America, Japan 
and Germany) (CATARC, 2003). This rapid growth, particularly in 2002 and 
2003, attracted significant amount of foreign investments (Holweg, Luo, & 
Oliver, 2005). Those giant foreign automakers, whether they already had previous 
operations in China or not, all had ambitions to further increase their local 
capacity and production. In 2003, there were over 10 auto joint ventures operating 
in the domestic passenger car sector
19
, dominating most of China‟s passenger car 
production. Production volumes increased by about 39% in 2002 and by almost 
37% in 2003 (Newman, 2004).  
Although the above figures and facts are impressive, some observers 
comment that China‟s auto industry is still young (Davis & Diegel, 2002). Most 
of the Chinese automakers manufacture fewer than 100,000 units annually, and 
the total vehicle stock was just 10 million units in 2002 (CATARC, 2002), which 
was quite insignificant compared to the “17.2 million new cars registered in the 
United States” in the same year (Gallagher, 2006, p. 41). Meanwhile, the Chinese 
Government was concerned that the Chinese auto companies should not be over 
reliant on their foreign partners for introducing advanced technologies and 
management knowledge. Government then issued the Tenth Five-Year Plan 
(2001-2005) to encourage greater investment in technological innovation in the 
                                               
19  Involving FAW-Volkswagen, FAW-Tianjin-Toyota, Beijing-Jeep, Beijing-Hyundai, Shanghai-VW, 
Shanghai-GM, Dongfeng-Citroen, Dongfeng-Nissan, Chang‟An-Suzuki, Chang‟An-Ford, and Guangzhou-
Honda  (Newman, 2004). 
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automobile industry and to use the auto industry to fuel economic growth in China 
after accession to the WTO.  
The general guidelines of the Tenth Five-Year Plan (2001-2005) were “to 
meet the ever-increasing needs of the domestic market through opening up and 
accelerating self-development” (BIZChina, 2006, para. 1). Some specifically 
stated objectives include: to emphasise environmental protection and promote 
harmonious industrial development (The economy cars were regarded as the focus 
of development); to build a few local, famous brands based on Chinese 
independent intellectual property rights, and to be the dominant auto 
manufacturing country by 2010 (Thun, 2004).  
This plan confirmed that strategic reorganisation of the automotive industry 
should be promoted. “Large corporations should serve as the backbone to realise 
the optimisation of the structure of the automotive industry and achieve mass 
production. More national technical centres should be set up to enhance 
technique-innovation and production-development abilities. Market surroundings 
would thus be improved and management based on the legal system will be 
strengthened to promote fair competition” (BIZChina, 2006, para. 1 & 2). 
Cooperation between influential corporations and distribution of resources were 
also to be encouraged and supported. Thus the plan definitely reaffirmed the 
principles for sharpening the competitive edge of China‟s automotive industry to 
increase the China-made vehicle production volume to satisfy the domestic 
demands and to be ready to compete globally (Thun, 2004).  
6.3.11 The 2004 Auto Industry Policy 
In 2004, the total auto output in China‟s market exceeded 5 million units, which 
was a 15.5% increase from 2003 (China Automotive Industry Yearbook, 2005). 
These facts and figures made China the fourth largest vehicle production country 
and the third most important national auto market at that time (Newman, 2004). 
However, with the increasing concern that the production supply capacity might 
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supersede demand, the Government started to consider economic “cooling-down” 
policies.  
The Chinese National Development and Reform Commission also officially 
updated the 1994 Auto Industry Development Policy in May 2004 in order to 
further control the approval for investments in the auto industry
20
. The new 2004 
policy stated several new objectives above and beyond those in the 1994 policy 
(CATARC, 2004). This 2004 policy indicated, for the first time, foreign investors 
would be allowed to “control stakes of more than 50% in automobile joint 
ventures, if the joint ventures were built in China‟s export-processing zones and 
aimed at overseas markets” (Gallagher, 2006, p. 44). The Government was 
attempting to use market-oriented mechanisms rather than simply administrative 
intervention to guide the industry‟s strategic directions (Thun, 2004). For 
example, instead of previously imposed local content requirements which aroused 
some discontents among foreign firms, the Government now realised that this 
target could be achieved in tandem with overseas investors plus tax incentives 
under the current circumstances
21
 (Newman, 2004). The new policy also re-
encouraged the improvement of the Chinese firms‟ international competitiveness, 
as China hopes to accelerate the development of the independent capabilities of its 
automobile firms to safeguard the national interest of its auto industry while 
continuing to support domestic firms in cooperation with foreign partners 
(Newman, 2004). 
With respect to technological innovation and capacity building, the policy 
stated that the industry should continue to abide by the principle of integrating 
imported technologies with self-developed technologies, and that the state should 
                                               
20 At the beginning of 2004, in order to reduce the side effects of overheated investment and to cool down the 
whole auto market, the Chinese Government had already adopted a series of measures, for example, 
discouraging further investments, slowing down bank lending to the potential car buyers, and price 
discounting (Gallagher, 2006). 
21 To a certain degree the 2004 policy still retains some restrictions on the foreign firms‟ activities within the 
domestic marketplace (Newman, 2004). 
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support R&D activities through preferential tax policies. The other major 
objectives stated were that automotive enterprises should build a few local, 
famous brands based on Chinese independent intellectual property rights; to 
increase the China-made vehicle production volume with continued industry 
restructuring to be ready to compete globally, and to make China the dominant 
auto manufacturing country by 2010. This new policy particularly stated that the 
industry should actively conduct research on electric and hybrid-electric vehicles, 
and the state should take measures in the areas of scientific research to create an 
enabling policy environment for the production and use of hybrid vehicles.  
Although this new policy encouraged people to buy new energy efficient 
vehicles, as the Government emphasised harmonious industrial development and 
environmental protection with a goal of reducing average fuel consumption by 
passenger vehicles by 15% by 2010 (CATARC, 2004), it is still doubtful whether 
or not the fuel cell and solar autos can enter into the market. One major reason is 
the Chinese buyers have paid more attention to the final sale price and usage 
costs. As far as the individual customer is concerned, the hybrid is more fuel 
efficient, but its initial price and repair costs are also very high
22
 (Chen, 2009).  
                                               
22 According to one survey, the production cost of hybrids is US$ 7,000 to US$ 10,000 higher than that of 
traditional internal combustion automobiles. The costs of pure electric automobiles and fuel cell automobiles 
are even higher (Chen, 2009). For example, the sale price of the hybrid type “Puris” was between RMB 
260,000 (US$ 38,000) and RMB 3 00,000 (US$ 43,800), which was US$ 10,000 higher than for internal 
combustion engines of a similar type. Another hybrid “CIVIC” was priced at RMB 269,800 (US$ 39,400) in 
2009, while the traditional new “CIVIC” was only RMB 176,800 (US$ 25,800). Because of the low 
difference in engine performance between these two types of vehicles, most customers would not choose the 
“CIVIC” hybrid. After all the price difference was near to RMB 93,000 (US$ 13,600). The third Chinese 
domestically developed hybrid vehicle “BYD” was priced less than US$ 30,000. However, its price still 
seems “higher than that of other internal combustion engines of a similar type” (Chen, 2009, para. 11). In 
sum, although the Government has subsidised prices, the real price of new energy automobiles is still higher 
than that of internal combustion automobiles (Chen, 2009). Most Chinese customers would like to choose an 
automobile with high quality equipment and ignore fuel efficiency. Apart from the private buyers, taxi 
companies even with government subsidies find it hard to justify a decision to buy new energy automobiles. 
So it is not surprised to see, by the end of 2008, the total sales volumes of new energy automobiles for 3 years 
were under 3,500. For the year 2008, total sale volumes of new energy automobiles in China were “only 899” 
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6.3.12 Summary 
The Chinese auto industry has been experiencing impressive changes over the 
past decades, contributing factors for the growth of China‟s gross domestic 
product, and also showing the characteristics of path dependency (Fetscherin & 
Sardy, 2008).  
The above sections have reviewed the historical “stop-go” development path 
of the Chinese automobile industry since 1949, a path which clearly has been 
circumscribed by both gradual institutional reform in the country and global 
industrial changes. Initially, the Chinese Government relied on knowledge 
transfer and technical assistance from the Soviet Union to build up China‟s own 
modern automobile industry. As a result, First Auto Works (FAW) was 
established in 1953. From 1953 onwards, there were several local state-owned 
auto plants emerged in Shanghai, Nanjing, Jinan, and Beijing during the first five-
year plan period for facilitating industrialisation. Due to the abrupt rupture in the 
Sino-Soviet friendship in 1960, the Chinese auto industry had been without 
foreign assistance and technology support for nearly 20 critical years until the 
“opening reform” in 1978.  
During this period of isolation combined with increased political 
confrontations and military pressures in international societies, the Chinese 
Government fragmented the industry geographically, and also relocated its state-
owned auto plants to the remote mountainous areas of central China (Gan, 2003). 
In other words, prior to 1978, the Chinese automotive industry paid more 
attention to producing trucks, rather than passenger cars, for cargo transportation 
and the needs of infrastructure projects, especially for the sake of defence 
requirements in time of war. After adopting the “opening up” policy in 1978, the 
Chinese Government emphasised economic development and transformation 
                                                                                                                                
(The sale volumes of hybrid “CIVIC” were fewer than 300 in 2008 in the Chinese market.), and Chinese new 
energy automobiles held “less than 1% market share” (Chen, 2009, para. 4). 
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(Zhang & Taylor, 2001). However, with the escalation of market demand, the 
auto industry suffered under many pressures, such as the requirements of 
industrial restructuring, lack of capital and technology development and scarcity 
of knowledge accumulation in car production. The only remaining assets in the 
auto industry were the outdated Russian truck production technology of 1960s 
(which could not actually fulfil the Government‟s specified objectives) referred to 
as “High Technology Starting Point, Mass Production with Deep Processing 
Capacity and Professional Working Style” (Holweg et al., 2005, p. 22).  
The institutional environment in China began to change rapidly from 1978 
onwards. The first change was the weakening of central government‟s role in the 
economic decision-making process, with a gradual shift towards a market-based 
economy rather than central planning control. Thus the open-door reform actually 
led to a mixed regulatory mechanism including both market-based competition 
and the legacy of a command economy. State-owned auto enterprises (SOEs) 
have been authorised more freedom in the decision-making processes. 
The second change was that, in spite of the highly fragmented industry 
structure in the past, the central authority started to use market mechanisms to 
foster the formation of corporation groups to compete with global players, for 
example, the First Auto Works (FAW), Second Auto Works (SAW) and Shanghai 
Automotive Industry Corporation (SAIC), which now have a dominant share of 
the major auto market in China.  
The third change referred to the encouragement of setting up JVs and 
foreign-owned enterprises, which were usually given preferential treatments such 
as a two-year exemption and a three-year tax reduction starting from 1979. The 
Chinese Government has emphasised the development of an appropriate 
infrastructure as a high priority and it is quite willing for foreign investors to add 
to these facilities – in transportation and communication, in energy capacity, and 
even in education. Due to the strict auto-related regulations, in certain 
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strategically important or pillar industry sectors (such as the automotive industry), 
the Chinese Government puts pressure on foreign MNEs to use equity joint 
ventures rather than wholly-owned foreign enterprises (WOFEs) (Conklin, 2006). 
The Government initially began to encourage the formation of joint ventures 
to acquire more advanced technology and assistance from foreign automakers in 
the 1980s. However, there were still no formal and systematic policies for 
regulating the auto industry until late 1989 (Newman, 2004), followed by 1994, 
2004 industry policies respectively.  
In sum, the combination of the above-mentioned institutional dynamic 
processes and stimulating industrial features has led to a unique dynamic 
development path for the Chinese auto industry, providing a complicated while 
interesting scenario for focusing on the knowledge transfer in transitional 
economies such as China. Scholars such as Li and Tsui (2000) suggest that 
institutions matter, but how they matter remains contentious. Yang and 
Stoltenberg (2008) further propose that understanding the complexities and 
continuing institutional changes in China is the key for management and 
organisation scholars, as the different organisational development patterns are 
embedded in this complex environment, with its economic reforms, enterprise 
transformation, and China‟s changing policies over the past decades.  
6.4 Countering the Challenges of Global Economic Slowdown 
The 2008 economic crisis hit hard the automobile industry across the world. 
Traditional global auto giant companies lost their previous prosperity. The 
Chinese auto industry “did not escape” (MarketWatch, 2009, para. 11). It was 
reported that the rate of automotive production and sales began to drop after their 
continuous rapid growth in the second half of 2008. Data released by the China 
Association of Automobile Manufacturers (CAAM) showed the sales volume was 
down 14.4% from the record of 860,000 units (in January 2008) to 735,000 (in 
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January, 2009) (Haq, 2009). The growth in sales of passenger cars generally 
slowed to 7.3% in 2008 (Ho, 2009). 
6.4.1 The Chinese Government Reaction and 2009 Auto Policy 
In order to counter the effects of the global economic slowdown and to promote 
the industry‟s future development (PRLog, para. 4), the Chinese Government 
particularly unveiled a wide-ranging stimulus plan as part of a relevant policy 
(“The Revitalization of Chinese Automobile Industry”) in February 2009. The 
package includes: (1) to reduce the sales tax into half (to 5%) on small cars with 
engine capacities below 1.6 litres; and (2) to provide subsidies amounting to US$ 
732 million to owners of older vehicles, if they would like to exchange their old 
cars for more fuel-efficient new ones (Yan, 2009).  
The Chinese Government also promises to “provide finance and tax relief for 
new energy automobiles”, and Government will “invest 10 billion RMB Yuan 
(1.46 billion US Dollars) from 2009 to 2011 to support the development and 
eventual mass production of new energy automobiles and electric vehicles” based 
on “technological innovations and the research of special parts” (Chen, 2009, 
para. 2).  The 2009 Auto Policy stipulated that “all Chinese domestic automobile 
manufacturers must have certified automobile products offering new energy and 
energy alternatives”, providing products such as “pure electric power 
automobiles, plug-in hybrids, special engines, power modules, driver components, 
and optimal design” (Yan, 2009, para. 1). In addition to such short-term measures, 
the Chinese Government has reemphasised the importance of supporting Chinese 
automobile manufacturers‟ global competitiveness by developing “independent 
brands and speeding up the export base construction of automobiles and 
accessories” (PRLog, 2009, para. 4). 
6.4.2 Change the Difficulties into Opportunites 
The so-called “economic crisis” has implications offering both challenges and 
opportunities for Chinese automotive industry development. Inevitably, each 
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industry will meet with periodic circular fluctuations. After a period of rapid 
growth, the Chinese auto industry will enter a period of temporary stagnation, 
whether there is an international financial crisis or not. The current international 
financial meltdown has just triggered a new round of consolidation of the auto 
industry. In such consolidation, Chinese carmakers with low technological 
content and small scale might be discarded, and those better, more innovative 
carmakers with development potential will survive and grow stronger (Wang, 
2009). Despite the international financial meltdown, some multinational car 
makers have even increased their investment in the Chinese market. Confidence 
in the auto market was firstly initiated by confidence in the Chinese economy. 
Although not unaffected by the global financial crisis, the Chinese economy is 
still growing rapidly. One important reason is that China has been rapidly 
growing in terms of production share of the world‟s auto market, and has not 
disappeared with the advent of the international financial meltdown. 2008 saw 
over eight million motor vehicles manufactured in China compared with 0.5 
million in 1996 (Global Market Data Book, 2008). In the same year, China 
became the second largest car market in the world with total sales of 9.38 million 
vehicles, after only the United States (MarketWatch, 2009). 
Demand in the Chinese auto market is also huge, as most people are in the 
phase of first car ownership. According to the “Official Report on 2007 National 
Economy and Social Development Statistics”, China‟s private car population had 
been around 15 million units, 32.5% up year on year (Alon & McIntyre, 2008). 
Industry researchers point out that the demand for passenger cars in the near 
future is most likely to rise by a minimum of 20% a year (National Bureau of 
Statistics of China, 2008). With economic development and increased national 
incomes, more families can afford a car, which, to a certain degree, will determine 
the growth tendency of the Chinese auto market in the mid and long term (Wang, 
2009).  
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6.4.3 Confidence in Mid- and Long-term Development  
For years, as some industrial analysts comment, under the existing circumstances, 
China‟s automobile industry had essentially suffered from diseconomies of scale, 
limited model ranges, low technological capacities, and limited cultivation of 
skilled and innovative workers. “Various costs are rising in the Chinese 
automobile industry. As far as accessories are concerned, China has no advantage 
in high quality accessories. China even has to compete with India and Vietnam in 
the low quality manufacturing sector for batteries and tyres” (PRLog, 2009, para. 
5). It seems that Chinese vehicle manufacturers were more like “truck-makers 
rather than car-makers” (Zhang & Taylor, 2001, p. 264). Existing vehicle 
production systems in China did not provide various automobiles with a high 
level of quality for consumers to choose (Holweg et al., 2005).  
However, despite serious challenges and problems emerging in China‟s auto 
market, (such as traffic congestion, energy over-consumption, and environmental 
pollution), there are still some positive aspects to the Chinese auto industry. 
Chinese automobile manufacture has “an advantage of low cost compared with 
the developed countries, and it seems that China is becoming a manufacturing 
centre and cost centre” (PRLog, 2009, para. 5). The Chinese automotive market 
has also attracted all the major auto brands in the world, and multinational auto 
manufacturers regard the Chinese market as one of their most important markets 
globally. Other opportunities still lie in the further import of foreign technologies 
and human resources
23
. Experts think the Chinese auto industry should make full 
use of these opportunities to attract more high-level international auto talent to 
                                               
23 It is reported that one of the Chinese private car makers - Zhejiang Geely Holding Group completed its 
acquisition of the Volvo car brand from Ford Motor on August 2, 2010 (China Daily, 2010, para. 1). Geely 
paid US$ 1.3 billion in cash and issued a US$ $200 million note to complete the deal (China Daily, 2010, 
para. 3), which is reported the biggest overseas acquisition yet by a Chinese automaker (China Daily, 2010, 
para. 1).  
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work in China, and bring more advanced management ideas, technologies and 
experiences to China‟s auto industry (Alon & McIntyre, 2008).  
Most importantly, the Chinese Government reconsidered the automotive 
industry policies and the competitive market environment was gradually formed; 
the Government began to encourage and support private car ownership to help to 
expand the passenger car market; vehicle prices kept going down and private car 
consumption became the major purchasing driver; consumption of related 
services, such as financing, repairs, and accident compensation were being 
provided; the construction of transportation infrastructure is being speeded up; 
and the Government has begun to relax its rigid control over foreign capital and 
domestic private investments in the auto industry. 
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6.5 Chapter Conclusion 
China‟s auto industry represents an extraordinary case of economic development 
in a transitional economy over the past three decades beginning in 1978, an 
economy which has clearly been affected by both the gradual institutional reform 
in the country and global industrial changes. This chapter has provided an 
overview and the key characteristics of how the institutional environment impacts 
on the historical development path of the Chinese auto industry at the time of the 
study. Several major features are demonstrated as follows:  
(1) The Chinese auto industry has contributed to the phenomenal growth in 
the country‟s economic development with an average annual growth rate of about 
9%. This tremendous macroeconomic achievement, combined with the increasing 
impacts of globalisation of production and market expansion, has undoubtedly led 
to the increasing inflows of foreign direct investment (IFDI) in the form of 
international joint ventures (IJVs) between the auto-producing foreign MNEs and 
major Chinese state-owned firms (Gan, 2003; McGunagle, 2007).  
(2) The Chinese auto industry emphasise the necessity of technology 
(knowledge) transfer and innovative learning, which can be regarded as an 
important aspect of maintaining competitiveness in industrialisation and global 
competition (Amsden, 2001; Gallagher, 2006). One of the obvious characteristics 
is that the impact of foreign technology introduction upon the development of 
China‟s automobile sector. This knowledge acquisition purpose especially can be 
reflected in state intervention and industrial regulations in the Chinese auto 
industry.  
(3) The final characteristic is the role of the Chinese Government has 
traditionally played in the formulation of relevant auto industry policies (Yan, 
2000). Even after extensive economic liberalisation and reform, government 
authorities still exerted their influence by intervening in business activities to 
meet specified targets in various industrial sectors, because the Chinese 
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Government wants to achieve a balanced effect, not only to increase economic 
and industrial modernisation through these liberalised policies (Henderson, 
Sheldon, & Thomas, 1994), but also to ensure that these national achievements 
are regulated in an appropriate way. China‟s auto industry has proven to be no 
exception (China Association of Automobile Manufacturers, 2004). These 
descriptions of the historical background and the current features of the industrial 
policies portray the rise of the automobile industry in China. 
In sum, this chapter depicts the unique institutional environment combined 
with the globalisation context of the auto market, and emphasises the importance 
of knowledge resources for industry and market growth. This chapter particularly 
shows how the mechanism of FDI, Sino-foreign auto joint venture development, 
foreign technology transfer and relevant auto industry policies have impacted on 
the emerging development path of the Chinese auto industry (Holweg et al., 2005) 
– an important context in understanding the sources of success and failure in this 
emerging and promising auto market. The next chapter charts the historical 
developments of the case company – Shanghai-GM – in order to pursue a further 
understanding of interfirm knowledge flows by cooperative partner firms.  
 
Chapter 7: Case Description 
188 
 
Chapter 7 Within-case Description and Findings 
 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter introduces the historical background of one particular auto joint 
venture – Shanghai-GM – between GM and SAIC. This provides the context 
related to the cooperative management activities involving interfirm knowledge 
transfer practices in this thesis. The chapter is concerned mainly with the 
partnering companies‟ profiles and case background, describing the dynamic 
development of the Shanghai-GM project since its formation to the date of the 
study. The within-case description and partnering companies‟ background (based 
on a combination of both primary and secondary sources) underlines the 
ideographic nature of alliance networks and interpartner knowledge transfer 
practices in developing and building the alliance‟s competitiveness.  
This chapter is organised in the following way. It begins in section 7.2 with 
the background and characteristics of the two partnering companies; the 
preformation and negotiation of the IJV project are described in section 7.3; the 
formation and starting operations is mentioned in section 7.4; it is followed by the 
detailed descriptions of knowledge transfer and partnership events in section 7.5; 
“Intensive Interactions” introduces knowledge development and adaptation-
related events in section 7.6; section 7.7  describes “Challenges and Difficulties” 
of transferring tacit cultural knowledge; section 7.8 identifies the managerial trust 
and partner relationship; section 7.9 describes “Further Rounds of Cooperative 
Knowledge Transfer”; The following sections emphasises “Alliance 
Achievements” (section 7.10), “Partners‟ Satisfaction” (section11), and “Various 
Locations in China” (section12); “Knowledge Acquisition and Harvesting” notes 
the knowledge transfer results in section 7.13. This chapter concludes with section 
7.14.  
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7.2 Characteristics of Partnering Firms 
As GM loses market share in the US, GM must gain the lead in China … 
China now continues to be a very solid profit contributor. 
- Frederick A. Henderson,  
Former President and CEO of GM (2009-2009) 
SAIC will be one of the top 10 car companies in the world … Youngsters in 
Europe or the US will consider a Shanghai Auto car in the next 10 to 15 years.  
- Graeme Maxton, An Industry Consultant, Britain 
Before identifying the dynamic reconfigurations and shifts of this joint venture 
project and the focused research on interpartner knowledge transfer practices, the 
two cooperative partnering companies and their preformation background are 
firstly reported in the following sections.  
7.2.1 General Motors’ Company Profile 
(1) Initiation Stage – On September 16, 1908, General Motors (GM) was started 
in Flint, Michigan as a holding company. GM was initially controlled by William 
C. Durant, but it also had another co-founder – Charles Stewart Mott who joined 
“with his carriage company at the time of its creation”, which made him “the 
largest single stockholder in GM” (“General Motors”, 2010, para. 4). 
In 1908, GM brought in Oldsmobile. In the year of 1909, GM began to 
acquire some other motor vehicle companies such as “Cadillac, Elmore, Oakland 
(later known as Pontiac)”. After 1909, GM acquired the Reliance Motor Truck 
Company of Owosso (in Michigan) and the Rapid Motor Vehicle Company of 
Pontiac (in Michigan), and later became GMC Truck. At the superficial level, it 
seems that GM had achieved great growth. However, these series of acquisitions 
meant that GM suffered “a large amount of debts”, which made GM gradually 
“lose bankers‟ trust” in 1910 (“General Motors”, 2010, para. 4). 
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(2) Rapid Development Stage – Until Alfred P. Sloan took over as President 
and CEO in 1923 and when he was faced with 75 factories in 40 cities, GM grew 
rapidly in the American automotive industry and moved toward postwar global 
dominance (Lethbridge, 1992). Although GM was much smaller than Ford in 
1923, from 1928 onwards GM sold more cars each year than any other company 
in the world. In 1956, GM became the world‟s largest manufacturing company. 
This unprecedented growth lasted “through the late ‟70s and into the early ‟80s” 
(“General Motors”, 2010, para. 4). In 1983, GM announced it had made a top 
quality small car, and seven years later the first Saturn models were being 
manufactured under the most integrated and automated operation in the United 
States (Lethbridge, 1992). This Saturn project was expected to be the answer to 
the Japanese challenge at that time. There were no hourly-paid employees, and 
production workers were placed in teams. If a defect was spotted, the assembly 
line could be stopped with pull cords. Four or five models could be produced 
simultaneously, and the line was designed to promote quality, worker comfort, 
and efficiency.  
(3) Reaching Peak Performance – With global headquarters located at the 
Renaissance Center in Detroit, Michigan, GM became the world‟s second largest 
automaker in 2008, which “employed about 244,500 people around the world in 
2009” (“General Motors”, 2010, para. 2). As a global company, GM once had a 
wide range of business operations, including “telecommunications, aerospace, 
defense, locomotives, diesel engines, automotive systems, heavy-duty automatic 
transmissions, business financial and insurance services worldwide” (KBizZle, 
2005, para. 4).  
GM used to own a broad brand portfolio, with brands such as “Buick, 
Cadillac, Chevrolet, GMC, Holden, Saturn and Vauxhall. In some countries, GM 
also distributed vehicles branded by Isuzu, Subaru, GM Daewoo and Suzuki” 
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through its own global marketing networks as a result of its cooperative 
agreements (“GM Background”, 2009, para. 3).  
GM‟s international operations were once divided into European, Asia 
Pacific, Latin America, Africa, and the Middle East regions. Its current largest 
national market is the United States, followed by China, Brazil, Germany, the 
United Kingdom, Canada, and Italy (“GM Company Profile”, 2010, para. 1). GM 
Asia Pacific, headquartered in Shanghai, provides oversight for GM‟s Asian 
Pacific operations including mainland China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong. GM was 
the major shareholder in Daewoo (South Korea). It also had established several 
important and influential cooperative partnerships worldwide with “Toyota, 
Suzuki, Isuzu, Daimler-Chrysler, BMW, Shanghai Automotive Industry Corp., 
AVTOVAZ of Russia and Renault SA of France” (“GM Background”, 2009, 
para. 2). These global partnerships gave GM links to the global market.  
Internally, GM offered a variety of continuous education and training 
opportunities for its employees, and “supported advanced education and 
certification through tuition assistance, EMBA programme, and technical 
education programmes” (KBizZle, 2005, para. 20). The “first three training 
programmes were available through GM University which was designed to align 
the company‟s training investment with its business needs, and to disseminate 
best practices and core values” (KBizZle, 2005, para. 18). The formal training 
programme consisted of five components: “Foundation Skill Training (i.e., 
computer software, GM history and business orientations); Functional Specific 
Skills and Techniques; Leadership and Professional Development, and On-the-job 
Training” (KBizZle, 2005, para. 20). Through these efforts, GM had established a 
learning culture across the entire enterprise, which provided a solid foundation for 
reaching its peak performance in terms of business expansion. 
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Hence it was not surprising to see GM‟s manufacturing and sales once again 
hold an influential position in the vehicle sector. In 2002, GM sold “more than 8.5 
million trucks and cars units, roughly 15% of the global vehicle market share” 
(KBizZle, 2005, para. 8). Its presence was significant in the main commercial 
areas, “with market shares equal to 26.7% in North America, 9.3% in Europe, 
16.3% in Latin America, Africa and the Middle East, and 3.7% in the Asia-Pacific 
Zone” (Camuffo & Volpato, 2002, p. 337). In 2004, GM sold about “9 million 
cars and trucks in the global auto market, up 4%” (“GM Background”, 2009, para. 
1). In 2007, nearly 9.37 million GM vehicles were sold globally, “this was a 3% 
increase over 2006 and the second best global sales number in the company‟s 
history” (“GM Global Sales”, 2008, para. 1). In 2008, “8.35 million GM cars and 
trucks were sold globally” (“General Motors”, 2010, para. 2). By sales, GM was 
ranked as “the largest automaker in the US and the second largest in the world for 
2008”, overtaken by Toyota. It “manufactures cars and trucks in 34 countries” and 
its vehicles were sold “in some 140 countries”. GM even had “the third highest 
2008 global revenues among automakers on the Fortune Global 500” (“General 
Motors”, 2010, para. 1). 
(4) Comparing the Past with Current Situation – GM had made great 
business achievements during the past decades. Certain specific reasons could 
explain GM‟s past achievements: First, GM products were strictly differentiated 
according to the different consumer markets. For each different division, GM was 
to produce a particular brand. Hence the complete market was covered. In such a 
way a full advantage of the economies of scale could apply. Second, GM set out 
to be the style leader, and introduced annual model changes. Third, GM pursued a 
low cost strategy in the industry, and yet had quality standards which compared 
closely with the competition. As a leading global company in vehicle products 
and transportation-related services, the key business consideration of GM was to 
establish diversified while related corporate initiatives.  
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However, in recent years, GM had been experiencing serious business 
operational problems, struggling to keep hold of its market share. And finally, the 
mighty GM finally had to go into bankruptcy in order to redeem itself. On 
Monday June 1, 2009, GM “filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection 
proceedings” (“General Motors”, 2010, para. 1). This arrangement was part of the 
Obama administration‟s plan in order to let GM restructure itself and the federal 
government hold a majority ownership stake of GM
24
.  
Korzeniewski (2008) once gave two major reasons to explain GM‟s tragedy: 
First, GM had been constantly struggling to unite the United Auto Workers 
(UAW) in an agreement in terms of the retired employees‟ pension plan and 
healthcare costs. Second, although GM had the technology to produce more fuel-
efficient vehicles, GM did not believe a significant portion of its customers would 
want to buy them. The filings were “testimony to the size and complexity of this 
101-year-old company and to the scale of the problems that had finally 
overwhelmed it” (“The Bankruptcy of General Motors”, 2009, para. 2). 
7.2.2 The Local Partner: SAIC’s Company Profile 
In China, SAIC is a fully state-owned enterprise (SOEs) which was originally 
established in 1955 as the Shanghai Internal Combustion Engine Components 
Company (Its major historical changes and renaming are shown in Table 7.1 
below).  
Since 1978, SAIC has been managed by four different executives, and their 
service terms were four, eight, four and seven years respectively
25
. Three of the 
four presidents were transferred from senior positions in the Shanghai 
Government and two vice presidents remained officials after leaving SAIC. Mr. 
Hu Maoyuan, the current Chairman and President of SAIC, is an exception. “His 
                                               
24 See also Chapter 5, Section 5.5 and Coda in Chapter 9. 
25 The fourth chief executive is still in the managerial position. 
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career started in one of the SAIC‟s factories and he has been in the management 
team since 1986” (www.saicgroup.com, cited in Liu & Tylecote, 2009, p. 531).  
Table 7. 1 Major Historical Changes and Renaming in SAIC 
Dec. 1955 Shanghai Internal Combustion Engine Components Company was 
founded. 
March 1958 Shanghai Internal Combustion Engine Components Company was 
consolidated into Shanghai Powertrain Machinery Manufacturing 
Company. 
Jan. 1960 Shanghai Powertrain Machinery Manufacturing Company was renamed 
Shanghai Agricultural Machinery Manufacturing Company. 
April 1969 Shanghai Agricultural Machinery Manufacturing Company was 
renamed Shanghai Tractor Industry Company. 
July 1984 Shanghai Automobile & Tractor Industry Company was inaugurated. 
March 1985 Shanghai Volkswagen Automotive Co., Ltd. was founded. 
March 1990 Shanghai Automobile & Tractor Industry Company was renamed 
Shanghai Automotive Industry Corporation. 
Sept. 1995 Shanghai Automotive Industry Corp. (Group) was founded. 
June 1997 Shanghai General Motors Co., Ltd. started its business. 
July 2004 Shanghai Automotive Industry Corp. (Group) became a Fortune 500 
company for the first time. 
Dec. 2004 SAIC Motor Corp. Ltd. was launched. 
Source: adapted from SAIC Annual Report (2005). 
 
Together with First Auto Works (FAW) and Dongfeng Motor Corporation 
(DMC), SAIC is currently known as one of the leading and well-reputed major 
Chinese auto groups (Liu & Tylecote, 2009). It invests mainly in different lines of 
auto manufacturing products, such as passenger cars, commercial vehicles and 
auto components. It also engages in some auto related insurance services, car 
loans, and the retailing trade (SAIC Annual Report, 2007). The company‟s 
business assets‟ structure is shown in Figure 7.1. 
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Figure 7. 1 Business Assets’ Structure of SAIC 
 
 
 
 
Source: SAIC Annual Report, 2007. 
As a leading car manufacturer in China‟s auto industry, the operations of 
SAIC are not just limited to the Shanghai area. It has already “established its own 
domestic manufacturing bases in certain cities in China – Shenyang, Qingdao, 
Yantai, Yizheng, Chongqing, and Liuzhou” (as shown in Figure 7.2 below) 
(“About SAIC”, 2009, para. 3), and holds major shares in Liuzhou Wuling 
Automotive Company in Guangxi and Jiangsu Yizheng Automotive Company, as 
well as shares in Anhui Chery (SAIC Annual Report, 2007). 
Figure 7. 2 The Domestic Geographic Layout of SAIC in China 
 
Source: SAIC Annual Report, 2007. 
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SAIC has also set up overseas branches or offices in the US, Europe, Hong 
Kong, Japan and Korea, including SAIC USA Inc. (in Detroit); SAIC Motor 
Technical Center (in Leamington Spa, UK); SAIC Europe GMBH (in Hamburg, 
Germany); SAIC Korea Co., Ltd. (in Seoul, Korea); SAIC Japan Co., Ltd. (in 
Tokyo); and SAIC Hong Kong Co., Ltd. (SAIC Annual Report, 2007).  
Guided by its corporate values and strategies – customers‟ satisfaction, 
competitive advantage through innovation, internationalisation, and people 
management
26
 – and with opportunities emerging from the rapid growth of the 
Chinese auto market, the management of SAIC has demonstrated their forward-
looking insights by sticking to the principles of strengthening strategic 
cooperation and joint venture activities with global original equipment 
manufacturers (OEMs). One famous international partnership example is between 
SAIC and German Volkswagen – Shanghai-VW, created in March 1985. Both 
VW and SAIC contributed a 50% stake, and the JV vehicle production focused on 
models such as Santana, Santana 2000, Santana 3000, Passat and Polo with 
current total market share roughly above 30% in China (www.saicgroup.com).  
In recent years, combined with increased economic performance in China 
and strategic partnerships with global automakers, SAIC sped up its growth and 
made significant model development. It gained remarkable achievements in the 
passenger car sector, enjoying amazing profits. Some of SAIC‟s financial 
achievements have been very impressive. In 1999, SAIC “generated RMB 88.29 
billion Yuan (US$ 10.63 billion) in sales revenue, with profits reaching RMB 6.2 
billion Yuan (US$ 746 million)” (“Shanghai Auto Leads”, 2000, para. 2). By 
2000, the company had captured “45% share of the auto market in China and 
ranked first among Chinese auto companies” (“Shanghai Auto Leads”, 2000, 
                                               
26 The abbreviation of the group‟s name stands for its corporate values: S-Satisfaction from customers; A-
Advantage through innovation; I-Internationalization in operating; and C-Concentration on people (SAIC 
Annual Report, 2005, 2007). 
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para. 2). In 2005, it sold more than 1.05 million vehicles, of which more than 
740,000 were passenger cars, and realised consolidated revenue of US$ 14.37 
billion. In 2006, SAIC “topped the Chinese automotive groups with a sales 
volume of over 1.34 million units of vehicles, of which 910,000 were passenger 
cars and 429,000 commercial vehicles”. SAIC was on the “Fortune 500” list 
(ranking 402) in 2007 as one of a few Chinese firms with its “consolidated US$ 
18.01 billion main business revenue” (“About SAIC”, 2009, para. 1). 
In order to be one of the top global auto companies, along with such as 
Toyota, GM, Ford, and Volkswagen in the near future, SAIC has set its “target to 
produce over 2 million vehicles”, including certain percentage of self-developed 
and own-brand models, with “trade and export revenue of US$ 5 billion by 2010” 
(Bursa, 2007, p. 22). While some industrial analysts argue this target seemed over 
ambitious for SAIC based on the fact that SAIC was only ranked seventeenth 
globally in terms of unit sales
 
in 2003, other industrial analysts do believe this 
target is realistic (e.g., Bursa, 2006, 2007).                                                  
7.3 Origins and Formation of Shanghai-GM 
7.3.1 The Preformation Strategic Considerations    
                                                                                                             
Before the formation of Shanghai-GM in 1997, despite having worldwide 
revenues of US$ 123 billion in 1991, General Motors was in crisis. By 1990 the 
company was suffering from low labour productivity, a reputation for making 
poor quality cars relative to the Japanese, lengthy new-model cycles, and 
particular problems with the United Automotive Workers‟ union (the UAW) with 
whom there had been almost continual confrontation, sparked by the job 
insecurity caused by the large swings in demand in the industry (Keller, 2003).  
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In December 1991 GM announced the closure of 21 factories and the loss of 
74,000 jobs, and by the end of 1995 GM anticipated that the North American 
workforce would be half the 1985 size, having lost US$ 7.1 billion in the 1991 
financial year, and with 1992 shaping up as the third successive year of massive 
losses. There were some internal arguments about GM‟s global market situation 
and new directions to go for future growth at that time. One GM executive 
recalled: 
In recent years, USA is becoming a well structured and fairly saturated 
market … [which] only offers a limited space for our business expansion and 
growth potential. Cars sales in the European market are also under pressure. I 
am pretty sure our long-term growth will be in Asia. Asia continues to be an 
important part of our expansion strategy and China is an example. We know 
there are tremendous demands here. We have to take advantage of that. 
(Interviewee A1) 
Another GM manager agreed with his comments: 
We are all observing that China‟s auto market is growing rapidly. Chinese 
sales of new automobiles grew 18% each year annually, this is a doubling in 
the number of passenger vehicles on the road every 4 years. I believe that 
China will be an export platform for vehicles and parts, and a global auto 
manufacturing and research centre. It is predictable and it is just a matter of 
time. GM should find a way to put a stake in China. This is a historical 
development opportunity. (Interviewee A3) 
As GM management believed that Chinese “economic expansion would 
eventually create a middle class having the ability to afford a car” (Keller, 2003, 
para. 1), GM began to have contact with Chinese government officials in 1994
27
.  
However, GM was later reminded by a Chinese government official that it 
might be a little bit late for GM to access the Chinese auto market, as some other 
global auto competitors had already established their presence in China, from 
                                               
27 Retired GM Chairman John Francis “Jack” Smith Jr. once showed a keen interest in Asian auto market. 
Smith particularly “saw China‟s huge population as an opportunity”. He went to China in 1994 and began a 
year of negotiations with government officials, including then-Vice-Premier Li Lanqing and SAIC 
(BusinessWeek, 2004, para. 11). 
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Volkswagen, the first investor to make business operations profitable in China, to 
Daimler-Chrysler, Ford Motor, Toyota, Honda and Nissan. Having seen its 
competitors already established in the Chinese market and the Japanese 
automakers coming on fast, GM could not keep waiting anymore and felt worried: 
Things are getting much tougher for everyone. We need to worry about 
staying ahead of the competition, and how to keep our presence in China, 
from auto manufacturing to professional designing, fostering sales, business 
development and auto-related financial services. (Interviewee A4) 
As the Chinese auto market was definitely seen as having big potential in the 
years to come for GM‟s further growth, in the same year of 1994, GM made a 
strategic decision and opened its GM China office in Beijing. In January 2005, 
GM even moved its Asia Pacific regional headquarters from Singapore to 
Shanghai in order to rationalise its China operations. Former GM Chairman and 
CEO Rick Wagoner commented on the significance of office location in China: 
“Establishing our regional headquarters in Shanghai recognizes how important 
China has become to our plans to expand our global industry leadership … 
Having a strong presence in this dynamic and growing market is not an option, 
it‟s a necessity.” (Automotive Intelligence News, 2004, para. 3).  
Troy Clarke, former president of GM Asia Pacific, also noted, “We view 
aggressive expansion in China as a key part of our future growth around the world 
… Singapore is an outstanding place to do business. But our business model has 
changed substantially since we originally located there in 1993.” (Automotive 
Intelligence News, 2004, para. 5&7). 
Given that China was suitable for investment and the Chinese Government 
has issued some important favourable foreign investment policies, the next step 
for GM was to decide in which way to enter into China‟s auto market.  
After 1994, the Chinese Government began to consolidate the industry in 
order to “establish large-scale groups of vehicle manufacturing companies, and to 
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replace previous small-scale, scttered producers” (Holweg et al., 2005, p. 14). As 
fully-owned foreign ventures were not allowed in the Chinese auto industry, 
foreign MNEs had to form joint ventures with local Chinese firms in the 
passenger car sector
28
. It seems that establishing collaborative linkages in the 
automotive industry in China was a must to fulfil certain legal requirements.  
GM top management believed that the IJV business model could be an 
excellent platform for establishing and expanding business within China and GM 
actually had a lot of previous international alliance experiences. GM did not show 
any hesitation and followed the Chinese Government regulations.  
To decrease the risks of operating in a particularly complex market like 
China, and to develop the necessary business contacts, the next step for GM was 
to find a suitable Chinese partner with a good understanding of how this region 
functions, and with the special competence which GM lacked. GM expected the 
candidate partner could demonstrate a certain fit, such as domestic sales networks 
and commercial distribution capacities required by the future interfirm 
cooperation.  
The inquiry process for GM was not very lengthy, as GM could easily find a 
qualified local company – SAIC. Although SAIC was already involved in a 
partnership with Volkswagen, GM was still interested in SAIC, as GM found 
SAIC could have the right contacts in the automobile industry with various 
decision makers at different levels and believed SAIC‟s competence and local 
know-how could be beneficial for both sides. One American manager reflected: 
My impression in the beginning was that SAIC had done a pretty good job by 
taking the leadership in China‟s automotive industry. They seem to be an 
efficient company as such after visiting there and seeing how they are 
operating everything. We think they have so many good people there, they 
                                               
28This ownership restriction policy was continued even after China‟s entry into the World Trade Organisation 
at the end of 2001, and foreign firms cannot hold more than 50% of equity in any final car assembly 
operation, excluding the auto components industry (Buckley et al., 2004). 
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have positive working attitude and that‟s what was actually the big 
impression for us. (Interviewee A2) 
Indeed, SAIC had many advantages at that time, which “was reputed to be 
the most profitable Chinese automobile company”, and had been publicly 
appointed by the Chinese Government as “the primary Chinese passenger car 
producer” (Gallagher, 2006, p. 66).  
7.3.2 Initial Contacts and Partner Recognition 
GM initially expressed their intention to establish a certain kind of partnership 
model with SAIC. Coincidently, SAIC also showed great interest in setting up a 
new cooperative relationship with another giant auto player like GM. In fact, 
despite being a leading automaker in China during the past decades, and 
managing several successful joint ventures with foreign MNEs such as Shanghai-
Volkswagen, SAIC believed that if the partnership with GM could be achieved, 
this would further improve SAIC‟s future competitive advantage both in China 
and on the global stage in a more positive way. These considerations have been 
discussed widely and eagerly at top management level in SAIC. One Chinese 
executive commented: 
Facing globalisation, China‟s automobile sector has its own weaknesses. 
Most of our domestic automakers cannot compete against foreign companies 
at that time. Even now giant gaps still exist not only in the technology aspect, 
but also in the system and production knowledge, which are reflected in 
[things] such as small scale, irrational allocation of resources, and low 
efficiency. We are not at the same level of scale as our counterparts. We do 
not have enough time and power to establish an internationally competitive 
auto industry by ourselves. Therefore, we have a pressing task to sharpen our 
competitive edges. How to achieve our task? One effective way we consider 
might be to strengthen the cooperation with foreign companies. We hope this 
[partnership model] can give us a chance to get to know the advanced 
technologies and product development platforms, and international sales 
channels. These are what we really need [when thinking about joint venturing 
with foreign MNEs]. We must develop those capabilities through these 
„windows‟ in order to survive. If we do not continually improve our 
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capabilities, profits will likely level off, and companies may be forced to 
close down, we are clearly aware of that. (Interviewee B1) 
One most important consideration for SAIC at that time was that it was 
particularly interested in obtaining GM high-end vehicle models and wanted to 
expand its field of marketing operations and produce more top brand vehicles. 
One Chinese manager expressed his concern: 
We have actually been cooperating with German Volkswagen for so many 
years, but we are only allowed to produce B class Santana model. It is a quite 
old model. We still lack some core proprietary technologies. These core 
technologies are essentially held by our current German partner. The 
technology-intensive new models like Audi series have been arranged to go 
to another Volkswagen‟s Chinese joint venture with FAW in Changchun. 
The Germans dominate many advantages in the Chinese auto production 
aspect. They strictly control new product and technology transfer, and always 
emphasise that the current introduced technology and vehicle models are 
sufficient to meet the demands of the Chinese market. That‟s definitely no 
good to us, [this situation] constrained new product development and 
technology progress. This made our vehicle products in Shanghai-VW only 
limited to low-end lines. We are not satisfied with that situation. We can‟t 
blame our German partner, but if we can‟t solve these problems, we will not 
be qualified as a “top three automaker” in China, not to say to compete in the 
world. This is actually also harmful to Volkswagen. They finally realised this 
problem several years later after facing severe domestic competition realities. 
(Interviewee B3) 
Recognising these constraints and its potential needs, SAIC undertook 
several overseas auto plant visits starting in 1994 before taking GM‟s offer. On 
the one hand SAIC wanted to investigate the global auto market trends; on the 
other hand it tried to explore other new cooperative modes and to introduce 
certain competition mechanisms into its corporation. During the trip, SAIC 
purposely compared several big multinational companies (such as Ford, GM, 
Korean Daewoo, and Japanese Mazda), and tried to decide which foreign auto 
company would be the best potential cooperative partner.  
SAIC listed several key selection criteria in searching for a suitable business 
partner, in terms of (1) a willingness to cooperate with SAIC; (2) the extent of its 
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supporting component localisation strategy in China; (3) whether it had detailed 
procedures and work plans for technical support and transfer; and (4) the 
conditions of technical transfer and new vehicle model introduction.  
7. 3.3 Two Years’ Negotiation 
In 1994, as the vehicle models recommended by GM were assessed more suitable 
for the Chinese auto market, plus the detailed comparisons with other foreign auto 
companies‟ price offers and technology transfer conditions, SAIC finally 
expressed its determination to conduct detailed negotiations with GM. Both sides 
undertook a series of business talks in 1994.  
The main negotiator from GM was the former Chairman and President of 
GM China Group – Philip Murtaugh. The Chinese side appointed a negotiation 
team composed of senior representatives from SAIC‟s top management team and 
relevant government officials. Key people from the two companies met at 
different sites, both in China and in the US. The main focus of negotiations was to 
formulate cooperative agreements in detail, to determine the investment 
percentage and the price of technology transfer from GM. As both parties were 
really interested in interfirm collaboration, the initial talks between them went 
relatively rapidly and smoothly to get to the main points. One Chinese manager 
stated: 
We have followed the path of „cooperating with giants and achieving win-
win solutions‟ since the implementation of the reform and open-door policy. 
During the past several years, by enhancing cooperation with such world 
prestigious companies as Volkswagen, we have achieved certain strategic 
targets such as localisation of vehicle production. Our vehicle development 
strategy has been mostly achieved. But look at it deeply, we still haven‟t got 
enough technical secrets for producing some key components. Some of the 
critical parts, like the auto braking system and electrical products still suffer 
from customers‟ complaints. The quality of engine casting, car body sealing 
kit, and our R&D capabilities are still at the infant stage, we lack [a] whole 
range of theoretical knowledge and practical experiences in auto producing. 
All of these problems are potential bottlenecks for our future development. 
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That‟s why we are interested in cooperating with GM. It is a very good 
company with a global reputation in terms of like marketing expertise. 
(Interviewee B2) 
On October 31 1995, SAIC and GM signed a basic letter of intent, expressing 
a willingness to construct a greenfield joint venture project in Shanghai with an 
estimated investment of US$ 1.57 billion. Based on GM‟s core values – 
“integrity, continuous improvement, customer enthusiasm, teamwork, innovation, 
and individual respect and responsibility” (“Key GMC Facts”, n.d., para. 11), and 
SAIC‟s core values – “creating value for society, continuous improvement and 
high efficiency” (SAIC Annual Report, 2005, p. 1), both sides agreed to jointly 
establish a platform to achieve continuous improvements and competitive 
advantage in the areas of R&D, production and quality control systems, product 
differentiation and innovations, reduction in cost and time to sales and after-sales 
services (SAIC Annual Report, 2005). 
For joint venture establishment, government permission and approval are 
required, and these are part of the bureaucratic process in China. SAIC took this 
responsibility and had discussions with relevant government departments in both 
Bejing and Shanghai, in the areas of investment percentage, capital allocation 
sources and potential benefits resulting from this joint venture project.  
However, there were some misunderstandings and arguments at the initial 
application stage. Hu Maoyuan (the vice president of SAIC group at that time) 
paid nearly 50 visits in 1 year to the relevant government departments in Beijing 
to obtain permission and support. One Chinese executive also reflected: 
Getting approval (for the Shanghai-GM project) was a hard process. First, 
this project is obviously big, involving huge investment indeed. Second, it 
was quite sensitive at that time (in 1995) to initiate a second passenger car 
joint venture because we have already had Shanghai-Volkswagen. So there 
was no further good reason to explain why we still need another JV partner 
with GM. Especially we were required to explain why this JV project will be 
producing medium to high-end sedans. We suffered great pressures and the 
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opposing letters and complaints against this (Shanghai-GM) project were just 
like heavy snow. Some people wrote letters to Beijing and complained that it 
was not necessary to produce the high-end passenger cars, it is a waste of 
money as there would be no market at all (in China). Facing such huge 
difficulties, our only choice was just to put our efforts into doing every piece 
of the job at this preparatory stage well and we tried to explain our thinking 
to the Government. We emphasised we did the right thing, and did follow the 
legal rules and regulations, and if managed properly, this project would bring 
benefits for our Chinese auto industry. (Interviewee B2) 
7. 3.4 Partnership Formation in 1997 
Two years later in 1997, after an arduous process of applications, the joint venture 
agreement was finally created, and SAIC also obtained the formal approval from 
the central government. On March 25, 1997, former US Vice President Al Gore 
and former Chinese Prime Minister Li Peng witnessed the signing ceremony of 
the deal in Beijing (Gallagher, 2003). On June 12, 1997, Shanghai-GM was 
formally lauched (Chinacarforums, 2007).  
From the outset, Shanghai-GM was regarded as a priority project in 
international partnership between GM and SAIC. It was commonly reported that 
this JV project was the largest single Sino-American joint venture with an 
investment of US$ 1.52 billion (Zhong & Hu, 2008), and GM was the “first 
American auto giant entering into China in 1997” (Hastings & Schafer, 2006, p. 
36). The overriding goal of this cooperative Shanghai-GM project was to become 
the leading vehicle manufacturer with both domestic and international 
competitive advantage (Table 7.2 below describes the relevant information 
regarding this finalised JV project). One GM manager could not contain his 
excitement and expectations: 
We are so excited, as we [were] entering into China now. JV investment by 
GM with SAIC will provide an excellent opportunity for both of us. We will 
not simply produce passenger cars, we also have set up a principle – we will 
definitely bring our best technology, most competitive vehicle models, the 
newest purchasing, sales and service system and management knowledge to 
China, to provide our „know-how‟ for the local Chinese market, and do our 
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best to make things better in China. … The situation will be better in the 
future through our joint contribution. (Interviewee A1) 
Philip Murtaugh, former Chairman & CEO of GM China, also said in an 
interview with Xinhua News Agency on February 15, 2002, “GM investment in 
China with SAIC has created a win-win situation for both GM and China‟s auto 
industry. … The achievements made by Shanghai-GM will be highly 
commendable” (Xinhua News Agency, 2002).  
 
Table 7. 2 Description of the Finalised JV Partnership Project 
Total investment in dollars US$ 1.52 billion 
GM-SAIC equity shares 50/50 
Business Scope To manufacture vehicle products, engines, 
transmissions and relevant components 
Product market To sell the above-mentioned vehicle products and 
components locally for import substitution, and also 
for exporting overseas 
GM objectives Business growth, market penetration, profit 
SAIC objectives Import substitution, technology gain, and business 
expansion, profit 
IJV Management American chairman, American Vice General 
Manager, Chinese president and plant managers 
GM Key contribution Manufacturing process and engineering, financing, 
overseas customer contacts, product model design 
SAIC Key contribution Plant startup, JV plant management, administration 
support (HR, legal, finance), domestic customer 
contacts, access to raw materials 
Four basic principles of the cooperation:  
1. Study each other‟s culture;  
2. Joint venture interests come first;  
3. Standardisation of policies and procedures;  
4. Practicing and promoting flexibility. 
Source: This thesis 
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7.4 Starting Joint Venture Operations                                        
7.4.1 Strategic Location Selection in Shanghai 
The coastal city of Shanghai was then selected as a strategic location for joint 
venture‟s passenger car production. There were some good reasons for picking up 
Shanghai for passenger car production. It is one of the most dynamic cities in 
China with over 20 million people, where it has relatively developed 
infrastructure, and “the locals are renowned for their business acumen and 
attention to detail” (Gallagher, 2006, p. 66). Since the opening-up of China over 
the past 20 years, Shanghai has enjoyed national preferential policies for 
developing the Pudong area, and always been viewed as a leading city for FDI 
absorption and MNEs expansion in China. By 1997, Shanghai “had attracted 
more than US$ 1.5 billion of FDI in the automotive sector”, sharing one-fifth of 
the country‟s total inward FDI (Sit & Liu, 2000, p. 667). FDI inflows and MNEs‟ 
presence have helped Shanghai to become China‟s largest car production centre, 
which saw it producing over half of the total assembled passenger cars in 1997.  
While the two sides were busy with negotiations regarding a general 
cooperative framework throughout 1997, certain detailed “site-preparation work”, 
such as the selection and construction of the joint venture manufacturing site, was 
also carried out at the same time (Graham, 2000, para. 6). Philip Murtaugh once 
reflected upon his working experience at Shanghai-GM, “We made a decision to 
work out a joint venture contract and build the plant simultaneously [throughout 
the whole year of 1997]. It was a fairly high-risk approach. GM has never built a 
plant on this scale this fast in its entire history. In terms of the challenges of 
building a plant, we had about three [potential sites] but settled on this one, 
because of its location and the fact that it was the biggest one. … We did 
everything in parallel.” (Graham, 2000, para. 8 & 9)  
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7.4.2 Manufacturing Location Selection in Pudong 
The manufacturing plant was set up in “Jinqiao Export Processing Zone in 
Shanghai Pudong District
29
 with an area of 800,000 square metres” 
(Chinacarforums, 2007, para. 6). It includes five shops (i.e., general assembly, 
power train, press, body, and paint), which is still recognised as “the most 
advanced of its kind in China” today (Zhang & Khabelashvili, 2002, p. 94). The 
plant was completed in a remarkably short period of time and was formally 
opened on December 15, 1998.  
In the first phase of factory construction, Shanghai-GM was firstly designed 
to adopt GM‟s “lean manufacturing-based system” which would deal with various 
aspects of production and quality management process in an efficient and 
effective way, including “materials purchasing, logistics, manufacturing, sales and 
after-sales service” (Chinacarforums, 2007, para. 3). Meanwhile, Shanghai-GM 
also adopted the “first flexible production line” in the Chinese automotive 
industry, which allows it to produce different while complete vehicles on a single 
manufacturing platform, including “press, body, paint and assembly, as well as 
the entire process of manufacturing powertrain, engines and transmissions 
(Chinacarforums, 2007, para. 3). Most importantly, Shanghai-GM was installed 
with a “most advanced information system (SAP IS-AUTO)”, which ensured 
Shanghai-GM was able to comprehensively integrate and optimise every aspect of 
the value chain creation to bring about results “seldom seen in the automotive 
industry anywhere in the world” (Chinacarforums, 2007, para. 8). This lean and 
flexible production system provided a firm foundation for Shanghai-GM‟s 
expansion in the following years.  
                                               
29 Three decades ago, the Chinese government has determined that “the Pudong industrial area would be a 
showcase for the new China, a site that would be tailor-made to the needs of foreign investors.” (Graham, 
2000, para. 9)   
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7.4.3 Considering Knowledge (Technology) Transfer 
Following the designed cooperative technology transfer agreement, GM was then 
expected to transfer modern vehicle production technology and equipment, new 
vehicle models, the marketing know-how, R&D and management skills to 
Shanghai-GM with an aim to gradually realise its annual “manufacturing capacity 
from 100,000 to 200,000 units” for the Chinese local auto market in the coming 
future (Autoparts Report, 2003, para. 5). Table 7.3 below demonstrates the major 
aspects of interfirm knowledge transfer stages in the Shanghai-GM alliance case. 
Table 7. 3 Interpartner Knowledge Transfer Statges in Shanghai-GM 
Stages Contents Transfer Routines Implications 
Initial Knowledge 
Linkages 
Technology, 
marketing skills, 
quality control, 
production 
documents, 
information 
systems,  
local knowledge 
On-site visits, 
training,  
managerial 
arrangements, 
vehicle models 
introduction    
Cooperative 
contract,  
partners‟ initial 
trust,  
commitment 
 
Challenge Stage      Cultural 
misunderstanding, 
language barriers 
Training, 
communication,  
HR arrangement 
Cultural knowledge 
and understanding is 
difficult, tacit, and 
time-consuming 
Knowledge 
Development   
R&D,  
new vehicle models‟ 
introduction,    
technology 
adaptation   
Personnel 
adjustment,     
knowledge 
exchange,     
training   
Higher individual 
trust,  
social interactions, 
partnership 
realisation 
Knowledge 
Harvesting     
Mindset changing,  
technology transfer, 
internal innovation 
Mutual learning Partnership 
developing, 
shared 
understanding 
Source: Interview Data 
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7.5 Starting Knowledge Transfer in Shanghai-GM 
For the initiation stage (the period 1997-2003), technology transfer essentially 
included the following aspects: First came the introduction of the vehicle models, 
product technology and manufacturing operation procedures into Shanghai-GM. 
Second, staff members began receiving relevant on-site training in Shanghai-GM 
and GM‟s various manufacturing sites around the world. Third, offering initial 
technical competence development support for the newly-recruited local 
technicians in the joint venture whenever necessary. Fourth, each partner 
company dispactched qualified managerial personnel to the joint venture.  
7.5.1 Introducing Vehicle Technology and Models 
In December 1998, the first vehicle model – Buick – was introduced from GM. 
Buick was chosen because it was said to have a special place in the Chinese 
history – in the 1920s, the mayor of Shanghai had a Buick sedan, as did Sun Yat-
sen, China‟s revolutionary hero in the early twentieth century.  
The impact of the introduction of Buick model was enormous, although the 
technologies applied in the first Buick model were actually not the most 
advanced. At the time, the Chinese people only had a limited choice when looking 
for the middle-end passenger cars in the domestic market. The available models 
were only confined to Santana 1000, Santana 2000, Audi 100, Audi 200, FAW 
Hongqi (means Red Flag), Jetta sedans. These models‟ prices were relatively 
cheaper than Buick‟s, and “favoured by taxi drivers and mid-ranking officials for 
almost a decade since the early 1990s” (Graham, 2000, para. 20). But these 
models‟ qualities were widely considered “poor” and “outdated” (Gallagher, 
2006, p. 68). 
 Seeing that the Buick models received a great deal of attention from the 
Chinese consumers, who all believed that the Buick was a “current” GM 
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technology (Gallagher, 2003, p. 12)
30
, other auto producers felt great pressure and 
began bringing in new models into the Chinese market: VW, Honda and Audi 
responded with Passat, Accord and Audi A6 respectively, which were “priced 
directly against the Buick” (Gallagher, 2006, p. 69).  
Impressively, in 1999, just 13 months later after introducing the Buick 
prototype to Shanghai-GM, a Buick Xin Shi Ji (means New Century) luxury car 
took shape, “starting with 47%” locally produced components, which was “in 
accordance with the 40% local content requirements” set by the Chinese 
government (Gallagher, 2006, p. 63 & P. 69). In April 1999, three other mid-sized 
luxury sedans, including Buick Xin Shi Ji, Buick GLX and Buick GL were also 
launched subsequently (Gallagher, 2006).  
7.5.2 Training Provision and Expertise Transfer  
Long before the first Buick car started rolling off the production assembly lines, 
some Chinese staff members had already been selected and dispatched to GM 
factories around the world (mainly in USA, Australia and Germany). They 
worked alongside GM crews with different ethnic and cultural backgrounds for 
receiving relevant training and production-related management courses.  
Former Shanghai-GM plant manager Dennis Dougherty once publicly stated 
that he was quite pleased with these Chinese employees‟ training results, “I got 
letters back saying, „where do you get these employees from? They are so keen 
they take their manuals home to read at night.‟ I have worked for GM for 28 years 
and I have never had letters like that.” (Graham, 2000, para. 16)  
For training purposes, Shanghai-GM was gradually equipped with: 
1) TV monitors, text books, audio-tapes and videos for viewing training-
related programmes; 
                                               
30 By 2000, Shanghai-GM had reached a 60% localisation rate for its Buick sedan (Graham, 2000). 
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2) Multimedia workstations, comprising a PC unit, a laser-disc player, 
keyboard and mouse. This was for the programme to use computer-based 
training packages and interactive videos; 
3) Computer-based training. This programme used a mixture of text books, 
computer graphics and sound to create stimulating interactive training. It 
is particularly useful for learning PC applications; 
4) Interactive-video. This combined the benefits of two media types: video 
and computer-based training. Video scenarios were used to demonstrate 
situations and techniques, combining animation, sound, movement, and 
then interaction. The stimulation of real-life circumstances within an 
interactive PC-based training programme was designed to help the 
Chinese to learn faster and retain the training messages. 
The main reason to provide these training equipments and materials was for 
GM to upgrade the local Chinese employees‟ technical know-how and problem-
solving skills. One manager emphasised: 
GM training is multitask based and interactive. The trainee should be fully 
involved and can dictate the pace and direction of his or her training by 
responding to prompts and questions. Because of the individuality of 
responses, no two training sessions are the same and the training suits 
individual needs. (Interviewee B3) 
Before receiving over 300 hours of training programme, “each would-be 
employee was screened initially for personality traits through behavioural and 
psychological tests and teamwork activities” (Graham, 2000, para. 17) 31 . 
Meanwhile, management asked relevant department supervisors what skills they 
considered important in the joint venture and what problems they considered 
detracted from the JV project‟s success.  
                                               
31 Because the annual average salary was set by US$ 4,000, which was “well above the city average and four 
times the national average”, there was always “no shortage of applicants” during the JV starting operation 
period before 2000 (Graham, 2000, para. 17). 
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Based on their responses, a series of technical training sessions was devised 
to explore the significant aspects identified and to help provide a framework for 
further discussions within the JV. The sessions set out aspects such as the nature 
of joint ventures, communication skills‟ development, collaborative working 
environment, and the importance of learning. The sessions were well attended and 
attracted a good deal of interaction between presenters and those attending. One 
Chinese manager mentioned two advantages over traditional training methods: 
First, it replicated what could happen in the workplace, allowing the 
company to test people; and second, it allowed employees to become familiar 
with the true working environment. (Interviewee B4) 
Shanghai-GM management also trained their employees to work 
independently. As part of this process, the employees were trained to take more 
responsibilities for their areas of operations. JV management felt that this kind of 
training had the advantage of transferring not just technical and operational 
knowledge but also the more tacit elements. Management hoped employees could 
understand working procedures in depth through a series of training and education 
programmes. Individual skills‟ challenge and competence development projects 
were also carried out in several periods, and were finally extended to everyone 
employed in the joint venture, even though it cost a lot of money to develop these 
programmes, and to educate and train the employees in the JV.  
7.5.3 Technicians On-site Visits 
As part of the cooperative technology transfer requirements, GM sent its highly-
skilled technicians to Shanghai to discuss with Chinese counterparts the technical, 
production, and general management issues. GM technicians normally stayed in 
Shanghai for 2-10 days at a time to teach whatever knowledge and capacities the 
local partner might need if the local Chinese faced some particular problems that 
needed solving. At the same time, a series of GM‟s overseas plants‟ visits took 
place, in the expectation that such visits would contribute to knowledge 
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accumulation for the Chinese staff as the JV progressed. It was a time-consuming 
process but did help GM to develop and change the Chinese partner‟s traditional 
way of thinking and performing their duties to a more appropriate way.  
At this stage, GM showed its commitment to and patience with the transfer of 
knowledge and has made important progress. The support from GM was greatly 
appreciated by the Chinese partner: 
GM helped us a lot. At the beginning, we were not very sure and uncertain 
about GM‟s long-term commitment, and some people suspected that GM 
would just come in and take the money. We actually saw some other western 
auto companies entering China, instead of upgrading production and 
introducing new vehicle models, they just started importing vehicle 
components from the parent company and assembling the parts into a vehicle 
then tried to sell it in the Chinese market in the name of joint ventures. This 
doesn‟t create any technical and managerial know-how introductions from 
outside at all. Seeing is believing. There was a real willingness from GM to 
create some good partnership with us. (Interviewee B3) 
7.5.4 Expatriate Managers’ Deployment 
In 2000, GM appointed its expatriate managers and sent one of its top executives 
– Philip Murtaugh – as the GM China President and Managing Director to 
investigate the local Chinese auto market. Murtaugh also took other 
responsibilities: to determine the types of inputs GM should consider in the 
context of cooperative arrangements, and to coordinate the overall Shanghai-
GM‟s extensive manufacturing and marketing operations. 
Murtaugh once studied at General Motors Institute (GMI). In 1973, he joined 
GM after graduating from GMI and then served several positions in the United 
States and Japan as a vehicle production and management specialist. His 
important working experiences included “Director of Manufacturing for GM 
Overseas‟ Corporation in Japan, Executive Assistant to the Executive Director of 
product planning at ISUZU, President of IBC in Luton, England, and General 
Manager of GM China‟s Shanghai representative office” (Wharton Global Forum, 
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2004, para. 20). He was actually “part of the negotiating team” and “played a key 
role” in the launch of Shanghai-GM project (Wharton Global Forum, 2004, para. 
20). In 2005, because of “personal reasons”, Murtaugh quit the post he had held 
as head of GM‟s China operations for 5 years (from June 2000 until April 2005) 
(Xinhua News Agency, 2005, para. 7).  
After Murtaugh‟s departure, who would be the immediate predecessor 
became a key concern. On March 31, 2005, in order to continuously win the 
goodwill of its Chinese partner and customers, GM headquarters appointed Kevin 
Wale to replace Murtaugh‟s position (effective May 1, 2005), coordinating “GM‟s 
operations in mainland China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong” (MCAD, 2005, para. 7).  
Kevin Wale, an Australia-born senior executive at GM Group, has been 
taking various managerial roles in “sales, marketing, planning, finance and 
general management” (PR Newswire, 2005, para. 2). Holding qualifications from 
the General Motors Institute (the same as Murtaugh), he used to be in charge of 
“GM European business as a vice president, and chairman of Vauxhall Motors”. 
Before that, he was responsible for GM Asia Pacific operations, covering “15 
countries in the region” (Xinhua News Agency, 2005, para. 2, 3 & 4).  
GM‟s former CEO – Rick Wagoner – publicly commented on Wale joining 
GM China operations, “His [Wale‟s] strong background in the region and ability 
to work with his partners” made him suitable to participate in developing China‟s 
automotive sector (MCAD, 2005, para. 2). Troy Clarke, former GM Group Vice 
President and President of GM Asia-Pacific operations, also welcomed Wale‟s 
return, “Kevin brings a great deal of leadership and international experience to his 
new position. … His familiarity with China and Asia Pacific … laid the 
groundwork for our current presence. We are excited to have him back” (MCAD, 
2005, para. 4). 
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In the meantime when Shanghai-GM started up, SAIC also dispatched some 
experienced Chinese managers from SAIC headquarters to Shanghai-GM. Some 
of them even had previously worked for Shanghai-Volkswagen. They had been 
dealing with the Sino-foreign JV management issues for a number of years and 
had good experience of interpersonal communication skills and cross-cultural 
management styles, which were considered an advantage in operating this new 
venture from the SAIC perspective.  
Hence, these expatriate managers dispatched from both sides were to create 
initial connections between GM and SAIC around which other relationships 
would later develop. As time passed, these links were deliberately cultivated in 
order to create a cooperative environment to support further transfers of industry-
specific and organisational embedded knowledge. 
7.6 Intensive Interactions and Knowledge Development 
It is understandable that all of the foreign companies entering into China are 
attracted by the alluring huge potential market with a population figure of 1.3 
billion. However, this population figure sometimes “can be misleading like all 
statistics” (Graham, 2005, para. 23). In reality, although China has been rapidly 
progressing in these three decades, the majority of the Chinese people are still 
living in under-developed rural areas with limited access to a highway 
transportation system. Their dreams of owning transportation in the foreseeable 
future may be just a bicycle. For those developed regions, it was estimated that 
about “300 million people will be looking for suitable cars for their one-child 
families” in the near future (Graham, 2005, para. 25), most of the Chinese people 
only hope to buy a new economy-type car to fulfil their immediate ambitions and 
to upgrade their living standards. Even for the “minority affluent enough” who 
can afford to buy a luxury car, they still have to consider which vehicle model is 
more endurable under the current conditions of Chinese roads (Graham, 2005, 
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para. 24). Although China has made great efforts, the national highway system 
linking its major city clusters and urban centres still needs to be further improved, 
and “there are not too many places to drive outside the major big cities” (Graham, 
2005, para. 24).  
These unique factors embedded in the Chinese auto market made GM 
seriously consider how to deal with the opportunities and challenges and how to 
adopt the next strategic move for the purpose of appropriately meeting the 
demands of the potential buyers. With its “customer-oriented and market-driven 
philosophy”, GM firstly decided to continuously launch comprehensive new 
product lines in the Shanghai-GM (Chinacarforum, 2007, para. 2), then it 
considered the critical issue of technological adaptation and product 
improvements after evaluating the real situations in China.   
7.6.1 Continuous Introduction of New Vehicle Models 
In 2000, only 2 years after launching Buick luxury series sedans, Shanghai-GM 
began to introduce a new low-cost compact sedan “called the Buick Sai Ou (Sail) 
with a 1.6-litre engine to tap into the burgeoning Chinese family-car market” 
(Osnos, 2006, p. 2). Priced initially at about 100, 000 RMB (US$ 12,000), Sail 
was primally positioned “against the VW Jetta, Tianjin Xiali, as well as the VW 
Santana” in the market (Gallagher, 2003, p. 13). There was an emphasis on some 
new recreational family-friendly features in this car, such as “anti-lock brakes, 
dual air bags, and low price” (Osnos, 2006, p. 2).  
For GM, launching this new product took some time, but it became used to 
the situation in China.  After 1999, Shanghai-GM actually began offering “a new 
model each year” (“GM investment”, 2002, para. 5) as shown in Table 7.4 below: 
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Table 7. 4 A Portfolio of Vehicle Models Introduced (2000 – 2003) 
Time/Year of 
Introduction 
Vehicle 
Model 
Main Features 
May, 2000 Buick GS,  
Buick GL8 
Driver-oriented sedan; 
First executive wagon made in China 
August, 2000 Buick G Equipped with a smaller engine 
December, 2000 Buick Sail First low-cost and small car, 1.6-litre engine, 
based on the Opel Corsa 
October, 2001 Chevrolet GL8-based model 
November, 2001 Buick S-RV Recreational vehicle 
December, 2002 Buick Regal Upper-medium sedan 
April, 2003 Buick 
Excelle 
First lower-medium sedan 
Source: Based on “SGM Products”, 2007. 
 
The new product lines gradually extended from the low-end Buick Sail 
subcompact car (priced later at US$ 10,800) up to the high-end Buick Regal (US$ 
44,500). In between, consumers could also choose Buick Excelle (US$ 20,000) 
and Buick GL8 (US$ 33,600) (Bradsher, 2003). From the perspective of some 
auto industry specialists, “in offering such a wide range within a single division, 
GM has broken with the formula of Alfred P. Sloan, its famed strategist before 
and after World War II, who moulded the company‟s separately acquired 
divisions into an orderly ladder extending from Chevrolets up to Cadillacs” 
(Bradsher, 2003, para. 2). One Chinese manager commented: 
GM is committed to provide its most advanced models. This is quite different 
from other foreign carmakers. GM carefully chose the right vehicles for the 
Chinese market based on a series of investigation and research. The result is, 
these medium to advanced products became popular in attracting Chinese 
consumers. Now GM is launching Cadillac, one of its high-end models, in 
China. We are now actually manufacturing it in China according to 
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technology provision agreement. That was just what the Chinese Government 
and we wanted. (Interviewee B6) 
Shanghai-GM thus promoted the sales just under the Buick brand with 
different engines-types during the years between 2000 and 2003, and began to 
lead the Chinese automotive industry. 
7.6.2 Technological Adaptation and Product Improvements  
Both GM and SAIC realised the importance of technological adaptation product 
model improvements and localisation relating to local market requirements. One 
manager recognised: 
Our firsthand experience tells us customers here have their own tastes. They 
don‟t necessarily want a product straight from North America or Europe, 
particularly in lower-end segments. China itself has unique vehicle driving 
regulations and fuel conditions. Adaptation was crucial. (Interviewee A4) 
 Another GM manager also commented: 
The road conditions in most of China‟s cities and country areas are unusually 
poor although they have been improved a lot in recent years. We have to face 
the realities. We need to change some original components such as the 
suspension system, the braking system in these new environments … to add 
up some new functions. Lots of modifications have to be carried out. … We 
actually have paid great attention to vehicle development and adaptation, and 
I think we have made incredible changes to our commitment to the 
development of our products over the last several years. I think it is great to 
provide a proper assistance for innovation and renewal. (Interviewee A3) 
One Chinese manager also pointed out: 
Indeed, we never ignore adaptation. Chinese auto market is quite unique, [it 
is] huge, but consumers in different areas have different choices. … You can 
imagine how difficult our job it is to meet these various demands. Blindly 
introducing the vehicle models without thinking about local conditions, and 
without appropriate adaptation or localisation will definitely fail. So many 
lessons we have learned in the past. (Interviewee B4) 
The first test vehicle model started with the Buick GL8. The Buick GL8 is a 
plush mini-van model; it was especially tailored to meet the requirements for 
chauffeur-driven Chinese executives and officials. Notably, because the 
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importance of fuel economy has gradually been realised and accepted by Chinese 
car purchasers, Shanghai-GM decided to reduce the engine size of Buick GL8 to 
“2.5 litres after the vehicles went into production” (Gallagher, 2003, p. 12). 
Meanwhile, certain engine sizes were limited from 3.5 litres to 2.8 litres, critically 
to accommodate so-called “Communist Party pecking-order etiquette” (Graham, 
2000, para. 15). The reason is quie obvious – in China, high-powered models are 
normally picked up by high-ranking officials or senior company executives as 
their transportation tool. If the engines can be designed less than 3 litres, this will 
allow “less senior officials or managers to place an order for the [suitable type of] 
auto” (Graham, 2000, para. 15).  
In order to meet adaptation expectations of Buick GL8, the managerial 
procedures, technical and operational systems were re-examined in Shanghai-GM 
in many occasions. Each time, the Chinese partner invited GM top executives and 
senior technicians to visit Shanghai plants and had on-site meetings to discuss 
effective ways of innovating the manufacturing activities and outcomes. These 
meetings reached certain major conclusions: (1) vehicle adaptation is a must; (2) 
the percentage of vehicle adaptation should follow the relevant government 
requirements; (3) JV employees need to be notified of the importance of 
adaptation and relevant production process changes; (4) a special joint team 
comprising both Chinese and American engineers should be formed under the 
guidance of Shanghai-GM board management; (5) the joint venture should keep 
expected levels of quality along with the necessary reasonable costs and 
adaptation of existing product ranges. 
The second test vehicle model was with Buick Regal, which was also 
modified to meet the requirements of the China market. One GM manager 
recalled:  
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“In the US, the Regal was mostly for personal use. Here, almost half of them 
are chauffeur driven [for those Chinese officials or managers]. We made 
some changes for a more formal look.” (Interviewee A5) 
Taking into account the fact that most of the Chinese middle-class owning a 
car “cherish conveying a wealthy image to their backseat visitors” (Osnos, 2006, 
p. 2), some extra changes were also made to both the exterior and interior designs. 
For example, the headlights are made bigger, “with three reflectors rather than 
one, because the Chinese think a more expensive car should have more lights” 
(Webb, 2004, p. 4). Inside, on a Buick Regal, large-sized DVD screens were 
added and adjusted (on the back of the front headrests) for the backseat guests. 
Meanwhile, certain details were also designed, such as built-in phones, rear-
mounted heating, more air-conditioning controls, and dark-colored sunshades for 
privacy. Another particular change is that Chinese engineers “scrapped the US 
standard cup holder and replaced it with a tall, narrow silo, providing the exact 
specifications of the tea bottle toted by millions of Chinese drivers every day” 
(Osnos, 2006, p. 2).  
Consequently, the final Buick Regal made in Shanghai-GM had about 600 
design changes compared with the US version, after considering Chinese 
consumers‟ unique tastes, “from strengthening the chassis to endure the appalling 
rural roads to making the ashtrays bigger for a nation of inveterate smokers” 
(Graham, 2000, p. 4). After these “improved” changes, it was reported that 
Regal‟s sales increased dramatically – “from 37,325 units in 2002 to 89,988 in 
2003” (Webb, 2004, p. 4).  
7.7.3 Establishing PATAC - A Technical R&D Centre 
Most importantly, in order to offer better-adapted vehicle products to customers 
and to fit the Chinese market, GM and SAIC jointly established a technical R&D 
centre, called the Pan Asia Technical Center (PATAC) constructed on March 25, 
1997 (Webb, 2005). PATAC‟s primary task is to adapt existing vehicle 
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architectures to the China market (Webb, 2005). With an additional investment 
amounting to US$ 50 million, PATAC offered a range of auto design, 
engineering, and testing services for Shanghai-GM, including engineering of 
vehicle interiors and exteriors, powertrain calibration, emission systems, chassis 
tuning, and validation of components, and whole vehicles (Webb, 2005). 
The establishment of PATAC R&D centre for developing products was 
viewed as a landmark in the closer cooperation and knowledge transfer between 
SAIC and GM, which was vital in convincing clients that the benefits of using 
better-quality cars more than justified a price that was slightly higher than that 
charged for other JVs‟ products.  
PATAC was directly linked with GM global R&D resources and technical 
centres “in the US, Australia, South Korea, Brazil, the UK and Germany”, 
enabling GM to demonstrate its commitments by making ex post adjustments for 
which the initial agreement left a wide scope, and supporting valuable resources 
transfer to China (The Auto Channel, 2007, para. 6). One American executive 
commented: 
PATAC is actually our first-of-its-kind joint venture technical centre with 
SAIC in China. It provides a broad range of engineering, testing, and 
validation services. Perhaps the greatest value of this R&D centre has been 
its work in reengineering and redesigning the introduced vehicles and turning 
them into locally popular models for Chinese customers. … The reason is 
simple: in the long run, as business expands in the country, we must set up 
our own R&D organisations in China. A China-based product development 
centre will soon become a key competitive edge and will help us design car 
models that cater specifically to Chinese consumers‟ needs and shorten time 
to market. GM has healthy product development taking place in China and 
has had this for several years. In fact, our PATAC latest concept vehicle 
received attention in April (1997) at the Shanghai Motor Show. PATAC has 
been integrated into the rest of GM‟s global design organisation. The design 
director is a member of our global design team. This integration enables 
PATAC to apply best practices from around the world and carry out work for 
the rest of our global operations on a limited basis … because of the 
expanding needs of our operations in China and our growing product lines in 
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the country. PATAC is doing the vast majority of its work for our domestic 
operations in China. (Interviewee A1) 
PATAC was also highly welcomed by SAIC as an established in-house 
emissions testing centre with about 1000 Chinese engineers. One of the main 
concerns was, as commented by a Chinese manager: 
It is true that we have an engineering talent pool, but the Chinese engineers 
lack certain experience in vehicle development, and we are still a very young 
vehicle producer compared to our 100-year history American partner. We are 
eager to develop PATAC as a part of our global vehicle engineering and 
design networks, although it takes time to accumulate the experience. 
(Interviewee B2) 
He added: 
Just like in many other industries, those companies in the automotive 
industry that react fastest to the changing market are those that tend to grow 
the fastest. Because of PATAC, GM has taken the lead in introducing new 
and upgraded vehicle models with further local modifications to meet the 
changing demands of the Chinese market and, most important, to do so in a 
timely manner. PATAC has actually played a critical role in our business 
expansions with GM in China by leveraging the global resources of the entire 
GM Group and tailoring them to the specific needs of our Chinese customers. 
For example, the Buick Regal and the Buick Excelle, which are all very 
popular models in China, have been reengineered by PATAC. These cars are 
now best sellers in the country. In order to remain successful and satisfy our 
long-term product development and testing needs in China, we will work 
with GM to continue to upgrade PATAC along with the Chinese market, and 
ensure that PATAC remains the most advanced auto design and research. 
(Interviewee B2) 
Through these joint efforts, Shanghai-GM has been widely regarded as one 
of the most innovative Sino-American joint ventures since 1997 (Webb, 2005). 
Meanwhile, because of working closely together, the two partners came to know 
each other further, which did bring about various indications of cross-cultural 
conflicts that evolved over time. Senior managers and staff members of the two 
sides sometimes misunderstood each other on certain occasions.  
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7.7 Facing Challenges: Cross-cultural Misunderstandings 
When the Shanghai-GM project was established in 1997, in order to solve any 
potential cultural misunderstandings and to ensure smooth communications with 
each other, several measures were considered and gradually adopted: (1) in the 
short term, recruiting qualified interpreters to solve communication problems 
between middle and/or top level managers from both sides; (2) in the medium 
term, offering a series of overseas training and language education programmes; 
(3) and in the long term, searching for and employing a new cadre of management 
from the local human resource market and newly graduated college students who 
had command of both Chinese and English. Other specified recruitment 
requirements include professional skills, positive attitudes, being ready to take 
responsibility for their actions, and motivation.  
Shanghai-GM tried to employ English-speaking Chinese managers and 
provided competitive salary packages. However, it was actually not easy to find 
those competent people, because there are high demands for such talent in the 
local human resource market in China, even in the Shanghai area. Shanghai-GM 
eventually employed several experienced Chinese managers through a large scale 
nationwide job advertisement campaign. Some of those recruited even had an 
overseas tertiary education background. These managers could speak both 
Chinese and English fluently, were familiar with the Chinese laws and knew 
western cultural principles. During the interviewing process, they showed a very 
open attitude towards being prepared to take on responsibilities and to adopt an 
“open” market economy mentality.  
After a certain period of interaction, both sides found that at the top 
management level communication was smooth, to a certain degree. However, 
some Chinese and American managers still noticed there existed certain cultural 
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gaps which seemed difficult for them bridge. One Chinese manager once 
experienced an awkward situation: 
There is an awkward experience about Chinese and American staff jointly 
attending a meeting. At the beginning, because of language problems, and 
different working habits, Chinese staff always stayed together in a circle and 
discussed something in the workplace, and the foreign staff standing in 
another circle. It gradually caused some problems. Both sides sometimes 
don‟t know what happened in the other circle. Maybe you are actually talking 
about how to improve some working procedures; the other side may suspect 
you are trying to fool him [sic]. Once, the Chinese purchasing team was 
working extra hours in order to discuss how to solve some logistics 
problems, however, one American manager complained why all of your 
Chinese attended this meeting without letting him participate, he was 
unhappy and want to know what‟s happened. (Interviewee B8) 
From the perspective of American managers, they also expressed their 
confusion about Chinese working behaviour and cultural misunderstanding in the 
workplace. One GM manager said: 
I had already read several introductory books about Chinese culture and 
traditions before I came to Shanghai. I think I can handle certain 
communication problems (with the Chinese staff). Many Chinese people, 
especially those young graduate technicians and engineers can speak very 
good English, which made me very surprised. I think communication with 
the Chinese staff regarding the technical issues has not been a problem at all 
because specifications used in the automotive industries are internationally 
standardised. The main difference and difficulties are relating to the work 
procedures applied around the cultural understanding. Sometimes I was 
unable to understand the Chinese way of behaviour in the workplace or why 
Chinese sometimes behave like this. Most of the time, the communication is 
only limited to the surface level, [it is] not [at the] deep level. One example is 
some Chinese staff always like to directly report to my boss, he is also an 
American, even though I am actually in charge of this area, maybe you know, 
I am not the very senior. Or maybe it was because of the Chinese way of 
doing things or some characteristics in SOE ways. (Interviewee A5) 
These misunderstandings caught the attention by GM and SAIC top 
executives. One Chinese executive wrote about his previous joint venture working 
experience in a published document:  
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This kind of suspicion, misunderstanding and unhappiness may lead to big 
problems day after day. At that time, I thought we should change that 
situation. Then I invited both sides to have a public meeting, and expressed 
my opinion – both sides should follow the mutual-agreed principles of 
Shanghai-GM working functions, whether he/she is Chinese or American. 
Anything happened in the workplace, if it is related to the other side, they 
(the other side) should also be invited to participate (in the meeting). The 
Chinese and American should be working together. This requirement 
gradually allayed suspicion and facilitated communications with each other. 
(Zhong & Hu, 2008, p. 132)
32
 
Through their efforts, GM and SAIC established communication channels, 
and gained experience in using them. GM managers gradually knew that it had to 
demonstrate “real cooperation” by employing certain local Chinese ways in the 
management of the business. The Chinese also recognised that cultural 
understanding and communication problems were not due to a lack of interest in 
cooperating on the part of both partners. Rather both partners had been used to a 
different system of managing and doing business for quite a long time, thus 
requiring efforts from both sides to change the traditional ways of thinking. 
7.8 Managerial Attributes and Interpartner Trust Relationship  
Reflecting on his time spent in Shanghai-GM, Hu Maoyuan, the first general 
manager of the joint venture and current President of SAIC Group, indicated top 
executives from GM and SAIC formed “close personal relationships” between 
each other – he and Philip Murtaugh were like old friends (Miesing, Kriger, & 
Slough, 2007, p. 115). Other Chinese executives also appreciated their friendship 
with GM expatriate managers. One Chinese manager stated: 
We appreciate our friendship with GM. Our good relationship means an 
informal and high quality information channel between us. On the one hand, 
we need their fullest support and cooperation to keep joint venture operating 
properly. On the other hand, as new products keep coming up, GM also 
needs us. We in turn were being open and frank [with each other]. 
(Interviewee B1) 
                                               
32 Based on original documents written in Chinese. 
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SAIC recognised the personal attributes of Murtaugh in contributing to 
SAIC‟s future success, as Murtaugh carried tacit managerial know-how, industrial 
and technical information, and interpersonal knowledge between the partner firms 
and built new links as he went (Zhong & Hu, 2008). It was then not surprising to 
see that after Murtaugh left GM in 2005, SAIC hired him immediately (publicly 
announced on June 18, 2006) as executive vice president to be responsible for 
SAIC‟s overseas market operations and co-chief executive of SAIC‟s subsidiary 
Ssangyong Motor Co. in Korea (Bursa, 2006) – SAIC held 51.3% of Ssangyong 
Motor equity as well as 10% of GM Daewoo in South Korea (McGunagle, 
2007)
33
. In a similar vein, Murtaugh also commented in public that the 
relationship between GM and SAIC has been fruitful, “we worked hard to make 
the relationship a good one. Each decision has been made with the goal of making 
the joint venture more successful.” (Gallagher, 2006, p. 74) 
One American manager also cited GM‟s relationship with SAIC are 
successful: 
Our Chinese partnership is strong. Partnerships are required by law in China 
and for GM it [the partnership] worked extremely well. We did receive 
support and help from SAIC. The local partner handled all contacts with the 
Government during the formation of the JV. SAIC is capable of dealing with 
those local affairs, and has a good working knowledge of how the society and 
authorities functioned. During the transition period, from signing the first 
contract till GM obtained all its permits, SAIC did a great job. Without the 
help of SAIC, the process would probably have taken much longer. 
(Interviewee A2) 
The Chinese side appreciated GM‟s contributions to the JV. Hence GM 
gradually earned SAIC‟s trust. Meanwhile, with a positive attitude to each other, 
both sides found it easier to smooth many kinds of interorganisational cooperative 
issues, resulting in increased interfirm knowledge transfer in the following years. 
                                               
33On September 7, 2007, Philip Murtaugh left SAIC. On October 18, 2007, he was appointed by Chrysler as 
“CEO - Asian operations, including China and India” (Autobuzz, 2007, para. 1).  
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7.9 Further Rounds of Cooperation and Knowledge Transfer 
After these years of cooperation, having commenced operations and transferred 
the necessary resources to the Shanghai-GM project, the JV management looked 
to develop additional skills in the workplace, realising that technology transfer 
was only one factor contributing to the JV‟s performance. The JV management 
was keen to promote effective working practices within the JV, and to raise 
awareness concerning mutual understanding and further cooperation. GM wants 
to continue collaborating with the local partner and has no intention of leaving the 
JV even if it has other promising alternatives. SAIC is also convinced that GM 
can really contribute both to the company and the country. In terms of how to 
move to the next stage for both GM and SAIC, one GM executive claimed: 
We will introduce the fuel-efficient vehicle model to the JV in the coming 
years. The JV form will bring together two sides involving resource 
integration and bring the costs down. However, this will depends on the 
extent of our cooperation between GM and SAIC, and the support of the 
local government. (Interviewee A3) 
The local partner had the same view and understood the intensive 
competitive situations in the Chinese auto market. One SAIC executive clarified:  
In the future, we will concentrate on innovative activities, such as developing 
fuel-efficient, clean energy vehicle model. Developing such a kind of vehicle 
model really depends on the cooperative partnership with GM and local 
government support. But I am confident about that. Through the joint efforts 
with relevant stakeholders, we can complete this task at an early date. 
(Interviewee B1)  
Hence, both GM and SAIC displayed interests in continue with the 
partnership and a readiness to seek other cooperative opportunities to produce and 
sell hybrid vehicles and transmission engines.  
In June 2004, GM publicly announced that it would invest “more than US$ 3 
billion” to uplift relevant “new production capacities, R&D facilities, and auto 
financing business over the following 3 years in China” (China Daily, 2004, para. 
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1, 2 & 3). The money mainly came from profits generated from its China-based 
joint ventures, making GM‟s investment in China a total of US$ 5 billion (China 
Daily, 2004). Philip Murtaugh once commented on this strategic move, “The new 
investment follows our principle of aggressively pursuing growth opportunities 
under the [Chinese] government policies. … The new investment would increase 
GM‟s annual production capacity to nearly 1.3 million vehicles by 2007 from the 
530,000 units in 2004, enabling GM to maintain its leadership in China”. (China 
Daily, 2004, para. 8 & 10) 
In October 2004, GM and SAIC jointly stated to explore the opportunities of 
expanding the “hybrid demo bus programme” which would be applied in the 
“mass transportation system of 2010 World Expo in Shanghai.” (Green Car 
Congress, 2005, para. 3) 
In late September 2005, GM and SAIC again co-sponsored the opening of an 
exhaibition in Shanghai Science and Technology Museum (SSTM), aiming to 
educate the Chinese people on issues of “sustainable transportation”, “hydrogen 
fuel cell technology” and “clean energy vehicles” (“GM Global Operations”, 
2008, para. 21 & 22). This 18-month-long public exhibition not only provided 
“pictures and videos” but also showcased “actual fuel cell vehicles and 
components”, which was reported as “the most comprehensive display of its kind 
ever held in China.” (“GM Global Operations”, 2008, para. 23) 
In October 2005, Rick Wagoner and Hu Maoyuan jointly signed a 
“Memorandum of Understanding” in Shanghai to seek opportunities for 
producing “energy-efficient and environmentally clean vehicles in China, 
beginning in 2008” (“GM Global Operations”, 2008, para. 18). GM and SAIC 
believed that the two companies could take advantage of the R&D capabilities of 
their well-established PATAC technical research centre. PATAC‟s designers and 
technicians would be required to highly participate in hybrid vehicles 
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development programmes in Shanghai-GM, to “build complete demonstration 
vehicles, assess various hybrid concepts for near-term production and develop 
local competency in regenerative braking, electric power steering, and high-
voltage battery systems” (Green Car Congress, 2005, para. 4 & 5).  
In terms of following the environmental regulations introduced by the 
Chinese Government, aiming at curbing emissions and developing new 
technology-based vehicles, one GM executive claimed: 
We have some concerns about the environmental regulations recently 
introduced by the Chinese Government. In October 2004, the Chinese 
Government issued “Limits of Fuel Consumption for Passenger Cars”. It is 
the Chinese first national standards aiming at curbing emissions and 
developing new technology-based vehicle
34
. We fully understand and support 
this policy. This policy could achieve a good balance between sustained auto 
industry growth and protecting the country‟s energy and environmental 
needs. So far, we have begun to meet the specific needs of the Chinese 
market and its vehicle users. Many of our products are among the best in 
terms of fuel economy. We call for the development of advanced 
technologies and support relevant programmes. All our products sold in 
China today meet Phase I of the Chinese Government‟s fuel economy 
standards
35
. In addition, we are taking into consideration the Phase II 
requirements as we continue to develop our future products for China. We 
see no major complications in meeting these requirements. We expect our 
products will be in compliance with these standards. (Interviewee A3) 
On 29 October 2007, combined with the support of SAIC and Tsinghua 
University, GM announced it would to “provide a five-year, US$ 5 million grant” 
to establish the China Automotive Energy Research Center (CAERC) (USCar 
                                               
34 China issued the compulsory “Limits of Fuel Consumption for Passenger Cars”, aiming to “cut litres per 
100 kilometres by up to 10% by 2008” (started from July 1, 2005) in the first stage (Phase 1) (Zhao, 2004, 
p.2). The second stage (Phase 2) entered force on January 1, 2008, which “requires vehicle fuel consumption 
to drop by another 10% from the first phase level” (Zhao, 2004, p. 3). 
35 These standards reflect Chinese efforts to regulate the rapidly growing vehicle market in China. There were 
“35% of cars sold in China in 2008 met the 2005 standards, while only 4% of SUV‟s and minivans met the 
2005 standards (while no light trucks currently met the 2008 standard)”. Hence, most of the Chinese and 
foreign manufacturers in China are likely to “face increased costs and market constraints under these new 
standards” (Sauer & Wellington, 2004, p. 1 & 3).  
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News, 2007, para. 7). The three sides want to “bring together various resources”, 
and “work with various stakeholders in government, academia, and related 
industries to develop a comprehensive and integrated automotive energy strategy 
for China” (USCar News, 2007, para. 7). 
On 19 April, 2009, inspired by “GM‟s latest fourth-generation fuel cell 
propulsion technology” (“GM Technology”, 2009, para. 4), GM and SAIC jointly 
launched a new type of Shanghai Brand “zero-emission high-tech vehicles” (“GM 
Technology”, 2009, para. 2). This new type of vehicle “has been modified and 
improved to fit into the Shanghai Brand Fuel Cell Vehicles” (“GM Technology”, 
2009, para. 4), which is originally based on the “Chevrolet Equinox fuel cell 
propulsion system” and would be demonstrated at 2010 World Expo in Shanghai 
(“GM Technology”, 2009, para. 2).  
According to the company news released by PRNewswire on the same date 
(i.e., April 19, 2009), GM former Asia Pacific President Nick Reilly commented, 
“GM supports China‟s move toward sustainability, and we are providing our 
latest fuel cell technology in line with our overall strategy of in China, with 
China, for China”( PRNewswire, 2009, para. 3). These Shanghai Fuel Cell 
vehicles “will be featured in the most extensive fuel cell demonstration 
programme ever conducted in China. This follows the [Chinese] Government‟s 
call for the creation of a sustainable transportation system” (“GM Technology”, 
2009, para. 3).  
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7.10 Alliance Achievements: So Far, So Good  
Since its first day, the joint venture – Shanghai-GM – has been designed towards 
one strategic goal – “to become the leading domestic and an internationally 
competitive automaker” (Chinacarforums, 2007, para. 1). Leveraging GM‟s 
world-leading technology and product resources, Shanghai-GM has delivered 
good quality vehicle products since 1997 in the respective segments, featuring 
“safety, comfort and environmental friendliness” (Chinacarforums, 2007, para. 2).  
7.10.1 Increasing Various Vehicle Brands and Models 
Shanghai-GM today builds and sells “a comprehensive and diverse product range 
of vehicles”, mainly under the brands like “Chevrolet, Buick, Cadillac, and Saab 
with a product line-up comprising 18 major product lines” (Chinacarforums, 
2007, para. 2), as shown in Table 7.5. With the support of the computerised 
manufacturing system, these vehicles produced at Shanghai-GM passed certain 
international quality control assessments, such as SAC (conducted by Shanghai 
Audit Center of Quality System) and Det Norske Verritas (DNV). Shanghai-GM 
was aslo “granted the ISO/TS16949 certification in 2002,” thus became the “first 
automaker in China to achieve this distinction” (Chinacarforums, 2007, para. 3 & 
8). 
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Table 7. 5 A Portfolio of Introduced Vehicle Models (After 2000) 
Brands Name Specific Models Features 
Buick别克 Royaum荣御 Premium sedan 
 Park Avenue林荫大道 Premium sedan 
 LaCrosse君越 Upper-medium sedan 
 Regal君威 Upper-medium sedan 
 Excelle凯越英朗 Lower-medium sedan 
 Excelle HRV凯越 HRV Hatchback 
 Excelle凯越旅行车 Station wagon 
 Enclave 昂科雷 SUV 
 GL8 陆尊 Executive wagon 
Chevrolet 雪佛兰 Aveo乐骋 Hatchback 
 Epica 景程 Intermediate sedan 
 Lova 乐风 Small car 
 Cruze克鲁兹 Compact sedan 
 Captiva 科帕奇 SUV 
 New Sail新赛欧 Small car  
Cadillac 凯迪拉克 SLS 赛威 Luxury business sedan 
 XLR Luxury roadster 
 SRX Medium luxury utility 
vehicle 
 CTS Luxury sedan 
 Escalade凯雷德 Luxury utility 
Saab 萨博 9-5  Sport sedan 
 9-3  Convertible 
 9-3 Sporthatch 
 9-3 Sport sedan 
 Turbo255+ Sport sedan 
Source: Based on www.shanghaigm.com and www.wikipedia.com 
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7.10.2 Expanding Various Production Locations in China 
After over 10 years of operations, Shanghai-GM has set up four different 
manufacturing locations in the Chinese market (as show in Table 7.6).  
Table 7. 6 Shanghai-GM’s Various Production Locations in China 
Vehicle 
Manufacturing 
Bases 
Location 
Area 
Square 
Metres 
Year of 
Establishment 
Annual 
Production 
Capacity 
Shanghai-GM 
Jinqiao  
(North and South 
plants) 
Pudong 
Jinqiao, 
Shanghai 
792,000 June 12, 1997 320,000 vehicles;  
510,000 engines;  
80,000 
transmissions 
Shanghai-GM 
Dongyue 
Yantai, 
Shandong 
Province 
1667,000 Feb. 10, 2003 
(Vehicle Co.);  
June 18, 2004 
(Powertrain Co.) 
240,000 vehicles;  
360,000 engines; 
300,000 
transmissions 
Shanghai-GM 
Norsom 
Shenyang, 
Liaoning 
Province 
413,000 Aug. 2, 2004 200,000 vehicles  
 
Source: Based on http://www.shanghaigm.com 
 
The purpose of establishing other joint ventures in other areas was to explore 
the “red hot” Chinese market or other potential business opportunities elsewhere 
(Hastings & Schafer, 2006), and to establish new, important contacts with new 
local potential customers. GM and SAIC believed that strategic cooperation of 
this kind in specific areas would complement their respective businesses in the 
passenger car sector.  
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It was also important for GM to maintain its current position in the Chinese 
market compared to its foreign competitors. Another important consideration was 
the risks involved in leaving an attractive segment of the market, which could 
prompt its competitors to invest. One GM manager commented: 
We began to explore the Chinese auto market 6 years ago, as we cannot 
retain a leadership position without the foothold in Asia. Now we are happy 
to serve the Chinese consumers the GM way, and fortunately, the road is now 
open. It is now building its management group in China, with local people 
possessing knowledge, which GM didn‟t have. These people can be used as a 
bridge or a stepping-stone to Asia Pacific regions as well as to other 
countries. We view our future success in China as leveraging global 
resources on the one hand, and working with these people to meet the local 
market requirements on the other. This is the key part of our long-term global 
growth. (Interviewee A2) 
7.10.3 Manufacturing Abilities and Sales Performance 
Each year, Shanghai GM can produce a total of 480,000 vehicles, boasting itself a 
leading car manufacturer in China “both in scale and capacity” (Chinacarforums, 
2007, para. 5). As to the marketing sales, Shanghai-GM was profitable in its first 
year of sales, and was operational 18 months after first breaking the ground in 
1997 (Chinacarforums, 2007). In 2003, Shanghai-GM sold 201,188 vehicles. Its 
market share in China then increased to 9.8% (Xue, 2005), “placing Shanghai-
GM among the top three passenger car manufacturers in China” for the first time 
(“SGM Products”, 2007, para. 6). In 2005, although Shanghai-GM experienced a 
sudden drop in sales and profit plunges for the first six months, its “annual 
production capacity still grew to 450,000 vehicles” (“SGM Products”, 2007, para. 
5), and the sales volume jumping to 325,429 units. This performance represented 
a year-on-year increase of 28.7%, making Shanghai-GM the biggest Sino-foreign 
venture in 2005, overtaking Volkswagen‟s venture with SAIC (“General Motors 
Revealed Sales”, 2006). After reaching the sales of 413,400 vehicles in 2006, 
Shanghai-GM then completed a comprehensive market network throughout China 
with “225 dealerships, and 236 after sales and parts centres created” (“SGM 
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Products”, 2007, para. 4). Shanghai-GM finally gradually reached an annual 
manufacturing output of 480,000 vehicles, demonstrating its potential as a leading 
player among car manufacturers in China (SAIC, 2005).  
In 2008, Shanghai-GM suffered “a significant drop off” comparing with the 
previous 4 consecutive years‟ growth which was “at least 27% each year” (Nunez, 
2009, para. 2 & 3). Its total sales were only increased by 12%. Meanwhile, while 
GM‟s “Chevrolet, Cadillac, and Saab all showed growth in China”, Buick 
suffered an overall sales decline (Nunez, 2009, para. 3). Some industrial analysts 
stated certain major reasons to explain why Shanghai-GM had such a 
disappointing performance in 2008. First, with the explosive vehicle sales growth 
in previous years in Chinese car market, some Chinese “car shoppers” have been 
transformed into first-time “car owners” (Nunez, 2009, para. 3). Second, it seems 
that GM‟s “freshly-updated” models like Buick Excelle, did not deliver the 
expected achievements in terms of “styling, price, or fuel economy” (Nunez, 
2009, para. 2). Hence, Chinese consumers began to look for other models instead, 
such as VW Jetta and Toyota Corolla.  
In 2009, in order to boost the Chinese auto industry against the impact of 
global economic crisis, Chinese central government provided tax cuts and 
subsidies for buyers focusing on cleaner and fuel-efficient cars (also see section 
6.4.1). In this sense, this policy pushed vehicle sales for car manufacturers 
(particularly smaller cars) in the domestic market. Shanghai GM was no exception 
and did quite well, seeing its sales “rose 63.3 percent to 727,620 units” in 2009 
(CBS News, 2010, para. 8).  
 
7.11 Cooperative Partners’ Satisfaction 
As JV operations are managed properly, both SAIC and GM have earned a good 
return from the joint venture investment. In a relatively short time, as performance 
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exceeded the expectations the partners had anticipated from the JV, both GM and 
SAIC showed their satisfaction with the alliance results and declared openly on 
various occasions that they are satisfied with the knowledge transfer outcome in 
the JV.  
7.11.1 GM’s Attitude and Response 
At the JV initiation stage, GM was exposed to “a barrage of criticism about the 
huge size of its investment, and the significant commitments to transfer 
technology and design capabilities to China” (Tao, 2009, p. 248). Critics pointed 
out that GM had enough trouble dealing with its home market problems. Critics 
suspected that it could be “a major gamble [to invest] in a communist country 
where rule of law is still an alien concept”. They also proposed one extraordinary 
fact – that GM once “pumped in US$ 100 million before a solid contract was 
signed” in 1997 (Graham, 2000, para. 2).  
Despite these criticisms, GM top management reiterated on numerous 
occasions that China would “become the biggest automotive market in the world 
within two decades”, and China represents “the single most important emerging 
market for GM” (Tao, 2009, p. 249). GM former Chairman John F. Smith Jr. once 
said “the time and place were right for investment” (Graham, 2000, para. 3). From 
GM‟s point of view, this joint venture has fulfilled its realisation investment 
objective during a period when many people believed that China was not ripe for 
heavy investment. One manager confessed: 
The cooperation with SAIC fulfilled our expectations. We are satisfied with 
the cooperative results achieved. We have reached the objectives so far as the 
market has developed as anticipated. No major problems regarding the 
collaboration have been detected since the start. (Interviewee A1) 
Managers who were directly involved in the start-up operations could not 
forget those nights and days when a piece of sleepy land on the outskirts of 
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Shanghai was finally turned into a “show case factory that churns out luxury 
Buick sedans” (Graham, 2000, para. 1).  
As to the vehicle products‟ quality, according to GM, Buick, the company‟s 
main sedan model, is “built to the same high standards as those that roll off 
production lines in the US or Europe” (Graham, 2000, para. 14). GM agreed: 
We are fairly content about the vehicle quality. We have seen a number of 
new vehicle models coming into China each year. To a certain degree, I can 
say the cars produced here [in Shanghai] are better than those produced 
elsewhere [in our other countries‟ plants], although we all produce the same 
model. (Interviewee A3) 
GM‟s former Chief Executive, Richard Wagoner publicly stated that working 
together with SAIC “helped improve the cost base or competitiveness of all the 
products we produce” (MarketWatch, 2005, para. 4). GM would derive enormous 
benefits by developing a long-term understanding with its Chinese partner at 
many levels. Furthermore, Wagoner emphasised, if the formation of a joint 
venture could be successful, it would provide GM a platform in its efforts to 
pursue a sustainable “China Strategy”, which is to “leverage GM‟s extensive 
global resources to provide transportation products and services that deliver the 
best combination of technology and customer care innovation” in China (“GM 
Global Operations”, 2008, para. 1). 
The most positive result that GM experienced concerned its successful entry 
into the Chinese auto market. GM has increased its sales and market share, both 
of which have been the basic motives in entering into China. It has been 
successful up until now and considers the market to be very promising in the near 
future.  
In both 2003 and 2004, China became GM‟s most profitable auto market 
around the world (“GM overtakes Volkswagen”, 2005). In 2004, 25% of GM‟s 
global profit came from the Chinese market. In 2005, GM‟s sales in China 
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surged by 35.2% (compared to 2004) to 665,390 vehicles (“General Motors 
Revealed Sales”, 2006), and for the first time, GM‟s sales and market share in 
China had overtaken that of Volkswagen as the number one automaker in China 
although “the profits and sales in the United States continued to plummet” 
(Hastings & Schafer, 2006). One GM manager said: 
From a financial perspective, we are quite satisfied about what we have done 
so far. Let me show you some figures: market share in 2004 was 9.3%, now 
in 2005 about 11%. Today, GM has a sound base in China. China has 
become our second largest market in the world – it counts for 85% of our 
total revenue in Asia Pacific. (Interviewee A2) 
Still in 2005, China surpassed Japan for the first time to become GM‟s 
second largest global car market, behind only the US (Hastings & Schafer, 2006). 
GM thus created a market-leading position in China‟s automotive industry in a 
manner that was quite satisfactory. 
Thinking about the prospects in 2010, GM held confidence in getting positive 
results from the Chinese auto market, as Kevin Wale stated, “Despite the sales 
records in 2009, it looks as if 2010 will be even stronger. The industry outlook is 
strong and we expect more growth.” (CBS News, 2010, para. 4) 
7.11.2 SAIC’s Attitude and Response 
The JV was also considered successful from the perspective of the Chinese side. 
SAIC is very much goal-oriented. The cooperation with GM has largely satisfied 
its target as to increasing vehicle brands, production volume and sales growth in 
the domestic market, although many improvements are still possible. GM‟s 
entering into the Chinese auto market in the form of joint venture provides 
benefits for its Chinese partners.  
One of the expectations SAIC had in the IJV was the introduction of new 
vehicle models from GM which would help shorten R&D periods, and provide 
Chinese customers with the better passenger cars and services they required. 
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Although this has been a gradual process, GM has shown it is moving toward 
these goals – GM continuously introduced its diversified vehicle models, and 
continued to send its experts to China to support and upgrade the skills of the 
local partner. Through the joint venture project, SAIC gained access to these 
manufacturing techniques and skills in Shanghai-GM than would otherwise be 
available through the ordinary licensing of their technology.  
The newly-built world-class manufacturing facilities, production lines and 
plant surroundings in Shanghai Pudong are also world-class, which have no big 
difference “from any similar modern facility in the world – apart from the 
Chinese-language announcements and signs and an overhead walkway” (Graham, 
2000, para. 19).  
SAIC was also satisfied with the performance of the IJV particularly as high-
end quality vehicles could be made in the factory nowadays. It was inspiring 
watching new-brand whole passenger cars coming off the production lines “every 
2 minutes and 2 seconds” (Graham, 2000, para. 19). 
Meanwhile, the China-made vehicle products can be exported to overseas 
markets through GM‟s global sales network, which brought in a satisfactory 
turnover for both SAIC and GM. In October 2001, the first batch of Buick GL10s 
entered the Philipphines. Subsequently, in November 2002, Shanghai-GM signed 
a contract with GM‟s Canadian CAMI to “export a large number of V6 engines to 
CAMI (effective in January 2003)”, representing the “beginning of Chinese made 
upper-end cars entering into a developed country” (Chinacarforums, 2007, para. 
7).  
Many things could still be improved, but the way Shanghai-GM‟s business 
operations developed has been a successful part of its overall activities. One 
manager commented: 
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The operations in Shanghai-GM factory in terms of partnership, production 
volume, products range, vehicle quality, and productivity are impressive to 
us. (Interviewee B5) 
7.12 Knowledge Acquisition and Harvesting 
7.12.1 SAIC’s Learning Outcomes 
So far, as the above section 7.11.2 mentioned, SAIC has developed manufacturing 
expertise as a series of new vehicle models have been put into production in 
Shanghai-GM and sales figures have shown pretty well. Previously, GM had been 
giving clear instructions and advising the local partner on the western way of 
thinking in the automobile industry. After working together to develop several 
projects, SAIC has learned how GM thinks and operates as well as how a market 
economy functions. A GM manager noticed: 
As far as I know the Chinese have one purpose for establishing the JV: they 
want to learn and finally have their own abilities to produce their own brand 
cars one day. My personal impression is that the Chinese are very open. They 
learn and interact [with us] quickly. We have also given clear instructions to 
advise the local partner on people‟s way of thinking in the car industry. For 
example, we do often educate Chinese employees to understand the concept 
of identifying and satisfying the customer‟s needs. But I want to emphasise 
that our Chinese partner, SAIC, is not just on the receiving end.  Knowledge 
transfer is two way, and I think SAIC is bringing much to the table in terms 
of technology development, application engineering and in the critical area of 
supplier development, domestic market knowledge, labour and local cultural 
understanding. (Interviewee A2)  
GM regularly conducts courses for joint venture personnel, and takes up 
various practical problems with the course participants. After several intensive 
meetings and regular contacts in the business sites in the JV, the local Chinese 
staff confessed that they learned about procedures for managing the after-sales-
service concept.  
We learned how an auto project is intensively structured, and which person 
we have to address it to in case of a specific problem. (Interviewee B1) 
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The local people obtained a clear idea about the product and production 
development in connection with the training of the service personnel and sales 
staff. Direct association with the personnel from USA has increased the sales and 
service competence of the local people. SAIC became familiar with aspects of 
marketing patterns in GM and learned how to increase operational efficiency in 
the JV. Most importantly, the Chinese staff members are taught how to upgrade 
their own technical know-how which is urgently needed in the modern auto 
factory. One Chinese manager claimed: 
This is a lesson that we learned: the American did not want a lot of 
procedures except for a coordination procedure and a safety procedure. 
(Interviewee B9) 
During these years of cooperation with GM, SAIC managers, designers and 
engineers have been able to design new cars and develop relevant capabilities. 
With the knowledge acquired from its JV experience with GM, SAIC is now 
developing its own-brand cars in parallel with its joint venture activities with GM 
and VW. Partly based on MG Rover‟s Rover 75 technology bought in early 2005, 
SAIC initially released what the company called a “modified version of MG 
Rover‟s Rover 75 – a luxury four-door sedan”36 (Fairclough, 2006, para. 8). It is 
set to manufacture 200,000 of these sedans annually by 2010. SAIC‟s total 
producing capacity topped 1 million vehicles in 2005, and it wants to build “2 
million vehicles a year by 2010, 600,000 of which would be its own-brand 
vehicles” (Bursa, 2006, p. 19). 
SAIC now has 50.9% ownership in Korean Ssangyong and has intellectual 
property rights of the Rover 25 and 75 models, plus the K-series engine, which 
formed the basis for SAIC‟s future expansion (Bursa, 2006). As SAIC is 
                                               
36 SAIC bought the “Rover 75 design” from MG Rover Group Ltd in early 2005, “before this British 
company filed for bankruptcy in April 2005” (Fairclough, 2006, para. 8), while “Nanjing Automobile 
(Group) Corporation acquired the tooling for the car” (“Rover 75”, 2010, para. 18)  
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interested in good company performance so it could secure a better position for its 
future internationalisation procedures. One Chinese manager emphasised: 
During these years‟ cooperation [with GM and VW], we have developed 
relevant capabilities, experiences and resources in every field from 
manufacturing to sales, and have been able to design our new cars to a 
certain degree. The mass-production of our own-brand cars can further be 
emphasised in the following years. (Interviewee B10) 
7.12.2 GM’s Learning Outcomes 
GM delivered and transferred to SAIC what it promised: technology (knowledge) 
resources. With the help of SAIC, GM has taken advantage of this joint venturing 
opportunity and become familiar with the local environment during the past 10 
years. GM learned that China lagged behind in its technical development of 
automobiles. It learned how the market functioned, as well as the technical level 
in the Chinese auto industry. Meanwhile, GM has learned about the bureaucratic 
set-up in China and the need to live with bureaucracy. GM has gained experience 
in handling various relationships with the authorities at the local, regional and 
national level. One American manager emphasised what he considers the most 
important thing to remember when doing business with the Chinese was 
“relations or guanxi.” “You need to have good relations or guanxi here,” he said, 
“but you also need to devote a lot of time to them” (Interviewee A4). 
GM realised that the local partner had a lot of contacts at all of these levels, 
which proved useful in the planning stages and later in the setting up of other JVs 
in other China‟s cities. SAIC introduced GM to the government parties and people 
with whom GM had to deal and negotiate. Especially in the preformation and 
planning stage, two parties worked closely and spent a lot of time meeting with 
relevant administrative ministers and leaders. It was very helpful for GM to 
acquire this local experience and knowledge. The bureaucratic pressure can be 
reduced to some extent, but largely has to be dealt with by the help of local 
experts. One GM executive stated: 
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During the past 10 years, SAIC has helped us become familiar with the local 
environment. We gained invaluable experiences. Our Chinese partner 
actually has a lot of contacts in the local area. For example, SAIC introduced 
us to the government parties that we have to deal with. These proved useful 
in the planning and later [JV] formation stage. Besides providing us with 
some great help in navigating China‟s challenging institutions, I think the 
important thing is we have good relations [with the Chinese]. Working with 
SAIC gives us invaluable insight into what local Chinese are looking for in a 
vehicle. We would not have learned these important things, had we not 
worked with our Chinese colleagues.  (Interviewee A4) 
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7.13 Chapter Conclusion 
This chapter examined the ways in which the case company Shanghai-GM, an 
IJV formed by SAIC (China) and GM (USA), approached interactive cooperation 
and interfirm knowledge transfer practices. The partners in this alliance brought 
together their complementary capabilities in automotive technology and 
management expertise to build an independent organisation with its own board of 
directors and staff members to facilitate knowledge sharing and alliance learning 
which consisted of the following four elements: 
1) Contracts and agreements that articulated each member‟s responsibilities; 
2) Interorganisational knowledge transfer stages and procedures; 
3) A set of communicating channels, including training, expatriate managers‟ 
deployments and a conflict management system; 
4) Partnership evolution at the interfaces between the participating firms.  
The main issues identified were how to build efficiency and leverage the 
partners‟ strengths. SAIC was motivated by anticipation of foreign technology 
transfer in order to compete more effectively in the increasingly competitive auto 
market in China. GM wanted to take advantage of knowledge transfer-oriented 
cooperative arrangements. Working with SAIC enabled GM to reduce costs and 
expand business opportunities in the Chinese auto market, stemming the huge 
crisis in its home market.  
This close collaboration helped the IJV partners to work better together in the 
Chinese car industry, and season by season, they learned how to improve the 
alliance performance and trust each other. As GM transfers the necessary 
knowledge throughout, the local partner‟s knowledge of the operation is 
satisfactory. GM also realised that things (such as doing business in China) did 
not happen or change overnight. Both partners thus maintained a mutual 
understanding of each other‟s capacities and requirements, and were supportive of 
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each other in the JV. The next chapter brings statistical results together with 
relevant discussions by following the CATPAC operating procedures mentioned 
in the methodology chapter. 
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Chapter 8   In-depth Textual Analysis and Findings 
 
8.1 Introduction 
The focus in Chapter 7 was on the historical background and developments of 
interfirm knowledge flows in Shanghai-GM. In the pursuit of an in-depth 
understanding in terms of interpartner interactions involved in the knowledge 
exchange, a process of textual analysis is undertaken in Chapter 8. The chapter 
has three main purposes: 
First, based on multiple interviewees‟ responses 37  as per the proposed 
research questions, this chapter presents the CATPAC statistical results of the 
interview data, including the textual analysis of the relevant concepts and 
associations between different themes
38
. CATPAC is useful for conducting textual 
analysis of knowledge transfer in IJVs for the following reasons (also see 
methodology Chapter 4): CATPAC does not require precoding of the text but 
allow the categories and patterns to directly emerge from the data. After 
transcribing the interview notes, the text is entered into the CATPAC programme 
which designs, monitors, and displays a mapping of statistical frequencies and 
word occurrences. The advantage of CATPAC is that its analysis includes Ward‟s 
(1963) hierarchical cluster analysis and multidimensional scaling of the words. 
CATPAC provides a network of the interrelationships among the words along 
with the meaning clusters of the identified words. The analyst can then identify 
dominant themes as represented in the entirety of the corpus (groupings of 
words). This tool reads and identifies the concepts conveyed in the text and 
produces perceptual maps directly from the text. The CATPAC software thus 
helps find linkages between word concepts which are reflected in the textual 
                                               
37 The interview results with the Chinese executives were all translated into English for the convenience of 
computer data entry. 
38 In terms of the overview and rationale of the CATPAC statistical analysis, please also refer to Chapter Four, 
Section 4.7.2 – 4.7.4. 
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documents. These features also reflect information about the relationships among 
the words, providing visual representations of the identified interrelationships. 
Second, this chapter also analyses the implications of knowledge transfer and 
learning practices in the case of IJVs in order to identify sources of change-driven 
IJV reconfigurations and the prompted shifts in interpartner knowledge transfer 
practices. Each of the dominant themes is discussed. Relevant factors such as 
willingness to transfer, learning intent, partnership development and relationship 
capital that affect the knowledge transfer process, as well as the benefits gained 
and difficulties experienced during the logical stages of knowledge transfer, are 
discussed in this chapter. 
Third, based on the research findings and a literature-based analysis, 
discussion on the final refinement of the tentative conceptual framework 
(originally presented in research model chapter) is addressed in section 8.12. 
This chapter consists of the following sections: Section 8.2 to section 8.11 
summarises the computer operating results by going over the main points of each 
of the proposed research questions (Refer to section 2.12.2.). Section 8.2 briefly 
explains the findings of the “Strategic Objectives and Motivation toward 
Cooperation”. This is followed by section 8.3, which presents the findings in 
terms of “Willingness to Transfer and Intent to Learn”.  
The next sections are arranged as follows: “Existing Knowledge Base and 
Identification” (section 8.4); “Knowledge Connection and Complementarity” 
(section 8.5); “Knowledge Contribution” (section 8.6); “Knowledge Development 
and Adaptation” (section 8.7); “HR Training and Expatriate Managers 
Deployment” (section 8.8); “The Impact of Cultural Difference” (Section 8.9); 
“Knowledge Characteristics and Nature” (section 8.10); and “The Value of 
Interfirm Partnership” (section 8.11). Section 8.12 then examines the refinement 
of the tentative conceptual framework. Section 8.13 finally concludes this chapter. 
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8.2 Strategic Objectives and Motivation toward Cooperation  
8.2.1 Statistical Frequency Results 
Table 8.1 below displays the first dominant theme emerging from the data 
analysis, based on frequency statistics results that indicate interviewees‟ 
perception of “Strategic Objectives and Motivation toward Cooperation”. The 
first set of summary statistics at the top left side of the page shows that the total 
number of words used by the 16 respondents during the interview process was 
108
39
. Total unique words used in the analysis were 23. The total episodes (102) 
are the number of windows that were used in the CATPAC analysis. The total 
number of lines analysed in the interview text was 53. The network options at the 
top right remained at their default settings.  
In the left-hand column below the first set of data, the second group of 
statistics reports each unique word by frequency. These unique words are dually 
recorded in alphabetically order in the right column. For example, the word 
“Motives” under the “Descending Frequency List” has been listed as the most 
frequently occurring word in the interview text. “Motives” occurred 10 times, 
which was 9.3% of all occurrences. This suggests that “Motives” appeared 42 
times (41.2%) of the scanned windows.  
The columns at the right give the same information as found in the left hand 
columns, except the unique words are now listed in alphabetical order, and thus 
the word “Motives” is shown alphabetically (for immediate reference) among the 
other unique words. Several other words with high-frequency clustering together 
were the words “Market” mentioned 8 times (7.4%), “Chinese” which was 
mentioned 6 times (5.6%), and “Firms” was mentioned 6 times (5.6%). 
                                               
39 The exclude file was used to remove noncontent bearing words from the text.  
Chapter 8: In-depth Analysis and Findings 
250 
 
Table 8. 1 Statistical Frequency Results 
Total Words 108 Threshhold 0.000 
Total Unique Words 23 Restoring Force 0.100 
Total Episodes 102 Cycles 1 
Total Lines 53 Function Sigmoid (-1 - +1) 
  Clamping Yes 
Descending 
Frequency List 
    Alphabetically 
Sorted List 
    
WORD FREQ PCNT CASE 
FREQ 
CASE 
PCNT 
WORD FREQ PCNT CASE 
FREQ 
CASE 
PCNT 
MOTIVES 10 9.3 42 41.2 ALLIANCE 4 3.7 22 21.6 
MARKET 8 7.4 45 44.1 CASE 4 3.7 13 12.7 
CHINESE 6 5.6 32 31.4 CHINESE 6 5.6 32 31.4 
FIRMS 6 5.6 27 26.5 COMMUNICATION 3 2.8 21 20.6 
LOCAL 6 5.6 28 27.5 CONCERN 3 2.8 11 10.8 
COST 5 4.6 27 26.5 COOPERATIVE 4 3.7 26 25.5 
COSTS 5 4.6 24 23.5 COST 5 4.6 27 26.5 
ALLIANCE 4 3.7 22 21.6 COSTS 5 4.6 24 23.5 
CASE 4 3.7 13 12.7 DUE 3 2.8 21 20.6 
COOPERATIVE 4 3.7 26 25.5 FIRMS 6 5.6 27 26.5 
KNOWLEDGE 4 3.7 20 19.6 FOREIGN 3 2.8 21 20.6 
PARTNER 4 3.7 28 27.5 FORMATION 3 2.8 21 20.6 
PRODUCTS 4 3.7 20 19.6 GENERAL 3 2.8 17 16.7 
STRATEGIC 4 3.7 21 20.6 KNOWLEDGE 4 3.7 20 19.6 
TIME 4 3.7 27 26.5 LOCAL 6 5.6 28 27.5 
COMMUNICATION 3 2.8 21 20.6 MARKET 8 7.4 45 44.1 
CONCERN 3 2.8 11 10.8 MOTIVES 10 9.3 42 41.2 
DUE 3 2.8 21 20.6 PARTNER 4 3.7 28 27.5 
FOREIGN 3 2.8 21 20.6 PERSONAL 3 2.8 21 20.6 
FORMATION 3 2.8 21 20.6 PRODUCTS 4 3.7 20 19.6 
GENERAL 3 2.8 17 16.7 RESOURCES 3 2.8 21  20.6 
PERSONAL 3 2.8 21 20.6 STRATEGIC 4 3.7 21  20.6 
RESOURCES 3 2.8 21 20.6 TIME 4 3.7 27  26.5 
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Table 8.1 indicates that the words “Local” (6, 5.6%), “Cost” (5, 4.6%), 
“Alliance” (4, 3.7%) were also frequently clustered words in the text. To further 
explore the principal concepts of the text, the results of the frequency statistics are 
shown in a dendogram to aid in visually identifying the most important words 
used in the text, as shown in Figure 8.1. 
8.2.2 Cluster Dendogram Results 
Figure 8.1 below illustrates the output from the hierarchical cluster analysis by 
computing a visual of a “city skyline”. The dendogram has constructed a one-
dimensional visual of the respondents‟ perceptions. 
Figure 8. 1 Cluster Analysis of Dendogram 
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At the left side of Figure 8.1, cluster one identifies the associations among 
the words: Alliance, Cooperative, Motives, Strategic, Knowledge, and Resources. 
Cluster two identifies: Case, General Communication, and Personal. Cluster three 
shows: Foreign, Products, Wanted, and Time. Cluster four includes: Chinese, 
Market, Due. Cluster five recognises: Concern, Transaction, Costs, Firms, Cost, 
Local, Partner, and Formation. Figure 8.1 reveals the patterns of association with 
perceptions of the “Strategic Motives and Willingness to Cooperate”, which are 
consistent with the interview transcripts. The significance of these clusters derives 
from their representation of the relationships between the unique words and the 
perceptions of the interview participants. 
Given the primary intent of the research and the interview transcripts, the 
words “Chinese”, “Market”, “Transaction”, “Costs”, “Concern”, “Local”, 
“Partner”, and “Formation” cluster very sharply together in this analysis. These 
cluster solutions suggest that some of the most frequently elicited perceptions in 
the study involve these words. For example, GM wanted to work with a “local 
partner” to expand the “local Chinese market”, and to take advantage of the “low 
production costs”. Clearly, the comments made by the participants support the 
grouping of the perceptions the managers have of the willingness to cooperate. 
8.2.3 Implications of Findings  
In studying the interfirm knowledge transfer and learning phenomenon in 
alliances, it is essential to firstly consider the strategic motives as they can explain 
the degree of cooperative willingness, commitment, experience, flexibility, and 
adaptability, as well as the various types of knowledge resources engaged by the 
participating firms in the collaborative activities (Hyder & Abraha, 2003). Culpan 
and Kumar (1994) discussed three general motives of alliance formation, i.e., 
transaction costs concern, resources acquisition concern, and alliance competitive 
advantage concern. If transaction costs in the market are high, firms will enter 
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into collaborations to reduce the cost of each transaction. Acquiring knowledge 
resources, such as skilled, semiskilled manpower, and local market know-how can 
also be attractive motives for firms (Yan, 2000).  
This research is conducted from the alliance perspective, and the motives of 
the involved partner firms can be identified to explain partnering firms‟ strategic 
behaviour with regard to international market presence, profit and cost 
considerations, and equity preference. Based on the historical, documentary 
accounts and the interview findings, this research offers evidence that since the 
early contacts between GM and SAIC, both sides showed motivation and positive 
attitudes toward establishing the cooperative partnership and wanting to make it 
work as quickly as possible. 
The primary motive related to cost advantages. Producing vehicles in the US 
was extremely expensive for GM and rendering products uncompetitive, while the 
production costs in China were lower due to cheaper labour and material costs 
than in the US. These offered GM competitive pricing and it could thereby sell 
more of its products at a higher margin. This aim could be achieved by finding an 
efficient and competent partner [SAIC] and by establishing production in China 
where salary costs were low. As one American manager commented: 
We believe that [interfirm] cooperation will create a huge potential. Of 
course, GM wants to see growth with sparks. From the perspective of cost 
reduction, the tough price competition in the US makes China a fresh start; 
we could buy the raw materials in China at a very low cost, this can‟t be 
achieved in US. All these could essentially help us increase the company‟s 
competitiveness. (Interviewee A2)  
SAIC was also attracted by the lower costs when advanced technology and 
management expertise would be introduced. This finding extends the literature of 
transaction cost economics that the low cost advantage has always been an 
important motive for considering alliance formation for the MNC, but this data 
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also indicates that the local partner too benefits from cost advantages from the 
MNC.  
Second, the researcher found that the main reason for GM to share their 
knowledge was to develop long-term working relationship with SAIC and acquire 
local knowledge when operating in China. GM intended to cooperate with SAIC, 
as the Chinese market provided considerable potential due to the fast-growing 
economic and industrial development of the country. One manager said: 
We‟re not going to take big stakes just because we can use the Chinese 
manufacturing bases, or they have good connections. Considering the 
institutional differences, which were characterised by 50 years of socialist 
administration and deeply rooted bureaucracy, China‟s market was still 
considered to be complex and uncertain for us at that time; a suitable 
cooperative partner who could deal appropriately with the problems and 
constraints of day-to-day operations was really needed. Therefore, if we 
don‟t believe there is a good potential for us to make successful operations 
out of it, we wouldn‟t think about it. (Interviewee A4) 
GM wanted to work with local partners to implement the Shanghai-GM 
project development plan, and to become familiar with the auto industry in China 
through the partnership with SAIC. GM preferred to share the risks with local 
associates as political and economic uncertainties exist in China. The local 
partner, SAIC in this case, considered its two options – the cooperative 
arrangement strategic choice or internal self-development route. SAIC recognised 
the new strategic cooperative partnership opportunities with GM for better 
technology access, competitiveness, and profitability enhancement for SAIC. 
SAIC clearly cited skill development and upgrade of competitiveness as one 
major motivating factor for getting involved in the JV with GM.  
This is aligned with the Chinese Government commitment to upgrade the 
automotive industry for industrial growth and efficiency. This upgrade has opened 
up the scope for collaboration with GM since the parties assumed joint 
development of products through working together. In sum, although motives 
Chapter 8: In-depth Analysis and Findings 
255 
 
between GM and SAIC varied to a certain degree due to different backgrounds, 
environmental conditions, internal and external capabilities, opportunities and 
constraints, both partners were clear on what they expected from the 
collaboration. It is, therefore, confirmed that the underlying motivational factor 
for the establishment of IJVs is to achieve a joint competitive position (Contractor 
& Lorange, 1988; Inkpen & Beamish, 1997; Lane & Beamish, 1990; Steensma & 
Lyles, 2000). Cooperative arrangements can thus be a means of using a new 
manufacturing process or a new capability (Ding et al., 2009a, 2009b; Drucker, 
1992; Harrigan, 1986). Coproduction, common procurement, and other joint 
activities are becoming the means to attain increased efficiency, productivity, 
scale economies, and other benefits commonly attributed to interfirm cooperation 
which are particularly appropriate when projects involve great uncertainties, 
costly technological innovations, or innovative managerial practices as in the 
automotive industry in China.  
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8.3 Willingness to Transfer and Intent to Learn 
8.3.1 Statistical Frequency Results 
Table 8.2 below displays the statistical frequency results that indicate 
interviewees‟ perceptions toward “Willingness to Transfer Knowledge and Intent 
to Learn”. The first set of summary statistics at the top left side shows that the 
total number of words used by the respondents during the interview process was 
217
40
. Total unique words used in the analysis were 25. The total episodes (211) 
are the number of windows that were used in the analysis. The total number of 
lines analysed in the interview text was 71. The network options at the top right 
remained at their default settings. The word “Market” under the “Descending 
Frequency List” has been listed as the most frequently occurring word in the 
interview text. “Market” occurred 20 times, which was 9.2% of all occurrences. 
This suggests that “Market” appeared 109 times (51.7%) of the scanned windows.  
In the columns at the right, the word “Market” is then shown alphabetically 
among the other unique words. Several other words with high-frequency 
clustering together were the words “Local” also mentioned 20 times (9.2%), 
“Knowledge” which was mentioned 13 times (6.0%), and “Chinese” was 
mentioned 11 times (5.1%). Table 8.2 indicates that the words “Development” 
(11, 5.1%), “Gaps” (10, 4.6%) were also frequently clustered words in the text. 
 
 
                                               
40 The exclude file was used to remove noncontent bearing words from the text.  
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Table 8. 2 Statistical Frequency Results 
Total Words 217 Threshhold 0.000 
Total Unique Words 25 Restoring Force 0.100 
Total Episodes 211 Cycles 1 
Total Lines 71 Function Sigmoid (-1 - +1) 
  Clamping Yes 
Descending 
Frequency 
List 
    Alphabetically 
Sorted List 
    
WORD FREQ PCNT CASE 
FREQ 
CASE 
PCNT 
WORD FREQ PCNT CASE 
FREQ 
CASE 
PCNT 
MARKET 20 9.2 109 51.7 ACQUIRE 6 2.8 39 18.5 
LOCAL 20 9.2 101 47.9 CHINESE 11 5.1 66 31.3 
KNOWLEDGE 13 6.0 53 25.1 CLOSE 8 3.7 56 26.5 
CHINESE 11 5.1 66 31.3 COMPANIES 6 2.8 36 17.1 
DEVELOPMENT 11 5.1 66 31.3 COMPETENCE 6 2.8 42 19.9 
GAPS 10 4.6 62 29.4 CONTACTS 9 4.1 55 26.1 
CONTACTS 9 4.1 55 26.1 DEVELOPMENT 11 5.1 66 31.3 
TECHNOLOGY 9 4.1 62 29.4 END 6 2.8 42 19.9 
CLOSE 8 3.7 56 26.5 ESTABLISH 8 3.7 53 25.1 
ESTABLISH 8 3.7 53 25.1 FOREIGN 7 3.2 39 18.5 
LEARN 8 3.7 45 21.3 GAPS 10 4.6 62 29.4 
PRODUCTION 8 3.7 54 25.6 HIGH 6 2.8 42 19.9 
PRODUCTS 8 3.7 50 23.7 KNOW 7 3.2 49 23.2 
FOREIGN 7 3.2 39 18.5 KNOWLEDGE 13 6.0 53 25.1 
KNOW 7 3.2 49 23.2 LEARN 8 3.7 45 21.3 
ACQUIRE 6 2.8 39 18.5 LOCAL 20 9.2 101 47.9 
COMPANIES 6 2.8 36 17.1 MARKET 20 9.2 109 51.7 
COMPETENCE 6 2.8 42 19.9 MIDDLE 6 2.8 42 19.9 
END 6 2.8 42 19.9 MODERN 6 2.8 40 19.0 
HIGH 6 2.8 42 19.9 PARTNERS 6 2.8 38 18.0 
MIDDLE 6 2.8 42 19.9 PRODUCE 6 2.8 42 19.9 
MODERN 6 2.8 40 19.0 PRODUCTION 8 3.7 54 25.6 
PARTNERS 6 2.8 38 18.0 PRODUCTS 8 3.7 50 23.7 
PRODUCE 6 2.8 42 19.9 RELATIONSHIPS 6 2.8 36 17.1 
RELATIONSHIP 6 2.8 36 17.1 TECHNOLOGY 9 4.1 62 29.4 
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8.3.2 Cluster Dendogram Results 
To further explore the principal concepts of the text, the results of the frequency 
statistics are shown in a dendogram (See Figure 8.2.). 
Figure 8. 2 Cluster Analysis of Dendogram 
 
 
Figure 8.2 represents a perceptual map made from the interview texts by 
CATPAC, and also shows the unique words in a one-dimensional space. Three 
groups of words are clustered together. Group one identifies the associations 
among the words: Acquire, Development, Technology, Learn, Produce, Modern, 
Market. Group two identifies: Close, Gaps, Competence, Know, End, High, 
Chapter 8: In-depth Analysis and Findings 
259 
 
Products, Middle. Group three shows: Chinese, Local, Contacts, Relationships, 
Establish, Companies, Foreign, Knowledge, Production, Partners.  
Figure 8.2 reveals the patterns of association with perceptions of the 
“Willingness to Transfer Knowledge and Intent to Learn”. The significance of 
these clusters derives from the representation of the relationships between the 
unique words and the perceptions of the interview participants. Given the primary 
intent of the research and the interview transcripts, these cluster solutions suggest 
that some of the most frequently elicited perceptions in the study involve these 
words.  
8.3.3 Implications of Findings 
Researchers point out that a clear learning intent can be seen as an important 
determinant for facilitating learning from its allies (Ding et al., 2009b; Inkpen, 
2002; Simonin, 2004; Szulanski, 1999, 2000; Zander, 1998). Another element 
with knowledge transfer concerns a partner‟s willingness for knowledge sharing 
or protection against knowledge leakage (Ding et al., 2009b; Yan & Luo, 2001). 
Naturally, firms may be reluctant to share knowledge and each party wants to 
protect its knowledge from uncompensated leakage to the other or any third party 
(Becerra et al., 2008; Faems et al., 2007).  
The Chinese side showed explicit learning intent in the case. The most 
important consideration was to develop another useful connection with a well-
established world-class auto giant, and to learn GM‟s modern technology, skills 
and know-how in order to produce and improve the quality of the middle or even 
high-end vehicle products. In the words of one Chinese manager: 
With the rapid expansion of [the] Shanghai auto industry in recent years, we 
need to seriously consider how to build up another whole vehicle cooperative 
enterprise starting from the even higher level of technology. We are not just 
content with the current achievements, we need to further check our 
weaknesses and gaps. This is critical for keeping us in the leading position in 
the domestic passenger car market. These are our whole series of strategic 
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considerations, as we are willing to make precautions beforehand, and this is 
called “risk management”. (Interviewee B5) 
One American manager who went through on-the-job training in Shanghai-
GM also had the following observation: 
Some Chinese engineers and workers showed eagerness to learn despite their 
language problems or lack of intercultural communication skills. They 
always ask questions and observe the American colleagues . . . how to handle 
various issues . . . I was surprised by their willingness and capabilities for 
answering my questions. (Interviewee A5) 
There were two considerations for SAIC: First, SAIC wanted to keep up with 
the Chinese auto market‟s sudden expansion. Second, such a new cooperative 
project would be useful to the state-owned company, the industry and the country. 
In the case, although the global auto industry has been developed for over 100 
years and most of the vehicle products have been received extensive tests for the 
purpose of quality assurance, Chinese managers realise big gaps still exist in 
many aspects compared with their foreign automakers. SAIC was not content with 
its previous achievements. Most of the Chinese managers estimated at least 10 to 
30 years would be needed to catch up with their world-class counterparts.  
Hu Maoyuan expressed his feeling 10 years later in his book “Shanghai 
Automobile Industry – 50 years (1955-2005)”, which was published in 2008, “We 
had very strong confidence. Many people asked me why we wanted to cooperate 
with GM because at that time we‟ve got another IJV with Volkswagen. But I had 
two main thoughts: first, we were having very old products in the auto market, 
and we wanted to seek new development. But that was not easy. So when I knew 
that there would be foreign investment to develop new products, I was very happy 
and I was very motivated as well. I wanted to go to do some new products. 
Second, I had worked many years and it was time for me to learn something new. 
That‟s why I went to GM. We are ready to start from zero.” (p. 126)41 
                                               
41 This is the researcher‟s English translation based on the original contents written in Chinese. 
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In the case, the researcher found GM promised in the agreement to provide 
SAIC with relevant technology and resources needed for IJV development. GM 
promised to be a provider of critical technology and marketing knowledge for 
SAIC‟s own ambitious plans, and showed a strong willingness and commitment 
of providing its up-to-date vehicle manufacturing expertise to Shanghai-GM and 
interest to invest in China with SAIC, which was positively responding to SAIC‟s 
learning requirements. This contrasts with Volkswagen‟s reluctance to transfer its 
new models and technologies to its Chinese partner SAIC over many years.  
GM also wished to gain access to important contacts at the political, 
government and ministerial levels in the local market, and to establish contacts 
with actors with the knowledge and experience required to handle these 
relationships. One American manager stated:  
Accessing the experience of local partners are specific goals for us. 
(Interviewee A2) 
Thus, it can be concluded that supplying the necessary knowledge and skills 
to ensure JV operational and management efficiency and intent to learn the rules 
and regulations in China were both important motives for GM and SAIC. We can 
see both the Chinese firm and the American firm have clearly specific knowledge-
related goals within IJVs, and this cooperative project was set up with a clear 
knowledge acquisition intent. The key objective was, effective and efficient 
alliance management and cooperative experience, and the cooperative partners 
could learn from each other. Clearly, the comments made by the participants 
support the grouping of the perceptions the managers have of the “willingness to 
share knowledge” within the Chinese automotive industry context. 
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8.4 Existing Knowledge Base and Identification 
8.4.1 Statistical Frequency Results 
Table 8.3 displays the statistical frequency results that indicate interviewees‟ 
perceptions toward “Existing Knowledge Base and Identification”.  
Table 8. 3 Statistical Frequency Results 
Total Words 181 Threshhold 0.000 
Total Unique Words 25 Restoring Force 0.100 
Total Episodes 175 Cycles 1 
Total Lines 56 Function Sigmoid (-1 - +1) 
  Clamping Yes 
Descending 
Frequency 
List 
    Alphabetically 
Sorted List 
    
WORD FREQ PCNT CASE 
FREQ 
CASE 
PCNT 
WORD FREQ PCNT CASE 
FREQ 
CASE 
PCNT 
PARTNER  22 12.2 119 68.0 ACCESS 3 1.7 20 11.4 
KNOWLEDGE 22 12.2 88 50.3 ATTRACTIVE 3 1.7 17 9.7 
FIRM 14 7.7 60 34.3 AUTO 6 3.3 42 24.0 
SELECTION 11 6.1 64 36.6 BASE 6 3.3 38 21.7 
EXPERIENCE 9 5.0 52 29.7 CAPABILITIES 3 1.7 16 9.1 
LOCAL 9 5.0 51 29.1 CHINESE 6 3.3 31 17.7 
FOREIGN 8 4.4 49 28.0 EXPERIENCE 9 5.0 52 29.7 
PARTNERS 8 4.4 51 29.1 FINDING 3 1.7 15 8.6 
MARKET 7 3.9 44 25.1 FIRM 14 7.7 60 34.3 
PLAYER 7 3.9 48 27.4 FOREIGN 8 4.4 49 28.0 
AUTO 6 3.3 42 24.0 GIANT 4 2.2 28 16.0 
BASE 6 3.3 38 21.7 KNOWLEDGE 22 12.2 88 50.3 
CHINESE 6 3.3 31 17.7 LENGTHY 4 2.2 28 16.0 
MARKETING 5 2.8 30 17.1 LOCAL 9 5.0 51 29.1 
WEAK 5 2.8 35 20.0 MARKET 7 3.9 44 25.1 
GIANT 4 2.2 28 16.0 MARKETING 5 2.8 30 17.1 
LENGTHY 4 2.2 28 16.0 PARTNER 22 12.2 119 68.0 
PREVIOUS 4 2.2 28 16.0 PARTNERS 8 4.4 51 29.1 
RESOURCES 4 2.2 25 14.3 PLAYER 7 3.9 48 27.4 
SKILLS 4 2.2 26 14.9 PREVIOUS 4 2.2 28 16.0 
STRONG 4 2.2 26 14.9 RESOURCES 4 2.2 25 14.3 
ACCESS 3 1.7 20 11.4 SELECTION 11 6.1 64 36.6 
ATTRACTIVE 3 1.7 17 9.7 SKILLS 4 2.2 26 14.9 
CAPABILITIES 3 1.7 16 9.1 STRONG 4 2.2 26 14.9 
FINDING 3 1.7 15 8.6 WEAK 5 2.8 35 20.0 
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The total number of words used by the respondents during the interview 
process was 181. Total unique words were 25. Total episodes were 175. Total 
number of lines was 56. Network options at the top right remained at their default 
settings. The word “Partner” under the “Descending Frequency List” has been 
listed as the most frequently occurring word (It occurred 22 times.), 12.2% of all 
occurrences. This suggests that “Partner” appeared 119 times (68.0%) of the 
scanned windows. Several other words with high-frequency clustering together 
were the words “Knowledge” also mentioned 22 times (12.2%), “Firm” was 
mentioned 14 times (7.7%), and “Selection” was mentioned 11 times (6.1%).  
8.4.2 Cluster Dendogram Results 
Figure 8.3 below represents a perceptual map which shows the unique words in a 
one dimensional space. Five groups of words are clustered together, revealing the 
patterns of association with perceptions of the “Existing Knowledge Base and 
Identification”. Group one includes: Access, Chinese, Capabilities, Attractive, 
partners. Group two shows: Firm, Foreign, Local, Market. Group three 
demonstrates: Auto, Giant, Base, Strong, Marketing, Player. Group four has: 
Experience, Weak, Lengthy, Previous. Group five shows: Finding, Knowledge, 
Partner, Selection, Resources, Skills. The significance of these groups derives 
from the representation of the relationships between the unique words and the 
perceptions of the interview participants, which will be discussed in the following 
section. 
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Figure 8. 3 Cluster Analysis of Dendogram 
 
8.4.3 Implications of Findings  
Finding a good cooperative partner has been argued as an essential strategy for 
forming alliances (Albers, 2005; Ariño & Reuer, 2004; Child & Faulkner, 1998; 
Geringer & Herbert, 1991; Luo, 1998; 2002; Porter & Fuller, 1986). Responding 
to the institutional policies, operating procedures, complex indigenous conditions 
and dynamic changes, the quest of a particular partner selection with a mixture of 
appropriate knowledge, skills and resources available to the venture is particularly 
magnified, because the suitable partner can increase the flexibility, strategy 
adaptability, and to reduce environmental uncertainties and achieve the strategic 
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objectives, leading to the ultimate success of a knowledge learning process (Lyles 
& Gudergan, 2006). 
Tsang (2007) also argues that ahe basic understanding behind partner 
selection is to acquire the knowledge that is suitable and convenient to meet JV 
technical and managerial operations. The ability to do so relies heavily on their 
knowledge bases that are developed in a path-dependent manner (Tsang, 2007).  
In the case, Shanghai-GM is an auto manufacturing plant, and the products 
and equipment are similar to that manufactured or supplied by both partner firms. 
GM was undeniably a giant auto company in the world. The Chinese partner – 
SAIC – is also not weak. SAIC also has already gained lengthy experience of 
working in previous collaboration with foreign firms such as Volkswagen. One 
American recognised: 
SAIC is actually a well-known state-owned company and has a good 
knowledge of customer preferences and attitudes, good company control of 
the home market, and knows how to manage and deal with the economic 
situation. It is able to enter the agreements and contracts needed in a proper 
manner and in a short period of time. SAIC is very competent in its fields of 
operation, has technical skills of a general nature and is capable of 
developing car and engine products. (Interviewee A2) 
In brief, both partners are highly experienced and have sufficient knowledge 
bases and skills in the auto industry field, i.e., strong manufacturing and 
marketing networks. In fact, neither of them could be rated as a weak player at 
vehicle production management. The above findings thus showed evidence that 
the existing knowledge provided excellent learning “window” for SAIC and GM.  
This learning potential had three main values. First, larger initial investment 
and higher commitment in technology transfer from the foreign side should be 
more attractive and welcome to a local partner. Second, existing knowledge and 
initial experience enabled GM to effectively identify SAIC as its Chinese partner. 
Third, a foreign firm considering entering a country/market with high 
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uncertainties and/or risks can also give first priority to selecting the right partner, 
someone who can handle the local situation with certain knowledge and skills. In 
such a market, things can change quickly and new regulations affecting business 
activity come and go, making local partnering essential. 
Luo (2000), Hitt et al. (2000), Shenkar and Li (1999) point out that in an 
emerging market, valuable technical capabilities, marketing knowledge, 
management expertise as well as capital and other intangible resources have the 
highest priority when local firms select joint venture partners. On the other hand, 
when a foreign firm looks for a local partner, it typically looks for local 
knowledge, market access, and low costs. Hence, if we assume joint venture 
formation is a mutual selection process among potential partners, and the 
selection criteria are along those dimensions above, then it is logical to anticipate 
that in order to get the best possible mix of the joint resources, foreign firms will 
bid for the most attractive local partners, and vice versa local firms will bid for the 
most attractive foreign partner. 
In sum, the implication here that is central to the interpartner knowledge 
transfer is the initial selection process for a suitable partner, as the choice of 
cooperative partner will determine how well the partners work together and what 
existing knowledge resources are available to be identified and contributed. It is 
thus found that knowledge transfer should be linked to the criteria of partner 
knowledge base, as choosing a partner on the basis of its market position or local 
connections reflects competitive advantage and transaction cost perspectives 
respectively (Simonin, 2004).  
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8.5 Knowledge Connection and Complementarity 
8.5.1 Statistical Frequency Results 
Table 8.4 displays the statistical frequency results that indicate interviewees‟ 
perceptions toward “Knowledge Connection and Complementarity”. The total 
number of words used by the respondents during the interview process was 124. 
Total unique words were 20. Total episodes were 118. Total number of lines was 
41. The network options at the top right remained at their default settings. The 
word “Complementary” under the “Descending Frequency List” has been listed as 
the most frequently occurring word (occurred 12 times), 9.7% of all occurrences. 
This suggests that “Knowledge” appeared 59 times (50%) of the scanned 
windows. Several other words with high-frequency clustering together were the 
words “Knowledge‟ also mentioned 11 times (8.9%); “Resource” was mentioned 
10 times (8.1%). 
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Table 8. 4 Statistical Frequency Results 
Total Words 124 Threshhold 0.000 
Total Unique Words 20 Restoring Force 0.100 
Total Episodes 118 Cycles 1 
Total Lines 41 Function Sigmoid (-1 - +1) 
  Clamping Yes 
Descending 
Frequency List 
    Alphabetically 
Sorted List 
    
WORD FREQ PCNT CASE 
FREQ 
CASE 
PCNT 
WORD FREQ PCNT CASE 
FREQ 
CASE 
PCNT 
COMPLEMENTARY 12 9.7 59 50.0 CHINESE 5 4.0 25 21.2 
KNOWLEDGE 11 8.9 55 46.6 COMPETITIVE 6 4.8 42 35.6 
RESOURCE 10 8.1 33 28.0 COMPETITORS 3 2.4 9 7.6 
JOINT 7 5.6 30 25.4 COMPLEMENTARY 12 9.7 59 50.0 
VENTURE 7 5.6 30 25.4 DIFFERENCE 5 4.0 32 27.1 
COMPETITIVE 6 4.8 42 35.6 DIRE 5 4.0 33 28.0 
END 6 4.8 42 35.6 END 6 4.8 42 36.5 
HIGH 6 4.8 42 35.6 ENVIRONMENT 5 4.0 35 29.7 
NEED 6 4.8 41 34.7 FOREIGN 3 2.4 15 12.7 
SHARING 6 4.8 41 34.7 HIGH 6 4.8 42 35.6 
SKILLS 6 4.8 38 32.2 JOINT 7 5.6 30 25.4 
SUPPLEMENT 6 4.8 36 30.5 KNOWLEDGE 11 8.9 55 46.6 
CHINESE 5 4.0 25 21.2 LOCAL 5 4.0 35 29.7 
DIFFERENCE 5 4.0 32 27.1 NEED 6 4.8 41 34.7 
DIRE 5 4.0 33 28.0 PARTNERS 4 3.2 27 22.9 
ENVIRONMENT 5 4.0 35 29.7 RESOURCE 10 8.1 33 28.0 
LOCAL 5 4.0 35 29.7 SHARING 6 4.8 41 34.7 
PARTNERS 4 3.2 27 22.9 SKILLS 6 4.8 38 32.2 
COMPETITORS 3 2.4 9 7.6 SUPPLEMENT 6 4.8 36 30.5 
FOREIGN 3 2.4 15 12.7 VENTURE 7 5.6 30 25.4 
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8.5.2 Cluster Dendogram Result 
Figure 8.4 below represents a perceptual map showing the unique words in a one 
dimensional space. Three groups of words are clustered together, revealing the 
patterns of association with perceptions of the “Knowledge Connections and 
Knowledge Complementarities”. At the left side of Figure 8.4, cluster one 
identifies the associations among the words: Chinese, Foreign, Partners, 
Competitors, Resource, Joint, Venture. Cluster two identifies: Competitive, 
Environment, Sharing, End, Local. Cluster three shows: Complementary, 
Supplement, Skills, High, Need, Dire, Difference, Knowledge. 
Figure 8. 4 Cluster Analysis of Dendogram 
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8.5.3 Implications of Findings 
Scholars of international business strategy have emphasised the impact of 
resource complementarities – two (or more) firms that pool complementary 
resources enter into strategic alliances and can then create excess value (Chung, 
Singh, & Lee, 2000). The literature review chapter (Chapter 2) mentioned the 
resource-based theory which suggests that alliances may create optimal returns by 
integrating the involved partner firms‟ unique collections of resources, assets, and 
know-how, because no two companies have the same knowledge, skills and 
experiences (Das & Teng, 2000). Therefore, potential alliance partners are 
heterogeneous in nature (Barney & Clark, 2007), and they have resources that can 
not be easily acquired for the following reasons: (1) physical uniqueness – those 
natural resources and patents which by definition cannot be copied and imitated; 
(2) path dependency – these unique, scarce and valuable resources have been 
accumulated over time, thus it is both time and money-consuming for competitors 
to acquire them instantaneously through market transactions; (3) economic 
deterrence, a company can preempt its competitors by making a sizeable 
investment in assets (tangible or intangible). Beamish (1987) also comments that 
collective strengths based on knowledge complementarities describes the 
alliances‟ overall resource endowments and capabilities; it should contribute to 
better or worse alliance performance.  
Knowledge complementarities can be initially identified between GM and 
SAIC at the preformation stage. First, SAIC had its business networks in China as 
an important SOE in the automotive industry while GM lacked these. However, 
SAIC was in need of advanced vehicle manufacturing technology because of the 
product upgrade consideration. GM‟s high-end vehicle model technology and 
marketing expertise were attractive for SAIC. In the case data, the Chinese 
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interviewees acknowledged GM‟s strength in marketing expertise, regarded as a 
knowledge complementarity opportunity.  
However, the Chinese still emphasised that foreign carmakers cannot 
successfully promote the sales of vehicles without the inputs from local Chinese 
engineers and marketers. There is an Asian/Chinese innovative mentality in 
designing and promoting new cars, which means Chinese automakers may 
understand better than western companies the local Chinese market trends and 
consumers‟ tastes.  
The Kunpeng (鲲鹏) concept CAV (compact activity vehicle), debuted at 
Auto Shanghai 2003 in April and featured at the North American International 
Auto Show in Detroit in 2004, was a good example. It was the first time a concept 
vehicle like Kunpeng CAV had been designed with Chinese elements in mind and 
demonstrated the rapid development of auto design in China. Although its name 
may sound strange by western standards, the Kunpeng illustrates innovative 
Chinese design acumen. The name comes from a legendary Chinese animal that 
transformed itself from a fish to a bird. “[This vehicle] combines the 
aerodynamics of a bird in flight with styling reminiscent of a fish in motion. True 
to its names, the design of a streamlined body incorporates fish eye-line 
headlamps and fin-like door handles” (Smith, 2004, p. 28).  
It is thus found that knowledge complementarities between partners in the 
IJV are directly related to opportunities for learning. One Chinese interviewee 
emphasised:  
Strategic partnership involves knowledge complementarities, and the 
subsequent knowledge transfer can be achieved when the knowledge 
complementarities were treated respectfully by both sides. In this way, 
cooperative partners can obtain combined achievements in the auto market 
based on joint inputs. (Interviewee B7)  
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This finding is consistent with Das and Teng‟s (2000) research that all the 
partners involved in forming the joint venture can bring a certain distinct set of 
resources, and it is the combined rich complementary resources will give the 
alliances a competitive advantage over their competitors. The implication here is 
that knowledge complementarities can be seen as the strategic move to get to the 
desirable position, and while collective strengths may change over an alliance‟s 
life span, we can expect to see the alliance performance change accordingly. 
8.6 Knowledge Contribution  
8.6.1 Statistical Frequency Results 
Table 8.5 displays the statistical frequency results that indicate interviewees‟ 
perceptions toward “Knowledge Contribution”. The total number of words used 
by the respondents during the interview process was 405. Total unique words 
were 20. The total episodes were 399. The total number of lines was 180. The 
network options at the top right remained at their default settings. The word 
“Knowledge” under the “Descending Frequency List” has been listed as the most 
frequently occurring word (It occurred 46 times.), 11.4% of all occurrences. This 
suggests that “Knowledge” appeared 195 times (48.9%) of the scanned windows. 
Several other words with high-frequency clustering together were the words 
“Customer” mentioned 29 times (7.2%), “Contacts” 28 times (6.9%).  
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Table 8. 5 Statistical Frequency Results 
Total Words 405 Threshhold 0.000 
Total Unique Words 20 Restoring Force 0.100 
Total Episodes 399 Cycles 1 
Total Lines 180 Function Sigmoid (-1 - +1) 
  Clamping Yes 
Descending 
Frequency List 
    Alphabetically 
Sorted List 
    
WORD FREQ PCNT CASE 
FREQ 
CASE 
PCNT 
WORD FREQ PCNT CASE 
FREQ 
CASE 
PCNT 
KNOWLEDGE 46 11.4 195 48.9 ACCESS 13 3.2 91 22.8 
CUSTOMER 29 7.2 186 46.6 ADMINISTRATION 13 3.2 91 22.8 
CONTACTS 28 6.9 183 45.9 AVAILABLE 14 3.5 98 24.6 
MANAGEMENT 28 6.9 131 32.8 CHINESE 16 4.0 94 23.6 
PLANT 26 6.4 117 29.3 CONTACTS 28 6.9 183 45.9 
LOCAL 24 5.9 152 38.1 CUSTOMER 29 7.2 186 45.6 
DESIGN 19 4.7 107 26.8 DESIGN 19 4.7 107 26.8 
PRODUCT 19 4.7 114 28.6 DEVELOPMENT 17 4.2 79 19.8 
MARKET 18 4.4 99 24.8 DOMESTIC 17 4.2 119 29.8 
DEVELOPMENT 17 4.2 79 19.8 ENGINEERING 17 4.2 105 26.3 
DOMESTIC 17 4.2 119 29.8 KNOWLEDGE 46 11.4 195 48.9 
ENGINEERING 17 4.2 105 26.3 LOCAL 24 5.9 152 38.1 
PROCESS 17 4.2 97 24.3 MANAGEMENT 28 6.9 131 32.8 
CHINESE 16 4.0 94 23.6 MARKET 18 4.4 99 24.8 
PARTNER 15 3.7 88 22.1 MATERIALS 14 3.5 98 24.6 
SUPPORT 15 3.7 104 26.1 PARTNER 15 3.7 88 22.1 
AVAILABLE 14 3.5 98 24.6 PLANT 26 6.4 117 29.3 
MATERIALS 14 3.5 98 24.6 PROCESS 17 4.2 97 24.3 
ACCESS 13 3.2 91 22.8 PRODUCT 19 4.7 114 28.6 
ADMINISTRATION 13 3.2 91 22.8 SUPPORT 15 3.7 104 26.1 
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8.6.2 Cluster Dendogram Results 
For visual clarity, Figure 8.5 below further presents a perceptual map showing the 
unique words in a one-dimensional space.  
Figure 8. 5 Cluster Analysis of Dendogram 
 
At the left side of Figure 8.5, cluster one identifies the associations among 
the words: Access, Materials, Chinese, Market, Development, Partner. Cluster 
two identifies: Contacts, Customer, Local, Design, Product, Engineering, Process, 
Knowledge. Cluster three shows: Administration, Support, Domestic, Available, 
Management, Plant. In terms of cluster analysis of the dendogram, Figure 8.5 
reveals the patterns of association with perceptions of the “Knowledge 
Contribution” which are consistent with the interview transcripts.  
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8.6.3 Implications of Findings 
Interfirm knowledge tranferring is a costly process as it needs to be done 
continuously through a series of activities, including on-the-job training, 
managerial deployment arrangements, mutual interactions and communications. 
However, the knowledge contributed by each side through the formation of 
cooperative arrangements sigals that it has strategic meaning to each partner 
(Inkpen & Pien, 2006).  
In the case data, the knowledge transfer process at the IJV early cooperation 
stage included initial knowledge resource contribution from partner firms, and 
each partner represented a knowledge source in the automotive industry. In order 
to ensure the JV operations could start as early as possible, GM initially 
introduced relevant vehicle models, western management styles, staff training and 
modern manufacturing skills. When Shanghai-GM was further developed, GM 
continuously introduced up-to-date vehicle models. GM worked with the local 
partner to develop production schedules and to meet the local Chinese customers‟ 
requirements. GM expended much effort in this regard to make the “localisation” 
programme possible. This unequivocal knowledge contribution presented GM as 
a qualified cooperative partner with a strong knowledge base. 
In the meantime, SAIC also provided locally available knowledge, and 
sufficient knowledge in the technical field, materials procurement and 
manufacturing capabilities for the installation of vehicle production lines. The 
local Chinese partner was responsible for employing qualified workers, well-
educated sales people, experienced managers and engineers locally, as there was 
ample manpower, and skilled technicians in the field were available locally. One 
of the most important and essential contributions of SAIC was its expertise in 
managing the domestic market and contacts with the influential government 
officials in China‟s auto industry.  
Chapter 8: In-depth Analysis and Findings 
276 
 
In this sense, the initial knowledge contribution created the effective 
connections and good opportunities for sharing observations and resources, 
because partnering firms can gain knowledge outside their traditional 
organisational boundaries and communicate their JV experiences with each other 
(Inkpen & Dinur, 1998). This knowledge contribution represents the effective 
knowledge link between cooperative partners, laying a good foundation for 
further knowledge converge and knowledge development at a later stage. 
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8.7 Knowledge Development and Adaptation 
8.7.1 Statistical Frequency Results 
Table 8.6 displays the statistical frequency results that indicate interviewees‟ 
perceptions toward “Knowledge Development and Adaptation”. The total number 
of words used by the respondents during the interview process was 253. Total 
unique words were 20. The total episodes were 247. The total number of lines was 
110. The network options at the top right remained at their default settings. The 
word “Knowledge” under the “Descending Frequency List” has been listed as the 
most frequently occurring word (It occurred 58 times.), 22.9% of all occurrences. 
This suggests that “Knowledge” appeared 202 times (81.8%) of the scanned 
windows. Several other words with high-frequency clustering together were the 
words “Development” also mentioned 22 times (8.7%); “Adaptation” was 
mentioned 17 times (6.7%).  
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Table 8. 6 Statistical Frequency Results 
Total Words 253 Threshhold 0.000 
Total Unique Words 20 Restoring Force 0.100 
Total Episodes 247 Cycles 1 
Total Lines 110 Function Sigmoid (-1 - +1) 
  Clamping Yes 
Descending 
Frequency List 
    Alphabetically 
Sorted List 
    
WORD FREQ PCNT CASE 
FREQ 
CASE 
PCNT 
WORD FREQ PCNT CASE 
FREQ 
CASE 
PCNT 
KNOWLEDGE 58 22.9 202 81.8 ADAPTATION 17 6.7 100 40.5 
DEVELOPMENT 22 8.7 129 52.2 ADVANTAGE 15 5.9 90 36.4 
ADAPTATION 17 6.7 100 40.5 CHANGES 8 3.2 56 22.7 
ADVANTAGE 15 5.9 90 36.4 CHINESE 10 4.0 45 18.2 
COMPETITIVE 15 5.9 91 36.8 CLOSELY 6 2.4 39 15.8 
INNOVATION 14 5.5 84 34.0 COMMUNICATION 7 2.8 49 19.8 
WORK 14 5.5 92 37.2 COMPETITIVE 15 5.9 91 36.8 
CHINESE 10 4.0 45 18.2 DEVELOPMENT 22 8.7 129 52.2 
TRANSFER 9 3.6 45 18.2 FIT 8 3.2 52 21.1 
CHANGES 8 3.2 56 22.7 FLEXIBLE 7 2.8 39 15.8 
FIT 8 3.2 52 21.1 INNOVATION 14 5.5 84 34.0 
PERSONAL 8 3.2 56 22.7 KNOWLEDGE 58 22.9 202 81.8 
RECORD 8 3.2 56 22.7 MARKET 7 2.8 41 16.6 
COMMUNICATION 7 2.8 49 19.8 PARTNER 6 2.4 32 13.0 
FLEXIBLE 7 2.8 39 15.8 PERSONAL 8 3.2 56 22.7 
MARKET 7 2.8 41 16.6 RECORD 8 3.2 56 22.7 
RENEWAL 7 2.8 49 19.8 RENEWAL 7 2.8 49 19.8 
TECHNOLOGY 7 2.8 44 17.8 TECHNOLOGY 7 2.8 44 17.8 
CLOSELY 6 2.4 39 15.8 TRANSFER 9 3.6 45 18.2 
PARTNER 6 2.4 32 13.0 WORK 14 5.5 92 37.2 
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8.7.2 Cluster Dendogram Results 
Figure 8.6 below represents a perceptual map which shows the unique words in a 
three-dimensional space. It reveals the patterns of association with perceptions of 
the “Knowledge Development and Adaptation”. At the left side of Figure 8.6, 
cluster one identifies the associations among the words: Development, 
Knowledge, Adaptation, Innovation, Work, Advantage, Competitive. Cluster two 
identifies: Changes, Renewal, Transfer, Chinese, Market, Partner, Fit, Record. 
Cluster three shows: Closely, Technologies, Flexible, Communication, Personal. 
This pattern is consistent with the interview transcripts.  
Figure 8. 6 Cluster Analysis of Dendogram 
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8.7.3 Implications of Findings 
Technology/knowledge differences between developing and developed countries 
require product modification to meet the local demands in the host market 
(Buckley et al., 2004), and the ability to adapt those products is regarded as a 
competitive advantage (Dunning, 1993). Recognising the knowledge development 
and adaptation significance is by no means absent in the case.  
During the fieldwork interview process, the researcher found a number of 
managers touched on the importance of knowledge development, innovation and 
adaptation based on cooperation. GM realised local knowledge is important to 
adaptation – Philip Murtaugh once openly commented (as cited in Graham, 2000), 
“One of their [Chinese] primary objectives was to have GM bring in our 
management practices, so the Capitalist versus Marxist/Leninist culture clash 
wasn‟t such a big issue . . . They wanted the western system. … We had to 
explain why we did things. They said that might work in Detroit, but this is the 
way things are done in China” (para. 11). One American manager also 
emphasised: 
My understanding is one cannot expect to get the original system in without 
any changes. When entering [into] foreign countries, you must comply with 
the local situation . . . Changes are really necessary. GM adapted itself in the 
Chinese environment. (Interviewee A5) 
For SAIC, its existing knowledge base, lack of market-orientation and new 
passenger car-models due to its deep roots in a planned economy gradually 
changed and developed when partnering with GM. This is particularly true and 
understandable in the Chinese automobile industry‟s context – due to the complex 
environment including political, economic, social, and cultural factors. One 
Chinese interviewee recognised that: 
A lot of product development practices that need to be done are based on 
many contextual and situational elements. . . . Some product development 
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procedures need to consider the local needs. But GM accepts suggestions 
from us. (Interviewee B2) 
As both GM and SAIC have now come to see knowledge transfer practices 
as a way of managing transition and changes, the concept of knowledge 
development as a key source of competitive advantage is now recognised. 
Shanghai-GM is capable of integrating and utilising knowledge, a capability that 
has been linked to rapid alliance achievements. The case thus also suggests 
interfirm knowledge transfer in the IJV should not be seen as a way to hide 
weakness. Rather, if used prudently, such joint ventures can create and develop 
combined strengths and development (Harrigan, 1986).  
In sum, the above interviewee quotes and the rapid localisation evident in the 
case description chapter are thus subject to questions of adaptation, reevaluation, 
improvisation, and mutation (Lyles, 1988; Miner et al., 2001). The contribution 
from this finding is the distinctiveness of many institutional changes and alliance 
context elements that require partner firms to constantly adapt their management 
process to new circumstances. The uniqueness of each IJV thus requires 
management to recognise that adaptation of best practices although the knowledge 
acquired then developed will often not occur easily (Szulanski, 1996). This view 
is also consistent with the resource-based perspective, believing that the ability to 
exploit, integrate and create knowledge is essentially leading to organisational 
success (e.g., Barney, 1991; Conner, 1991). 
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8.8 HR Training and Expatriate Managers Deployment 
8.8.1 Statistical Frequency Results 
Table 8.7 displays the statistical frequency results that indicate interviewees‟ 
perceptions toward “Human Resource Training and Expatriate Managers 
Deployment”. The total number of words used by the respondents during the 
interview process was 68. Total unique words were 20. The total episodes were 
62. The total number of lines was 29. The network options at the top right 
remained at their default settings. The word “Knowledge” under the “Descending 
Frequency List” has been listed as the most frequently occurring word (It 
occurred 12 times.), 17.6% of all occurrences. This suggests that “Knowledge” 
appeared in 53 times (85.5%) of the scanned windows. Several other words with 
high-frequency clustering together were the words “Personnel” also mentioned 7 
times (10.3%), “Training” was mentioned 5 times (10.3%). “Staff” was 
mentioned 4 times (5.9%). 
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Table 8. 7 Statistical Frequency Results 
Total Words 253 Threshhold 0.000 
Total Unique Words 20 Restoring Force 0.100 
Total Episodes 247 Cycles 1 
Total Lines 110 Function Sigmoid (-1 - +1) 
  Clamping Yes 
Descending 
Frequency List 
    Alphabetically 
Sorted List 
    
WORD FREQ PCNT CASE 
FREQ 
CASE 
PCNT 
WORD FREQ PCNT CASE 
FREQ 
CASE 
PCNT 
KNOWLEDGE 12 17.6 53 85.5 APPOINTMENT 2 2.9 14 22.6 
PERSONNEL 7 10.3 35 56.5 ASSISTANCE 2 2.9 7 11.3 
TRAINING 5 7.4 26 41.9 CASE 2 2.9 8 12.9 
STAFF 4 5.9 26 41.9 COMMUNICATION 2 2.9 14 22.6 
IJV 3 4.4 15 24.2 CONSIDERABLE 2 2.9 10 16.1 
KNOW 3 4.4 15 24.2 COST 2 2.9 11 17.7 
PARTNER 3 4.4 16 25.8 DEVELOP 2 2.9 14 22.6 
PERSONAL 3 4.4 21 33.9 EFFECTIVE 2 2.9 10 16.1 
SUITABLE 3 4.4 12 19.4 IJV 3 4.4 15 24.2 
TECHNICAL 3 4.4 16 25.8 KNOW 3 4.4 15 24.2 
TYPE 3 4.4 20 32.3 KNOWLEDGE 12 17.6 53 85.5 
VENTURE 3 4.4 21 33.9 PARTNER 3 4.4 16 25.8 
APPOINTMENT 2 2.9 14 22.6 PERSONAL 3 4.4 21 33.9 
ASSISTANCE 2 2.9 7 11.6 PERSONNEL 7 10.3 35 56.5 
CASE 2 2.9 8 12.9 STAFF 4 5.9 26 41.9 
COMMUNICATION 2 2.9 14 22.6 SUITABLE 3 4.4 12 19.4 
CONSIDERABLE 2 2.9 10 16.1 TECHNICAL 3 4.4 16 25.8 
COST 2 2.9 11 17.7 TRAINING 5 7.4 26 41.9 
DEVELOP 2 2.9 14 22.6 TYPE 3 4.4 20 32.3 
EFFECTIVE 2 2.9 10 16.1 VENTURE 3 4.4 21 33.9 
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8.8.2 Cluster Dendogram Results 
Figure 8.7 below represents a perceptual map showing the unique words in a one-
dimensional space. At the left side of Figure 8.7, cluster one identifies the 
associations among the words: Appointment, Assistance, Cost, Effective. Cluster 
two identifies: Develop, Venture, Know, Technical. Cluster three shows: 
Communication, Partner, Personal, Considerable, IJV, Type. Cluster four 
demonstrates: Case, Knowledge, Personnel, Staff, Suitable, Training. 
 Figure 8. 7 Cluster Analysis of Dendogram 
 
Figure 8.7 reveals the pattern of associations in terms of the interviewees‟ 
perceptions toward “Human Resource Training and Expatriate Managers 
Deployment”, which are consistent with the interview transcripts.  
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8.8.3 Implications of Findings 
Human resource (HR) arrangements, such as technical experts, expatriate 
managers‟ deployment or the relocation of staff overseas for a period of time have 
been researched extensively, although linking HR assignment issues with the 
knowledge transfer have not been fully explored (Pollard, 2001). Several 
technology transfer-based studies allude to the importance of the “expert” as a 
mechanism for learning and knowledge transfer. However, HR assignments are 
not always successful and factors such as culture shock, organisational cultural 
differences, family and social difficulties, and poor preparation for the 
deployment are well-known problem areas. 
In the case of Shanghai-GM, both of GM and SAIC may be vital sources of 
knowledge. Foreign “experts” are often used to assist in knowledge transfer 
stations, spending periods of time training local staff in new skills and routines. 
GM provided training at their establishment for venture employees. This type of 
training, whilst being costly, can be very effective for knowledge transfer and 
might also lead to the development of personal relationships and knowledge links 
at the later stage.  
In the case, in order to enhance the capacity of the decision-making 
procedures and systems, GM and SAIC cultivated human resources with two 
attributes: first, they needed trustworthy people to whom they could delegate 
managerial tasks. Second, technicians in GM depended on SAIC to find and 
process information needed to support dialogues that enabled the former to 
appreciate the local context in which decisions were made, and the latter to absorb 
points of wider significance to those at home. These exchanges were conditioned 
by interpersonal knowledge and the experience that partners had gained while 
working together in Shanghai-GM or visiting manufacturing sites, and conversely, 
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by impressions formed by technicians while they worked in the parent firm before 
taking the expatriate assignments or during home leave.  
Both partner firms intervened in the joint venture‟s personnel affairs in a 
judicious manner. GM did not force the JV personnel to cooperate, but rather had 
to let them develop overlapping channels to identify and evaluate interpersonal 
knowledge. SAIC also maintained a West-friendly attitude. This was vital because 
diversification depended upon arranging contracts with staff who possessed 
explicit technical knowledge and tacit know-how. In the case, both partner firms 
expressed the importance of certain human resource arrangements such as 
selecting suitable employees and dispatching managerial staff to support IJV 
operations, which, to a certain degree, facilitated the exchange of knowledge 
resources. As one manager confessed: 
One of the impressions about HR practices in the JV is that we emphasise 
human resource rearrangements and personnel requirements [which are 
needed] to match with the attributes of individual candidates. If someone is 
not suitable to fill the position, they would be relocated to another position. 
(Interviewee B3)  
It was also observed that in the case, arranging suitable expatriate managers 
from the parent company to work in the joint ventures was important for the 
cooperative partners to acquire jointly-developed knowledge and skills. Shanghai-
GM is a social community in which individual managers interact with each other, 
and managerial skills and ways of doing things can be observed and shared. For 
instance, GM China Group, led by Murtaugh, acted as a channel for liaising with 
SAIC. After several rounds of contacts between the top management from both 
sides, Murtaugh quickly received the confidence of and compliments from the 
Chinese partner.  
Murtaugh also formed “a very favourable” impression of Hu Maoyuan, the 
first president of SAIC, whom SAIC sent to negotiate with GM regarding 
cooperation procedures and advice on how to organise IJV‟s structure, culture, 
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and strategic operations. Hence, exchange of knowledge with the appointment and 
relocation of the right staff and relevant training programme became to serve 
some managerial functions in the joint venture. As one manager commented: 
Knowing the nature of IJV knowledge transfer operations in China we attach 
considerable importance to getting the right type of person for the job . . . 
What was required was a good working knowledge of the managing side of 
the automobile industry plus considerable imagination. (Interviewee A3) 
In this sense, managerial expatriate deployment can thus be considered a 
process of mobilising personal knowledge (Inkpen & Dinur, 1998). The rotation 
of managers through either from JV positions to the parent or parent positions to 
the joint venture helps make knowledge more fluid and easier to put into practice 
(Harrigan, 1986; Nonaka, 1994).  
Experts like expatriate managers can also gain valuable knowledge from 
working in joint venture operations as “experts” or indeed in the management of 
the joint venture. Such knowledge could be shared with others (Pollard, 2001). 
They could also be a valuable source of knowledge concerning the working 
practices and management priorities of the parent organisations. Having 
considered the role of expatriates as “experts” in technology transfer, we move on 
to consider learning and knowledge aspects contained in the technology transfer 
process itself. Pollard (2001) notes that managers should be facilitators of 
knowledge transfer, as interfirm knowledge transfer requires management of both 
learning integration and the devolvement of integrating mechanisms, dealing with 
both emergent knowledge and the growth of stored knowledge. This view extends 
to managing knowledge and continual education, ultimately linking to innovation 
and creativity; that is, innovation and creativity flow out of knowledge. The 
guidance and interest of the company‟s HR management is vital in both enabling 
and promoting knowledge development. 
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In sum, as international business has to utilise its own knowledge and further 
acquire and/or create more valuable knowledge so as to be more competitive in 
the global arena, and to realise potential synergy resulting from globalisation. 
Human resource arrangements and appropriate training provision in the IJVs 
which can facilitate knowledge transfer and core competency need to be seriously 
considered, although this process is not without challenges and difficulties. 
 For example, the expert may be perceived as an outsider and as someone to 
be obeyed, rather than as a teacher and a source of knowledge, which will affect 
the recepient‟s approach to knowledge transfer. The ability to transfer technology 
within a collaborative setting could be adversely affected if care is not taken in 
this area. In IJVs, the expert will be perhaps working with partner personnel, 
calling for additional skills in dealing with consensus rather than control. In this 
research, the role of the managers as “expert” in learning transfer is a good 
example of the impact of cross-cultural differences impacting on the transfer of 
knowledge across borders. 
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8.9 The Impact of Cultural Difference  
8.9.1 Statistical Frequency Results 
Table 8.8 displays the statistical frequency results that indicate interviewees‟ 
perceptions toward “Cultural Difference”. The total number of words used by the 
respondents during the interview process was 262. Total unique words were 20. 
The total episodes were 256. The total number of lines was 141. The network 
options at the top right remained at their default settings. In Table 8.8, the word 
“Chinese” under the “Descending Frequency List” has been listed as the most 
frequently occurring word (It occurred 22 times.), 8.4% of all occurrences. This 
suggests that “Chinese” appeared 88 times (34.4%) of the scanned windows. 
Several other words with high-frequency clustering together were the words 
“Different” also mentioned 22 times (8.4%), “Economy” was mentioned 19 times 
(7.3%). “Cultural” was mentioned 18 times (6.9%).  
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Table 8. 8 Statistical Frequency Results 
Total Words 262 Threshhold 0.000 
Total Unique Words 20 Restoring Force 0.100 
Total Episodes 256 Cycles 1 
Total Lines 141 Function Sigmoid (-1 - +1) 
  Clamping Yes 
Descending 
Frequency List 
    Alphabetically 
Sorted List 
    
WORD FREQ PCNT CASE 
FREQ 
CASE 
PCNT 
WORD FREQ PCNT CASE 
FREQ 
CASE 
PCNT 
CHINESE 22 8.4 88 34.4 BUREAUCRATIC 12 4.6 72 28.1 
DIFFERENT 22 8.4 128 50.0 CENTRALISED 10 3.8 70 27.3 
ECONOMY 19 7.3 115 44.9 CHINESE 22 8.4 88 34.4 
CULTURAL 18 6.9 83 32.4 CDOOPERATION 9 3.4 59 23.0 
PEOPLE 15 5.7 80 31.2 CULTURAL 18 6.9 83 32.4 
CULTURE 14 5.3 88 34.4 CULTURE 14 5.3 88 34.4 
PLANNED 14 5.3 95 37.1 DIFFERENT 22 8.4 128 50.0 
STATE 14 5.3 89 34.8 DIFFICULT 11 4.2 77 30.1 
BUREAUCRATIC 12 4.6 72 28.1 ECONOMY 19 7.3 115 44.9 
WAYS 12 4.6 84 32.8 GUANXI 10 3.8 70 27.3 
DIFFICULT 11 4.2 77 30.1 HIERARCHICAL 10 3.8 70 27.3 
MARKET 11 4.2 45 17.6 LEVEL 9 3.4 41 16.0 
UNDERSTAND 11 4.2 77 30.1 MARKET 11 4.2 45 17.6 
CENTRALISED 10 3.8 70 27.3 PEOPLE 15 5.7 80 31.2 
GUANXI 10 3.8 70 27.3 PLANNED 14 5.3 95 37.1 
HIERARCHICAL 10 3.8 70 27.3 PROBLEM 10 3.8 65 25.4 
PROBLEM 10 3.8 65 25.4 STATE 14 5.3 89 34.8 
COOPERATION 9 3.4 59 23.0 THINKING 9 3.4 63 24.6 
LEVEL 9 3.4 41 16.0 UNDERSTAND 11 4.2 77 30.1 
THINKING 9 3.4 63 24.6 WAYS 12 4.6 84 32.8 
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8.9.2 Cluster Dendogram Results 
Figure 8.8 below represents a perceptual map which shows the unique words in a 
one-dimensional space. At the left side of Figure 8.8, cluster one identifies the 
associations among the words: Bureaucratic, Centralised, Hierarchical, 
Cooperation, Ways, Level, People, Problem, Market. Cluster two identifies: 
Chinese, Culture, Different, Thinking, Cultural. Cluster three shows: Difficult, 
Understand, Guanxi, Economy, Planned, State. 
Figure 8. 8 Cluster Analysis of Dendogram 
 
Figure 8.8 reveals the patterns of association with perceptions of the 
“Cultural Difference”. It shows that cultural gaps between SAIC and GM do exist. 
Differences are described by the Chinese and the American managers in terms of 
the ways of managing and doing business. Several times “misunderstandings”, 
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“difficulties” arose due to the differences in the way of “thinking”, such as the 
attitudes of the JV partners towards working style in the IJV environment. Some 
Chinese and American managers noted that it was a costly and time-consuming 
process to change the mindsets of people coming from different cultural 
backgrounds. Thus it seems that the cultural element in the case had a 
considerable impact on the collaboration and knowledge transfer process. The 
next section discusses and analyses the role of culture, how firms handle the 
demands and constraints imposed by different business cultural environment, and 
with what result.  
8.9.3 Implications of Findings 
As knowledge transfer implies that technological capability on the part of the 
employee is the critical factor when choosing an individual for the task, it seems, 
therefore, that technical ability is the only factor, and some other attributes are 
often neglected. However, knowledge transfer in the international management 
setting should be concerned in relations to dealing with the cultural differences 
(Pollard, 2001). This role of “cultural differences” raises a number of knowledge 
transfer concerns. Pollard and Tayeb (1997) state “the provision of knowledge, 
the expectations of its recipients and the implementation of new techniques all 
have significant cultural dimensions” (p. 68). Pan and Tse (1996) also discuss 
cultural distance issues and collaboration motivations amongst others in their 
study of two foreign companies collaborating to enter a third market (China) in 
cooperation with a local company. They found this type of collaboration (i.e., 
interactions between individuals and the transfer of knowledge are carried out in 
an environment of cultural differences, whether the people are in face-to-face 
contact or not) raised a number of fascinating learning issues, both in learning to 
collaborate and learning about the new market and the venture partner in the 
market.  
Chapter 8: In-depth Analysis and Findings 
293 
 
In the case of Shanghai-GM, cultural differences between partnering 
companies are obvious. One Chinese manager pointed out: 
We had good relations with GM. But we have to admit there do exist some 
differences between us. This comes from different business cultures and 
company backgrounds. The long period of state-planned economy in China 
taught people to think in a way that is different from that in the West . . . The 
concept of marketing or sales did not exist in China before the “open door” 
reform. For example, the products‟ delivery was not based on customer needs 
and to a certain degree, the local culture encouraged production but was less 
concerned with quality and improvement. This was not a big obstacle and 
there is nothing lacking in their level of competence, as Chinese firms 
gradually gained marketing knowledge through these years from the 
interaction with western investors. However, some problems still exist, as 
China experienced a planned economy rule for about 50 years . . . To survive 
in the international competition, it is required that firms act quickly so that 
buyers do not have to wait unnecessarily long for supplies. (Interviewee B6)  
GM managers also noticed conducting business in China was different from 
doing so in the US: 
Personal relationships (Guanxi) with the right people are of great importance 
in the Chinese culture. To develop such a relationship, one has to work and 
make efforts from a long time perspective – it is not something that can be 
done in 1 week or a short period . . . If one does not previously know the 
right people on the basis of other old relationships, one must work 
successively to get to know the right people more and establish relationships. 
This is so different from us. (Interviewee A4) 
Another cultural misunderstanding was related to different ways of dealing 
with management issues in different contexts. GM found that although there were 
no serious misunderstandings that could make the operations difficult, and these 
challenges were dealt with in an appropriate manner, the old state-owned 
enterprises‟ (SOEs) inheritance still had an impact on some Chinese people‟s 
values. One GM manager noticed: 
The local authority was helpful on judicial and formal aspects during the 
establishment of the joint venture between GM and SAIC, and the 
Government was favourable toward the establishment of a joint venture. In 
contrast to the West, the practice of taking responsibility and working 
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independently does not work well in China. Organisational structures are 
centralised and hierarchical and people always depend on the higher level for 
decisions and clear instructions. It is really difficult to delegate responsibility 
to the lower level. The level of bureaucracy in China is greater, and has 
slowed down the operations of the JV in many respects. JV managers have to 
deal with bureaucracy both in the company and in its relations to the 
authorities. The employees were also used to an authoritarian style of 
management: the boss was really a boss – the boss should take the decision: 
workers think they will be penalised if something goes wrong. The whole 
system is bureaucratic, and in a bureaucratic system people are made 
responsible when they make mistakes. If one never takes any initiative, one 
will never make any mistakes. (Interviewee A5) 
GM and SAIC thus both noticed that the partners‟ different cultural 
backgrounds, plus deep-level communication problems, may affect the extent of 
interfirm knowledge transfer and cooperation, as many things were interpreted in 
completely different ways than they were intended. These findings have 
implications for the management of pathways of knowledge transfer between 
collaborating partners. When transferring knowledge across national boundaries; 
it needs to be done carefully so that it is received effectively. 
 Some other implications can also be drawn. Although interfirm diversities 
might inhibit the ability to work jointly and effectively unless the firms can 
overcome their differences, it also means that joint ventures from culturally-
dissimilar countries can also have a higher potential for learning (i.e., the cultural 
knowledge). This is particularly true in international alliances/IJVs. It is thus 
critical to understand and manage both commonalities and differences across 
cultural and political divides when looking at knowledge transfer, although this 
will require more effort and commitment from management. 
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 8.10 Knowledge Characteristics and Nature  
8.10.1 Statistical Frequency Results 
Table 8.9 displays the statistical frequency results that indicate interviewees‟ 
perceptions in terms of “Knowledge Characteristics and Nature”. The total 
number of words used by the respondents during the interview process was 132. 
The total unique words were 25. The total episodes were 126. The total number of 
lines was 35. Network options at the top right remained at their default settings. 
The word “Knowledge” under the “Descending Frequency List” has been listed as 
the most frequently occurring word (It occurred 38 times), 28.8% of all 
occurrences. This suggests that “Knowledge” appeared 116 times (92.1%) of the 
scanned windows. Several other words with high-frequency clustering together 
were the words “Tacit” mentioned 17 times (12.9%), “Explicit” was mentioned 8 
times (6.1%). “Transfer” and “Transferred” were also mentioned 8 times (6.1%) 
respectively. 
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Table 8. 9 Statistical Frequency Results 
Total Words 132 Threshhold 0.000 
Total Unique Words 25 Restoring Force 0.100 
Total Episodes 126 Cycles 1 
Total Lines 35 Function Sigmoid (-1 - +1) 
  Clamping Yes 
Descending 
Frequency List 
    Alphabetically 
Sorted List 
    
WORD FREQ PCNT CASE 
FREQ 
CASE 
PCNT 
WORD FREQ PCNT CASE 
FREQ 
CASE 
PCNT 
KNOWLEDGE 38 28.8 116 92.1 BARRIERS 3 2.3 21 16.7 
TACIT 17 12.9 92 73.0 CASE 3 2.3 21 16.7 
EXPLICIT 8 6.1 47 37.3 CODIFIED 2 1.5 14 11.1 
TRANSFER 8 6.1 41 32.5 COMPLEX 2 1.5 14 11.1 
TRANSFERRED 8 6.1 49 38.9 COMPONENTS 2 1.5 14 11.1 
MARKETING 4 3.0 24 19.0 CONTEXT 2 1.5 14 11.1 
TECHNOLOGY 4 3.0 25 19.8 CULTURAL 2 1.5 14 11.1 
BARRIERS 3 2.3 21 16.7 CULTURE 2 1.5 14 11.1 
CASE 3 2.3 21 16.7 DIFFERENT 2 1.5 14 11.1 
DIFFICULTIES 3 2.3 21 16.7 DIFFICULT 2 1.5 10 7.9 
EASILY 3 2.3 18 14.3 DIFFICULTIES 3 2.3 21 16.7 
EFFORTS 3 2.3 21 16.7 EASILY 3 2.3 18 14.3 
FACE 3 2.3 15 11.9 EFFECTIVELY 2 1.5 14 11.1 
LEARNING 3 2.3 21 16.7 EFFORTS 3 2.3 21 16.7 
MANUALS 3 2.3 17 13.5 EXPLICIT 8 6.1 47 37.3 
TACITNESS 3 2.3 15 11.9 FACE 3 2.3 15 119 
CODIFIED 2 1.5 14 11.1 KNOWLEDGE 38 28.8 116 92.1 
COMPLEX 2 1.5 14 11.1 LEARNING 3 2.3 21 16.7 
COMPONENTS 2 1.5 14 11.1 MANUALS 3 2.3 17 13.5 
CONTEXT 2 1.5 14 11.1 MARKETING 4 3.0 24 19.0 
CULTURAL 2 1.5 14 11.1 TACIT 17 12.9 92 73.0 
CULTURE 2 1.5 14 11.1 TACITNESS 3 2.3 15 11.9 
DIFFERENT 2 1.5 14 11.1 TECHNOLOGY 4 3.0 25 19.8 
DIFFLCULT 2 1.5 10 7.9 TRANSFER 8 6.1 41 32.5 
EFFECTIVELY 2 1.5 14 11.1 TRANSFERRED 8 6.1 49 38.9 
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8.10.2 Cluster Dendogram Results 
Figure 8.9 below also represents a perceptual map showing the unique words in a 
one-dimensional space. At the left side of Figure 8.9, cluster one identifies the 
associations among the words: Barriers, Transfer, Case, Components, Codified, 
Technology, Easily, Effectively, Face. Cluster two identifies: Complex, Learning, 
Difficult, Context, Efforts, Tacitness, Culture, Different, Difficulties. Cluster 
three shows: Cultural, Explicit, Knowledge, Tacit, Manuals, Marketing, 
Transferred.  
Figure 8. 9 Cluster Analysis of Dendogram 
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The perceptual map is consistent with the interview transcripts. As the 
Chinese intend to acquire advanced “technology”, which is expected to be 
relatively “complex”, the issue of transferring “tacit” knowledge becomes 
pertinent. The Chinese partner was keen to have knowledge transferred by its 
American counterpart, particularly “tacit” knowledge such as management know-
how, problem-solving and “marketing” techniques, and GM was willing to 
“transfer” their technologies “effectively”, but both sides did experience the 
burden of transcending the “cultural” and institutional “barriers” when working 
together. It has been noted that “tacit” “cultural” knowledge constituted a 
substantial part of the “difficult” knowledge, and “codified” technologies, such as 
“manuals” are more explicit and more “easily” transferred. 
8.10.3 Implications of Findings 
The integrative roles that the tacit knowledge and explicit knowledge played in 
the learning process have always been emphasised in the knowledge transfer 
literature (Kogut, 2000). With regard to the knowledge characteristics, researchers 
clarify the nature of knowledge, such as tacitness (Nonaka, 1994; Lam, 1997) and 
ambiguity (Simonin, 1999a, 1999b), and complexity (Zander & Kogut, 1995).  
In the case data, although there were no serious misunderstandings and 
disagreements regarding the strategic orientation (See also section 8.9.3), the tacit 
nature of knowledge (such as cultural understanding) left much room for 
problems of interpretations on both sides. This finding is not different from 
previous research results, as Tsang (2007) argues if the transferred knowledge is 
tacit, the knowledge source organisation will likely face difficulties in trying to 
articulate the tacit components of knowledge to the recipient. The learning 
process in the recipient organisation can be complex and difficult. The difficulties 
could be aggravated if the partners come from countries that are very different in 
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terms of the culture, economic, and political environment. Obviously, it is much 
harder to transfer tacit knowledge than explicit knowledge (Ding et al., 2009b). 
The tacit or implicit knowledge, which is important in the business 
operations, is context specific (De Long & Seeman, 2000). Complex and tacit 
knowledge has to be transferred through intimate interactions (Nonaka, 1994). 
The case in this thesis shows trust-based interactions allow partners to exchange 
complex and tacit knowledge (which will be further discussed in the next section), 
which further shapes the portfolio of interfirm strategic partnership.  
In order to overcome the tacit knowledge transfer difficulties, SAIC and GM 
used a series of channels, such as training sessions and meetings at work, which 
served as important means through which tacit knowledge was transferred. These 
interactions followed by further common understanding between SAIC and GM 
enhances their absorptive capacity (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990) and facilitates the 
exchange of complex and difficult-to-articulated knowledge. These channels thus 
actually strengthed common understanding of collective goals and proper ways of 
acting in the Shanghai-GM joint venture system. In other words, commitment and 
dedicated efforts are required to ensure transfer of intangible know-how (Tsang, 
2007). 
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8.11 The Value of Interfirm Partnership 
8.11.1 Statistical Frequency Results 
Table 8.10 displays the statistical frequency results that indicate interviewees‟ 
perceptions in terms of “The Value of Interfirm Partnership”. The total number of 
words used by the respondents during the interview process was 288. The total 
unique words were 20. The total episodes were 282. The total number of lines was 
183. The network options at the top right remained at their default settings. The 
word “Transfer” under the “Descending Frequency List” has been listed as the 
most frequently occurring word (It occurred 19 times.), 6.6% of all occurrences. 
This result suggests that “Transfer” appeared 124 times (40.0%) of the scanned 
windows. Several other words with high-frequency clustering together were the 
words “Market” also mentioned 18 times (6.2%), “Two” was mentioned 18 times 
(6.2%). “Trust” was mentioned 17 times (5.9%). 
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Table 8. 10 Statistical Frequency Results 
Total Words 288 Threshhold 0.000 
Total Unique Words 20 Restoring Force 0.100 
Total Episodes 282 Cycles 1 
Total Lines 183 Function Sigmoid (-1 - +1) 
  Clamping Yes 
Descending 
Frequency List 
    Alphabetically 
Sorted List 
    
WORD FREQ PCNT CASE 
FREQ 
CASE 
PCNT 
WORD FREQ PCNT CASE 
FREQ 
CASE 
PCNT 
TRANSFER 19 6.6 124 44.0 CHINESE 17 5.9 92 32.6 
MARKET 18 6.2 64 22.7 COMMITMENT 15 5.2 98 34.8 
TWO 18 6.2 113 40.1 COOPERATION 14 4.9 93 33.0 
CHINESE 17 5.9 92 32.6 DEMAND 11 3.8 77 27.3 
TRUST 17 5.9 92 32.6 DEVELOPMENT 15 5.2 79 28.0 
INDUSTRY 16 5.6 59 20.9 HIGH 12 4.2 77 27.3 
RELATIONSHIP 16 5.6 95 33.7 INDUSTRY 16 5.6 59 20.9 
WORKING 16 5.6 94 33.3 KNOWLEDGE 11 3.8 60 21.3 
COMMITMENT 15 5.2 98 34.8 MARKET 18 6.2 64 22.7 
DEVELOPMENT 15 5.2 79 28.0 PARTNERS 11 3.8 59 20.9 
COOPERATION 14 4.9 93 33.0 PARTNERSHIP 14 4.9 82 29.1 
PARTNERSHIPS 14 4.9 82 29.1 PROPERLY 12 4.2 84 29.8 
TECHNOLOGY 13 4.5 91 32.3 RELATIONS 16 5.6 95 33.7 
HIGH 12 4.2 77 27.3 REWARDS 11 3.8 77 27.3 
PROPERLY 12 4.2 84 29.8 SOCIAL 12 4.2 72 25.5 
SOCIAL 12 4.2 72 25.5 TECHNOLOGY 13 4.5 91 32.3 
DEMAND 11 3.8 77 27.3 TRANSFER 19 6.6 124 44.0 
KNOWLEDGE 11 3.8 60 21.3 TRUST 17 5.9 92 32.6 
PARTNERS 11 3.8 59 20.9 TWO 18 6.2 113 40.1 
REWARDS 11 3.8 77 27.3 WORKING 16 5.6 94 33.3 
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8.11.2 Cluster Dendogram Results 
Figure 8.10 below represents a perceptual map which shows the unique words in a 
three-dimensional space, revealing the patterns of association with perceptions 
toward the “The Value of Interfirm Partnership”.  
Figure 8. 10 Cluster Analysis of Dendogram 
 
Because partnerships are closely committed to learning and knowledge 
transfer, some partnership issues are taken up in this case, and the level of trust 
between the partners was obvious. At the left side of Figure 8.10, cluster one 
identifies the associations among the words: Chinese, Market, Industry, 
Commitment, Working, High, Trust, Social. Cluster two identifies: Cooperation, 
Demand, Technology, Partnerships, Properly, Rewards. Cluster three shows: 
Development, Relationship, Transfer, Two, Knowledge, Partners.  
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8.11.3 Implications 
From the resource-based perspective, trust-based relationship affects the process 
of knowledge exchange, sharing, combination, and joint problems solving through 
creating a variety of necessary conditions, such as increasing openness, respect, 
friendship (Ding et al., 2009b; McEvily et al., 2003). These have been empirically 
supported in a number of interorganisational contexts (Becerra et al., 2008; 
Muthusamy & White, 2005). For instance, Zaheer and Venkatraman (1995) found 
that trust increases the scope of joint problem-solving and planning in strategic 
alliances. Through relationship-building processes, partners learn about each 
other‟s competency and develop confidence in one another, which leads to further 
increase in investments, risk sharing, and knowledge exchange (Becerra et al., 
2008; Muthusamy & White, 2005). Such behaviours reciprocally increase the 
scope of the relationship, and enhance an enriched, meaningful mutual knowledge 
transfer between partnering firms in the alliances. This is especially true in a 
manufacturing industry such as the automobile industry. When working together 
in a new uncertain market, as managers have to decide the level of knowledge 
resources committed to the market, large-scale investment with more knowledge 
resources often signals increasing commitment to a market (Mascarenhas, 1997).  
Two aspects in terms of relational capital issues can also be identified after 
the JV formation: on the one hand, there is GM‟s commitment in fulfilling 
demands from SAIC for the continuous introduction of new vehicle models. The 
continuous new technology transfer showed the trust and commitment held 
between SAIC and GM in the joint venture. On the other hand, both partners 
worked together to conduct vehicle product development and adaptation, which 
also helped to strengthen trust levels. As Ramos (2001) pointed out “all the terms 
of the Shanghai-GM joint venture were equal for both parties, from the number of 
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senior management representatives to distribution rights. This equality contrasts 
with the joint venture between SAIC and Volkswagen”42 (para. 10).  
In this case, GM and SAIC in the Chinese market developed important 
contacts with each other in the well-organised IJV network which they utilised in 
distributing the joint venture‟s products. The following quotation from a Chinese 
manager suggests there is a strong working relationship and intensive 
communication between both sides: 
Although there are some misunderstandings and conflicts between the two 
partners, the cooperation in the areas of automotive technology transfer has 
always been very smooth. … When the interests of the two partners 
conflicted, we did suggest intensive opinion exchanges, which became a big 
success. (Interviewee B3) 
Because the partners were cooperating in order to deal with problems that 
cropped up in their day-to-day operations, fruitful contacts could be developed. 
Both firms managed to develop properly functioning networks through joint 
efforts with each other. These contacts proved to be of substantial importance and 
were already regarded as potential candidates for intimate collaboration in case of 
future expansion. One GM executive commented positively: 
We believe that GM would catch up other competitors in the Chinese market 
rapidly through the collaboration with SAIC. We are quite happy that the 
forecast is holding, although there exists increasing sales price and 
production cost competition in China‟s auto market. (Interviewee A1) 
It is interesting to note that GM and SAIC not only built an IJV partnership 
in the Pudong area where Shanghai-GM operated, but also managed to develop 
additional IJVs and transfer technology in other regions, such as in Shangdong 
Province. This case thus offers examples of building effective trust relationships 
in the IJV system, which to a certain degree reduced barriers such as the suspicion 
                                               
42 In order to enter the Chinese market, VW initially made a deal with SAIC to grant sole distribution of the 
cars to a separate company, which was wholly owned by SAIC. Volkswagen eventually renegotiated the 
relevant terms with SAIC regarding the control over distribution. In 2007, an equally owned distribution 
company was created, which was after “16 years into their partnership” (Ramos, 2001, para. 10).  
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and protectiveness in the IJV knowledge transfer process. Through these contacts, 
both partners managed to gain access to some important customers, other 
companies, government authorities, domestic and international markets. These 
contacts have been beneficial for GM and SAIC, even when considering the 
possibilities of expanding into other related investment projects in China.  
8.12 Refinement of Conceptual Framework  
8.12.1 Rationale for Refinement: Knowledge Transfer Patterns  
The phenomenon of organisational knowledge transfer activities has become a 
very important part of strategic thinking in business strategy and management 
area (Ding et al., 2009a, 2009b; Easterby-Smith et al., 2008; Peng, 2001). 
Although many different understandings about knowledge transfer concepts, 
processes and outcomes exist, some identified basic agreements have occurred: 
knowledge transfer outcomes are generally positive; and firms can even learn 
from their mistakes (Argyris, 1977); knowledge transfer could improve business 
decision-making and problem-solving through better understanding and 
knowledge acquisition, creation and transfer (Fiol & Lyles, 1985); guide future 
actions (Bandura, 1986), and increase the chances of an organisation‟s adaptation 
to the environment (Dodgson, 1993a, 1993b). 
However, knowledge transfer is inherently complex and less clear-cut in 
practice. This complexity is compounded especially in the international strategic 
alliances/IJVs context (Easterby-Smith et al., 2008; Parkhe, 2006). As research on 
alliance knowledge transfer is important in business and management research, a 
full understanding of the knowledge transfer activities in alliances/IJVs thus 
requires a multidisciplinary approach. This study depicts the features and 
outcomes associated with the formation of knowledge-driven interfirm 
cooperative arrangements, whilst trying to identify distinct dimensions of the 
interfirm knowledge transfer process in alliances. This case-based research 
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concludes that alliances do provide an ideal platform for acquiring knowledge and 
learning, and suggests the relevant barriers and facilitating mechanisms which 
could affect the knowledge transfer process in alliances/IJVs. The linkages 
between the strategic alliances, interfirm knowledge transfer and relevant factors 
postulated in the research questions are identified as follows (which will provide a 
rationale for further refinement of the conceptual framework in the section 8.12.2): 
(1) Alliance Linkages Are Valuable for Transferring Knowledge 
International strategic alliances, in which two or more parties engage in the 
development and operation of a new business entity, can create synergies by 
combining resources to secure a competitive position within the global 
marketplace (Contractor & Lorange, 2002; Dymsza, 1988; Kogut, 1988a). 
Beamish and Berdrow (2003) state that alliance networks allow for knowledge 
flows between firms, and knowledge acquired also contributes to the alliance 
knowledge management. Alliances are often seen as efficient vehicles for 
knowledge transfer across organisational boundaries, especially for knowledge 
that is difficult to transfer because of its tacitness (Beamish & Berdrow, 2003; 
Ding et al., 2009b). 
Shanghai-GM belongs to a category of coordinated joint ventures whose 
value-added comes from complementarities in capabilities (Bamford, Ernst, & 
Fubini, 2004). Management team members maintain constant interactions and this 
collaboration is helpful for interfirm knowledge transfer:  
On one hand, as GM contributes auto technology and manufacturing 
experience into Shanghai-GM, SAIC is able to access the knowledge and 
experience of GM‟s business practices. On the other hand, SAIC, as a local 
company, supplies local market knowledge and supplies management, sales, 
services, technological engineering, most human resources requirements, and 
deals with market development and labour relations with government. In China, 
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in order to get the required yet time-consuming paperwork done, it is necessary to 
have this local knowledge, such as the Chinese market conditions, political and 
business systems awareness, and cultural, language and competition appreciation, 
and the ways of dealing with local business. Although it seems difficult for a 
foreign company with a different business and cultural background, with the 
helping hand of the local partner, it was much easier and efficient for GM to get 
“Chinese knowledge” to know the system and local business operation, and made 
GM gradually familiar with the Chinese market.  
Thus, this joint venturing fundamentally provides good opportunities for both 
partners to expand their market share in China. These findings support Buckley et 
al.‟s (2004) arguments that the most important need fulfilled by IJVs in China is 
perhaps the provision of expertise by the foreign partner and familiarity with the 
market environment by the host Chinese partner. As the advantages of the 
collaboration were many for both SAIC and GM, so they want to continue the 
collaboration as it is working well and generating a good income.  
In sum, as the case suggests, alliances/joint ventures can facilitate better 
knowledge exchange and create combined strengths by offering partner firms a 
window on promising technologies such as automated manufacturing equipment 
and testing platforms – a position which is consistent with Ness‟s suggestions in 
2009.  
(2) Alliance Knowledge Transfer is Two-way Learning Process 
With knowledge transfer becoming ever more important, organisations having the 
ability to learn and gain knowledge will have a clear source of advantage. Ding et 
al. (2009b) and Ness (2009) note although interfirm partnerships provide 
opportunities for the partner firms to access the knowledge necessary for success, 
it is the interfirm transferring process which provide a lasting competitive 
advantage for partner firms. 
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In this case, both partners claimed they learned from being in the JV. First, 
the most important result of the cooperation is that the local partner and its 
employees have largely adopted GM‟s way of thinking. Previously, it was only 
the most senior managers who could reply, and the others were not authorised to 
respond or act. It became faster and easier to communicate and to get a response. 
As a result of the training and skills development, there are now people in the 
company who can take responsibility and reply to most inquiries that come from 
the American partner. With technical assistance from GM, its Chinese partner is 
now able to produce quality vehicle products acceptable to GM. The Chinese 
company is even able to independently develop its own branded vehicles after 
these years‟ knowledge accumulation. 
Meanwhile, GM had to deal with a lot of local bureaucracy. In the beginning, 
this was difficult, but the American partner gradually learned how to tackle it with 
the local partner‟s support which is of benefit to the JV. These government 
contacts gave GM special status in the Chinese automotive industry through 
recognition in the form of several awards received from the national and local 
governmental authorities, and public sector institutions for its outstanding 
contribution to the economic development in China. Through working together 
with local partner, GM gained local market and cultural know-how and 
knowledge of how to interact with relevant government authorities. It also learned 
about the industrial policies and ways of communicating with key people (Zahra 
et al., 2000). This finding – learning from and with the local partners – is also 
referred to as “reverse knowledge spillovers” termed by Feinberg and Gupta 
(2004).  
Different knowledge from each side complements each other, and both 
partners have a better understanding of their capacities and needs which has a 
positive influence on the cooperation as the partners learned how to properly 
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manage communications between them. The partners succeeded in building a 
company that could manufacture competitive products according to their 
contractual agreements, and introduced new, unique models successfully, 
reflecting that the partnership between GM and SAIC is a work in progress in 
China. 
Thus, alliance knowledge transfer in this circumstance is an ongoing two-
way learning process, and the knowledge exchanged between these two 
companies was gradually enlarged to such areas as market knowledge, managerial 
efficiency, production knowledge, and technological issues. This confirms that 
partners will actively engage in aggressive learning to acquire self-sufficiency as 
quickly as possible (Hyder & Abraha, 2003). This research demonstrates that 
learning can occur in a bidirectional manner, with both partners committed to a 
mutual exchange of knowledge for the purpose of developing competence.  
Because their cooperative learning was so efficient, the partners could also 
develop other joint projects aside from the existing collaboration. Success in this 
type of learning strategy has been dependent on the stability, maturity and growth 
of the IJV. With the integration of global and domestic resources, Shanghai-GM 
vehicles represent the most advanced products in their segments. The partners‟ 
cooperative learning thus has a positive influence on the IJV performance. This 
cooperation made it easier to agree on long-term strategic planning. 
(3) Alliance KT is a Complex System with Various Elements 
In the literature, knowledge transfer and learning have been described as an 
important process for the alliance partners (Ding et al., 2009b; Hyder, 1999; 
Tsang, 1999; Ness, 2009; Varadarajan & Cunningham, 1995). However, 
knowledge transfer in the joint venturing process entails tremendous challenges 
and complexities due to different organisational contextual factors, cultures, and 
worldviews (Ding et al., 2009b; Yan & Luo, 2001). Organisations are 
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understandably protective of their knowledge assets, especially if the IJV partner 
is a current or potential competitor (Becerra et al., 2008). Scholars have sought to 
warn of the dangers of what they see as a giving away of competitive 
competencies. One means of protection is to “ring-fence” technology to be 
transferred within the venture agreement and limit access to particular areas of 
technology involved in the venture and to separate irrelevant company operations 
(Pollard, 2001; Becerra et al., 2008).  
When knowledge is to be transferred within the alliance entity, both internal 
and external barriers may exist. Internal barriers may result from differences in 
learning style or different goals formulated by each partner. Once knowledge is 
transferred outside the entity, it also encounters a second level of external barriers 
that come from between the alliance entity and the parent organisations (Argote & 
Ingram, 2000). Both internal and external boundaries should be actively managed 
and have to be broken down in order to facilitate knowledge transfer.  
Four antecedents of knowledge transfer in alliances can be identified in the 
case: knowledge source characteristics; knowledge recipient characteristics; the 
characteristics of the knowledge (tacit and explicit); and alliance contextual 
features. For example, knowledge resources that are identifiable and generalisable 
are easier to transfer. Trustworthy knowledge sources with strong knowledge 
bases are more reliable. Recipients with prior knowledge bases and learning intent 
have high levels of absorptive capacity, and are capable of experimenting with 
new competences. Finally, an alliance with appropriate structures and 
mechanisms, such as human resource arrangement, training, and communication 
may facilitate the reduction of cultural misunderstanding, thus encouraging 
interfirm transfers. 
In the case data, SAIC and GM were exposed to several obstacles from the 
initial stage to the more involved stages of their knowledge transfer process. They 
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often faced a high level of uncertainty and both internal and external obstacles 
(Bauerschmidt, Sullivan, & Gillespie, 1985). Furthermore, SAIC and GM also 
encountered culture and language differences, technology gaps, and obstacles in 
understanding. All of these obstacles can influence knowledge transfer 
performance in global markets. The implication is that if companies lack adequate 
knowledge and abilities to solve these problems, they may have difficulties and 
lack confidence to make proper strategic decisions.  
One of the questions addressed in this thesis was to look at how different 
organisational efforts have been made to enable knowledge transfer within the 
IJV. Sharing knowledge-embedded products involves the development of working 
relationships, personal interactions, movement, and strategic linkages (Ding et al., 
2009b; Nonaka, 1994). Trust and managerial support are also considerations in 
fostering the effective sharing of knowledge (Inkpen, 1996; Holste & Fields, 
2010). It is generally acknowledged that the greater degree of experimentation, 
risk-taking attitude and shared decision-making enables both partners to 
contribute to new knowledge procedures and processes (Ness, 2009).  
This thesis supports the positive role of interpartner relationship as a 
facilitator of knowledge transfer. This thesis provides evidence of the important 
role relationship capital plays in interorganisational knowledge transfer and its 
subsequent impact on alliance performance. The results also suggest that 
knowledge transfer is an arduous process that requires significant levels of 
commitment from the contributor and receptivity from the transferee. Finally, the 
thesis empirically confirms the claim made by the knowledge-based perspective 
that knowledge is a key resource that contributes to enhancing financial returns 
and overall alliance performance. 
Some other factors, many of which have been dealt with earlier such as the 
nature of the venture, its location, the strategic positions of the collaborating 
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companies are of great importance. Much depends on the motivation of the 
collaborating firms and the staff involved. This research thus suggests that a series 
of mechanisms that facilitate the knowledge connections between the alliance 
partners need to be considered (Almeida, Song, & Grant, 2002; Ding et al., 2009b; 
Inkpen & Pien, 2006; Kogut & Zander, 1992). These various mechanisms 
discussed above serve as the basis and potential for partners to share and 
communicate their experiences, corporate philosophy, and new knowledge for 
operating successfully. 
8.12.2 Refinement of Proposed Research Model 
To date, interpartner knowledge transfer has occurred in the case between GM 
and SAIC. The IJV partnering firms are both gaining learning opportunities for 
business operations and knowledge development and/or adaptation process.  
In Chapter 3, building on the resource-based theory, this research articulated 
and presented the original conceptual framework for the current study examining 
interorganisational knowledge transfer process and learning consequences. 
Through comparing the case‟s knowledge transfer patterns and a literature-based 
analysis, the insights gained into interfirm knowledge transfer in IJVs result in a 
refinement of the tentative conceptual framework (as shown in Figure 8.11). This 
research contributed several refinements to the proposed conceptual framework. 
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   Figure 8. 11 Refined Model of Interfirm Knowledge Transfer 
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It is proposed by Foss, Husted and Michailova (2010) that “knowledge 
governance (i.e. choosing organisational structures and mechanisms that can 
influence the processes of using, sharing, integrating, and creating knowledge in 
preferred directions and towards preferred levels)” has not yet been well explored, 
although this concept has “recently become a distinct issue in management and 
organisation” (p. 456).  
Following the suggestions by Edvinsson and Malone (1997) and Davidson 
and Voss (2002), this refined research framework suggests that some facilitating 
mechanisms may embody, empower, and support the sharing and transferring of 
knowledge. It is also necessary to identify relevant factors (both formal and 
informal) that may affect interpartner knowledge transfer in the IJVs from a 
holistic perspective. These factors (including frequent interaction; mutual 
communication; training; job rotation, and site visits) help turn individual know-
how into knowledge for the organisation as a whole.  
One important identified dimension in the Shanghai-GM case is willingness 
or intent to share knowledge (See Category C & D, Figure 8.11). The case shows 
that foreign and local partners had different things to learn and share, but both 
partners maintained similar learning intentions and objectives. This research 
suggests that the term “interfirm knowledge transfer” has been coined to describe 
a situation in which the primary objective of the partner firms is to learn and share 
knowledge. Although in some instances, learning is an unintended outcome that 
emerges over the life of the alliance, the knowledge gaps and skills differences 
between the alliance partners undoubtedly provide the learning opportunities 
(Ding et al., 2009b; Inkpen & Pien, 2006). Tsang (2007) also notes that effective 
knowledge transfer requires the source unit to recognise the knowledge needs of 
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the recipient unit. The local partner was interested in learning about the foreign 
technology and technology-related matters, and the foundations of the managerial 
mechanisms of GM. This desire is understandable considering the local partner 
has a more or less clear conceptualisation of the skills and technological 
knowledge they must learn to make technology transfer possible. Hence, a true 
willingness to share knowledge was apparent in the research framework.  
Scholarly inquiries into interfirm knowledge transfer in alliances have also 
emphasised the important roles of the surrounding social contexts in resource 
exchanges. The surrounding social contexts can be, according to Nonaka and 
Konno (1998), physical (e.g., office, dispersed business space), virtual (e.g., 
email, teleconference) or mental (e.g., shared experiences, ideas, ideals). In 
addition, a social context can be formal or informal (Ding et al., 2009b; Foss et 
al., 2010; Powell, Koput, & Smith-Doerr, 1996). Formal social context requires 
some kind of articulation of tacit knowledge, e.g., a common language, metaphors 
or analogies. Informal social contexts, instead, imply the sharing of feelings, 
emotions and experiences or what Senge (1991) has called “shared mental 
models” (p. 174).  
Based on the literature review and case analysis, the research framework 
illustrates another strand in this thinking (See Category G, Figure 8.11). An IJV 
can be seen as a space which concentrates and integrates all the knowledge 
created and acts as a frame in which knowledge is activated as a resource for 
creation (Nonaka & Konno, 1998), thus, the IJV‟s knowledge is an emergent 
property of the social activities undertaken by each partner of the IJV. Nahapiet 
and Ghoshal (1998) label these attributes as three distinct yet interrelated aspects 
(the structural, relational, and cognitive). The structural dimension refers to the 
degree and frequency of social interaction between the firms; the relational 
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dimension refers to goodwill and reciprocity; and the cognitive dimension refers to 
shared understanding (Ding et al., 2009b; Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998). Foss, 
Husted and Michailova (2010), in particular, refer to social activities which 
include the structural dimension, that is, to the pattern of connections between 
actors and to the mechanisms organisations use to reach each other. The more 
extensive the set of social links between actors, the greater will be the set of 
external resources of knowledge that each actor can draw on. Social interactions 
in an exchange relationship thus facilitate learning by making it possible to 
exchange and combine not only codified knowledge, but also tacit knowledge 
(Nonaka, 1994).  
This framework particularly recognises that transferring knowledge involves 
not only explicit technological knowledge but tacit cultural knowledge that can be 
shared through the development of working relationships, personal interactions, 
movement, and strategic linkages (Ding et al., 2009b; Nonaka, 1994). The 
distinguished different types of knowledge: namely, technological R&D 
knowledge; organisational management knowledge; and social cultural 
knowledge with various characteristics (such as uniqueness, tacitness and 
complexities) identified in the framework require management to recognise that 
access to a partner‟s knowledge base needs serious consideration, especially when 
much of the knowledge is often organisationally embedded (Ding et al., 2009b; 
Szulanski, 2000). Additional competence, abilities, and partnership-based 
cooperation are therefore required to overcome these challenges (Holste & Fields, 
2010; Inkpen & Dinur, 1998).  
These assumptions are validated and supported by several empirical studies 
(such as Holste & Fields, 2010; Inkpen & Pien, 2006). In order to facilitate and 
generate relational rents from network ties, this research suggests that three 
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aspects of social capital are required between cooperative partners in the learning 
alliances context to mediates the knowledge-specific flows (See Category F, 
Figure 8.11), i.e., the nature of ties (structure), trust (relational capital), and shared 
goals and understanding (cognitive), will act as the “convergent conditions” for 
“reciprocal” knowledge transfer to occur (Pavlovich & Corner, 2006, p. 178). 
This research suggests that alliances/IJVs facilitate knowledge flows because they 
function as mediators and repositories of knowledge providing necessary 
mechanisms. To facilitate greater flow of valuable knowledge across alliances, 
some partnership attributes are also considered important. This framework thus 
particularly recognises that trust and shared understanding are considerations in 
fostering the effective sharing of knowledge (Ding et al., 2009b; Holste & Fields, 
2010; Pollard, 2001). 
This refined framework suggests that relational embeddedness, as evidenced 
by parent support to the alliances and commitment between the partner firms, all 
enhance interfirm learning (Ding et al., 2009b; Lyles & Salk, 1996; Uzzi, 1997). 
It is the relational embeddedness between partner firms creates a common identity 
that helps to “openly share different types of valuable knowledge and prevent 
unwanted spillovers to competitors” (Dyer & Nobeoka, 2000, p. 348), thus 
reducing knowledge transfer costs. Relational embeddedness creates the “logic of 
confidence and good faith” and provides the “cohesive force” (Meyer & Rowan, 
1977, p. 340) that is imperative for creating an environment in which knowledge 
can flow, showing that social capital, a measure of embeddedness, positively 
impacts innovation.  
Foss et al. (2010) once claimed that the knowledge sharing literature is 
“preoccupied with constructs, processes, and phenomena defined at a macro 
(collective, organizational) level and pay comparatively little attention to micro 
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(individual) level constructs” (p. 455). However, Foss et al. (2010) emphasized 
that an understanding of the micro-level individual activities may “yield novel 
insights in organizational-level phenomena” (p. 457). Based on the research 
findings, the refined framework argues that IJV knowledge transfer and sharing 
literature needs to distinguish various levels on which knowledge can be 
transferred or even developed: namely, the technical; organisational; and 
managerial mindset level (See Category H, Figure 8.11).  
For example, the guidance and interest of the company‟s top management 
with a strategic mindset are vital in both enabling and promoting knowledge 
development (Pollard, 2001). Managers in this case were facilitators for 
knowledge transfer. Conversely, knowledge transfer or even development requires 
management of both learning integration and the devolvement of integrating 
mechanisms, dealing with both emergent knowledge and the growth of stored 
knowledge. This process extends to managing knowledge and continual 
education, ultimately linking to innovation and creativity; that is, innovation and 
creativity flow out of knowledge. A manager with a behavioural-change outlook 
will often focus on the knowledge management processes needed to capture and 
transfer both the explicit and tacit organisation-level knowledge (Long & 
Seemann, 2000). In particular, following Argyris and Schon‟s (1978) intuition 
about the paradox of organisational learning, we can state that the shared mental 
models become one of the enabling conditions for SAIC-GM interfirm knowledge 
transfer, in that they blend the learning processes which occur at different levels 
(individual, organisational, and interorganisational).  
As the knowledge transfer process consists of making targeted interventions 
in the organisation‟s knowledge base, the research framework offers an overview 
of the stages in the knowledge transfer process (See Category B, Figure 8.11). 
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The final tentative conceptual framework reflects the discovered empirically-
grounded pattern and certain dimensions of interfirm knowledge transfer in 
alliance networks, including initial knowledge contribution, knowledge 
development, and interpartner learning trend beyond the alliance formation stage. 
This research framework suggests that the development of knowledge transfer 
understanding is an incremental process.  
This framework opines that interfirm knowledge transfer in alliances refers to 
a complex set of arrangements, and the key element in knowledge transfer is 
recognising challenges leading to some technical, behavioural and mindset 
changes and/or the development of new knowledge (See the dash lines linking 
Category B and H, Figure 8.11). The revised model finally suggests that there 
exists a mediated relationship between the antecedents to interpartner knowledge 
transfer and learning performance, as managing knowledge resources effectively 
and efficiently is a key to the firm‟s competitive development (Despres & 
Chauvel, 1999; Ding et al., 2009b). The change in what an individual, a group or 
a firm can do is initiated by learning. Moreover, it is the use of the acquired 
technological, organisational, and social cultural resources (tangible or intangible 
skills and knowledge) that brings about a behaviour change at the individual, 
group, or firm level. This conclusion suggests that the IJV partners‟ ability to 
understand each other‟s knowledge needs and their ability to identify, acquire, 
integrate and develop that knowledge lead to interpartner learning which then 
influences the learning performance in IJVs (See the lines linking Category B & 
A, Figure 8.11).  
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8.13 Chapter Conclusion 
This chapter presents the main findings and relevant statistical results using 
CATPAC as an analytical tool for the purpose of perceptual mapping.  
First, partner firms in Shanghai-GM reinforce the development of 
international cooperation as a means of increasing knowledge exchange and 
adaptation such as enlarging the products‟ range, and developing new car models. 
In the case, the foreign partner primarily provides the financial investment and 
equipment; however, either or both members can have opportunities to access 
important resources such as technology, marketing channels, management 
expertise and skills.  
Second, both partner firms are motivated to increase their knowledge transfer 
activities to achieve competitive advantage levels similar to those of other 
competitors. There is a relationship between the objectives of partners and the 
resources brought into the alliance: each partner firm tries to access to what the 
other puts into the joint venture. In other words, cooperative partners can become 
sources of knowledge in the alliance; partner firms are dependent on the alliance 
for knowledge and other types of resources with the potential for utilisation 
elsewhere. Thus there is a shift from a single company‟s perspective to the double 
or multiple companies‟ standpoint of sharing costs, risks and benefits and 
accessing new resources (Child, 2001; Ding et al., 2009b). 
Third, IJV knowledge transfer actually occurred over a longitudinal period 
involving intensive interactions between the partners. Different types of 
knowledge were transferred over time from key technologies, management skills, 
followed by the tacit, social, cultural knowledge, which is also a critical barrier 
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during the process. As time passed, both partner firms demonstrate efforts and 
commitments in facilitating interfirm knowledge transfer practices.  
Conversely, the IJV knowledge transfer performance also significantly 
influenced the nature of the interfirm partnership. While alliance partners may 
share the same interest in transferring knowledge, they are likely to differ in terms 
of their foci. Firms and managers are thus faced with the imperative of dealing 
intelligently with knowledge transfer practices. It is also emphasised that 
knowledge transfer and learning do not take place in a vacuum, but in specific 
social and organisational environments (including their own knowledge base, 
willingness to share, learning intent, absorptive capacity, knowledge 
protectiveness, and cultural distance; each impacts differently on knowledge 
transfer performance in alliances). Hence, firms may need to establish effective 
mechanisms, which would have an impact on interfirm knowledge transfer, and 
thus on competitive advantage. The next chapter will provide a summary of the 
research conclusions and key implications derived from the research findings. 
Chapter 9: Summary and Conclusions 
Chapter 9   Summary and Conclusions 
 
9.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to identify the main contributions of the research 
findings in relation to interfirm knowledge transfer in IJVs in the Chinese 
automotive industry. The discussion of knowledge transfer and learning process 
based on the case IJV draws extensively on the existing international business 
literature in a number of areas; knowledge which is further combined with new 
research from both the case company and the fieldwork interview findings.  
This chapter is structured in the following way. Section 9.2 summarises the 
thesis and presents the detailed arguments of each chapter. Section 9.3 briefly 
explains the findings of the study. This chapter also considers theoretical 
contributions (section 9.4), managerial implications (section 9.5), rersearch 
limitations (section 9.6) and the suggestions for future research (section 9.7). 
Finally, this chapter concludes in section 9.8 with a restatement of the research 
goals accomplished in this thesis. 
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9.2 Summary of the Thesis Chapters 
Chapter 1 presented an outline of the major issues in relation to knowledge 
transfer in IJVs and the impact on the alliance firms at the strategic level. The 
background for the study was outlined to place the work in a wider context. The 
research objectives, research questions and relevant theoretical approach that 
provided the basis and framework for the research study were described and 
explained. The reasons for conducting the study were introduced, and the 
methodology and research approach employed were briefly described and 
explained. The contextual and theoretical limitations of the study were presented 
along with the structure of the thesis.  
Chapter 2 presented an overview of the literature and the relevant theories 
concerning the area of study. It critically reviewed theories relevant to the 
research questions. The purpose was to illustrate the importance of interfirm 
knowledge transfer in IJVs and relevant knowledge transfer barriers and 
facilitating mechanisms and knowledge transfer stages for alliance partners faced 
with the new knowledge environments. Based on the review of the literature, this 
chapter considered the theoretical and practical implications of knowledge 
transfer in alliances and examined the particular characteristics of knowledge 
transfer and learning process as an additional way of looking at cooperative 
relationships. This discussion served as the theoretical starting point for defining 
the frame of reference and the building blocks of the conceptual framework 
proposed in the next chapter. 
In Chapter 3, building on the research questions, the conceptualisation of the 
relationship between cooperative alliance arrangements and knowledge transfer 
on the one hand, and the knowledge transfer stages and relevant categories on the 
other hand, a framework of knowledge transfer within learning IJVs was 
provided. This conceptual research model justified the constructs and identified 
Chapter 9: Summary and Conclusions 
324 
 
the interrelationships among these concepts and categories. The main purpose was 
to extract suggestions and constructs from different literature perspectives that 
could be helpful in answering the research questions in the thesis. The aim was 
not to give an exhaustive overview, but rather to highlight the theoretical 
foundation of this thesis for conducting the empirical investigation.  
Chapter 4 initially described the methodology used when obtaining and 
analysing the data needed for analysis. This chapter provided the justification for 
using the qualitative approach in this research. The fundamental exploratory 
approach of the research formed the basis upon which the methodological 
decisions were made. This exploratory study generates relevant concepts and 
elements based on the empirical findings from a holistic perspective rather than 
simply testing the extant theories.  
Drawing on the relative philosophical theories about methodologies, plus the 
identification of research context and questions, this chapter also identified the 
case study as being the most appropriate method for this research. This kind of 
qualitative case research may permit deeper understanding and sharper 
delineation of concepts, and allow for theory building that focuses on the 
phenomena related to knowledge transfer performance in IJVs. Furthermore, the 
embedded alliances/IJVs structure and the evolution processes are context 
specific.  
This chapter then described the software package used in this research – 
CATPAC – to provide statistical frequencies in portraying the results/findings of 
the research. A computer-assisted approach employed for the management and 
analysis of respondents‟ data has several advantages over manual systems, 
particularly where there is a need to handle large volumes of textual data in 
qualitative research, at high speed, with rigour and consistency, plus the 
repetitiveness of the research task (Silverman, 2000). This combination of 
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theoretical paradigms gives the researcher the opportunity to apply a wide range 
of data collection and analytical tools and to build the research from one stage to 
the next. This is an efficient way to advance the theory of IJV knowledge transfer 
noted by Easterby-Smith et al. (2008). 
Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 outlined the research context of the thesis. These 
two chapters explained the global, US and Chinese automobile industry and 
established a background for the study in outlining the significance and rationale 
for using the global, US and Chinese automobile industry as the research context.  
Chapter 5 looked at the specific characteristics of the automotive industry in 
a global and US context to explore industry-related issues, highlighting its 
importance and significance in 100 years, and why society has so readily 
embraced the global automobile industry as a mechanism for economic and social 
development. After reflecting upon previous several transformation stages of the 
world automobile industry, this chapter emphasised that for nearly a century the 
future of auto industry seemed more critical than its past. Chapter 5 concluded 
that the global automotive industry today is in the middle of a dramatic and 
unprecedented transformation since 2008. On one hand, questions have been 
raised about the long-term prospects for the automobile industry due to the weak 
global economy, the emergence of excess production capacity, and saturation in 
the main global markets. On the other hand, in trying to find solutions for these 
problems, MNE automakers are now turning to future opportunities in emerging 
markets, such as South America, East Europe, and the Asia Pacific regions.  
Chapter 6 initially argued that among these emerging markets, global MNE 
automakers are penetrating aggressively into China, placing their hopes for 
recovery on a huge surge in demand for their vehicles. Global businesses, 
including major auto companies, have viewed China as a very attractive emerging 
market since the early 1980s. Chapter 6 sought to explore the features and 
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prospects of the evolution and restructuring of China‟s automobile industry, 
which helps better understand the changing market situations, policy 
formulations, inward FDI activities as well as the embedded incentives of 
technology (knowledge) transfer rationale in the auto IJVs in China. This chapter 
provided an overview and the key characteristics of the institutional environment 
which impacts on the historical development path of China‟s automobile industry 
at the time of the study. The description of the historical development and the 
current features of the industrial policies portrayed the rise of the automobile 
industry in China. This chapter also depicted the key Chinese FDI policies in the 
auto industry, and summarised the Sino-foreign auto JVs patterns – an important 
context in understanding the sources of success and failure in this emerging and 
promising auto market. The unique institutional environment, combined with the 
globalisation context of the auto market, emphasised the importance of 
knowledge resources for industry and the IJV market growth. This chapter 
concluded that the mechanism of FDI, joint venture development, foreign 
technology transfer and relevant auto industry policies have impacted on the 
emerging development path of the Chinese auto industry. 
Chapter 7 was concerned mainly with the partnering companies‟ profiles and 
case background, describing the dynamic development of the Shanghai-GM 
project since its formation to the date of the study. The within-case description 
and companies‟ background underlined the ideographic nature of alliance 
networks and interpartner knowledge transfer practices in developing and 
building the alliance competitiveness. This chapter examined the ways in which 
the partner companies approached interactive cooperation and interfirm 
knowledge transfer practices. The partner firms in this IJV brought together their 
complementary knowledge resources in automotive technology and management 
expertise with its own expatriate managers to facilitate knowledge sharing and 
alliance learning which consisted of four elements: (1) contracts and agreements 
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that clearly articulated each member‟s responsibilities; (2) interorganisational 
knowledge transfer procedures; (3) a set of communicating channels, including a 
personnel management system; (4) partnership evolution at the interfaces between 
the participating firms.  
The main issues identified in Chapter 7 were how partner firms jointly 
exploited the partners‟ strengths in order to build alliance efficiency. SAIC was 
motivated by anticipation of foreign technology transfer in order to compete more 
effectively in the increasingly competitive auto market in China. GM wanted to 
take advantage of knowledge transfer-oriented cooperative arrangements, working 
with SAIC to reduce costs and expand business opportunities in the Chinese auto 
market, as GM suffered a huge crisis in its home market. This chapter concluded 
that the close collaboration helped the partners to work better together in the car 
industry, and they also learned how to improve the alliance performance and trust 
each other. As GM transferred the necessary knowledge throughout, the local 
partner‟s knowledge of the operation was satisfactory. Both partners learned that 
things did not happen or change overnight. They also maintained a mutual 
understanding of each other‟s capacities and requirements, and were supportive of 
each other in the JV. 
While the focus in Chapter 7 was on the historical developments of the 
interfirm knowledge flows in Shanghai-GM, it was those features in the 
developments that the case firms shared that provide a basis to advance analysis 
in Chapter 8. In the pursuit of an understanding of common features a process of 
textual analysis was undertaken in Chapter 8. This chapter presented and 
discussed the statistical results of the empirical research conducted for the study 
following the CATPAC programme procedures, which was programmed to 
analyse data in a consistent, replicable, and unbiased way. CATPAC read the text, 
identified the most important words and concepts within written text, and 
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determined their patterns of similarity based on the way they were used in the 
text. This chapter identified sources of change-driven IJV reconfigurations and 
the prompted shifts in interpartner knowledge transfer practices. This chapter also 
analysed the implications of knowledge transfer and learning practices in the case 
of IJV. Each of the dominant themes was discussed. Data were presented in a way 
that could be identified, and commented on when necessary. Relevant factors 
such as willingness to transfer, learning intent, partnership development and 
relationship capital that affected the knowledge transfer process, as well as the 
benefits gained and difficulties experienced during the logical stages of 
knowledge transfer, were discussed in this chapter. 
Chapter 8 presented main findings and relevant results: First, partner firms in 
Shanghai-GM reinforced the development of international cooperation as a means 
of increasing knowledge exchange and adaptation, such as enlarging the products‟ 
range, and developing new car models. Second, the partner firms were motivated 
to increase their knowledge transfer activities to increase competitive advantage 
levels similar to those of other competitors. There was a relationship between the 
objectives of partners and the resources brought into the alliance: each partner 
firm tried to access what the other put into the joint venture. In other words, 
cooperative partners became sources of knowledge in the alliance; partner firms 
were dependent on the alliance for sharing knowledge and other types of 
resources with the potential for utilisation elsewhere. Third, IJV knowledge 
transfer occurred over a longitudinal period involving intensive interactions 
between the partners.  
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9.3 Summary of the Research Findings 
The knowledge transfer approach to business management necessitates the 
identification and valuation of knowledge, and its context-appropriate application, 
and the use of alliances has been seen to dramatically shape knowledge transfer 
patterns (Ding et al., 2009b; Tiemessen et al., 1996; Yan & Luo, 2001). It should 
be pointed out that the knowledge transfer processes are interrelated and used for 
illustrative purposes, and these are not explicitly separated from each other. The 
researcher recognised different yet interrelated knowledge flows, and each of 
these flows calls for related yet unique knowledge management processes within 
the alliance.  
It was discovered in the thesis that interorganisational knowledge transfer is a 
multidimensional concept which has an impact on learning performance. The 
driving factors mentioned in the thesis formed the context in which knowledge 
transfer and interpartner learning were explored effectively in the research 
framework, and have been identified as a result of both an extensive literature 
review and discussions with managers from the case company. These factors 
created an environment for the learning IJV to gain a competitive advantage. In 
other words, the driving factors created not only the challenges but also the 
opportunities for the partner firms to successfully conduct knowledge transfer and 
learning. Schein (1993) argues that “current circumstances tell us that learning is 
no longer a choice but a necessity” (p. 85). Some commentators (i.e., Ding et al., 
2009b; Van Wijk et al., 2008) would go further, arguing that the goal of 
transferring knowledge and learning the management knowledge and skills is 
necessary for firm survival.  
Meanwhile, as knowledge transfer manifests itself through changes in the 
recipient‟s knowledge-based performance, it is often considered as an unfolding 
stage through which one factor could be affected by another factor (Argote & 
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Ingram, 2000; Szulanski, 1996; Buchel et al., 1998; Berdrow & Lane, 2003). The 
learning itself depends on the partners‟ intent, alliance structure, communication, 
cooperative relationship and cognitive shared understanding which have potential 
roles in these mutual-learning activities and on the transfer of knowledge. This 
case research found that success in learning depends on certain factors, i.e., the 
willingness, intention, openness, and ability of the partners to share knowledge. 
This observation corresponds well with the work of Ding et al. (2009b) and 
Wang, Lee, Lin and Zhuo (2007). 
This case research demonstrated that for companies relying on knowledge 
and innovation for their competitive edge, the formation of interorganisational 
cooperation to improve knowledge transfer performance is significant (Choi & 
Lee, 1997; Nonaka, 1991, 1994; Lynn & Rao, 1995). The effective management 
of knowledge is increasingly considered a vital ingredient in competitive success 
(Davidson & Voss, 2002; Foss et al., 2010; Grant, 1996; Spender, 1996). In the 
case study, learning is an ongoing activity rather than a discrete outcome, and 
knowledge transfer mediates the relationship between organisational features and 
various types of alliance performance. In conceptualising the probable linkages 
between knowledge transfer, learning, and performance, this research argues that 
different categories of knowledge transfer need to be distinguished and examined 
separately at different levels in relation to efforts and expected outcomes of the 
IJV learning. The results show that different types of knowledge were also 
transferred over time from key technologies, management skills, followed by the 
tacit, social, cultural knowledge, which was also a critical barrier during the 
sharing process. As time passed by, both partner firms demonstrated effort and 
commitment in facilitating interfirm knowledge transfer practices. Conversely, the 
IJV knowledge transfer performance also significantly influenced the nature of 
the interfirm partnership.  
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This research finally proposes that not only are certain IJV characteristics 
associated with knowledge transfer and learning, but that the degree of learning 
outcomes – knowledge development and effective knowledge application in the 
IJV – in turn, should be associated with better IJV partnership development. 
Organisations are repositories of knowledge resources, and organisational 
learning is regarded as a key technique to increase organisational performance as 
it helps an organisation to utilise knowledge to make continuous progress and 
improvement in organisational development (Badaracco, 1991; Inkpen & Dinur, 
1998).  
9.4 Theoretical Contributions 
The past decades have witnessed a mushrooming of foreign investment and IJVs 
development in China as an emerging market, accompanied by a surge in interest 
on the part of international business research in China (Beamish, 1993; Child, 
1991; Daniels, Krug, & Nigh, 1985; Pearson, 1991; Peng, 2006). As in other 
transition economies, domestic companies in China are increasingly resorting to 
joint ventures with foreign companies in the hope of acquiring valuable 
knowledge from them. Foreign entrants into transition markets also often prefer to 
establish joint ventures with local partners because of the cultural distance, 
regulatory requirements, political risks, and need for market access.  
The various kinds of international business operations present a number of 
both challenges and learning opportunities for the cooperative partner companies, 
for example dealing with cultural differences in the context of working practices 
and procedures, management decision-making, and the transfer of technology 
(Ding et al., 2009b; Pollard, 2001). Meanwhile, the process of interpartner 
knowledge transfer also involves significant commitment on the part of 
cooperating firms in both the cost of transfer which usually includes the use of 
expatriate staff to provide training and a commitment to manage the changes 
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necessary to incorporate new knowledge in existing corporate working patterns 
(Pollard, 2001).  
Ding et al. (2009b), Foss et al. (2010) and Yan and Luo (2001) noted that 
knowledge transfer and organisational learning has long been considered a major 
source for firm growth and knowledge acquisition. For example, the necessity for 
dynamic learning is magnified during international expansion because it helps the 
firm overcome the liability of foreignness when operating abroad. Barringer and 
Harrison (2000) further point out that although organisational learning theory is 
predominantly a behavioural discipline, international expansion does not only 
have certain economic implications (reducing costs and increasing revenues and 
profitability), but also provides learning opportunities for firms entering into a 
new market to acquire distinct skills and new concepts critical to global success.  
Although the motives for establishing IJVs are fairly well established, 
interorganisational knowledge transfer aspects have generally been neglected in 
the literature (Ding et al., 2009b; Tsang, 1999; Inkpen & Pien, 2006). Few studies 
have been done to examine interpartner knowledge transfer in IJVs from a 
dynamic process perspective (Eunni et al., 2006), and the key factors and the 
process of interpartner knowledge transfer are less understood (Steensma & Lyles, 
2000). 
Consistent with a resource-based perspective, the researcher in the thesis 
argues that effective mutual learning stabilises the alliances/IJVs. Partners‟ 
managerial assistance and technical knowledge contribution had a positive 
influence on alliance success (Steensma & Lyles, 2000). This result confirmed the 
work of Hill and Hellriegel (1994) that there is a strong positive association 
between interpartner consensus and the venture‟s overall performance. Moreover, 
transferring knowledge resources also represents a long-term commitment on the 
part of alliances, and it tends to generate the goodwill of the foreign and Chinese 
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firms and relevant government authorities. Based on this exploratory case study, 
this research gained insights into interfirm knowledge transfer in IJVs, and the 
following contributions can be made to the existing interorganisational knowledge 
transfer and alliance learning as follows.  
First, it adds a resource-based view to examine the interorganisational 
knowledge transfer and learning process in alliances/joint ventures in several 
ways: (1) knowledge transfer in IJVs is a two-way sharing process; (2) knowledge 
transfer spans various levels: technical, organisational, and managerial mindset 
level; (3) several key factors such as willingness, intent, knowledge base, and 
cooperative partnership play an important role in the interfirm knowledge transfer 
process. 
Second, this research focuses on knowledge transfer within IJVs, which 
provides an important addition to the international management literature on the 
impact of relationship capital (including mutual interaction, trust, and shared 
understanding) on knowledge transfer. This thesis found that effective partnership 
facilitated knowledge transfer in the IJV. A partnership may have begun as a 
contractual agreement, but it still can result in a relationship that is close or 
special.  
Third, this research looks at the relationship between tacit and explicit 
knowledge and provides an important step forward by differentiating them and 
also empirically showing their direct relationship. By differentiating between tacit 
and explicit knowledge, the thesis is able to advance the explanation developed by 
Lane et al. (2001). They found that trust is not related to learning; however, the 
conceptual model in this thesis suggests that trust, strong IJV network ties, and 
shared values and systems enhance the transfer of both explicit and tacit 
knowledge.  
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Fourth, by examining the interaction effects of network relationship, initial 
knowledge resource contribution finally brings about knowledge resource 
development; this research can contribute to reconciling the partnership-
performance linkages within the strategic alliance literature. The results provide a 
value-added contribution to our knowledge of alliance learning operations beyond 
the formation stage. 
9.5 Managerial Implications 
With respect to the implications to management practices, the thesis suggests that 
interfirm knowledge transfer should consider key influencing factors in building a 
knowledge-sharing platform, which facilitates knowledge exchange and learning, 
to enhance competitive advantages. 
The implications of the findings in the thesis for international managers 
include: a) the decision to implement a knowledge transfer strategy is a key 
strategic decision, but one which despite its importance, has not been well 
understood; b) managers need guidelines to cope with knowledge transfer if they 
expect to use this strategy effectively; and c) managers must understand the forces 
that increase the value of knowledge, so they can manage these forces to their best 
advantage. Given the accelerating pace of industry evolution and the increasing 
interdependencies among players within previously independent industries, 
managers must evaluate all of their strategy options carefully. 
Regarding the use of mechanisms, on the one hand, international managers 
need to take the advantage of the opportunities such as formal contracts, on-site 
training programmes, expatriates and task forces deployments to enhance 
knowledge transfer. On the other hand, it is also desirable to utilise and promote 
certain socialisation mechanisms such as individual trust, commitment, mutual 
interaction and shared understanding for smoother and efficient knowledge 
transfer. The mere existence of such alliance network structure does not 
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automatically lead to knowledge flows. Through socialisation mechanisms, 
potential transaction costs or problems may decrease and partner firms exchange 
and develop better knowledge.  
The research results also emphasise the importance of willingness to share, 
relationship building and management in dynamic and volatile environments 
which characterise transition economies. From a management viewpoint, 
knowledge transfer in a transition economy will not succeed unless both partner 
firms make a strong commitment and willingness to the venture. Relationships 
between foreign firms and Chinese partners play a crucial role. Contracts mean 
little when legal systems change rapidly and rules of the competitive game are in 
flux. Strong relationships will ensure that through both rough and smooth times 
partner firms can make progress toward their knowledge goals. The critical 
backdrop to this is a high degree of trust and the minimisation of conflict between 
partners. This commitment should be more than a pledge of equity, management 
talent, or technical personnel. This is especially true when conducting business in 
the Chinese environment.  
Compared with SAIC‟s other joint venture partner – German Volkswagen 
(VW) – General Motors demonstrated a positive attitude and commitment toward 
its Shanghai-GM joint venture development. VW was reluctant and thought it was 
not necessary to provide the most up-to-date vehicle models and design capacities 
during the period of the cooperation with SAIC, gradually resulting in complaints 
and dissatisfaction from its Chinese partner. GM, however, grasped this JV 
opportunity and continuously introduced its world-class vehicle manufacturing 
expertise and newest models into the Chinese market, a decision which could 
explain why GM has been gaining profits in China in recent years since the 
establishment of Shanghai-GM. Foreign companies thus should proactively find 
ways to transfer crucial knowledge needed to shore up the competitive position of 
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the venture. Meanwhile, foreign entrants from developed markets also need to 
consider the cooperative learning opportunities to acquire the much-needed local 
knowledge from their joint activities with the local partners when conducting 
business and contributing their knowledge resources in the alliances, as 
knowledge transfer is not just a single way, which is evident in this case.  
At the same time, the local recipient firms cannot remain passive; they must 
be receptive to the knowledge contributor‟s efforts, taking advantage of the 
learning opportunities when cooperating with foreign MNEs, digesting and 
transforming the acquired knowledge into their own strength, and further 
conducting innovation.  
Given the importance of knowledge transfer strategies and the many 
remaining unanswered questions, there is a need for rigorous inquiry that joint 
ventures might be undertaken with various expectations for success. It is 
important to recognise that firms have varying strategic objectives, strengths, 
knowledge resources, and other important differences that will temper their choice 
of which industries to enter, which firms to choose, and how to make their 
decisions concerning interorganisational knowledge transfer. If managers are open 
to change, interpartner activities can be a way of building strengths through 
innovation in their managerial practices and methods of diffusing technology.  
Managerial practices can be modernised through contact with innovative 
information systems and administrative techniques used by other firms, as with 
cooperative ventures that bring together international partners. Firms need to treat 
learning as an explicit objective of international cooperative arrangements and 
create mechanisms and systems by which interpartner learning opportunities can 
take place (Faems et al., 2007; Yan & Luo, 2001). Only if partners can overcome 
inhibitions regarding interorganisational knowledge transfer and develop systems 
to use them effectively, their firms can build strengths and gain knowledge by 
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cooperating, as in the case example in the Chinese automobile industry. It is 
important to recognise the nature of those differences and changes when all actors 
should be working together for mutual gains. Finally, it is important to distil the 
skills of managing knowledge transfer into patterns that suggest which knowledge 
management practices are most likely to prosper and to relate these patterns to an 
alliance framework for creating and managing knowledge successfully.  
In sum, the economy of the twenty-first century is closely linked to the 
knowledge-based competitiveness. With increasing global competition, we have 
moved to a world where knowledge transfer and learning are significant. Through 
the knowledge processes, managers seek to increase employees‟ expectations and 
their capabilities in dealing with constant changes from diverging and 
unpredictable forces. If many of the difficulties relating to knowledge transfer can 
be recognised and analysed, it could be easier to develop knowledge transfer 
guidelines.  
9.6 Research Limitations 
This research explored several major elements influencing the transfer of 
knowledge in IJVs in the Chinese auto industry context. However, there are 
several limitations in this research.  
First, as the researcher uses one industry/market setting in a transition 
economy, the generalisation of results to wide contexts should be made with 
caution. Transition economies have some common features, such as “gradual 
transformation from a planned economy to a market economy, opening up to the 
outside world, embracing the inward foreign direct investments, and state-owned 
enterprises‟ privatisation” (Tsang, 2005, p. 442). However, there are still 
differences among transition economies and other emerging economies because 
of cultural, political, social, and historical factors. Research findings “collected in 
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one transition economy may not be wholly generalisable to another” (Tsang, 
2005, p. 442).  
Therefore, the propositions drawn from the literature and the choice to focus 
on one industry initiated in one transitional economy – China – does limit 
generalisation of the results to other settings, and it is necessary to expand the 
geographical scope and study other transition economies. By so doing, it is 
possible to obtain a more in-depth understanding of the common characteristics of 
transition economies as a whole. The statements are tentative and await further 
testing and verification.  
Second, the thesis findings are only based on top executives‟ comments. 
However, it is necessary to interview other average employees in the joint 
venture(s) to obtain their perceptions regarding interpartner knowledge transfer 
practices.  
Finally, this thesis is only a small-sample exploratory case study, which is 
only focusing on an existing IJV knowledge transfer “survivor”, while screening 
out those IJVs that have been purposely dissolved despite having undertaken 
successful knowledge transfer practices. Thus the findings reported in this thesis 
should be carefully considered. Future research could be done using multiple case 
analysis techniques.  
9.7 Suggestions for Future Research 
Considerable research has investigated the transferability of knowledge within an 
organisation, a complicated issue given the “sticky” nature of knowledge and 
organisational complexity. Despite the proliferation of research on 
interorganisational knowledge transfer, knowledge transfer is still a complex 
phenomenon and the body of theory on alliance knowledge transfer as a whole is 
underdeveloped – to the extent that there are many competing perspectives 
(Easterby-Smith et al., 2008; Inkpen, 2002). However, on the other hand, these 
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perspectives offer a range of insights that can be brought together sufficiently to 
distinguish key concepts and arguments from which a future research can be 
derived. The researcher has thus identified several interesting research tasks worth 
pursuing in the future and a number of suggestions for further research can be 
made as follows: 
First, knowledge transfer in both developed and developing countries with 
established market economies has received the most attention (Steensma & Lyles, 
2000). The overall evolution from centralised economy to decentralised economy 
is a common phenomenon in many transitional economies and emerging markets. 
China‟s automobile industry has experienced a remarkable development in the 
last two decades and its institutional environment is very different from that of a 
developed economy. Local firms in the Chinese automobile market have 
experienced the evolutionary process of variation, selection, retention, and 
struggle in the past two decades. Thus, a longitudinal study on their strategic 
behaviours in a rapidly changing institutional environment and their knowledge 
transfer performance or survival consequences can help us answer the 
fundamental questions in the international business strategy field (Peng, 2000): 
Why do firms differ? How do firms behave? What determines the international 
success or failure of firms? Focusing on local firms can avoid some of the 
limitations experienced in this research, since more observations of these firms 
can explore more complex knowledge transfer processes. For example, a more 
detailed field study can be done in the future to uncover other complex factors 
that are influencing the success and failure of knowledge transfer in the Chinese 
automobile industry. 
Second, this thesis emphasises the important role of “willingness to share” 
based on trust, interaction and shared understanding in the knowledge transfer 
process. However, as some researchers comment (i.e., Adler & Kwon, 2002; 
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Holste & Fields, 2010), building willingness is a cumulative process and costly to 
remain. Meanwhile, knowledge management efforts may need to “include a finer 
grained view of the nature of the social networks impacting on the knowledge 
transfer process” (Holste & Fields, 2010, p. 128). Hence, future research looking 
at the issue of how to build social capital or social networks may have valuable 
academic and practical implications 
Third, together with more interfirm knowledge transfer from various 
industries in different country combinations, a future study can derive a more 
generalised research framework from these studies. Extending this research model 
to other industries (or automobile industry) in other transition economies such as 
Mexico, Brazil, Poland, and the Czech Republic where significant knowledge 
transfer activities can be found is a further possibility. 
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9.8 Chapter Conclusion 
This thesis examined the particular characteristics of knowledge transfer and 
learning process as an additional way of looking at cooperative relationships. The 
focal point of this chapter was to provide conclusions for the thesis. Several 
limitations and key implications were explored for both theory and management 
practice in strategic partnerships, knowledge transfer and learning issues.  
The case provided several main insights as follows. First, Shanghai-GM has 
to address environmental challenges to accommodate the knowledge transfer 
framework in a comprehensive manner. Second, the case identified a learning 
process after the initial technology transfer; indeed some interviewees suggested 
that a good deal of learning had still to be done. Third, the case shows the 
importance of a partnership commitment to provide not only resources for 
knowledge development and adaptation but also in playing their part in indicating 
their importance for the future of the venture. This case shows in detail how the 
IJV evolves by means of sequential adjustments – the partners created an 
enduring thread that connected the existing IJV to new network allies. 
Meanwhile, the mixture of contractual elements devised for the initial knowledge 
transfer agreement between GM and SAIC favoured culture over legal 
specifications and monitoring mechanisms, and thus was consistent with the 
contract arranged between them.  
This thesis concludes that knowledge flows in alliances are related to the 
interorganisational cooperation process. In collaborative environments, this 
knowledge process involves the sharing of knowledge between the venture 
partners working together to increase their total knowledge base, a base that has 
the potential to affect innovative decision-making and strategic behaviour based 
on past accumulative organisational knowledge.  
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The thesis argues that in learning IJVs, the transfer of knowledge should be 
seen as a central tenet for all business partners, not merely be confined to the 
research and development area (Denton, 1998). The abilities to take knowledge 
from other organisations or other parts of the organisation and learn from what 
they are doing are, therefore, important.  
However, such knowledge activities are complex enough within the same 
national environment but the knowledge process when transplanted to foreign 
locations poses further difficulties, especially when knowledge is acquired and 
institutionalised in a cross-border context. Firms can thus enhance their 
competitive position by cooperation, since within alliances there is a provision for 
mechanisms for knowledge transfer, and gain access to new knowledge and 
capabilities (Pollard, 2001). For instance, if the partners‟ marketing know-how is 
regarded as a resource, then market access can be achieved by using the partner 
firm‟s distribution networks. 
Clearly, the major relevant concern here is how interactions contribute to 
knowledge transfer at individual, group firm and/or alliance level. These research 
findings are expected to contribute to theoretical understanding about 
interorganisational knowledge transfer practice, and offer new insights to enhance 
the current body of research on this topic. 
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Coda 
Until 2008, before being overtaken by Japanese Toyota, GM was the No. 1 
vehicle producer in the world. During its operational peak period, its annual sales 
of cars and trucks once reached over 9 million, distributed in 34 countries and 
regions. GM once had 234,500 employees working in 463 subsidiary factories 
around the world. In the US alone, “US$ 50 billion a year” could be spent for 
“purchasing parts and/or services from 11,500 American vendors” and “US$ 476 
million could be used for employees‟ salaries every month” (“The Bankruptcy of 
GM”, 2009, para. 2). However, GM‟s glory based on the above astonishing facts 
and figure could not cover up another truth: “against its US$ 82.2 billion worth in 
total assets, GM had liabilities of US$172 billion” (“The Bankruptcy of GM”, 
2009, para. 3). 
However, it was still a mission impossible for GM‟s leadership to meet these 
demands from the government and “a bankruptcy filing” was bitterly but 
obviously unavoidable (Strumpf & Johnson, 2009, para. 30). That judgement day 
finally came – GM had to apply for its Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection on June 
1, 2009. This filing “labelled an end for GM” (“The Bankruptcy of GM”, 2009, 
para. 2).  
GM‟s bankruptcy was considered “the fourth-largest in US history and the 
largest for an industrial company” which brought about a dramatic impact on US 
industrial world (Strumpf & Johnson, 2009, para. 2). GM‟s dramatic downfall 
also meant “about 34% “of GM workers (over 21,000 employees) would lose 
their jobs, and the car dealers would be reduced to 2,600 from 6,100 (Strumpf & 
Johnson, 2009, para. 21). With the disposal of its European business operations 
and sell up some of its famous brands, such as Opel, GM was “no longer a truly 
global car company”, although GM still retain most of its factories in Latin 
American and Asian countries (“GM Goes Bust”, 2009, para. 3).  
Chapter 9: Summary and Conclusions 
344 
 
Reflecting upon its past, although GM once boasted a series of world famous 
brands vehicles, its reputation had been suffering for several decades when it 
made “bad cars, mismanagement and union intransigence” (“The Bankruptcy of 
GM”, 2009, para. 25).  
Turning to Chrysler, which used to be one of the “Detroit Big Three”, its 
prospectus is still not very promising (“The Bankruptcy of GM”, 2009, para. 16). 
Chrysler tried to establish a partnership with Fiat to avoid the disaster of 
bankruptcy, and as a return, Fiat can “have 20% of the new company” (later 
increasing to 35%), and “a union trust is permitted to own 55% and the 
Government 10%” (“The Bankruptcy of GM”, 2009, para. 16), Chrysler is still 
suffering huge debts and other liabilities.  
It seemed that only Ford Motor Co. avoided bankruptcy at this stage. Ford 
once stated that it “remains absolutely committed to continuing to make progress 
on transformation plan without accessing emergency taxpayer assistance from the 
US government” (Strumpf & Johnson, 2009, Para. 23). Ford once also mortgaged 
“all of its assets in 2006 to borrow roughly US$ 25 billion”, which gave it “a 
financial cushion that GM and Chrysler lacked” (Strumpf & Johnson, 2009, Para. 
22). However, Ford “has still been stung hard by plunging sales of cars and trucks 
in recent years” (Strumpf & Johnson, 2009, Para. 22).  
In sum, the “Detroit Big Three” that made over half of the cars on America‟s 
roads a few decades ago”, are now experiencing a new era of transformation 
(“GM Goes Bust”, 2009, para.7). With the world auto market share shrinking and 
global economic decline, the future prospects for the American auto industry are 
not optimistic and it all seems that their competitiveness was weakened by so 
many problems. The key challenge is, whether or not American Detroit can 
“revive its good name” (“GM Goes Bust”, 2009, para.7), or rely on automobile 
sales in the emerging markets, such as China. 
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On August 18, 2010, GM filed an application to make an initial public 
offering (IPO) of the „slimmed down version‟ of GM to the US Securities and 
Exchange Commission. It was reported by Reuters on August 19, 2010 that GM 
wants to “distance itself from government ownership” (Reuters, 2010, para. 13) 
and “attracts private investors” (Reuters, 2010, para. 11), as “government 
ownership has hurt GM‟s public image and sales” (Thomas, 2010, para. 12). 
Starting “as early as October” (Thomas, 2010, para. 2), GM plans to raise up to 
US$ 20 billion in the IPO process, making it one of the biggest IPOs ever in the 
US history (Reuters, 2010). 
 
 
 
 
 346 
 
References 
About SAIC USA (2009). SAIC USA INC. Retrieved April 8, 2010, from 
http://www.saicusa.com/index.php?pg=3 
Adler, P. S., & Kwon, S. W. (2002). Social capital: Prospects for a new concept. 
Academy of Management Review, 27(1), 17-40. 
Adler, N. J., Campbell, N., & Laurent, A. (1989). In search of the appropriate 
methodology: From outside the People‟s Republic of China looking in. Journal of 
International Business Studies, 20(1), 61-74. 
Aervitz, I. (2007). The driving force behind the automotive sector in China and Russia: 
The role of the state in technology appropriation. Unpublished Doctoral Thesis, 
Oxford, Ohio: Miami University. 
Akoorie, M., & Scott-Kennel, J. (2005). International business strategy: A New Zealand 
perspective. Auckland, New Zealand: Pearson Education New Zealand. 
Albers, S. (2005). The design of alliance governance systems. Köln, Germany: Kölner 
Wissenschaftsverlag.  
Ali, S., & Guo, W. (2005). Deterrminants of FDI in China. Journal of Global Business 
and Technology, 1(2), 21-33. 
Almeida, P., Song, J., & Grant, R. (2002). Are firms superior to alliances and markets? 
An empirical test of cross-border knowledge building. Organization Science, 13(2), 
147-161. 
Alon, I., & McIntyre, J. R. (2008). Globalization of Chinese enterprises. New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan. 
Alter, C., & Hage, J. (1992). Organizations working together. Newbury Park, CA: Sage. 
Alvesson, M., & Skoldberg, K. (2000). Reflective methodology: New vistas for 
qualitative research. London: Sage.  
Ambos, T. C., Ambos, B., & Schlegelmilch, B. B. (2006). Learning from foreign 
subsidiaries: An empirical investigation of headquarters‟ benefits from reverse 
knowledge transfers. International Business Review, 15(3), 294-312. 
Amsden, A. (1989). Asia‟s next giant: South Korea and late industrialization. New York: 
Oxford University Press.  
Amsden, A. (2001). The rise of “the rest”: Challenges to the West from late-
industrializing economies. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Anderson, C. D., & Anderson, J. (2005). Electric and hybrid cars: A history. Jefferson, 
NC: McFarland & Company.  
Andersen, I., Borum, F., Kristensen, P. H., & Karoe, P. (1995). On the art of doing field 
 347 
 
studies: An experience-based research methodology. Copenhagen, Denmark: 
Copenhagen Business School Press. 
Appleyard, M. M. (1996). How does knowledge flow? Interfirm patterns in the 
semiconductor industry. Strategic Management Journal, 17, 137-154.  
Argote, L. (1999). Organizational learning: Creating, retaining and transferring 
knowledge. Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers. 
Argote, L., Beckman, S. L., & Epple, D. (1990). The persistence and transfer of learning 
in industrial settings. Management Science, 36, 140-154. 
Argote, L., & Ingram, P. (2000): Knowledge transfer: A basis for competitive advantage 
in firms. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 82(1), 150-169. 
Argote, L., McEvily, B., & Reagan, R. (2003). Managing knowledge in organizations: 
An integrative framework and review of emerging themes. Management Science, 
49(4), 571-582. 
Argyris, C. (1977). Double loop learning in organizations. Harvard Business Review, 
55(5), 115-125. 
Argyris, C., & Schon, D. A. (1978). Organizational learning: A theory of action 
perspective. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley. 
Ariño, A., & de la Torre, J. (1998). Learning from failure: Towards an evolutionary 
model of collaborative ventures. Organization Science, 9(3), 306 -325. 
Ariño, A., & Reuer, J. (2004). Designing and renegotiating strategic alliance contracts. 
Academy of Management Executive, 3, 37- 48. 
As-Saber, S. N., Dowling, P. J., & Liesch, P. W. (1998). The role of human resource 
management in international joint ventures: A study of Australian-Indian joint 
ventures. International Journal of Human Resource Management, 9(5), 751-766. 
Austenfeld, R. B., Jr. (2001). W. Edwards Deming: The story of a truly remarkable 
person. In Papers of the Research Society of Commerce and Economics, September, 
Vol. XXXXVII No. 1 (pp. 49–102). Hiroshima, Japan: Hiroshima Shudo University. 
Autobuzz (2007). Chrysler appoints Phil Murtaugh as CEO of Asian operation. Retrieved 
April 27, 2010, from 
http://www.motioncars.com/autobuzz/articles57/murtaugh_chrysler_asia.htm 
Automotive Intelligence News (2004).  GM relocates Asia Pacific headquarters to 
Shanghai, China. Retrieved April 9, 2010, from http://www.autointell.com/News-
2004/June-2004/June-2004-5/June-30-04-p5.htm 
Autoparts Report (2003, Jan. 3). GM said it will expand auto production in China with 
purchase of car plant. Retrieved April 12, 2010, from 
http://www.allbusiness.com/transportation/motor-vehicle-parts-
manufacturing/431997-1.html 
 348 
 
Badaracco, J. L. (1991). The knowledge link: How firms compete through strategic 
alliances. Boston: Harvard Business School Press. 
Bailey, K. D. (1982). Methods of social research. New York: Free Press.  
Bailey, K. D. (1988). Ethical dilemmas in social research: A theoretical framework. 
American Sociologist, 19, 121-37.  
Bamford, J., Ernst, D., & Fubini, D. G. (2004). Launching a world-class joint venture. 
Harvard Business Review, (February), 93-99. 
Bandura, A. (1986). Social foundations of thought and action: A social cognitive theory. 
Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall. 
Barkema, H. G., Bell, J. H., & Pennings, J. M. (1996). Foreign entry, cultural barriers, 
and learning. Strategic Management Journal, 17(2), 151-66. 
Barney, J. B. (1991). Firm resources and sustained competitive advantage. Journal of 
Management, 17, 33-46. 
Barney, J. B. (1996). Gaining and sustaining competitive advantage. Reading, MA: 
Addison-Wesley. 
Barney, J. B., & Clark, D. N. (2007). Resource-based theory: Creating and sustaining 
competitive advantage. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Barringer, B. R., & Harrison, J. S. (2000). Walking the tightrope: Creating value through 
inter-organizational relationships. Journal of Management, 26(3), 367-403. 
Bauerschmidt, A., Sullivan, D., & Gillespie, K. (1985). Common factors underlying 
barriers to export: Studies in the US paper industry. Journal of International Business 
Studies, 16(3), 111-123. 
Beamish, P. W. (1987). Joint venture in LDCs: Partner selection and performance. 
Management International Review, 27, 23-37. 
Beamish, P. W. (1988). Multinational joint ventures in developing countries. New York: 
Routledge. 
Beamish, P. W. (1993). The characteristics of joint ventures in the People‟s Republic of 
China. Journal of International Marketing, 1(2), 29-48.  
Beamish, P. W., & Berdrow, I. (2003). Learning from IJVs: The unintended outcome. 
Long Range Planning, June, 36(3), 285. 
Becerra, M., Lunnan, R., & Huemer, L. (2008). Trustworthiness, risk and the transfer of 
tacit and explicit knowledge between alliance partners. Journal of Management 
Studies, 45(4), 691-713.  
Benvignati, A. (1983). International technology transfer patterns in a traditional industry. 
Journal of International Business Studies, 14(3), 63-76. 
Berdrow, I., & Lane, H. W. (2003). International joint ventures: Creating value through 
 349 
 
successful knowledge management. Journal of World Business, 38(1), 15. 
BIZChina (2006). Foreign investment. Retrieved April 10, 2009, from 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/bizchina/2006-04/21/content_573554_3.htm 
Bloomfield, G. (1978). The world automotive industry. Newton Abbot, England: David & 
Charles. 
Boisot, M., & Child, J. (1988). The iron law of fiefs: Bureaucratic failure and the problem 
of governance in the Chinese economic reforms. Administrative Science Quarterly, 33, 
507-27. 
Boisot, M. H. (1995). Information space: A framework for learning in organizations, 
institutions and cultures. London: Routledge. 
Bou-Liusar, J. C., & Segarra-Cipres, M. S. (2006). Strategic knowledge transfer and its 
implications for competitive advantage: An integrative conceptual framework. Journal 
of Knowledge Management, 10(4), 100-112. 
Bradley, F. (1999). International marketing strategy. London: Prentice Hall. 
Bradsher, K. (2003). G.M. to sell wider range of vehicles in China. Retrieved April 17, 
2010, from http://www.nytimes.com/2003/10/17/business/gm-to-sell-wider-range-of-
vehicles-in-china.html?pagewanted=1 
Brannen, J. (Ed.). (1992). Mixing methods: Qualitative and quantitative research. 
London: Gower.  
Bresman, H., Birkinshaw, J., & Nobel, R. (1999). Knowledge transfer in international 
acquisitions. Journal of International Business Studies, 30(3), 439-461. 
Brislin, R. W. (1970). Back-translation for cross-cultural research.  Journal of Cross-
Cultural Psychology, 75, 3-9. 
Bryman, A. (1988). Quantity and quality in social research. London: Unwin Hyman. 
Bryman, A. (1989). Research methods and organization studies. London: Unwin Hyman. 
Buchel, B., Prange, C., Probst, G., & Ruling, C. C. (1998). International joint venture 
management: Learning to cooperate and cooperating to learn. Singapore: John Wiley. 
Bucic, T., & Gudergan, S. (2004). The impact of organizational settings on creativity and 
learning in alliances. Management, 7(3), 257-273. 
Buckley, P. J., & Casson, M. (1988). A theory of cooperation in international business. In 
F. Contractor & P. Lorange (Eds.), Cooperative strategies in international business 
(pp. 31-54). Lexington, MA: Lexington Books. 
Buckley, P. J., & Casson M. (1996). An economic model of international joint venture 
strategy. Journal of International Business Studies, 27(5), 35-48. 
Buckley, P. J., & Casson, M. (1998). Analyzing foreign market entry strategies: 
Extending the internalization approach. Journal of International Business Studies, 
 350 
 
29(3), 539-61. 
Buckley, P. J., Clegg, J., & Tan, H. (2003). The art of knowledge transfer: Secondary and 
reverse transfer in China‟s telecommunications manufacturing industry. Management 
International Review, 43(2), 67-94. 
Buckley, P. J., Clegg, J., & Tan, H. (2004). Knowledge transfer to China: Policy lessons 
from foreign affiliates. Transnational Corporations, 13(1), 31-72. 
Buckley, P. J., Clegg, J., Zheng, P., Siler, P., & Giorgioni, G. (2007). The impact of 
foreign direct investment on the productivity of China‟s automotive industry. 
Management International Review, 47(5), 707-724. 
Burrell, G., & Morgan, G. (1979). Sociological paradigms and organizational analysis. 
London: Heinemann. 
Bursa, M. (2006, October). China automotive market review: Management briefing: The 
Chinese independents. Just – Auto, 16-22. 
Bursa, M. (2007, October). China automotive market review: Management briefing: 
Major developments at other Chinese automakers. Just – Auto, 16-22. 
BusinessWeek (2004). GM: Gunning it in China. Retrieved April 27, 2010, from 
http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/04_25/b3888092_mz017.htm 
Campbell, N. (1988). A strategic guide to equity joint ventures in China. Oxford, 
England: Pergamon.  
Campbell, D. T., & Fiske, W. (1959). Convergent and discriminant validation by the 
multitrail-multimethod matrix. Psychological Bulletin, 56, 81-105. 
Camuffo, A., & Volpato, G. (2002). Partnering in the global auto industry: The Fiat-GM 
strategic alliance. International Journal of Automotive Technology and management, 
2(3/4), 335-352.  
Cappelli, P., & Sherer, P. D. (1991). The missing role of context in OB: The need for a 
meso-level approach. Research in Organizational Behavior, 13, 55-110.  
Carty, S. S. (2008). Small cars sell, but GM, Ford suffer as gas prices rise. Retrieved 
November 16, 2008, from http://www.usatoday.com/money/autos/2008-05-01-april-
auto-sales_N.htm 
Casson, M. (1993). Contractual arrangements for technology transfer: New evidence 
from business history. In G. Jones (Ed.), Coalitions and collaboration in international 
business (pp. 18- 50). Aldershot, England: Elgar. 
CATARC (2002). Automotive industry of China 2002. Tianjin, China Automotive 
Technology & Research Center. Available at www.catarc.ac.cn 
CATARC (2003, January 20). Statistics. China Auto, 20. 
CATARC (2004, January 25). Auto Industry Development Policy. China Auto. 
 351 
 
Caudill, M., & Butler, C. (1990). Naturally intelligent systems. London: Bradford Books. 
CBS News (2010). GM: 1.8 million cars sold in China in 2009. Retrieved April 23, 2010, 
from http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2010/01/04/business/main6052403.shtml 
Chadwick, B. A., Bahr, H. M., & Albrecht, S. L. (1984). Social science research 
methods. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.  
Chalmers, A. (1982). What is this thing called science? Queensland, Australia: University 
of Queensland. 
Chen, K. (2009). Overview on Chinese auto industry in 2009. Retrieved April 10, 2009 
from http://www.goarticles.com/cgi-bin/showa.cgi?C=1464405 
Chen, M. (1995). Asian management systems. London: Routledge. 
Chetty, S. (1997). The case study method for research in small- and medium-sized firms. 
International Small Business Journal, 15(1), 73-85. 
Child, J. (1991). A foreign perspective on the management of people in China. 
International Journal of Human Resource Management, 2, 93-107. 
Child, J. (1994). Management in China during the age of reform. Cambridge, England: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Child, J. (2000). Management and organizations in China: Key trends and issues. In J. T. 
Li, A. S. Tsui, & E. Weldon (Eds.), Management and organizations in the Chinese 
context (pp. 33-62). New York: Macmillan Press. 
Child, J. (2001). Learning through strategic alliances. In M. Dierkes, A. A. Antal, J. 
Child, & I. Nonaka (Eds.), Handbook of organizational learning and knowledge (pp. 
657-80). New York: Oxford University Press. 
Child, J., & Faulkner, D. O. (1998). Strategies of cooperation: Managing alliances, 
networks, and joint ventures. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Child, J., Yan, Y., & Lu, Y. (1997). Ownership and control in Sino-foreign joint ventures. 
In P. Beamish & P. Killing (Eds.), Cooperative strategies: Asia pacific perspective 
(pp.181-226). San Francisco: New Lexington Press. 
National Bureau of Statistics of China (2008). China annual statistical yearbook. Beijing, 
China: China Statistical Publishing House. 
China Association of Automobile Manufacturers (2004). Tianjin: China Automotive 
Technology Research Center. Available at www.caam.org.cn 
China Automotive Industry Yearbook (1996). Tianjin: China Automotive Technology 
Research Center. Available at www.autoyearbook.com.cn 
China Automotive Industry Yearbook (1999). Tianjin: China Automotive Technology 
Research Center. Available at www.autoyearbook.com.cn 
China Automotive Industry Yearbook (2005). Tianjin: China Automotive Technology 
 352 
 
Research Center. Available at www.autoyearbook.com.cn 
China Business Update (CBU) ENews (2000). Available at www.cbuauto.com 
Chinacarforums (2007). Introducing Shanghai General Motors (SGM). Retrieved April 
11, 2010, from http://www.chinacarforums.com/forum/showthread.php?t=1715 
China Daily (2004). GM planning to doublr car production. Retrieved April 25, 2010, 
from http://www.iatp.org/tradeobservatory/headlines.cfm?refID=31501 
China Daily (2010). Geely completes Volvo brand acquisition. Retrieved September 2, 
2010, from http://www.china.org.cn/business/2010-08/03/content_20628315.htm 
ChinaNewswires (2009). SAIC may takeover GM‟s Buick brand. Retrieved April 13, 
2009 from 
http://www.chinaknowledge.com/Newswires/News_Detail.aspx?type=1&NewsID=22
595 
ChinaStakes (2008). Phasing out foreign companies tax holidays in China. Retrieved 
April 5, 2010 from http://www.chinastakes.com/2008/1/phasing-out-foreign-
companies-tax-holidays-in-china.html 
China, T. C. (2005). Effective knowledge transfer in multinational corporations. 
Gordonsville, VA: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Choi, C. J., & Lee, S. H. (1997). A knowledge-based view of co-operative 
interorganizational relationships. In P. W. Beamish & J. P. Killing (Eds.), Co-
operative strategies: European perspectives (pp. 33-58). San Francisco: The New 
Lexington Press. 
Chini, T. C. (2005). Effective knowledge transfer in multinational corporations. 
Gordonsville, VA, USA: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Chung, S., Singh, H., & Lee, K. (2000). Complementarity, status similarity and social 
capital as drivers of alliance formation. Strategic Management journal, 21, 1-22. 
Cicourel, A. (1964). Method and measurement in sociology. New York: Free Press.  
Clegg, S. (1982). Review of Burrell and Morgan (1979). Organization Studies, 3(4), 380-
381. 
Cohen, L., & Manion, L. (1989). Research methods in education (3
rd
 ed.). London: 
Routledge. 
Cohen, W. M., & Levinthal, D. A. (1990). Absorptive capacity: A new perspective on 
learning and innovation. Administrative Science Quarterly, 35, 128-152. 
Cohen, W. M., & Levinthal, D. A. (1994). Fortune favors the prepared firm. Management 
Science, 40(2), 227-251. 
 353 
 
Cole, D., McAlinden, S., Dziczek, K., & Menk, D. (2008). The impact of the U.S. 
economy of a major contraction of the Detroit three automakers. Ann Arbor, MI: 
Center for Automotiove Research (CAR).  
Collis, D. J., & Montgomery, C. A. (1995). Competing on resources: Strategy in the 
1990s. Harvard Business Review, 73(4), 118-128. 
Conklin, D. W. (2006). Cases in the environment of business: International perspective. 
London: Sage. 
Conner, K. (1991). A historical comparison of resource-based theory and five schools of 
thought within industrial organization economics: Do we have a new theory of the 
firm? Journal of Management, 17, 121-154. 
Conner, K., & Prahalad, C. K. (1996). A resource-based theory of the firm: Knowledge 
versus opportunism. Organization Science, 7, 477-501. 
Contractor, F., & Lorange, P. (1988). Why should firms cooperate? The strategy and 
economic basis for cooperative ventures. In F. J. Contractor & P. Lorange (Eds.), 
Cooperative strategies in international business (pp. 3-28). Lexington, MA: Lexington 
Books. 
Contractor, F. J., & Sagafi-nejad, T. (1981). International technology transfer: Major 
issues and policy responses. Journal of International Business Studies, 12, 113-135. 
Contractor, F., & Lorange, P. (2002). The growth of alliances in the knowledge-based 
economy. In F. Contractor & P. Lorange (Eds.), Cooperative strategies and alliances 
(pp. 3-22). Oxford, England: Elsevier Science. 
Conybeare, J. A. C. (2004). Merging traffic: The consolidation of the international 
automobile industry. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. 
Cook, K. S., & Emerson, R. M. (1974). Power, equity, commitment in exchange 
networks. American Sociological Review, 43, 721-738. 
Cooney, S., & Yacobucci, B. (2005). U.S. automotive industry: Policy overview and 
recent history. New York: Nova Science. 
Couch, C. J. (1987). Objectivity: A crutch and club for bureaucrats/subjectivity: A haven 
for lost souls. The Sociological Quarterly, 28, 105-118. 
Creswell, J. W. (1994). Research design: Qualitative and quantitative approaches. 
Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
Crossan, M. M., & Inkpen, A. C. (1995). Promise and reality of learning through 
alliances. The International Executive, 36(3), 263-73. 
Crotty, M. (1998). The foundations of social research: Meaning and perspective in the 
research process. St Leonards, NSW, Australia: Allen and Unwin. 
Culpan, R., & Kumar, N. (1994). Co-operative ventures of Western firms in Eastern 
 354 
 
Europe: The case of German firms. In P. J. Buckley & P. N. Ghauri (Eds.), The 
economics of change in East and central Europe: Its impact on international business 
(pp. 267- 277). London: Haworth Press. 
Cummings, J. L., & Teng, B. S. (2003). Transferring R&D knowledge: The key factors 
affecting knowledge transfer success. Journal of Engineering and Technology 
Management, 20, 39-68. 
Cusumano, M. (1988). Manufacturing innovation and competitive advantage: Reflections 
on the Japanese automobile industry. Cambridge, MA: Sloan School of Management.  
Cyr, D., & Schneider, S. (1996). Implications for learning: Human resource management 
in east-west joint ventures. Organization Studies, 17, 207- 226.   
Daniels, J. D., Krug, J., & Nigh, D. (1985). US joint ventures in China: Motivation and 
management of political risk. California Management Review, 27, 46- 58. 
Daniles, J. D., & Cannice, M. V. (2004). Interview studies in international business 
research. In R. Marschan-Piekkari & C. Welch (Eds.), A handbook of qualitative 
research methods for international business (pp. 185-206). Cheltenham, England: 
Edward Elgar. 
Das, T. K., & Teng, B. (2000). A resource-based theory of strategic alliances. Journal of 
Management, 26, 31- 61. 
Datta, D. K., & Rasheed, A. M. A. (1993). Planning international joint ventures: The role 
of human resource management. In R. Culpan (Ed.), Multinational strategic alliances 
(pp. 251- 271). New York: International Business Press. 
Davenport, T. H., & Prusak, L. (1998). Working knowledge: How organizations manage 
what they know. Boston: Harvard Business School Press. 
Davidson W. H. (1987). Creating and managing joint ventures in China. California 
Management Review, 27(4), 77- 94. 
Davidson, C., & Voss, P. (2002). Knowledge management: An introduction to creating 
competitive advantage from intellectual capital. Auckland, New Zealand: Tandem 
Press. 
Davis, S. C., & Diegel, S. W. (2002). Transportation energy databook (ORNL-6967). 
Washington, DC, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Center for Transportation Analysis, 
U.S. Department of Energy. 
Dees, S. (1998). Foreign direct investment in China: Determinants and effects. 
Economics of Planning, 31, 175- 194. 
De Long, D., & Seeman, P. (2000). Confronting conceptual confusion and conflict in 
knowledge management. Organizational Dynamics, 29(1), 33- 44. 
Demsetz, H. (1991). The theory of the firm revisited. In Williamson & Winter (Eds.), The 
nature of the firm (pp. 159- 178). New York: Oxford University Press. 
 355 
 
Denis, J. (1990). The internalization process for smaller Ontario firms (Exporting: A 
research agenda). In A. M. Rugman (Ed.), Research in global strategic management: 
International business research for the twenty-first century: Canada‟s new research 
agenda (Vol. 1, pp. 99- 111). Greenwich, CT: JAI Press. 
Denton, J. (1998). Organizational learning and effectiveness. London: Routledge. 
Denzin, N. K., & Lincoln, Y. S. (1994). Introduction: Entering the field of qualitative 
research. In N. K. Denzin & Y. S. Lincoln (Eds.), Handbook of qualitative research 
(pp. 1-17). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
Derksen, L., & Gartrell, J. (1992). Scientific explanation. In E. M. Borgatta (Ed.), 
Encyclopedia of sociology (Vol. 4, pp. 1711- 1720). New York: Macmillan. 
Despres, C., & Chauvel, D. (1999). Knowledge management(s). Journal of Knowledge 
Management, 3(2), 110- 120. 
Dey, I. (1993). Qualitative data analysis: A user-friendly guide for social scientists. 
London: Routledge. 
Dhanaraj, C., Lyles, M.A., Steensma, H. K., & Tihanyi, L. (2004). Managing tacit and 
explicit knowledge transfer in IJVs: The role of relational embeddedness and the 
impact on performance. Journal of International Business Studies, 35(5), 428- 442. 
Dierickx, I., & Cool, K. (1989). Asset stock accumulation and sustainability of 
competitive advantage. Management Science, 35(12), 1504- 1511. 
Ding, Q., Akoorie, M. & Pavlovich, K. (2009a). A critical review of three theoretical 
approaches on knowledge transfer in cooperative alliances. International Journal of 
Business and Management, 4(1), 47-56. 
Ding, Q., Akoorie, M. & Pavlovich, K. (2009b). Understanding the specificity and 
complexity of inter-firm knowledge flows in alliance networks. Interdisciplinary 
Journal of Contemporary Research in Business, 1(7), 8-33. 
Dodgson, M. (1993a). Learning, trust and technological collaboration. Human Relations, 
46(1), 77- 95. 
Dodgson, M. (1993b). Organizational learning: A review of some literatures. 
Organization Studies, 14(3), 375- 394. 
Dong, L., & Glaister, K. W. (2006). Motives and partner selection criteria in international 
strategic alliances: Perspectives of Chinese firms. International Business Review, 
15(6), 577- 600. 
Dow Jones Newswire (2009). China to issue quarter-to-quarter GDP data. Retrieved 
April 10, 2009, from 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123926996124904649.html?mod=googlenews_wsj 
Doz, Y. (1996). The evolution of cooperation in strategic alliances: Initial conditions or 
learning processes? Strategic Management Journal, 17, 55- 84. 
 356 
 
Doz, Y., & Hamel, G. (1998). Alliance advantage: The art of creating value through 
partnering. Boston: Harvard Business School Press. 
Doz, Y., & Prahalad, C. K. (1991). Managing DMNCs: A search for a new paradigm. 
Strategic Management Journal, 12, 145- 164. 
Doz, Y., Santos, J., & Williamson, P. (2001). From global to multinational. Boston: 
Harvard Business School Press. 
Driscoll, R. E., & Wallender, H. W. III. (1981). Control and incentives for technology 
transfer: A multinational perspective. In T. Sagafi-nejad, R. W. Moxon & H. V. 
Perlmutter (Eds.), Controlling international technology transfer (pp. 273- 287). New 
York: Pergamon Press. 
Drucker, P. F. (1992). The new society of organizations. Harvard Business Review, 
70(5), 95- 105. 
Drucker, P. F. (1993). Post-capitalist society. New York: Harper Business. 
Drucker, P. F. (1995). The network society. Wall Street Journal, 29, 12. 
Duanmu, J. L., & Fai, F. M. (2007). A processual analysis of knowledge transfer: From 
foreign MNEs to Chinese suppliers. International Business Review, 16(4), 449- 473. 
Duncan, R., & Weiss, A. (1979). Organizational learning: Implications for organizational 
design. Research in Organizational Behavior, 1, 75- 123. 
Dunning, J. H. (1993). Multinational enterprise and the global economy. Wokingham, 
England: Addison-Wesley. 
Duysters, G., de Man, A. P., & Wildeman, L. (1999). A network approach to alliance 
management. European Management Journal, 17(2), 182- 187. 
Dyer, J. H., & Singh, H. (1998). The relational view: Cooperative strategy and sources of 
inter-organizational competitive advantage. Academy of Management Review, 23(4), 
660- 679. 
Dyer, J. H., & Chu, W. (2000). The determinants of trust in supplier-automaker 
relationships in the U.S., Japan, and Korea. Journal of International Business Studies, 
31(2), 259- 285. 
Dyer, J. H., & Nobeoka, K. (2000). Creating and managing a high-performance 
knowledge -sharing network: The Toyota case. Strategic Management Journal, 21, 
345- 367. 
Dymsza, W. A. (1988). Successes and failures of joint ventures in developing countries: 
Lessons from experience. In F. Contractor & P. Lorange (Eds.), Cooperative strategies 
in international business (pp. 403- 42). Lexington, MA: Lexington Books. 
Easterby-Smith, M., Thorpe, R., & Lowe, A. (1993). Management research: An 
introduction. London: Sage. 
 357 
 
Easterby-Smith, M., & Lyles, M. (Eds.). (2003). The Blackwell handbook of 
organizational learning and knowledge management. Oxford, England: Blackwell 
Publishing. 
Easterby-Smith, M., Lyles, M., & Tsang, E. W. K. (2008). Inter-organizational 
knowledge transfer: Current themes and future prospects. Journal of Management 
Studies, 45(4), 677- 690. 
Edvinsson, L., & Malone, M. S. (1997). Intellectual capital: The proven way to establish 
your company‟s real value by measuring its hidden brainpower. London: Piatkus. 
Eisenhardt, K. (1989). Building theory from case study research. California Management 
Review, 14(4), 532- 550. 
Eisenhardt, K. M., & Martin, J. A. (2000). Dynamic capabilities: What are they? 
Strategic Management Journal, 21, 1105- 1121. 
Eisenhardt, K. M., & Schoonhoven, C. B. (1996). Resource-based view of strategic 
alliance formation: Strategic and social effects in entrepreneurial firm. Organization 
Science, 7(2), 136- 150. 
Encarta (2009). Automobile industry. Retrieved January 3, 2009, from 
http://encarta.msn.com/encyclopedia_761563934/automobile_industry.html 
End game.  (2009, April 30). The Economist. Retrieved May 7, 2009, from 
http://www.economist.com/business/displaystory.cfm?story_id=13579089 
Eppel, D., Argote, L., & Devadas, R. (1991). Organizational learning curves: A method 
for investigating intra-plant transfer of knowledge acquired through learning by doing. 
Organization Science, 2(1), 58- 70. 
Espinoza, J. (2008). Can Chrysler woo Fiat? Retrieved November 16, 2008, from 
http://www.forbes.com/markets/2008/08/14/chrysler-fiat-tieup-markets-equity-
cx_je_0814markets23.html?partner=autos_newsletter 
Eunni, R. V., Kasuganti, R. R., & Kos, A. J. (2006). Knowledge management processes 
in international business alliances: A review of empirical research, 1990-2003. 
International Journal of Management, March, 23(1), 34- 42. 
Faems, D., Janssens, M., & Looy, B. van (2007). The initiation and evolution of interfirm 
knowledge in R&D relationships. Organization Studies, 28(11), 1699- 1728. 
Fairclough, G. (2006). China‟s car sector gears up for big change. Retrieved April 27, 
2010, from http://online.wsj.com/public/article/SB114417218079616710-
jSJUG7flZi5rK91Kom3BHKu4Ld8_20060411.html?mod=regionallinks 
Faulkner, D. (1995). Strategic alliances: Cooperating to compete. London: McGraw-Hill. 
Faulkner, D., & De Rond, M. (2000). Perspectives on cooperative strategy. In D. O. 
Faulkner & M. De Rond (Eds.), Cooperative strategy: Economic, business, and 
organizational Issues (pp. 3- 39). Oxford, England: Oxford University Press. 
 358 
 
Feinberg, S., & Gupta, A. (2004). Knowledge spillovers and the assignment of R&D 
responsibilities to foreign subsidiaries. Strategic Management Journal, 25(8-9), 823- 
845. 
Feinstein, C., & Howe, C. (Eds.). (1997). Chinese technology transfer in the 1990s: 
Current experience, historical problems and international perspectives. Cheltenham, 
England: Edward Elgar. 
Ferro, J. R. (1995). Current developments of the Brazilian automotive industry. Retrieved 
January 16, 2009, from http://imvp.mit.edu/papers/95/Ferro/ferro-1.pdf 
Fetscherin, M., & Sardy, M. (2008). China shifts into gear in the global auto market. In I. 
Alon & J. R. McIntyre (Eds.), Globalization of Chinese enterprises (pp. 181- 193). 
New York: Palgrave MacMillan. 
Filed, A. M. (2006). Car trouble. Journal of Commerce, 2, 1. 
Finch, J. (1986). Research and policy: The use of qualitative methods in social and 
educational research. London: Falmer.  
Fiol, C. M., & Lyles, M. A. (1985). Organizational learning. Academy of Management 
Review, 10(4), 803- 813. 
Flink, J. J. (1975). The car culture. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.  
Ford, D., & Chan, Y. E. (2003). Knowledge sharing in a multi-cultural setting: A case 
study. Knowledge Management Research & Practice, 1, 11- 27. 
Foss, N., & Pederson, T. (2002). Transferring knowledge in MNCs: The role of sources 
of subsidiary knowledge and organizational context. Journal of International 
Management, 8, 49- 67. 
Foss, N., & Mahnke, V. (2003). Knowledge management: What can organizational 
economics contribute? In M. E. Smith & M. Lyles (Eds.), Blackwell handbook of 
organizational learning and knowledge management (pp. 78- 103). Oxford, England: 
Blackwell Publishing.  
Foss, N. J., Husted, K., & Michailova, S. (2010). Governing knowledge sharing in 
organizations: Levels of analysis, governance mechanisms, and research directions.  
Journal of Management Studies, 47(3), 455-482. 
Fung, K. C., Iizaka, H., & Tong, S. (2002). Foreign direct investment in China: Policy, 
trend and impact. In International Conference on „China‟s Economy in the 21st 
Century‟, June 24-25, 2002, Hong Kong. 
Gallagher, K. S. (2003). Foreign technology in China‟s automobile industry: Implications 
for energy, economic development, and environment. China Environment Series, No. 
6, 1-18. Retrieved April 18, 2010, from 
http://www.wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?topic_id=1421&categoryid=e606be25-423b-
763d-d87478b55ad77e73&fuseaction=topics.publications_topics 
 359 
 
Gallagher, K. S. (2006). China shifts gears: Automakers, oil, pollution, and development. 
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Gamble, J. (2003). Transferring human resource practices from the United Kingdom to 
China: The limits and potential for convergence. International Journal of Human 
Resource Management, 14(3), 369- 387. 
Gan, L. (2003). Globalization of the automobile industry in China: Dynamics and barriers 
in greening of the road transportation. Energy Policy, 31(6), 537- 551. 
Gannon, M. (1993). Towards a composite theory of foreign entry mode choice: The role 
of marketing strategy variables. Journal of Strategic Marketing, 1(1), 41-54. 
Garvin, D. (1998). Building a learning organization. In Harvard Business Review on 
Knowledge Management (pp. 47- 80). Boston: Harvard Business School. 
General Motors (2010). General Motors Company. Retrieved April 8, 2010, from  
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/General_Motors 
General Motors revealed sales growth (2006, January 6). China Daily. Available at 
www.chinadaily.com 
Geppert, M. (1996). Paths of managerial learning in the East German context. 
Organization Studies, 17(2), 532- 550. 
Geringer, J. M., & Hebert, L. (1989). Joint venture partner selection: Strategies for 
developed countries. Westport, CO: Quorum Books. 
Geringer, J. M., & Hebert, L. (1991). Measuring performance of international joint 
ventures. Journal of International Business Studies, 22, 249- 263. 
Ghauri, P. (2004). Designing and conducting case studies in international business 
research. In R. Marschan-Piekkari & C. Welch (Eds.), A handbook of qualitative 
research methods for international business (pp. 109-124). Cheltenham, UK: Edward 
Elgar.  
Ghoshal, S., & Bartlett, C. A. (1990). The multinational corporation as an 
interorganizational network. Academy of Management Review, 15(4), 603- 625. 
Ghoshal, S., & Moran, P. (1996). Bad for practice: A critique of the transaction cost 
theory. Academy of Management Review, 21(1), 13- 47.  
Glaister, K. W., & Buckley, P. J. (1996). Strategic motives for international alliance 
formation. Journal of Management Studies, 33(3), 301- 332. 
Glesne, C., & Peshkin, A. (1992). Becoming qualitative researchers: An introduction. 
New York: Longman.  
Global Market Data Book (2008, June 23). Automotive news. Available at 
www.autonews.com 
 360 
 
GM Background (2009). General Motors Corporation: Factsheets. Retrieved April 8, 
2010 from http://www.just-auto.com/factsheet.aspx?id=73 
GM Company Profile (2010). About GM: Company Profile. Retrieved April 7, 2010 from 
http://www.gm.com/corporate/about/company.jsp 
GM Corporate Information (2006). GM Overview. Retrieved November 4, 2006 from 
http://www.gmchina.com/english/company/company_overview.html 
GM Global Operations – Asia-Pacific – China (2008). GM Corporate Information. 
Retrieved April 24, 2010, from 
http://gmability.msltechdev.com/corporate/about/global_operations/asia_pacific/chin.j
sp 
GM Global Sales (2008). Jalopnik. Retrieved April 8, 2010, from 
http://jalopnik.com/347930/gm-global-sales-up-30-to-937-million-vehicles-possibly-
tied-with-toyota 
GM goes bust: Bankruptcy, at last (2009, June 1). The Economist. Avaiable at 
www.economist.com 
GM investment in China successful (2002). News. Retrieved April 17, 2010, from 
http://www.china-embassy.org/eng/xw/t34132.htm 
GM‟s latest remodel.  (2009, April 28). The Economist. Retrieved April 30, 2009, from 
http://www.economist.com/daily/news/displaystory.cfm?story_id=13567249&fsrc=nw
l 
GM overtakes Volkswagen as market leader in China (2005). Asia Pulse - The Press 
Trust of India Ltd. Retrieved April 24, 2010, from 
http://www.turnitin.com/viewGale.asp?r=67.4010739120572&svr=7&session-
id=9903d13dd3ed58eb8bb7039b41b0f400&lang=en_us&oid=14141705&key=1b6e63
44093f278c77f5774698e875a5 
GM Technology (2009). GM and SAIC Promote Fuel Cell Propulsion Technology. 
Retrieved April 26, 2010, from 
http://www.gm.com/experience/technology/fuel_cells/news/2009/saic_041909.jsp 
Gomes-Casseres, B. (1996). The alliance revolution. Cambridge, MA: Harvard                  
University Press. 
Gong, Z. (2002, October 21). Demand fuels car growth. China Daily, 22. Available at 
www.chinadaily.com 
Graham, A. (1996). The learning organization: Managing knowledge for business 
success. New York: Economist Intelligence Unit.  
Graham, M. (2000). Paddy fields to full production. Industry Week, 249(6), 54- 60. 
Retrieved April 11, 2010, from 
http://www.industryweek.com/articles/paddy_fields_to_full_production_757.aspx 
 361 
 
Granovetter, M. (1982). The strength of weak ties: A network theory revisited. In P. V. 
Mersiden & N. Lin (Eds.), Social structure and network analysis (pp. 105- 130). 
Beverly Hills, LA: Sage. 
Granovetter, M. (1985). Economic action and social structure: The problem of 
embeddedness. American Journal of Sociology, 91, 481- 510. 
Grant, R. M. (1991). The resource-based theory of competitive advantage: Implications 
for strategy formulation. California Management Review, 33(3), 114-135. 
Grant, R. M. (1996). Toward a knowledge-based theory of the firm. Strategic 
Management Journal, 17, 109- 122. 
Grant, R. M. (2002). The knowledge-based view of the firm. In C. W. Choo & N. Bontis, 
(Eds.), The strategic management of intellectual capital and organizational knowledge 
(pp. 133- 148). Oxford, England: Oxford University Press. 
Green Car Congress (2005). GM and SAIC announce push to develop and produce 
hybrids and fuel cell vehicles in China. Retrieved April 25, 2010, from 
http://www.greencarcongress.com/2005/10/gm_and_saic_ann.html 
Greenfield, D. (2009). Dangers of CO2 from vehicles: Increasing fuel efficiency and 
developing clean technology. Retrieved September 2, 2010, from   
http://www.suite101.com/content/automotive-industry-emits-high-levels-of-co2-
a105028 
Griffith, D. A., Zeybek, A. Y., & O‟Brien, M. (2001). Knowledge transfer as a means for 
relationship development: A Kazakhstan-foreign international joint venture 
illustration. Journal of International Marketing, 9(2), 1-18. 
Guba, E. G. (1990). The paradigm dialog. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.  
Guba, E. G., & Lincoln, Y. S. (1994). Competing paradigms in qualitative research. In N. 
K. Denzin & Y. S. Lincoln (Eds.), Handbook of qualitative research (pp. 105- 117). 
Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
Guide to China‟s auto market (2005). Automotive News. Crain Communications. 
Available at www.autonews.com 
Gulati, R. (1998). Alliances and networks. Strategic Management Journal, 19(4), 293-
317. 
Gulati, R., Nohria, N., & Zaheer, A. (2000). Strategic networks. Strategic Management 
Journal, 21, 203-215. 
Gummesson, E. (1991). Qualitative methods in management research. Newbury Park, 
CA: Sage. 
Gupta, A. K., & Govindarajan, V. (1991). Knowledge flows and the structure of control 
within multinational corporations. Academy of Management Review, 16(4), 768- 792. 
 362 
 
Gupta, A. K., & Govindarajan, V. (2001). Converting global presence into global 
competitive advantage. The Academy of Management Executive, 15(2), 45- 58. 
Gupta, A. K., & Govindarajan, V. (2000). Knowledge flows within multinational 
corporations. Strategic Management Journal, 21, 473- 496. 
Håkansson H. (1989). Corporate technological behavior, cooperations and networks. 
London: Routledge.  
Halberstam, D. (1986). The  reckoning. New York: Avon Books. 
Hamel, G. (1991). Competition for competence and inter-partner learning within 
international strategic alliances. Strategic Management Journal, 12, 83- 103. 
Hamel, G., Doz, Y. L., & Prahalad, C. K.  (1989). Collaborate with your competitors - 
and win. Harvard Business Review, 67, 133- 39. 
Hamel, G., & Prahalad, C. K. (1994). Competing for the future: Breakthrough strategies 
for seizing control of your industry and creating the markets of tomorrow. Boston: 
Harvard Business School. 
Hammersley, M. (1992). What‟s wrong with ethnography? London: Routledge.  
Hannerz, U. (1992). Cultural complexity: Studies in the social organization of meaning. 
New York: Columbia University. 
Haq, R. (2009). Auto industry in China, India and Pakistan. Retrieved April 10, 2009, 
from http://southasiainvestor.blogspot.com/2009/03/auto-industry-in-china-india-
and.html 
Harrigan, K. R. (1984). Joint ventures and global strategies. Columbia Journal of World 
Business, 19(2), 7-16. 
Harrigan, K. R. (1985). Strategies for joint ventures. Lexington, MA: Lexington Books. 
Harrigan, K. R. (1986). Managing for joint venture success. Lexington, MA: Lexington 
Books. 
Harryson, S. J., Dudkowski, R., & Stern, A. (2008). Transformation networks in 
innovation alliances: The development of Volvo C70. Journal of Management Studies, 
45, 730-58. 
Harwit, E. (1994). China‟s automobile industry: Policies, problems, and prospects. New 
York: M.E. Sharpe, Armonk. 
Harwit, E. (1995). China‟s automobile industry: Policies, problems, and prospects. New 
York: ME Sharpe. 
Hastings, M., & Schafer, S. (2006). Can China save GM? The auto giant is ice cold in 
Detroit, red hot in Shanghai. Newsweek, 147 (14), 36. Retrieved April 10, 2010, from 
http://www.turnitin.com/viewGale.asp?r=67.4010739120572&svr=7&session-
id=9903d13dd3ed58eb8bb7039b41b0f400&lang=en_us&oid=39079087&key=396cfc
 363 
 
3a18abe12bc4dbd2f39a1089a2 
Hayes, R., Pisano, G., & Upton, D. (1996). Strategic operations: Competing through 
capabilities. New York: Free Press. 
Hedlund, G., & Nonaka, I. (1993). Models of knowledge management in the West and 
Japan. In P. Lorange, B. Chakravarthy, J. Roos & A. Van de Ven (Eds.), Implementing 
strategic process: Change, learning and cooperation (pp. 117-144). London: Basil 
Blackwell. 
Henderson, D. R., Sheldon, I. M., & Thomas, K. N. (1994). International licensing of 
foods and beverages makes markets truly global. Food Review, 17(3), 7-12. 
Hennart, J. F. (1988). A transaction cost theory of equity joint ventures. Strategic 
Management Journal, 9, 361- 374. 
Hennart, J. F. (1989). Can the „new forms of investment‟ substitute for the „old forms‟? A 
transaction costs perspective. Journal of International Business Studies, 20, 211- 34. 
Hennart, J. F. (1991). The transaction costs theory of joint ventures: An empirical study 
of Japanese subsidiaries in the United States. Management Science, 37, 483- 497. 
Hilgard, E. R., & Bower, G. H. (1975). Theories of learning (4
th
 ed.). Englewood Cliffs, 
NJ: Prentice-Hall. 
Hill, R.C., & Hellriegel, D. (1994). Critical contingencies in joint venture management: 
Some lessons from managers. Organization Science, 5(4), 594- 607. 
Hill, R. C., & Lee, Y. J. (1994). Japanese multinationals and east Asian development: The 
case of the automobile industry. In L. Sklair (Ed.), Capitalism and development (pp. 
289-315). London: Routledge. 
Hill, C. (2005). International business: Competing in the global marketplace (5
th 
ed.). 
New York: McGraw-Hill Irwin. 
Hitt, M. A., Levitas, E., Arregle, J., & Borza, A. (2000). Partner selection in emerging 
and develop market contexts: Resource-based and organizational learning 
perspectives. Academy of Management Journal, 43, 449- 467. 
Hitt, M. A., Li, H., & Worthington, IV (2005). Emerging markets as learning 
laboratories: Learning behaviors of local firms and foreign entrants in different 
institutional contexts. Management and Organization Review, 1(3), 353- 380. 
Ho, J. Y. (2009). China‟s 2008 auto industry sales growth slows to 6.7%. Retrieved 
January 18, 2009, from 
http://money.cnn.com/news/newsfeeds/articles/djf500/200901120723DOWJONESDJ
ONLINE000221_FORTUNE5.htm 
Hofstede, G. (1980). Culture‟s consequences: International differences in work-related 
values. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage. 
 364 
 
Holste, J. S. & Fields, D. (2010). Trust and tacit knowledge sharing and use. Journal of 
Knowledge Management, 14(1), 128-140. 
Holstein, J., & Gubrium, J. (1998). Phenomenology, ethnomethodology and interpretive 
practice. In N. Denzin & Y. Lincoln (Eds.), Strategies of qualitative inquiry (pp. 137-
157). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
Holton, R. (2000). Globalization‟s cultural consequences. Annals of the American 
Academy of Political and Social Science, 570, 140- 152. 
Holweg, M., Luo, J., & Oliver, N. (2005). The past, present and future of China‟s 
automotive industry: A value chain perspective. (Working Paper). The Cambridge-
MIT Institute‟s Center for Competitiveness and Innovation. 
Hoopes, D. G., & Postrel, S. (1999). Shared knowledge, glitches, and product 
development performance. Strategic Management Journal, 20, 837- 865.  
Houston, J. P. (1986). Fundamentals of learning and memory (3
rd
 ed.). New York: 
Harcourt Brace Jovanovich. 
Huang, H. (1999). Policy reforms and foreign direct investment: The case of the Chinese 
automotive industry. Fourin, 9(1), 3- 66. 
Huber, G. P. (1991). Organizational learning: The contributing processes and a review of 
the literatures. Organization Science, 2, 88- 117. 
Hughes, J. A. (1990). The philosophy of social research (2
nd
 ed.). London: Longman.  
Humphrey, J., & Memedovic, O. (2003). The global automotive industry value chain: 
What prospects for upgrading by developing countries. Vienna, Austria: United 
Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO).  
Husman, T. B. (2001). Inter-organizational learning and knowledge transfer: Taxonomy 
of knowledge transfer costs. Paper Presented at the DRUID Conference, January 18-
20, 2001, Copenhagen.  
Hyder, A. S. (1999). Differences between developed and developing country joint 
ventures – A reality or a myth? International Business Review, 8(4), 441- 461. 
Hyder, A. S., & Abraha, A. (2003). Strategic alliances in eastern and central Europe. 
Oxford, England: Elsevier Science. 
Iles, P., & Yolles, M. (2002). International joint ventures, HRM and viable knowledge 
migration. International Journal of Human Resource Management, June, 13(4), 624- 
641. 
Inkpen, A. C. (1995). The management of international joint ventures: An organizational 
learning perspective. London: Routledge. 
Inkpen, A. C. (1996). Creating knowledge through collaboration. California Management 
Review, 39(1), 123- 140.  
 365 
 
Inkpen, A. C. (1997). An examination of knowledge management in international joint 
ventures. In P. W. Beamish & J. P. Killing (eds.), Cooperative strategies: North 
American perspectives (pp. 337- 369). San Francisco: The New Lexington Press. 
Inkpen, A. C., & Beamish, P. W. (1997). Knowledge, bargaining power, and the 
instability of international joint ventures. Academy of Management Review, 22(1), 
177- 203.  
Inkpen A. C., & Crossan, M. M. (1995). Believing is seeing: Joint ventures and 
organization learning. Journal of Management Studies, 32(5), 595-618. 
Inkpen, A. C. (1998). Learning, knowledge acquisition and strategic alliances. European 
Management Journal, 16(2), 223- 9. 
Inkpen, A. C., & Dinur, A. (1998). Knowledge management processes and international 
joint ventures. Organization Science, 9(4), 454- 468. 
Inkpen, A. C. (2000). Learning through joint ventures: A framework of knowledge 
acquisition. Journal of Management Studies, 37(7), 1019- 1051. 
Inkpen, A. C. (2002). Learning, knowledge management, and strategic alliances: So 
many studies, so many unanswered questions. In F. Contractor & P. Lorange (Eds.), 
Cooperative strategies and alliances (pp. 267-289). Amsterdam: Pergamon. 
Inkpen, A. C., & Pien, W. (2006). An examination of collaboration and knowledge 
transfer: China–Singapore Suzhou industrial park. Journal of Management Studies, 
43(4), 780- 811. 
Inkpen, A. C., & Ramaswamy, K. (2006). Global strategy: Creating and sustaining 
advantage across borders. New York: Oxford University Press.  
Inkpen, A. C., & Tsang, E. W. K. (2005). Social capital, networks, and knowledge 
transfer. Academy of Management Review, 30(1), 146- 165. 
In pieces. (2009, February 19). The Economist. Retrieved February 25, 2009, from 
http://www.economist.com/business/displaystory.cfm?story_id=13145718 
Ireland, R. D., Hitt, M. A., & Vaidyanath, D. (2002). Alliance management as a source of 
competitive advantage. Journal of Management, 28(3), 413- 446.  
Jackson, S., & Schuler, R. (2003). Managing human resources: A partnership perspective 
(8
th
 ed.). Cincinnati, OH: South-Western Publishing. 
JAMA (2009). Japan‟s auto industry. Retrieved January 15, 2009, from 
http://www.jama.org/about/industry1.htm 
Jennings, G. (2001). Tourism research. Queensland, Australia: John Wiley & Sons. 
Jin, H., Qian, Y., & Weingast, B. R. (1999). Regional decentralization and fiscal 
incentives: Federalism, Chinese style (Working Paper Number 99-013). Department of 
Economics, Standford University, California, 1999. 
 366 
 
Johanson, J., & Mattsson, L. G. (1987). Inter-organizational relations in industrial 
systems: A network approach compared with the transaction cost approach. 
International Studies of Management and Organization, 17(1), 34- 48.  
Johanson, J., & Mattsson, L. G. (1988). Formal and informal cooperation strategies in 
industrial networks. In F. J. Contractor & P. Lorange (Eds.), Cooperative strategies in 
international business (pp. 1-18). Lexington, MA: Lexington Books. 
Johanson, J., & Vahlne, J. E. (1977). The internationalization process of the firm: A 
model of knowledge development and increasing foreign market commitments. 
Journal of International Business Studies, 8, 23- 33. 
Jones, G. R. (2001). Organizational theory, design, and change: Text and cases (3
rd
 ed.). 
Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice-Hall. 
Jonscher, C. (2000). Wired life: Who are we in the digital age? London: Anchor 
Transworld Publishers/Random House. 
Kang, Y. (2002). Performance and network governance in international joint ventures: 
Case studies of three China-New Zealand JVs. Unpublished Doctoral Thesis, 
Auckland University, New Zealand. 
KBizZle (2005). Case Study of Automobile Industry, General Motors (GM) Focus. 
Retrieved April 7, 2010, from http://www.echeat.com/essay.php?t=27560 
Kedia, B. L., & Bhagat, R. S. (1988). Cultural constraints on transfer of technology 
across nations: Implications for research in international and comparative 
management. Academy of Management Review, 13(4), 559- 71. 
Keller, M. (2003). China: The new frontier. Retrieved April 9, 2010, from 
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m3012/is_2_183/ai_97998446/ 
Kennedy, E. D. (1972). The automobile industry;the coming of age of capitalism‟s 
favorite child. Clifton, NJ: Augustus M. Kelly Publishers.   
Key General Motors Company Facts. (n.d.). Company Profile. Retrieved April 9, 2010, 
from 
http://www.opel.co.za/content_data/LAAM/ZA/en/GBPZA/999/key_gmc_facts.html 
Khanna, T., Gulati, R., & Nohria, N. (1998). The dynamic of learning alliances: 
Competition, cooperation, and relative scope. Strategic Management Journal, 19, 193- 
210. 
Killing, J. P. (1982). How to make a global joint venture work. Harvard Business Review, 
60(3), 120-127. 
Killing, J. P. (1983). Strategies for joint venture success. New York: Praeger Publishers.  
Knight, G. A., & S. T. Cavusgil (2004). Innovation, organizational capabilities, and the 
born-global firm. Journal of International Business Studies, 35(2), 124-141. 
 367 
 
Kobayashi, N. (1988). Strategic alliances with Japanese firms. Long Range Planning, 
21(2), 29-34. 
Kogut, B. (1988a). Joint ventures: Theoretical and empirical perspectives. Strategic 
Management Journal, 9, 319- 332. 
Kogut, B. (1988b). A study of the life cycle of joint ventures. In F. J. L. Contractor & P. 
Lorange (Eds.), Cooperative strategies in international business (pp. 183-198). 
Lexington, MA: Lexington Books. 
Kogut, B. (2000). The network as knowledge: Generative rules and the emergence of 
structure (Special Issue). Strategic Management Journal, 21, 405- 425. 
Kogut, B., & Zander, U. (1992). Knowledge of the firm, combinative capabilities, and the 
replication of technology. Organization Science, 3(2), 383- 397. 
Kogut, B., & Zander, U. (1993). Knowledge of the firm and the evolutionary theory of 
the multinational corporation. Journal of International Business Studies, 24(4), 625- 
645. 
Kogut, B., & Zander, U. (1996). What firms do: Coordination, identity and learning. 
Organization Science, 7(5), 502- 518. 
Korzeniewski, J. (2008). Wagoner: GM didn‟t build hybrids because nobody wanted 
them. Retrieved April 8, 2010 from http://green.autoblog.com/2008/07/11/wagoner-
gm-didnt-build-hybrids-because-nobody-wanted-them/ 
Kostova, T. (1999). Transnational transfer of strategic organizational practices: A 
contextual perspective. Academy of Management Review, 24(2), 308- 324.  
Kotler, P. (1997). Marketing management. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall. 
Koza, M. P., & Lewin, A. Y. (1998). The co-evolution of strategic alliances. 
Organizational Science, 9, 255- 264. 
Kuhn, T. (1970). The structure of scientific revolutions. Chicago: The University of 
Chicago Press.  
Kumar, R. M., Cyert, P. K., & Williams, J. R. (1993). Information, market imperfections 
and strategy. Strategic Management Journal, 14, 47-58. 
Lam, A. (1997). Embedded firms, embedded knowledge: Problems of collaboration and 
knowledge transfer in global cooperative Ventures. Organisation Studies, 18(6), 973-
996. 
Lane, H., & Beamish, P. (1990). Cross-cultural cooperative behavior in joint ventures in 
LDCs. Management International Review, 30(Special Issue), 87-102. 
Lane, P. J., Lyles, M. A., & Salk, J. E. (2001a). Relative absorptive capacity, trust, and 
learning in international joint ventures. In M. A. Hitt, J. E. Ricart & R. D. Nixon 
(Eds.), Managing strategically in an interconnected world (pp. 373-397). New York: 
 368 
 
Wiley. 
Lane, P. J., Salk, J. E., & Lyles, M. A. (2001b). Absorptive capacity, learning, and 
performance in international joint ventures. Strategic Management Journal, 22, 1139–
1161. 
Lau, C. M., Lu, Y., Makino, S. Chen, X., & Yeh, R. S. (2002). Knowledge management 
of high-tech firms. In A. S. Tsui & C. M. Lau (Eds.), The management of enterprises 
in the People‟s Republic of China (pp. 183-210). Boston: Kluwer.  
Layder, D. (1988). The relation of theory and method: Causal relatedness, historical 
contingency and beyond. Sociological Review, 36(3), 441-463.  
Lee, D. (1997). Korean automotive industry in transition. Retrieved January 16, 2009, 
from http://imvp.mit.edu/papers/98/163a.pdf 
Lei, D., & Slocum, J. W. (1992). Global strategy, competence-building and strategic 
alliances. California Management Review, 35(1), 81-97. 
Leonard-Barton, D. (1992). Core capabilities and core rigidities: A paradox in managing 
new product development. Strategic Management Journal, 13(Special Issue), 111-126. 
Lethbridge, D. (1992). Factors influencing Australia‟s position in the global automobile 
industry (Occasional Paper, No. 126). Melbourne, Australia, Deakin University, 
Faculty of Commerce. 
Li, J. T., & Shenkar, O. (1996). In search of complementary assets: Cooperative strategies 
and knowledge by prospective Chinese partners. In J. Child & Y. Lu (Eds.), 
Management issues in China: Volume 2, international enterprises. London: 
Routledge. 
Li, J. T., & Tsui, A. S. (2000). Management and organizations in the Chinese context: An 
overview. In J. T. Li, A. S. Tsui & E. Weldon (Eds.), Management and organizations 
in the Chinese context. New York: Macmillan Press. 
Lieberman, M. B., & Montgomery, D. B. (1998). First-mover (dis)advantages: 
retrospective and link with the resource-based view. Strategic Management Journal, 
19, 1111- 1125.  
Lindlof, T. R., & Taylor, B. C. (2002). Qualitative communication research methods (2
nd
 
ed.). Thousands Oaks, CA: Sage. 
Lin, X. H., & Germain, R. (1998). Sustaining satisfactory joint venture relationships: The 
role of conflict resolution strategy. Journal of International Business Studies, 1, 179-
196. 
Ling, P. J. (1990). America and the automobile: Technology, reform and social change. 
Manchester, England: Manchester University Press. 
Liu, J., & Tylecote, A. (2009). Corporate governance and technological capability 
development: Three case studies in the Chinese auto industry. Industry & Innovation, 
 369 
 
16(4), 525-544.  
Lockyer, T. (2005). The perceived importance of price as one hotel selection dimension. 
Tourism Management, 26, 529-537.  
Long, D., & Seemann, P. (2000). Confronting conceptual confusion and conflict in 
knowledge management. Organizational Dynamics, 29(1), 33- 44.  
Lorange, P., Roos, J. (1993). Strategic alliances: Formation, implementation, and 
evolution. Cambridge, MA: Blackwell. 
Lundqvist, L., Button, K., & Nijkamp, P. (Eds.) (2003). The automobile. Cheltenham, 
England: An Elgar Reference Collection. 
Luo, J. X. (2005). The growth of independent Chinese automotive companies (Working 
Paper). Cambridge, MA: MIT International Motor Vehicle Program. 
Luo, Y. (1998). Timing of investment and international expansion performance in China. 
Journal of International Business Studies, 29, 391- 408. 
Luo, Y. (2000). Partnering with Chinese firms: Lessons for international managers. 
Aldershot, UK: Ashgate. 
Luo, Y. (2001). Strategy, structure, and performance of MNCs in China. Westport, CT: 
Quorum Books. 
Luo, Y. (2002). Contract, cooperation, and performance in international joint ventures. 
Strategic Management Journal, 23, 903-919. 
Luo, Y., & Peng, M. W. (1999). Learning to compete in a transition economy: 
Experience, environment, and performance. Journal of International Business Studies, 
30(2), 269- 295. 
Lyles, M. A. (1987). Common mistakes of joint venture experienced firms. Columbia 
Journal of World Business, 22, 79-85. 
Lyles, M. A. (1988). Learning among joint venture sophisticated firms. Management 
International Review, 28, 85-98. 
Lyles, M. A. (1994). The impact of organizational learning on joint venture formations. 
International Business Review, 3(4), 459-67. 
Lyles, M. A., & Gudergan, S. P. (2006). Learning and knowledge development in 
alliances. In O. Shenkar & J. J. Reuer (Eds.), Handbook of strategic alliances (pp. 
241-255). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
Lyles, M. A., & Salk, J. E. (1996). Knowledge acquisition from foreign parents in 
international joint ventures. Journal of International Business Studies, 27(5), 877- 904. 
Lyles, M. A., & Steensma, H. K. (1997). An examination of IJV survival in a transitional 
economy (Working Paper). Cambridge, England, University of Cambridge in 
Management Studies. 
 370 
 
Lynn, L., & Rao, H. (1995). Failures of intermediate forms: A study of the Suzuki 
Zaibatsu. Organization Studies, 16, 55- 80. 
Madhok A. (1996). The organization of economic activity: Transaction costs, firm 
capabilities, and the nature of governance. Organization Science, 7, 577- 590. 
Makhija, M. V., & Ganesh, U. (1997). The relationship between control and partner 
learning in learning-related joint venture. Organization Science, 8(5), 508-527.  
Mallela, K. (2009). Evolution and pattern of FDI in China: An outlook oriented study. 
Retrieved April 10, 2009, from 
http://www.associatedcontent.com/article/1433408/evolution_and_pattern_of_fdi_in_c
hina_pg5.html 
March, J. G. (1991). Exploration and exploitation in organizational learning. 
Organization Science, 2, 71-87. 
MarketWatch (2005). GM may help China ally build own car: Shanghai Automotive aims 
for independent brand. Retrieved April 24, 2010, from 
http://www.marketwatch.com/story/gm-may-help-china-partner-on-own-brand-car-
report 
MarketWatch (2009). Market Watch No. 5, 2009. Retrieved April 10, 2009, from 
http://www.bjreview.com.cn/business/txt/2009-02/02/content_176492_2.htm 
Markoczy, L. (1993). Managerial and organizational learning in Hungarian-Western 
mixed management organizations. International Journal of Human Resource 
Management, 4(2), 277-304. 
Marquardt, M. J., & Reynolds, A. (1994). The global learning organization: Gaining 
competitive advantage through continuous learning. London: McGraw-Hill. 
Marschan-Piekkari, R., & Welch, C. (Eds.). (2004). A handbook of qualitative research 
methods for international business. Cheltenham, England: Edward Elgar. 
Marschan-Piekkari, R., Welch, C., Penttinen, H., & Tahvanainen, M. (2004). 
Interviewing in the multinational corporation: Challenges of the organizational 
context. In R. Marschan-Piekkari & C. Welch (Eds.), A handbook of qualitative 
research methods for international business (pp. 244-263). Cheltenham, England: 
Edward Elgar. 
Marshall, C., & Rossman, G. B. (1989). Designing qualitative research. Newbury Park, 
CA: Sage. 
Martin, X., & Salomon, R. (2003). Tacitness, learning and international expansion: A 
study of foreign direct investment in a knowledge-intensive industry. Organization 
Science, 14(3), 297- 311. 
Mascarenhas, B. (1997). The order and size of entry into international markets. Journal of 
Business Venturing, 12, 287- 299. 
 371 
 
Mason, K. J., & Leek, S. (2008). Learning to build a supply network: An exploration of 
dynamic business models. Journal of Management Studies, 45, 759-84.  
MCAD (2005). General Motors names new GM China Group leader. Retrieved 
February, 18, 2009 from 
http://www10.mcadcafe.com/nbc/articles/index.php?articleid=173703 
McEvily, B., Perrone, V., & Zaheer, A. (2003). Trust as an organizing principle. 
Organization Science, 14(1), 91-103. 
McGunagle, D. M. (2007). The Chinese auto industry: Taming the dragon. Saarbrucken, 
Germany: VDM Verlag Dr. Mu ller. 
McNeill, P. (1985). Research methods. New York: Tavistock.  
Mercer, D., & Powell, J. (1972). Phenomenology and related non-positivistic viewpoints 
in the social sciences. Victoria, Australia: Monash University Publications in 
Geography. 
Meschi, P. X. (1997). Longevity and cultural differences of international joint ventures: 
Toward time-based cultural management. Human Relations, 50(2), 211-228. 
Meyer, J. & Rowan, B. (1977). Institutionalized organizations: Formal structure as myth 
and ceremony. American Journal of Sociology, 83,340-363. 
Michailova, S. (2004). Contextualising fieldwork: Reflections on conducting research in 
eastern Europe. In R. Marschan-Piekkari & C. Welch (Eds.), A handbook of 
qualitative research methods for international business (pp. 365-383). Cheltenham, 
England: Edward Elgar. 
Miesing, P., & Slough, N. (2003). Toward a model of transferring best practices within 
transnationals: The case of Chinese foreign invested enterprises. In Proceedings of the 
Academy of International Business, AIB-SE (USA), 2003 Annual Meeting, November, 
2003. Clearwater, FL, USA. 
Miesing, P., Kriger, M. P., & Slough, N. (2007). Towards a model of effective knowledge 
transfer within transnationals: The case of Chinese foreign invested enterprises. The 
Journal of Technology Transfer, 32(1-2), 109-122.  
Miles, M. B., & Huberman, A. M. (1994). Qualitative data analysis, (Vol. 2). Thousand 
Oaks, CA: Sage. 
Milgrom, P., & Roberts, J. (1992). Economics, organisation and management. 
Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall. 
Millington A., & Bayliss, B. (1995). Transnational joint ventures between UK and EU 
manufacturing companies and the structure of competition. Journal of International 
Business Studies, 26(2), 239-54. 
Mills, C. W. (1953). The sociological imagination. New York: Oxford University Press.  
 372 
 
Miner, A. S., Bassoff, P., & Moorman, C. (2001). Contours of organizational 
improvisation and learning. Administrative Science Quarterly, 46, 304- 337. 
Mintzberg, H. (1979). The structuring of organizations. Engelwood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice 
Hall. 
Mjoen, H., & Tallman, S. (1997). Control and performance in international joint ventures. 
Organization Science, 8(3), 257-74.  
Moore, M. (2009). Chinese deal for GM‟s Hummer „still on‟. Retrieved July 4, 2009, 
from http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/transport/5697661/Chinese-
deal-for-GMs-Hummer-still-on.html 
Morgan, G., & Smircich, L. (1980). The case for qualitative research. Academy of 
Management Review, 5(4), 491-500. 
Mowery, D. C., Oxley, J. E., & Silverman, B. S. (1996). Strategic alliances and interfirm 
knowledge transfer. Strategic Management Journal, 17, 77-92. 
Muthusamy, S. K., & White, M. A. (2005). Learning and knowledge transfer in strategic 
alliances: A social exchange view. Organization Studies, 26(3), 415- 441. 
Nahapiet, J., & Ghoshal, S. (1998). Social capital, intellectual capital and the 
organizational advantage. Academy of Management Review, 23(2), 242- 266. 
Nelson, R., & Winter, S. (1982). An evolutionary theory of economic change. Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard Business Press. 
Ness, H. (2009). Governance, negotiations, and alliance dynamics: Explaining the 
evolution of relational practice. Journal of Management Studies, 46(3), 451-480. 
Neuman, W. L. (2000). Social research methods: Qualitative and quantitative 
approaches (4
th
 ed.). Boston: Pearson Education. 
Newman, R. J. (2004, June 21). Motorcars for the masses. U.S. News & World Report. 
Retrieved November 8, 2006, from 
http://www.usnews.com/usnews/biztech/articles/040621/21china.htm 
Nilsson, K. (1996). Practice, myths and theories for change: The reconstruction of an 
eastern Germany organization. Organization studies, 17(2), 291-309. 
Nobel, R., & Birkinshaw, J. (1998). Innovation in multinational corporations: Control and 
communication patterns in international R&D operations. Strategic Management 
Journal, 19(5), 479-496. 
Nonaka, I. (1991). The knowledge-creating company. Harvard Business Review, 69(6), 
96-104. 
Nonaka, I. (1994). A dynamic theory of organizational knowledge creation. Organization 
Science, 5(1), 14-37. 
Nonaka, I., & Konno, N. (1998). The concept of „ba‟: Building a foundation for 
 373 
 
knowledge creation. California Management Review, 40(3), 40-54.  
Nonaka, I., & Takeuchi, H. (1995). The knowledge-creating company. New York: Oxford 
University Press. 
Nonaka, I., Toyama, R., & Konno, N. (2000). SECI, ba and leadership: A unified model 
of dynamic knowledge creation. Long Range Planning, 33(1), 5-34. 
Noorderhaven, N. G. (2004). Hermeneutic methodology and international business 
research. In R. Marschan-Piekkari & C. Welch (Eds.), A handbook of qualitative 
research methods for international business (pp. 84-104). Cheltenham, England: 
Edward Elgar.  
Nunez, A. (2009). Shanghai GM stumbles in „08‟. Retrieved May 12, 2009, from 
http://www.autoblog.com/2009/01/06/shanghai-gm-stumbles-in-08/ 
OICA (2007). 2007 production statistics. Retrieved November 13, 2008, from 
http://oica.net/category/production-statistics/ 
Osnos, E. (2006, March 26). Buick China‟s cup of tea. Chicago Tribune. Retrieved April 
18, 2010, from 
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2006-03-26/business/0603260182_1_gm-asia-pacific-
automotive-resources-asia-president-of-gm-china/2 
Ouchi, W. G. (1980). Markets, bureaucracies and clans. Administrative Science 
Quarterly, 25, 129-141.  
Page, C., & Meyer, D. (2000). Applied research design for business and management. 
Sydney, Australia: Irwin/McGrawHill. 
Pan, Y., & Tse, D. K. (1996). Co-operative strategies between foreign firms in an 
overseas country. Journal of International Business Studies, 27(5), 929- 47. 
Parkhe, A. (1991). Interfirm diversity, organizational learning, and longevity in global 
strategic alliances. Journal of International Business Studies, 22(4), 579- 601. 
Parkhe, A. (1993a). “Messy” research, methodological predispositions, and theory 
development in international joint ventures. Academy of Management Review, 18(2), 
227-268.  
Parkhe, A. (1993b). Strategic alliance structuring: A game theoretic and transaction cost 
examination of inter-firm cooperation. Academy of Management Journal, 36, 794-829.  
Parkhe, A. (2006). Research methods in alliances. In O. Shenkar & J.J. Reuer (Eds.), 
Handbook of strategic alliances. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
Pauwels, P., & Matthyssens, P. (2004). The architecture of multiple case study research 
in international business. In R. Marschan-Piekkari & C. Welch (Eds.), A handbook of 
qualitative research methods for international business (pp. 125-143). Cheltenham, 
England: Edward Elgar.  
 374 
 
Pavlovich, K. (2000). The organization of supply in a tourism destination: An analysis of 
a networked community - The Waitomo caves village. Unpublished Doctoral Thesis, 
the University of Waikato, Hamilton, New Zealand. 
Pavlovich, K., & Akoorie, M. (2003). Strategic alliances and collaborative partnerships: 
A case book. Palmerston North, New Zealand: Dunmore Press. 
Pavlovich, K., & Corner, P. D. (2006). Knowledge creation through co-entrepreneurship. 
International Journal of Knowledge Management Studies, 1(1/2), 178-197. 
Pearce, R. J. (1997). Toward understanding joint venture performance and survival: A 
bargaining and influence approach to transaction cost theory. Academy of Management 
Review, 22(1), 203-225. 
Pearson, M. M. (1991). Joint ventures in the People‟s Republic of China: The control of 
foreign direct investment under socialism. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Peng, M. W., & Heath, P. S. (1996). The growth of the firm in planned economies in 
transition: Institutions, organizations and strategic choice. Academy of Management 
Review, 21(2), 492-528.  
Peng, M. W. (2000). Controlling the foreign agent: How governments deal with 
multinationals in a transition economy. Management International Review, 40, 141-
166.  
Peng, M. W. (2001). The resource-based view and international business. Journal of 
Management, 27, 803- 830.  
Peng, M. W. (2006). Global strategy. Mason, OH: Thomson South-Western. 
Peng, M. W. (2009). Global business. Mason, OH: Thomson South-Western. 
Peng, M. W., & Luo, Y. (2000). Managerial ties and firm performance in a transition 
economy: The nature of a micro-macro link. Academy of Management Journal, 43(3), 
486-501. 
Peng, M. W., & Shenkar, O. (2002). Joint venture dissolution as corporate divorce. 
Academy of Management Executive, 16(2), 92-105.  
Penrose, E. T. (1956). Foreign investment and the growth of the firm. Economic Journal, 
60, 220-235. 
Penrose, E. T. (1959). The theory of the growth of the firm. New York: Wiley. 
Perez-Nordtvedt, L., Kedia, B. L., Datta, D. K., & Rasheed, A. A. (2008). Effectiveness 
and efficiency of cross-border knowledge transfer: An empirical examination. Journal 
of Management Studies, 45, 699-729. 
Persson, M. (2006). The impact of operational structure, lateral integrative mechanisms 
and control mechanisms on intra-MNE knowledge transfer. International Business 
Review, 15(5), 547- 569. 
 375 
 
Pisano, G. P. (1989). Using equity participation of support exchange: Evidence from the 
biotechnology Industry. Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 5, 109-126. 
Podaskoff, L. T., & Dalton, D. R. (1987). Research methodology in organizational 
studies. Journal of Management, 13(2), 419- 444.  
Polanyi, M. (1958). Personal knowledge. Towards a post-critical philosophy. London: 
Routlege & Kegan Paul.  
Polanyi, M. (1966). The tacit dimension. Garden City, NY: Doubleday. 
Pollard, D. (2001). Learning in international joint ventures. In M. H. Tayeb (Ed.), 
International business partnership: Issues and concerns (Chapter 4). London: 
Palgrave. 
Pollard, D. & Tayeb, M.  H. (1997). National culture and teaching management practices. 
In U. Groner, H. M. de Jongste, U. Kracke, & H. Senne (Eds.), Wirtschafts-
wissenschaft: Anwendungsorientierte Forschung an der Schwelle des 21. 
Jahrhunderts (Economic and Business Studies: Applied research on the threshold of 
the 21
 
century, pp. 57-69). Heidelberg, Germany: R.V. Decker‟s Verlag. 
Porter, M. E., & Fuller, M. B. (1986). Coalitions and global strategy. In M. E. Porter 
(Ed.), Competition in global industries (pp. 315-344). Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press. 
Powell, W. W. (1990). Neither market nor hierarchy: Network forms of organization. In 
L. L. Cummings & B. M. Staw (Eds.), Research in organizational behavior (pp. 295-
336, Vol. 12). Greenwich, CT: JAI Press. 
Powell, W. W., Koput, K. W., & Smith-Doerr, L. S. (1996). Interorganizational 
collaboration and the locus of innovation: Networks of learning in biotechnology. 
Administrative Science Quarterly, 41, 116-145. 
Prahalad, C. K., & Hamel, G.  (1990). The core competence of the corporation. Harvard 
Business Review, 68, 79- 91. 
Prasad, P. (2003). Crafting qualitative research: Working in the post-positivist traditions. 
New York: M.E. Sharpe. 
PricewaterhouseCoopers (2008). Global automotive perspective 2008. Available at 
www.pwc.com 
PRLog (2009). Report of Chinese automobile industry under international financial 
crisis, 2009. Retrieved April 10, 2009, from http://www.prlog.org/10199939-report-
of-chinese-automobile-industry-under-international-financial-crisis-2009.html 
PR Newswire (2005). General Motors names new GM China Group leader. Retrieved 
April 15, 2010, from http://www.encyclopedia.com/doc/1G1-131025861.html 
PR Newswire (2009). GM and SAIC promote fuel cell propulsion technology. Retrieved 
April 19, 2009, from 
 376 
 
http://www.streetinsider.com/Press+Releases/GM+and+SAIC+Promote+Fuel+Cell+P
ropulsion+Technology/4570627.html 
Pucik, V. (1991). Technology transfer in strategic alliances: Competitive collaboration 
and organizational learning. In T. Agmon & M. Von Glinow (Eds), Technology 
transfer in international business (pp. 121-38). New York: Oxford University Press.  
Quinn, J. B. (1992). Intelligent enterprise: A knowledge and service based paradigm for 
industry. New York: Free Press. 
Rae, J. B. (1984). The American automobile industry. Boston, MA: Twayne Publishers. 
Ragin, C. C. (1994). Constructing social research: The unity and diversity of method. 
Newbury Park, CA: Pine Forge Press. 
Ramos, A. D. (2001). Power Steering: General Motors hits the road to profitability in 
China. Retrieved April 28, 2010, from 
http://zoomsummary.com/people/Paenen_Louis_226190972.aspx 
Reuters (2010). GM files public stock offering. Retrieved August 31, 2010, from 
http://tvnz.co.nz/business-news/gm-files-public-stock-offering-3715889 
Richter, F. J. (2001). China‟s entry into the WTO and the impact on Western firms. China 
Economic Review, 11(4), 423-426.   
Ring, P. S., & Van de Venn, A. H. (1992). Structuring cooperative relationships between 
organizations. Strategic Management Journal, 13, 483- 498. 
Ring, P. S., & Van de Ven, A. H. (1994). Developmental process of cooperative 
interorganizational relationships. Academy of Management Review, 19(1), 90-118.  
Ritzer, G. (1983). Sociological theory. New York: Knopf.  
RNCOS (2008). Brazil automobile industry till 2010. Retrieved January 16, 2009, from 
http://www.marketresearch.com/product/display.asp?productid=1665341&g=1 
Robins, J. A. (1987). Organizational economics: Notes on the use of transaction cost 
theory in the study of organizations. Administrative Science Quarterly, 32(1), 68- 86. 
Robson, C. (1993). Real world research: A resource for social scientists and 
practitioner-researchers. Oxford, England: Blackwell Publishers. 
Rolland, N., & Chauvel, D. (2000). Knowledge transfer in strategic alliances. In C. 
Despres & D. Chauvel (Eds.), Knowledge horizons: The present and the promise of 
knowledge management (pp. 225-237). Boston: Butterworth-Heinemann. 
Romano, C. (1989). Research strategies for small business: A case study approach. 
International Small Business Journal, 7(4), 35- 43. 
Roos, J., Roos, G., Dragonetti, N. C., & Edvinsson, L. (1997). Intellectual capital: 
Navigating the new business landscape. London: Macmilllan. 
Rouse, M. J., & Daellenbach, U. S. (1999). Rethinking research methods for the resource-
 377 
 
based perspective: Isolating sources of sustainable competitive advantage. Strategic 
Management Journal, 20(5), 487-494. 
Rover 75 (2010). Chinese production. Retrieved April 27, 2010, from 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rover_75 
Rowley, T., Behrens, D., & Krackhardt, D. (2000). Redundant governance structures: An 
analysis of structural and relational embeddedness in the steel and semiconductor 
industries. Strategic Management Journal, 21, 369-386. 
Sako, M. (2004). Supplier development at Honda, Nissan and Toyota: Comparative case 
studies of organizational capability enhancement. Industrial and Corporate Change, 
13(2), 281–308. 
Salk, J. E., & Simonin, B. (2003). Beyond alliances: Towards a meta-theory of 
collaborative learning. In M. Easterby-Smith & M. Lyles (Eds.), The Blackwell 
handbook of organizational learning and knowledge management. Malden, MA: 
Blackwell. 
Sammarra, A., & Biggiero, L. (2008). Heterogeneity and specificity of inter-firm 
knowledge flows in innovation networks. Journal of Management Studies, 45, 785-
814. 
Sarantakos, S. (1993). Social research. Melbourne, Australia: Macmillan Education. 
Sauer, A., & Wellington, F. (2004). Taking the high (fuel economy) road. World 
Resources Institute, November. Available at www.capitalmarkets.wri.org 
Schein, E. H. (1993). How can organizations learn faster? The challenge of entering the 
green room. Sloan Management Review, 35, 85-92. 
Schlegelmilch, B. B., & Chini, T. C. (2003). Knowledge transfer between marketing 
functions in multinational companies: A conceptual model. International Business 
Review, 12, 215- 232. 
Schuler, R. S., & Tarique, I. (2006). Alliance forms and human resource issues, 
implications, and significance. In O. Shenkar & J.J. Reuer (Eds.), Handbook of 
strategic alliances. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
Schulz, M. (2001). The uncertain relevance of newness: Organizational learning and 
knowledge flows. Academy of Management Journal, 44(4), 661- 682. 
Seibert, K. W., & Daudelin, M. W. (1999). The role of reflection in managerial learning: 
Theory, research, and practice. Westport, CT: Quorum. 
SEMA (2008). U.S. auto market may mimic Europe. Retrieved November 16, 2008, from 
http://www.sema.org/Main/ArticleDetail.aspx?fc_c=1123885x2468667x66059664&c
ontentID=59806 
Senge, P. (1991). The fifth discipline: The art and practice of the learning organization. 
London: Randon House.  
 378 
 
SGM products (2007). Wuxi jixing Auto Interior Trimming Co., Ltd. Retrieved April 17, 
2010, from 
http://www.wxjixing.com/wxjixing/english/products2.aspx?class=63&classl2=75 
Shanghai Auto Leads Chinese Car Industry (2000, June 2). People‟s Daily: Business. 
Retrieved April 8, 2010, from 
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/english/200006/02/eng20000602_42157.html 
Shanghai Automotive Industry Corporation (SAIC). (2005). Annual Report 2004. 
Shanghai, China: Author. 
Shanghai Automotive Industry Corporation (SAIC). (2007). Annual Report 2006. 
Shanghai, China: Author. 
Shanghai GM (2010). Shanghai General Motors Company Limited. Retrieved April 23, 
2010, from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shanghai_GM 
Shapiro, J. (2001). Mao‟s war against nature: Politics and the environment in 
revolutionary China. New York: Cambridge University Press.  
Sharp, M., & Barz, M. (1997). Multinational companies and the transfer and diffusion of 
new technological capabilities in central and eastern Europe and the former Soviet 
Union. In D. A. Dyker (Ed.), The technology of transition (pp. 95-125). Budapest, 
Hungary: Central European University Press. 
Shenkar, O., & Li, J. T. (1999). Knowledge search in international cooperative ventures. 
Organization Science, 10(2), 134-143.  
Shenkar, O., & Yan, A. (2002). Failure as a consequence of partner politics: Learning 
from the life and death of an international cooperative venture. Human Relations, 
55(5), 565-583.  
Shimokawa, K. (1994). The Japanese automobile industry: A business history. Atlantic 
Highlands, NJ: The Athlone Press. 
Shrivastava, P. (1981). Strategic decision-making process: The influence of 
organizational learning and influence. Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation, University 
of Pittsburgh.  
Si, S. X., & Bruton, G. D. (1999). Knowledge transfer in international joint ventures in 
transitional economies: The China experience.  Academy of Management Executive, 
13(1), 83. 
Silverman, D. (1995). Interpreting qualitative data: Methods for analyzing talk, text, and 
integration. London: Sage. 
Silverman, D. (2000). Doing qualitative research: A practical handbook. London: Sage.  
Simonin, B. L. (1999a). Ambiguity and the process of knowledge transfer in strategic 
alliances. Strategic Management Journal, 20, 595-624. 
 379 
 
Simonin, B. L. (1999b). Transfer of marketing know-how in international strategic 
alliances: An empirical investigation of the role and antecedents of knowledge 
ambiguity. Journal of International Business Studies, 30(3), 463- 490. 
Simonin, B. L. (2004). An empirical investigation of the process of knowledge transfer in 
international strategic alliances. Journal of International Business Studies, 35, 407-
427. 
Simonin, B. L., & Helleloid, D. (1993). Do organizations learn? An empirical test of 
organizational learning in international strategic alliances. In D. Moore (Ed.), 
Academy of Management Best Paper Proceedings, 222- 226. 
Singh, J. (2004). Multinational firms and knowledge diffusion: Evidence using patent 
citation data. Retrieved April 9, 2009, from 
http://gsiaserver1.gsia.cmu.edu/seminars/docs/jasjitpaper.pdf 
Singleton, R., Straits, B., Straits, M., & McAllister, R. (1988). Approaches to social 
research. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press. 
Sit, F. S. V., & Liu, W. (2000). Restructuring and spatial change of China‟s auto industry 
under institutional reform and globalization. Annals of Association of American 
Geographers, 90(4), 653-673.  
Smith, D. C. (2004). Coming on strong. Ward‟s Auto World, 40(12), 28. 
Sobel, R. (1984). Car wars: The untold story. New York: Dutton. 
Spender, J. (1994). Organizational knowledge, collective practice and Penrose rents. 
International Business Review, 3(4), 353- 67. 
Spender, J. C. (1996). Making knowledge the basis of the dynamic theory of the firm. 
Strategic Management Journal, 17, 45- 62.  
Spender, G., & Grant, R. (1996). Knowledge and the firm: Overview. Strategic 
Management Journal, 17, 5-9. 
Sproull, N. L. (1988). Handbook of research methods: A guide for practitioners and 
students in the social science. London: The Scarecrow Press.  
Steensma, K., & Lyles, M. A. (2000). Explaining IJV survival in a transitional economy 
through social exchange and knowledge-based perspectives. Strategic Management 
Journal, 21(8), 831–852. 
Stockley, S. (2008). GM cancels all future full-size SUVs. Retrieved November 16, 2008, 
from http://www.worldcarfans.com/9081028.003/gm-cancels-all-future-full-size-suvs 
Stopping in a hurry.  (2008, December 11). The Economist. Retrieved February 23, 2009, 
from http://www.economist.com/science/displaystory.cfm?story_id=12758720 
 380 
 
Strange, R., Kamall, S., & Tan, H. (1998). Operating as a foreign company in China: 
Introduction and overview. In R. Strange (Ed.), Management in China: The experience 
of foreign businesses. London: Frank Cass. 
Strauss, A., & Corbin, J. (1990). Basics of qualitative research: Grounded theory 
procedures and techniques. Newbury Park, CA: Sage. 
Strumpf, D., & Johnson, K. S. (2009). General Motors files for bankruptcy protection. 
Retrieved June 4, 2009, from 
http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20090601/ap_on_bi_ge/us_automakers 
Subramaniam, M., & Venkatraman, N. (2001). Determinants of transnational new 
product development capability: Testing the influence of transferring and deploying 
tacit overseas knowledge. Strategic Management Journal, 22, 359-378. 
Szulanski, G. (1996). Exploring internal stickiness: Impediments to the transfer of best 
practice within the firm. Strategic Management Journal, 17, 27- 43. 
Szulanski, G. (1999). The process of knowledge transfer: A diachronic analysis of 
stickiness. Prepared for OBHDP, Special issue on Knowledge Transfer, June 14. 
Szulanski, G. (2000). The process of knowledge transfer: A diachronic analysis of 
stickiness. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Process, 82(1), 9-27. 
Tallman, S. (2005). Forming and managing shared organization ventures: Resources and 
transaction costs. In D. Faulkner & M. De Rond (Eds.), Cooperative strategy: 
Economic, business, and organizational issues. Oxford, England: Oxford University. 
Tallman, S., & Fladmoe-Lindquist, K. (2002). Internationalization, globalization, and 
capability-based strategy. California Management Review, 45(1), 116- 135. 
Tao, Q. J. (2009). Competing in the Chinese automobile industry. In M. W. Peng, Global 
Business (pp. 245-249). Mason, OH: Thomson South-Western. 
Tashakkori, A., & Teddlie, C. (1998). Mixed methodology: Combining qualitative and 
quantitative approaches. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
Teece, D. J. (1998). Capturing value from knowledge assets: The new economy, markets 
for know-how and intangible assets. California Management Review, 40(3), 55-79. 
The Auto Channel (2007, Aug. 21). SAIC wants more rights in China R&D, but GM 
thinks differently. Retrieved April 21, 2010, from 
http://www.theautochannel.com/news/2007/08/21/059282.html 
The bankruptcy of General Motors: A giant falls.  (2009, June 4). The Economist. 
Retrieved June 14, 2009, from 
http://www.economist.com/displaystory.cfm?story_id=13782942 
The decline and fall of General Motors: Detroitosaurus wrecks (2009, June 4). The 
Economist. Retrieved June 14, 2009, from 
http://www.economist.com/opinion/displaystory.cfm?story_id=13783014 
 381 
 
Thomas, K. (2010). General Motors takes first step towards IPO. Retrieved August 31, 
2010, from 
http://www.nzherald.co.nz/business/news/article.cfm?c_id=3&objectid=10667250 
Thun, E. (2004). Industrial policy, Chinese-style: FDI, regulation, and dreams of national 
champions in the auto sector. Journal of East Asian Studies, 4, 453- 489.  
Tiemessen, I., Lane, H. W., Crosson, M. M., & Inkpen, A. C. (1996). Knowledge 
management in international joint ventures. Paper presented at Global Perspectives on 
Cooperative Strategies, the North American Conference, 1-3 March. Ontario, Canada. 
Tiemessen I., Lane, H. W., Crossan, M. M., & Inkpen, A. C. (1997). Knowledge 
management in international joint ventures. In P.W. Beamish & J.P. Killing (Eds.), 
Cooperative strategies: North American perspective (pp. 370-399). San Francisco: 
New Lexington Press. 
Time for a new driver. (2009, April 2). The Economist. Retrieved April 5, 2009, from 
http://www.economist.com/business/displaystory.cfm?story_id=13414108 
Todeva, E., & Knoke, D. (2005). Strategic alliances and models of collaboration. 
Management Decision, 43(1), 123-148.  
Triandis, H. C. (1972). The analysis of subjective culture. New York: John Wiley. 
Trompenaars, F. (1993). Riding the waves of culture: Understanding cultural diversity in 
business. London: Economist Books. 
Tsai, W. (2000). Social capital, strategic relatedness and the formation of intra-
organizational linkages. Strategic Management Journal, 21, 925- 939. 
Tsai, W. (2001). Knowledge transfer in intraorganizational networks: Effects of network 
position and absorptive capacity on business unit innovation and performance. 
Academy of Management Journal, 44(5), 996-1004. 
Tsai, W., & Ghoshal, S. (1998). Social capital and value creation: The role of intrafirm 
networks. Academy of Management Journal, 41, 464- 476.  
Tsang, E. W. K. (1998). Can Guanxi be a source of sustained competitive advantage for 
doing business in China? Academy of Management Executive, 12(2), 64-73. 
Tsang, E. W. K. (1999). A preliminary typology of learning in international strategic 
alliances. Journal of World Business, 34, 211-229. 
Tsang, E. W. K. (2001). Managerial learning in foreign-invested enterprises of China. 
Management International Review, 41(1), 29-51. 
Tsang, E. W. K. (2005). Influences on foreign ownership level and entry mode choice in 
Vietnam. International Business Review, 14(4), 441-463. 
Tsang, E. W. K. (2007). Transferring knowledge to enterprises in China. In H. W. Yeung 
(Ed.), Handbook of research on Asian business (pp. 84-98). Cheltenham, England: 
 382 
 
Edward Elgar.  
Tung, R. L. (1994). Human resource issue and technology transfer. International Journal 
of Human Resource Management, 5(4), 807- 25. 
Turner, G. (1963). The car makers. London: Eyre & Spottiswoode.  
USCar News (2007). GM announces US$250 million research hub, energy center in 
China. Retrieved April 26, 2010, from 
http://www.uscar.org/guest/article_view.php?articles_id=182 
Uzzi, B. (1997). Social structure and competition in inter-firm networks: The paradox of 
embeddedness. Administrative Science Quarterly, 42, 35- 67. 
Van Maanen, J. (1983). Qualitative methodology. London: Sage. 
Van Wijk, R., Jansen, J. P., & Lyles, M. A. (2008). Inter- and intra-organizational 
knowledge transfer: A meta-analytic review and assessment of its antecedents and 
consequences. Journal of Management Studies, 45, 815- 38. 
Varadarajan, P. R., & Cunningham, M. H. (1995). Strategic alliances: A synthesis of 
conceptual foundations. Journal of the Academy Science, 23(4), 282- 296. 
Veal, A. J. (2005). Business research methods: A managerial approach (2
nd
 ed.). French 
Forest, NSW, Australia: Pearson Addison Wesley. 
Villinger, R. (1996). Post-acquisition managerial learning in central east Europe. 
Organization studies, 17(2), 181- 206. 
von Glinow, M. A., & Teagarden, M. (1988). The transfer of human resource 
management technology in Sino-US cooperative ventures: Problems and solutions, 
Human Resource Management, 27(2), 201- 229. 
von Krogh, G., Roos, J., & Slocum, K. (1994). An essay on corporate epistemology. 
Strategic Management Journal, 15(Special Issue), 53-71.  
W. Edwards Deming (2010). William Edwards Deming. Retrieved April 7, 2010, from 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/W._Edwards_Deming 
Wagoner‟s fast exit.  (2009, March 30). The Economist. Retrieved April 5, 2009, from 
http://www.economist.com/business/displaystory.cfm?story_id=13398267 
Walters, B. A., Peters, S., & Dess, G. G. (1994). Strategic alliances and joint ventures: 
Making them work. Business Horizons, 37(4), 5-10. 
Wang, C. C., Lee, Y. D., Lin, W., & Zhuo, L. T. (2007).  Effects of personal qualities and 
team processes on willingness to share knowledge: An empirical study. International 
Journal of Management, 24(2), 250-256. 
Wang, H., Richet, X., & Wang, W. (2000) Foreign direct investment in the Chinese 
automotive industry: Country of origin effects (Working Paper). Third EACES Paris 
Workshop, Marne la Vallée University, June 2000. 
 383 
 
Wang, H. (2009).  FACTBOX: China per-capita view. Retrieved April 10, 2009, from 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-04/02/content_11121175.htm 
Wang, W. (2009). Auto sector well prepared for international financial woes. Retrieved 
Jan. 18, 2009, from http://en.ce.cn/Insight/200901/05/t20090105_17873878.shtml 
Wang, X. (2002, October 19-20). Industries need to cope with WTO. China Daily. 
Available at www.chinadaily.com 
Wang, Y., & Nicholas, S. (2005). Knowledge transfer, knowledge replication, and 
learning in non-equity alliances: Operating contractual joint ventures in China. 
Management International Review, 45, 99- 118. 
Ward, J. (1963). Hierarchical grouping to optimize an objective function. Journal of the 
American Statistical Association, 58, 236- 244. 
Webb, A. (2004). GM‟s profits shrink in China. Automotive News, 79(6119), 4. 
Webb, A. (2005). GM adapts platforms to China. Automotive News, June 20.  
Wei, S. J. (2000). Sizing up foreign direct investment in China and India (Working Paper 
No. 85). Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University, Center for Research on Economic 
Development and Policy Reform. 
Wernerfelt, B. (1984). A resource-based view of the firm. Strategic Management Journal, 
5(2), 171-180. 
Westney, D. E. (1988). Domestic and foreign learning curves in managing international 
cooperative strategies. In F. Contractor & P. Lorange (Eds.), Cooperative strategies in 
international business (pp. 339-346). Lexington, MA: Lexington Books.  
Wharton Global Forum (2004). Speakers‟ biographies: Philip Murtaugh, Chairman and 
Chief Executive Officer, GM China. Retrieved April 15, 2010, from 
http://www.whartonshanghai.org/whartonshanghai/bios.html 
Williamson, O. E. (1975). Markets and hierarchies. New York: Free Press.  
Williamson, O. E. (1985). The economic institutions of capitalism. New York: The Free 
Press. 
Williamson, O. E. (1996). The mechanisms of governance. Oxford, England: Oxford 
University Press.  
Willis, J. W. (2007). Foundations of qualitative research: Interpretive and critical 
approaches. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.  
Wingfield, A. (1979). Human learning and memory: An introduction. New York: Harper 
& Row. 
Woelfel, J. K. (1993). Artificial neural networks in policy research: A current assessment. 
Journal of Communication, 43(1), 63- 80.  
Woelfel, J. K. (1998). CATPAC: Users guide. New York: Rah Press. 
 384 
 
Woelfel, J. K., & Stoyanoff, N.J. (1998). CATPAC: A neural network for qualitative 
analysis of text (Working Paper). Buffalo, NY: University of New York. 
World Bank (1997). China 2020: Development challenges in the new century. 
Washington, DC: Author. 
Wra, R. (2007, May 10). Fiat to swallow failing GM crop. Sunday Star Times, p. D12. 
Wright, L. L. (1996). Qualitative international management research. In B. J. Punnett & 
O. Shenkar (Eds.), Handbook for international management research (pp. 63- 81). 
Cambridge, MA: Blackwell. 
Xinhua News Agency (2002). GM investment in China successful. Retrieved April 10, 
2010, from http://www.china-embassy.org/eng/xw/t34132.htm 
Xinhua News Agency (2005). New chief of GM China named. Retrieved February 18, 
2009, from http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2005-04/01/content_2774401.htm 
Xia, D. W. (2002). Automotive industry: Technology advancement and industrial 
organizations. Shanghai, China: Shanghai Finance University Press.  
Xue, Z. Y. (2005). Using value chain analysis to make a choice of international 
marketing strategy. Unpublished Master Thesis, Nürtingen University of Applied 
Science, Germany. Retrieved April 23, 2010, from 
http://www.scribd.com/doc/16320660/values-chain-irfan 
Yan, A., & Gray, B. (1994).  Bargaining power, management control, and performance in 
United States-China joint ventures: A comparative case study. Academy of 
Management Journal, 37(6), 1478- 1517. 
Yan, A., & Luo, Y. (2001). International joint ventures: Theory and practice. New York: 
M. E. Sharpe.  
Yan, F. (2009). China to help auto sector with incentives. Retrieved January 18, 2009, 
from http://uk.reuters.com/article/oilRpt/idUKSHA27377420090105 
Yan, M. (2002, October 18). Wu and Lamy discuss Sino-EU trade issues. China Daily. 
Available at www.chinadaily.com 
Yan, Y. (2000). International joint ventures in China: Ownership, control and 
performance. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Yan, Y. (2005). Foreign investment and corporate governance in China. New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan. 
Yang, X., & Stoltenberg, C. (2008). Growth of made-in-China multinationals: An 
institutional and historical perspective. In I. Alon & J. R. Mcintyre (Eds.), 
Globalization of Chinese enterprises (pp. 61-76). New York: Palgrave MacMillan.  
Yin, R. K. (1989). Case study research: Design and methods. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.  
Yin, R. K. (1994). Case study research: Design and methods (2
nd
 ed.). Thousand Oaks, 
 385 
 
CA: Sage. 
Yin, R. K. (Ed.). (2004). The case study anthology. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
Yoshino, M. Y., & Rangan, U. S. (1995). Strategic alliances: An entrepreneurial 
approach to globalization. Boston: Harvard Business School Press. 
Yunshi, M., & Jing, Y. (2005, October 11). Overseas investment trends change with 
times. China Daily. Available at www.chinadaily.com. 
Zaheer, A., & Venkatraman, N. (1995). Relational governance as an interorganizational 
strategy: An empirical test of the role of trust in economic exchange. Strategic 
Management Journal, 16, 373-392.  
Zahra, S. A., & George, G. (2002). Absorptive capacity: A review of reconceptualization 
and extension. Academy of Management Review, 27, 185- 203. 
Zahra, S. A., Ireland, R. D., & Hitt, M. A. (2000). International expansion by new venture 
firms: International diversity, mode of market entry, technological learning, and 
performance. Academy of Management Journal, 43, 925- 950. 
Zajac, E. J., & Olsen, C. P. (1993). From transaction cost to transactional value analysis: 
Implications for the study of inter-organizational strategies. Journal of Management 
Studies, 30(1), 131-145. 
Zander, U., & Kogut, B. (1995). Knowledge and the speed of transfer and imitation of 
organizational capabilities: An empirical test. Organization Science, 6(1), 76- 92. 
Zander, U. (1991). Exploiting a technological edge: Voluntary and involuntary 
dissemination of technology. Stockholm: IIB. 
Zander, U. (1998). The evolution of technological capabilities in the multinational 
corporation: Dispersion, duplication and potential advantages from multinationality. 
Research Policy, 27, 17-36. 
Zhang, J. (2002). Review and prospect of China auto industry. Paper presented at Joint 
Workshop on Clean Vehicle Development and Deployment, Harvard University, China 
Ministry of Science & Technology, and China Automotive Research & Technology 
Center, April. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University. 
Zhang, P. G. (2004). Chinese yuan, renminbi: Derivative products. Hackensack, NJ: 
World Scientific.  
Zhang, F., & Khabelashvili, G. (2002). Foreign automobile companies in China: A case 
study of Volkswagen and General Motors. Unpublished master‟s thesis, Göteborg 
University, Gothenburg, Sweden. 
Zhang, W., & Taylor, R. (2001). EU technology transfer to China: The automotive 
industry as a case study. Journal of the Asia Pacific Economy, 6(2), 261- 274. 
Zhang, S., & Zhang, B. (2008). Growth of China‟s foreign exchange reserve. China 
 386 
 
Economic Journal, 1(1), 53- 62. 
Zhao, H. (2004). New limits set on car fuel consumption. Retrieved April 27, 2010, from 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2004-10/31/content_387210.htm 
Zhao, M. (2006). Competitive strategy – Differentiation of multinational enterprises in 
China: Case studies of American, European and Japanese Automobile Enterprises. In 
J. Chen & S. Yao (Eds.), Globalization, competition and growth in China. London: 
Routledge. 
Zhong, X. S., & Hu, M. Y. (2008). The 50 years of Shanghai automotive industry. The 
Selected Proceedings of Shanghai Historical Documents (Vol. 126, No. 1). Shanghai, 
China: Shanghai Editing House in Historical Documents. 
Zuboff, S. (1988). In the age of the smart machine: The future of work and power. New 
York: Basic Books.  
 
 387 
 
Appendix A Ethical Approval Application 
 
 
1. Title of Project: 
Knowledge Transfer and Learning in International Joint Ventures in China 
(Original Title) 
 
2. Researcher(s) name and contact information: 
Name:                      Qiang (Ken) Ding (PhD Candidate) 
                                Department of Strategy & Human Resource Management,  
                                 Waikato Management School,  
                                 The University of Waikato 
Email:                       qiang _ding@hotmail.com 
  
3. Supervisor’s name and contact information: 
Dr. Michele Akoorie,    
Department of Strategy & Human Resource Management,  
The University of Waikato 
Tel: 0064-7-8384466, extn. 8642,          Email: mema@waikato.ac.nz 
Dr. Kathryn Pavlovich,  
Department of Strategy & Human Resource management,  
The University of Waikato 
Tel: 0064-7-8384837,                             Email: KPAV@waikato.ac.nz 
 
4. Brief Outline of the Project (what is it about and what is being 
investigated): 
In the research project, the student researcher will review the literature in 
order to assess what is already known about knowledge transfer as a result of 
cooperative arrangement. The researcher will address the question of what 
modes of knowledge transfer are and should be used to enhance value 
creation through joint ventures. Based on the analysis, the researcher will 
present an organisational learning model. 
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5. Methodology: 
The student researcher will be using qualitative case study with an interview 
method and other sources of evidence to assist with gathering the archival 
secondary data. 
 
6. Expected Outcomes of the Research: 
The student researcher will write a PhD thesis report based on the collected 
information. Under the supervision and direction of the PhD supervisors, the 
convenor and Waikato Postgraduate Studies Committee, the research report 
will be published in whole / in part outside the Waikato University 
environment. 
 
7. How will the participants be selected and how many will be involved? 
Convenience or purposive samples will be selected on the basis of willingness 
and availability of prospective participants. Participation is entirely voluntary. 
For the research project, the researcher will focus on one IJV case company – 
Shanghai GM and about 20 interviewees will be involved. 
 
8. How will the participants be contacted? 
Participants are likely to be key IJV managers and government officials who 
will be selected as key informant persons to offer multiple perspectives on the 
same cases of knowledge transfer and managerial learning. The student 
researcher will approach prospective participants personally, either face to 
face at research sites or by phone, email, or letter as appropriate. The consent 
form and information for Chinese participants will be translated into 
Mandarin by the researcher who is a bilingual English/Mandarin speaker. 
 
9. Explain incentives and/or compulsion for participants to be involved in 
this study. 
There is not incentive or compulsion. Participation is entirely voluntary. 
 
10. How will your processes allow participants to: 
1. refuse to answer any particular question, and withdraw from the study 
at any time; 
2. ask any further questions about the study, which occur during 
participation; 
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3. be given access to a summary of the findings from the study when it is 
concluded. 
Participants will be explained the nature of the research by the student 
researcher and given an information sheet and an opportunity to ask 
questions before and during the research. They will be told they could 
withdraw at any time without having to give any reason and that if they wish, 
the student researcher would provide them with a summary of the findings 
when the study is concluded. For Chinese participants, the interviews will be 
conducted in Mandarin. For American participants, the interviews will be 
conducted in English. 
 
11. Explain how any publications and/or reports will have the consent of 
participants and how the anonymity of participants will be protected. 
It will be explained to participants that their names will not be used in the 
thesis report unless they have given permission.  Interview participants will be 
asked to sign a consent form. No person other than the student researcher, the 
PhD supervisors and Waikato Postgraduate Studies Committee may have 
access to the completed consent forms.  
 
12. What will happen to the information collected from participants? 
The completed consent forms, the tape recordings and interview transcripts 
will be archived securely for an indefinite period with adequate measures to 
protect confidentiality. 
 
13. Anticipated date to begin data collection. 
The beginning of November, 2005. 
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Appendix B Consent Form for Participants 
 
I have read the Information Sheet for Participants for this study and have had 
the details of the study explained to me. My questions about the study have 
been answered to my satisfaction, and I understand that I may ask further 
questions at any time.  
I also understand that I am free to withdraw from the study at any time, or to 
decline to answer any particular questions in the study. I agree to provide 
information to the researchers under the conditions of confidentiality set out 
on the Information Sheet.  
I agree to participate in this study under the conditions set out in the 
Information Sheet form. 
 
Signed: _____________________________________________ 
Name:  _____________________________________________ 
Date:  _____________________________________________ 
 
Researcher’s Name and Contact Information: 
Qiang (Ken) Ding, Department of Strategy & Human Resource Management 
Mobile Phone: 0064-21-1073378, Email: qiang_ding@hotmail.com 
 
Supervisor’s Name and Contact Information: 
Dr. Michele Akoorie, Department of Strategy & Human Resource 
Management 
Tel: 0064-7-8384466, extn. 8642, Email: MEMA@waikato.ac.nz 
Dr. Kathryn Pavlovich, Department of Strategy & Human Resource 
Management 
Tel: 0064-7-8384837, Email: KPAV@waikato.ac.nz 
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Appendix C Interview Guide for American Managers 
The following guide is to be used in the case interview. The general headings 
provide structure to the interviews, while the detailed questions are to be used 
primarily as a “check” in the interview process to ensure comprehensive data 
collection. 
 
Outline of Interview Question Areas 
 For the interview, your practical experiences, personal perceptions and 
thoughts regarding the following research project areas would be 
valuable to me. You do not need to have specific knowledge and 
expertise about these items. 
 If you cannot give me the direct answer to a particular question right 
now, I would appreciate it if you could email me your response as 
soon as possible. 
 I can terminate the interviewing process if you have particular reasons 
or you need time to think about some issues and you have the right to 
answer the questions according to your judgment. 
 
1. IJV Company Demographics (SGM) 
1. Your position and title 
2. Level and percentage of the investment in the IJV (GM and SAIC 
respectively) 
3. The number of employees in the IJV 
4. Numbers of expatriates from GM, their positions and responsibilities 
5. Description of the products/services produced and sold by the IJV 
6. The organisational structure in the IJV 
7. Market share of main products in the IJV 
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2. International Experience of GM (In general) 
2.1 Please tell me about GM’s international business development and 
expansion activities in recent years. 
2.2 Please tell me about GM’s experience of operating in an international 
environment (not country-specific). The number of countries in which 
GM has been operating abroad, and the current situation of operations. 
2.3 What criteria does GM use when selecting a market for the international 
activities? 
 
3. Knowledge and Experience in IJV Context (In China) 
3.1 Please tell me how GM came to be involved in IJV operation with SAIC. 
When was that? 
3.2 What are the factors influencing GM’s decision to enter into Chinese auto 
market? 
 Gain faster entry to the Chinese market;  
 Facilitating the international expansion;  
 Conforming the incentive of the Chinese Government policies to 
attract FDI;  
 Obtaining a faster payback on investment;  
 Co-opting or blocking competition;  
 Economies of scale scope and /or rationalisation;   
 Technology exchange. 
 
3.3 What are the main reasons that GM wants to set up the IJV form in 
China? (Comparison with licensing, agents, representatives, cooperative 
agreements with foreign firms, joint ventures, wholly owned enterprises). 
 
3.4 What are the factors affecting GM’s decision to select a Chinese partner? 
 Chinese partner’s production capacity and technology 
 Chinese partner’s ability to negotiate with the host government 
 Chinese partner’s established marketing and distribution system 
 Chinese partner’s strength of management  
 Chinese partner’s knowledge and experience of business practice in the        
 Chinese context 
 Chinese partner’s knowledge of Chinese business culture 
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3.5 What are the factors influencing GM’s decision on IJV location? 
 Proximity to the Chinese partner; 
 Proximity to the target major market; 
 Availability and access to basic natural resources; 
 Availability and access to low cost labour; 
 Access to financial incentive provided by Chinese Government for 
particular regions (such as Economic Development Regions);  
 Availability of skilled employees; 
 Availability of better infrastructure, such as transportation, 
communication, stable supply of electricity. 
 
4. External Environment and Knowledge Transfer 
 4.1 How would you describe the Chinese business environment?  
 Political risk perceived by GM expatriates; 
 Influence of changes of the Chinese Government’s policies related to 
FDI on IJV operation; 
 Influence of issues concerning legal system on IJV operation; 
 Issues of local infrastructure (e.g., transportation, communication, 
land use, electricity, water supply). 
  
4.2 Are the above issues difficult/easy to understand or not? How did they 
affect doing business here? Generally – your opinion from what you know so 
far. 
 
5. Industrial Knowledge and Structure in China 
5.1 How would you describe the automotive industry in China?  
 Market scale and sales growth in the auto industry; 
 Entry barriers in the auto industry for FDI set up by Chinese 
Government. 
 Competitive situation in the auto industry 
 
5.2 How would you describe other competitors at the moment?  
5.3 Is it fiercely competitive or there is a huge space for future development? 
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6. Production strategies and Technology Transfer in IJV 
6.1 Please give me some information about the following issues. 
 Sources of production machinery and equipment 
 Extent of technological-advance of machinery 
 Sources of engineers and technicians 
 Education background and career experience of engineers and 
technicians 
 Percentage of expenditure on R&D in total sales 
 Influence of R&D on IJV’s competitive advantage 
 Influence of R&D on IJV’s sales growth and market share 
 Quality of control for IJV products and services 
 
6.2 In the IJV context, have you learned some skills or knowledge from your 
Chinese partner and adjusted your technical expertise according to the 
Chinese local conditions? 
6.3 How do you organise technology transfer and knowledge management? 
What are the techniques or strategies used by GM to “safely” transfer 
technology to your Chinese partner? Please give me some examples. 
6.4 Does GM’s strategy change to adjust for changes in the technology 
transfer?  
6.5 How do the IJV’s business activities change to fit changes in the 
technology transfer in the Chinese market? Examples 
6.6 Is the technology transfer process part of the future internationalisation 
strategy in the IJV?  
 
7. Knowledge Transfer Regarding Marketing Methods  
7.1 Please give me some information about the following items. 
 Numbers of personnel in marketing section 
 Strength and weakness of IJV’s products compared to those produced 
by other firms in the same industry 
 Marketing channels and distribution of marketing offices 
 Methods of after-sale services 
 Importance of marketing management, as applied to the IJV (e.g. 
marketing research, marketing planning, competitive analysis). 
 
 395 
 
7.2 In the IJV context, have you learned some skills or knowledge from your 
Chinese partner and adjust your marketing expertise /mindset according to 
the Chinese local conditions? Is it difficult to understand or not? Why? 
 
8. Knowledge Transfer Regarding Human Resources Management  
8.1 Please give me some information about the following items. 
 Difference of IJV employees’ recruitment methods and procedures; 
 Employees’ education background and skill level; 
 Level of remuneration for employees compared to those of Chinese 
partner; 
 Stability and turnover rate of employees; 
 Issues concerning labour discipline, dismissal and reward; 
 Training programme and promotion. 
 
8.2 In the IJV context, have you learned some personnel skills or knowledge 
from your Chinese partner and adjusted your personnel expertise according to 
the Chinese local conditions? Is it difficult to understand or not? Why? 
 
9. Learning Issues in IJV 
9.1 Have the learning objectives been clearly stated in your company? 
9.2 Is the planned duration of the cooperation consistent with achieving the 
learning objectives? 
9.3 Does learning take place within the IJV? If so, which aspects of it or at 
what levels does it occur?   
9.4 Are problems in the IJV perceived as learning opportunities? 
What does it mean by “learning for shared understanding” in IJV (SGM)? 
9.5 Is the knowledge acquired in the IJV to be used? And how? 
9.6 Do you think learning positively affects performance? 
9.7 How can the learning outcomes be transformed into real competitive 
advantages? 
9.8 How can IJV (SGM) set up the learning culture to help you to gain 
knowledge from each other? 
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10. Culture difference between Partners on Knowledge Transfer  
10.1 Please give me some information about the following items. 
 Extent of culture distance perceived by partners in IJV operation 
 Extent of culture distance perceived by partners in IJV performance 
 Influence of culture difference on partner’s objectives set for IJV 
operation 
 Influence of culture difference on human resource management 
 Influence of culture difference on marketing methods and management 
 
10.2 How to deal with the above issues of culture difference for American 
expatriates? 
 
10.3 What part, if any, do you think cultural differences play in conducting 
business in a foreign market such as China? (These might include, for 
example, language and communication, business practices, business 
protocols, etc). 
 
10.4 How would you describe the organisational culture difference in GM 
and SAIC?  
 
10.5 Have you set up a unique IJV’s culture during these years of 
cooperation?  
        If yes, is the IJV’s culture shared by all employees? 
 
10.6 How do you perceive and monitor the cultural difference which may 
have potential impact on the JV’s knowledge transfer and learning? 
 
11. Communication and Interaction  
11.1 Do you often feel misunderstood when you interact with the Chinese 
managers? And how do you tackle these problems? (through meetings, private 
discussion, etc.) 
 
11.2 How is knowledge (tacit and explicit) and expertise transferred and 
distributed in SGM? Can you give me examples of the organisational routines 
in your company? (procedures, manuals, policies, directions).   
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 11.3 From your experience, what are the main factors and instruments that 
encourage and facilitate transfer of knowledge between local partners and in 
IJV?  
 
 11.4 What are the main difficulties and barriers in transferring knowledge 
that have to be overcome between the partners?  
 
11.5 How can barriers to knowledge transfer be dismantled? 
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Appendix D Interview Guide for Chinese Managers 
(Translation) 
The following guide is to be used in the case interview. The general headings 
provide structure to the interviews, while the detailed questions are to be used 
primarily as a “check” in the interview process to ensure comprehensive data 
collection. 
 
Outline of Interview Question Areas 
 For the interview, your practical experiences, personal perceptions and 
thoughts regarding the following research project areas would be 
valuable to me. You do not need to have specific knowledge and 
expertise about these items. 
 If you cannot give a direct answer to a particular question right now, I 
would appreciate it if you could email me your response as soon as 
possible. 
 I can terminate the interviewing process if you have particular reasons 
or you need time to think about some issues and you have the right to 
answer the questions according to your judgment. 
 
1.IJV Company Demographics (SGM) 
2 Your position and title 
3 Level and percentage of the investment in the IJV  
4 The number of employees in the IJV 
5 Numbers of Chinese managers from SAIC, their positions and 
responsibilities 
6 Description of the products/services produced and sold by the IJV 
7 The organisational structure in the IJV 
8 Market share of main products in the IJV 
 
2. International Cooperative Experience of SAIC (In general) 
2.1 Please tell me about SAIC’s business development and expansion 
activities in recent years. 
2.2 Please tell me about SAIC’s experience of operating in an IJV 
environment, the number of IJVs in which SAIC has been operating in China, 
and the current situation of operations. 
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3. Knowledge and Experience in IJV Context 
3.1 Please tell me how SAIC came to be involved in IJV operation with GM. 
When was that? 
 
3.2 What are the factors influencing SAIC’s decision to cooperate with GM? 
 Gain bigger market share in the Chinese market;  
 Conforming with the incentive of the Chinese Government’s policies 
to attract FDI;  
 Obtaining a faster payback on investment;  
 Coopting or blocking competition;  
 Economies of scale scope and /or rationalisation;   
 GM’s production capacity and technology 
 GM’s strength of management  
 GM’s knowledge and experience in the auto industry  
 
3.3. What are the factors influencing SAIC’s decision on IJV Location? 
 Proximity to the Chinese parent company; 
 Proximity to the target major market; 
 Availability and access to basic natural resources; 
 Availability and access to low cost labour; 
 Access to financial incentive provided by Chinese Government for 
particular    regions (such as Economic Development Regions);  
 Availability of skilled employees; 
 Availability of better infrastructure, such as transportation, 
communication, stable supply of electricity. 
 
4. External Environment and Knowledge Transfer 
4.1 How would you describe the Chinese business environment in terms of?  
 Political risk; 
 Influence of changes of the Chinese Government’s policies related to 
FDI on IJV operation; 
 Influence of issues concerning legal system on IJV operation; 
 Issues of local infrastructure (e.g., transportation, communication, 
land use, electricity, water supply). 
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4.2. Are these above issues clearly explained to the American managers?  
4.3 How about American managers’ reactions to these issues?  
4.4 Are these issues difficult/easy to explain to them or not?  
4.5 How did it affect IJV business here?  
      Your opinion from what you know so far. 
 
5. Industrial Knowledge and Structure in China 
5.1  How would you describe the current automotive industry in China?  
 Market scale and sales growth in the auto industry 
 Entry barriers in the auto industry for FDI set up by Chinese 
Government. 
 
5.2  Competitive situation in the auto industry 
 How would you describe other competitors at the moment?  
 Is it fiercely competitive or it is a huge opportunity for future 
development? 
 
6. Production strategies and Technology Transfer in IJV 
6.1 Please give me some information about the following issues. 
 Sources of production machinery and equipment 
 Extent of technological-advance of machinery 
 Sources of engineers and technicians 
 Education background and career experience of engineers and 
technicians 
 Percentage of expenditure on R&D in total sales 
 Influence of R&D on IJV’s competitive advantage 
 Influence of R&D on IJV’s sales growth and market share 
 Quality of control for IJV products and services 
 
6.2 In the IJV context, have you learned some skills or knowledge from 
American managers and adjusted your technical expertise accordingly? 
 
6.3 How do you organise technology transfer and knowledge management? 
How do you think of the techniques or strategies used by GM to “safely” 
protect technology transfer to Chinese partner? Please give some examples. 
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6.4 How do the IJV’s business activities change to fit changes in the 
technology transfer in the Chinese market? Please give some examples. 
 
7. Knowledge Transfer Regarding Marketing Methods  
7.1 Please give me some information about the following items. 
 Numbers of personnel in marketing section 
 Strength and weakness of IJV’s products compared to those produced 
by other firms in the auto industry 
 Marketing channels and distribution of marketing offices 
 After-sales service methods 
 Importance of marketing management, as applied to the IJV (e.g. 
marketing research, marketing planning, competitive analysis). 
 
7.2 In the IJV context, have you learned some skills or knowledge you’re your 
American partner and adjusted your marketing expertise /mindset according? 
Do you accept all of these skills or not? Why? 
 
8. Knowledge Transfer Regarding Human Resources Management  
8.1 Please give me some information about the following items; 
 Difference of IJV employees’ recruitment methods and procedures; 
 Employees’ education background and skill level; 
 Level of remuneration for employees compared to those of American 
managers; 
 Stability and turnover rate of employees; 
 Issues concerning labour discipline, dismissal and reward; 
 Training programme and promotion. 
 
8.2 In the IJV context, have you learned some personnel management skills 
or knowledge from your American partner and adjusted your Chinese 
personnel management expertise accordingly? Is it difficult to understand or 
not? Why? 
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9. Learning Issues in IJV 
9.1 Have the learning objectives been clearly stated in your company? 
 
9.2 Is the planned duration of the cooperation consistent with achieving the 
learning objectives? 
 
9.3 Does learning take place within the IJV? If so, which aspects of it or at 
what levels does it occur?   
9.4 Are problems in the IJV perceived as learning opportunities? 
 
9.5 What is meant by “learning for shared understanding” in IJV (SGM)? 
 
9.6 Is the knowledge acquired in the IJV used? And how? 
 
9.7 Do you think learning positively affects performance? 
 
9.8 How can the learning outcomes be transformed into real competitive 
advantages? 
 
9.9 How can the IJV (SGM) to set up the learning culture to help you to gain 
knowledge from each other? 
 
10. Culture difference between Partners on Knowledge Transfer  
10.1 Please give me some information about the following items. 
 Extent of culture distance perceived by partners in IJV operation 
 Extent of culture distance perceived by partners in IJV performance 
 Influence of culture difference on partner’s objectives set for IJV 
operation 
 Influence of culture difference on human resource management 
 Influence of culture difference on marketing methods and management 
 
10.2 How do Chinese managers deal with the above issues of culture 
difference? 
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10.3 What part, if any, do you think cultural differences play in conducting 
business with American managers in China? (These might include, for 
example, language and communication, business practices, etc.). 
 
10.4 How would you describe GM and SAIC organisational culture 
differences?  
 
10.5 Have you set up a unique IJV’s culture during these years of 
cooperation?  
              If yes, is the IJV’s culture shared by all employees? 
 
10.6 How do you perceive and monitor the cultural differences which may 
have potential impact on the JV’s knowledge transfer and learning? 
 
11. Communication and Interaction  
11.1 Do you often feel misunderstood when you interact with the American 
managers? And how do you tackle these problems? (through meetings, private 
discussion, etc.) 
 
11.2 How is knowledge (tacit and explicit) and expertise transferred and 
distributed in SGM? Can you give me examples of the organisational routines 
in your company? (procedures, manuals, policies, directions).   
 
11.3 From your experience, what are the main factors and instruments that 
encourage and facilitate transfer of knowledge between local partners and in 
IJV?  
 
11.4 What are the main difficulties and barriers in transferring knowledge that 
have to be overcome between the partners?  
 
11.5 How can barriers to knowledge transfer be dismantled? 
 
 
 
